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FOREWORD 
This publication consists of proceedings from the second International 
Conference on Legislative Studies held on 1–2 March 2010 in Helsinki. 
The conference was titled ‘Better Regulation – A Critical Assessment’. A 
multitude of different Better Regulation programs has been launched under 
the last decades all around the world but their success rate has varied. The 
aim of the conference was hereby to assess the merits and drawbacks of 
different Better Regulation activities and to develop new knowledge on 
law-drafting to improve the quality of legislation. 
The conference attracted researchers from a wide variety of different 
disciplines, among them Economics, Law, Political Science and Sociology, 
just to mention a few. The diverse background of participants reflects the 
multidisciplinary approach characteristic to Legislative Studies. Aside of 
many academics, the wide participation of state officials was a true delight. 
They represented among others Finnish Competition Authority, Parliament 
of Finland, Regional State Administrative Agency and different ministries. 
International visitors came from such diverse places as Brazil, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain and Sweden. 
The honorable list of keynote speakers included Professor Michael 
Faure from the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Professor Fabrizio Cafaggi 
from the European University Institute, researcher Anne Meuwese from the 
University of Tilburg and Tuomas Pöysti, President of the National Audit 
Office of Finland. 
In addition to the lectures there were four workshop sessions divided 
into different themes. This article collection follows the original division of 
workshops. The first chapter concerns fundamental questions on political 
power and the origins of legislation. Articles in the second chapter compare 
alternative regulatory instruments like traditional command and control 
regulation and self-regulation. The third chapter reviews impact assessment 
and measurement of administrative burden. The final chapter examines 
whether the goals of national competitiveness and Better Regulation can be 
combined at all.  
The conference was mainly organized by the Legislative Studies 
Research Group at the National Research Institute of Legal Policy. 
Additional finance was acquired from the central ministerial and research 
organizations in the field. They included the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, Ministry of Justice, Research Centre of Empirical Legal 
Studies at the University of Eastern Finland, Finnish Association for Legal 
and Social Sciences and the research project Transformations in Law and 
Power. The latter research group is financed by the Academy of Finland 
and hosted by the University of Turku. 
The organizers are highly grateful to all financiers as well as keynote 
speakers, their commentators, chairs and conference participants. We 
would like to show our special appreciation to all the contributors involved 
in creating this article collection. Secretary Eira Mykkänen has been 
responsible for editing it. 
 
Helsinki, August 10th 2010 
 
Jyrki Tala    Auri Pakarinen 
Research Director   Researcher 
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SOCIAL NORMS, CULTURE AND BETTER  
REGULATION 
Oskari Juurikkala* 
 
Introduction 
The starting point of this paper is twofold. Firstly, theories of regulation1 
imply theories of man and society: what human persons are; how they 
choose and behave; how they interact with each other; why and when they 
obey laws, and so on. Secondly, there is nothing more useful than a good 
theory. A good theory is one that is sufficiently simple, so that it can be 
used in practice, and sufficiently realistic, so that it does not significantly 
depart from the truth.2 
One of the most successful theoretical frameworks in regulatory 
literature has been law and economics, which combines legal and 
economic analysis. It is a useful approach, because it is both quite simple 
and quite realistic. It is not my intention to do away with it, but I will argue 
that it can and should be improved. There are two improvements that seem 
especially pertinent. 
One is to challenge ‘legal centralism’ and to adopt a broader 
understanding of the sources of normativity in human choosing and acting. 
In other words, we should not limit the analysis to different types of law 
and their usefulness in regulation. The other is to expand our concept of 
motivation in human behavior, especially taking into such notions as moral 
character and culture. In what follows, I will firstly explain these ideas in 
more detail and then suggest implications for regulatory discussion. 
 
                                                            
* I am grateful for comments to Kati Rantala, Pia Letto-Vanamo, Martti Vihanto, Matias 
Forss, Jason Lepojärvi, and conference participants at the International Conference on 
Legislative Studies in Helsinki, 1–2 March 2010. 
1 I am using the word regulation in a broad sense that covers both ‘regulatory law’ 
properly speaking and other kinds of deliberate state influence, ranging from general 
legal rules to specific intervention by regulatory bodies. I do however distinguish it from 
other (non-state) forms of social control or influence. See Baldwin and Cave (1999: 
chapter 1) for different definitions of the concept of regulation. 
2 This is obviously a simplistic summary of very complex set of issues. 
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Social and Behavioral Theory: Two Proposals 
Against Legal Centralism 
My first objective is to challenge the legal centralism that is implicit in 
most law-and-economics and regulatory theory and debate. It is assumed 
that law is what matters: simply put, when there is a problem, we probably 
need a new law. This assumption is not often said explicitly, but it is 
implicit in the logic of most legislative and regulatory projects. Certainly, 
legislators and regulators are increasingly aware of the limits of legislation 
and regulation: they realize that law cannot do everything. But then again, 
that is often where the analysis stops. 
Yet much more can be said about it – and has been said. The French 
aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville once mused in his observations on the 
democratic experiment of the United States: ‘Laws are always unsteady 
when unsupported by mores; mores are the only tough and durable power 
in a nation’ (Tocqueville 1969: 274).  
More recently, we have seen a burgeoning literature on the roles of and 
relationships between law, social norms, private morality, culture etc. 
Contributors to this discussion include several recipients of the Nobel Prize 
in economics. Ronald Coase (1991), for example, has frequently argued for 
the importance of studying the economic system empirically, especially in 
light of the richness of institutional arrangements. Drawing on evidence 
from economic history, Douglass North (1990) has studied the roles of 
formal and informal institutions in economic development. In her empirical 
work on the governance of common-pool resources, Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
has demonstrated the complexity and fundamental importance of non-state 
governance. Oliver Williamson (2000) has also underlined the role of non-
state governance institutions in the transition from socialism to a market 
economy. 
Among experts of regulation, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 12–14) 
could especially be mentioned for their stress on the role of communities 
and associations in understanding the institutional order of a society. And 
in law-and-economics literature, we have seen wide-ranging discussions on 
the roles and interactions between law and social norms.3 In the next 
section I will highlight some interesting findings of this discussion and 
then draw out implications for regulation. 
 
                                                            
3 Mercuro and Medema (2006: chapter 7) provide a good overview of the literature. 
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Law and Social Norms 
The perspective here is not simply that there are limits to legislation. It is 
that law, social norms, culture, morality and so on are parts of a complex 
whole that should be analyzed as such. The argument for a more holistic 
perspective is that, firstly, it is more realistic, and secondly, it is possible. 
Although ‘social norms’ is a vague concept, it can be studied both 
theoretically and empirically.4 In broad terms, both social norms and law can 
be seen as sources of normativity for human choosing and acting – sources 
which may be complementary or conflicting, supportive or eroding. 
Social norms and law relate to and interact with each other in various 
ways (see Panther, 2000). On the one hand, law and social norms may 
complement each other, as is perhaps often the case without our even 
noticing it. Social norms provide the broad institutional environment within 
which legal norms and formal institutions function and operate. The central 
importance of these supportive social norms is usually only appreciated 
when they begin to be eroded. The supportive function may also manifest 
itself the other way around: enshrining pre-existing social norms into law 
will give them greater strength and importance – perhaps even if such laws 
are difficult to enforce.5 
On the other hand, law may come into conflict with social norms. In 
such setting there are several possible scenarios. (i) It may be that, over 
time, social norms adapt to legal rules. This is likely to happen when such 
adaptation does not imply a loss on any significant party. But it may also 
be argued that generally law tends to shape social norms through its 
‘expressive function’ (Sunstein, 1996a, Cooter, 2000).6 (ii) Legal rules may 
adapt to social norms. In broad terms this happens often through legal 
reform, given that social norms are among the main factors that influence 
legal and social change.7 But it may also happen that ‘law in the books’ is 
                                                            
4 See Juurikkala (2009) for a review of the literature in the context of commercial 
relationships. 
5 Cooter (2000) gives an amusing example. A new law in California required dog-
walkers to clean up the poop. Before that, most people thought that was the right thing to 
do anyway, yet people did not complain much about dog poop; now after the new law, 
they do complain if someone breaks the law. It is easier to say ‘obey the law’ than ‘don't 
be so rude’. When a standard of behavior is included in the legal code, it has the moral 
backing of the legitimate public authorities of the community. 
6 For example, laws relating to environmental protection, tobacco smoking or drug use 
can have a powerful effect on public perceptions and expectations. 
7 An interesting historical example, among many others, is the formation of the Western 
legal concepts of criminal culpability, which emphasizes subjective intention instead to 
the objectivism of earlier Germanic practice; this notion of culpability was simply rooted 
in Christian moral theology (Berman, 1983). 
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supplanted by ‘law in action’ that reflects entrenched social norms in 
opposition to the literal meaning of the law. (iii) The two may also 
influence each other, one dominating from time to time and in different 
contexts. 
Some social and legal theorists have emphasized the importance of 
social norms as the proper basis of legal norms.8 Cooter (1996) argues that 
English contract law was rooted in the traditional ‘law merchant’ (lex 
mercatoria), which was based on business customs and cooperative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. As the power of English common law judges grew, 
they began to deal with commercial disputes; but instead of trying to create 
a new set of rules, they sought to discover the rules already in existence 
among merchants, and to enforce those rules selectively so as to create a 
coherent and systematic body of rules. 
However, placing too much emphasis on law may have an adverse 
effect on social norms. Pildes (1996) has warned about the possibility of 
destroying valuable social norms through law. Various fundamental social 
virtues, such as reciprocity, are learnt and acquired not through law but 
through life in smaller communities such as families, clubs and churches 
(see Tocqueville, 1969). Such social norms as reciprocity can be 
undermined through law-making and public policy by destroying the social 
conditions that enable informal reciprocity. For example, urban planning, 
when it pays little attention to the social context, may remove the practical 
opportunities for exercising reciprocity and maintaining active community 
life; thus the transition from busy street interaction to empty and quiet 
places may, paradoxically, have lead to the creation of more dangerous 
neighborhoods (see Jacobs, 1961). Similarly, overambitious welfare 
policies may crowd out pre-existing local-level and voluntary institutions 
that provide informal but effective remedies in unemployment, illness and 
old age (Beito, 2000, Putnam, 2000, Juurikkala, 2007).9 It may therefore be 
                                                            
8 Earlier contributions include Hayek (1960, 1973) and Leoni (1991). 
9 Beito (2000) is an insightful historical investigation of how so-called fraternal societies 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided extensive assistance ranging 
from health insurance, support in unemployment, orphanages, and homes for the elderly. 
Similar institutions existed in many European countries. Beito argues that such 
institutions died out not because they were deficient but because governments took over 
their role with taxpayer money, yet something important was lost in the transition. This 
dilemma of the welfare state has been subject to substantial discussion recently, 
especially in what is known as the social teaching of the Catholic Church. John Paul II 
(1991: 48) famously wrote that ‘excesses and abuses, especially in recent years, have 
provoked very harsh criticisms of the Welfare State, dubbed the “Social Assistance 
State”. Malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance State are the result of an 
inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State. Here again the principle of 
subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a higher order should not interfere in the 
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that sometimes law should simply provide a good, broad institutional 
context, but avoid unwise over-judicialization of society, as that may have 
complex and negative long-term consequences. 
One of the central insights of the social-norms perspective is that both 
law and social norms have their proper role and scope. Even when they 
support each other, they operate very differently. For example, Bernstein 
(1996) observes that there are many reasons why parties to a commercial 
transaction may actually prefer some aspects of their agreements and 
relationships to be legally unenforceable. Negotiating remote contingencies 
may signal distrust or unusual desire to litigate, and overly detailed 
contracts may make things too inflexible if circumstances change; legal 
system costs (litigation costs, delays, risk of judicial error) are high and 
both parties may prefer to avoid the possibility of legal battles; and there 
are many factors that are known to the parties by not verifiable by in a 
legally enforceable way. One common strategy seems to be that 
commercial transactors govern their dealings through flexible, cooperative 
social norms when they have a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship; 
but they combine those norms with legally stricter contracts that can be 
invoked if the other party turns out to be untrustworthy. 
This sensitivity to social context is reflected in some traditional legal 
principles such as the English doctrine that, when it comes to agreements 
of a domestic nature, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parties did 
not intend to create legal relations. The wisdom of this principle is that 
legal battles tend to shatter relationships, and strictly legal rights and duties 
cannot contain the rich and complex notions of justice and reasonableness 
that parties to a personal and long-term relationship have. As Lord Justice 
Atkin famously put it: 
 
‘The common law does not regulate the form of agreements between 
spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. 
The consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love 
and affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts. The 
terms may be repudiated, varied or renewed as performance 
                                                                                                                                                                 
internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but 
rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the 
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. […] In fact, it 
would appear that needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to 
them and who act as neighbours to those in need. It should be added that certain kinds of 
demands often call for a response which is not simply material but which is capable of 
perceiving the deeper human need. One thinks of the condition of refugees, immigrants, 
the elderly, the sick, and all those in circumstances which call for assistance, such as 
drug abusers: all these people can be helped effectively only by those who offer them 
genuine fraternal support, in addition to the necessary care.’ 
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proceeds or as disagreements develop, and the principles of the 
common law as to exoneration and discharge and accord and 
satisfaction are such as find no place in the domestic code.’10 
 
Greater sensitivity to the relationship between law and social norms also 
enables us better to understand legal – and regulatory – practices in 
different cultures and societies. Each culture is a product of numerous 
factors working over centuries and millennia. Western legal culture cannot 
be properly understood without taking into account the complex ‘synthesis 
of Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome’ (Gregg, 2003: xiv) that gave rise to 
Western civilization. In such places as Africa, India or China, the history 
and the accompanying social norms are very different indeed. Winn 
(1994), for example, argues that in the context of non-Western countries 
like China, it is appropriate to speak of legal marginalism, because Chinese 
relational systems give more importance to elaborate notions of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness. 
Last but not least, social norms can be enforced through various non-
legal sanctions, which in some respects resemble legal sanctions but in 
other respects are quite different (Panther, 2000, Charny, 1990). On the one 
hand there are external sanctions of two types, (i) second-party control and 
(ii) third-party control. Second-party control refers to non-legal sanctions 
that may be used by the other party to the transaction, such as refusing to 
do business again or creating credible threats (Williamson, 1983). Third-
party control requires the cooperation of third parties, for example in the 
form of gossiping, shaming, and loss of reputation. Then there is also a 
third type of non-legal sanction, namely (iii) internal sanctions (which may 
also be called first-party sanctions). They are various emotional reactions 
that human beings may have as a result of following or breaking social 
norms. On the positive side, they include such emotions as empathy, 
human desire for approval, honor and esteem. On the negative side, one 
may experience regret, remorse, shame, guilt and embarrassment. Frank 
(1987, 1988) proposes that the ability to undergo such emotional reactions 
is valuable, because it supports the establishment of mutually beneficial, 
cooperative relationships. 
The idea here is not simply that social norms can be enforced too, but 
that legal and non-legal sanctions are different yet related to each other. 
For example, Cooter (2000) notes that, although legal enforcement of 
rights and duties is often necessary, it also tends to be expensive, time-
consuming and uncertain. Therefore it is important that laws be 
                                                            
10 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, at 579–580. 
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complemented by social norms which support reasonable behavior. On the 
other hand, Pildes (1996) argues that over-intrusive laws can destroy social 
capital by failing to see the differences between enforcing social norms and 
enforcing laws. Social norms are not substantive rules, but they are 
dynamic wholes which are tied to complex social structures and flexible 
enforcement mechanisms. The informal enforcement of social norms 
differs drastically from formal legal processes, and the remedies available 
for breach of social norms are flexible and subtle, something that is rarely 
the case with law. This is a reason to respect the proper realm of social 
norms. 
 
 
Incentives, Motivation and Moral Behavior 
I have tried to show that the legal centralism of much of regulatory debate 
is neither necessary nor fruitful, because better results can be obtained by 
looking at a broader scope of sources of normativity. My second objective 
is to show that we can and should do the same about our understanding of 
human motivation and morality. In fact, these two perspectives are closely 
related: for example, the notion of ‘non-legal sanctions’ necessarily takes 
us to the issue of moral or internal constraints on action. However, the 
motivational and ethical perspective on behavior goes beyond such 
constraints.11 
Douglass North (1990) once said that internal norms are crucial to our 
understanding of social institutions, but we do not have any good theory of 
them. I agree with the first part, but I disagree with the second. We do have 
several good theories of human choice from an internal perspective, and 
even the disagreement between some of the accounts may only be 
apparent. In this paper I cannot delve into specific debates, but I will 
highlight some perspectives that are empirically strong and that support 
each other. 
                                                            
11 Mitchell (1999: 208–209) has criticized the new ‘[social] norms jurisprudence’ for 
accepting too much of the behavioral and positivistic attitude of modern social science 
and economics: the approach may end up distorting instead of improving the explanation 
of norms, because the leading authors ‘generally share the same basic goal, which is to 
establish a non-normative theory of norms. [...] They tend to share an underlying 
metanorm of efficient wealth or welfare maximization, and all share the basic belief that 
people are motivated principally – if not solely – by self-interest. Most importantly, by 
limiting their inquiry to what they see, they are unable to explain, except at the most 
superficial level, how norms become normative – that is, how they come to tell us what 
we ought (or ought not) to do.’ 
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Intrinsic motivation. It is obvious that people do many things not 
because they get some external benefit from it but because is an immediate 
source of human fulfillment (see Staw, 1976, Deci and Flaste, 1995, Frey, 
1997). Children need not be paid to play, and even few adults work only 
for the money (this is especially true of some professions, notably 
academic research). Similarly, most people devote time and energy to 
different forms of friendship and community – especially marriage and the 
family – not only because of some external benefits but mainly because 
friendship itself is an important aspect of truly human life. 
Nevertheless, mainstream economic models of human behavior tend to 
ignore the relevance of intrinsic reasons for action, because they treat 
human motivation as a ‘black box’. The problem is that this leads to too 
much importance being given to external compensation or punishment. 
Many empirical studies have shown that external incentives – sticks and 
carrots – do not always produce the desired results, because external 
interventions interact with intrinsic motivations in complex ways (Frey 
1993, Kohn, 1993). Building on a wealth of psychological literature, Frey 
(1997) summarizes the relationships between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation as follows: 
(i) Intrinsic motivation is of great importance for all human 
activities; it is inconceivable that people are motivated solely or 
even mainly by external incentives.  
(ii) The use of monetary incentives crowds out intrinsic motivation 
under identifiable and relevant conditions (Crowding-Out 
Effect). The same may also be true of other external 
interventions such as commands or regulations. 
(iii) External interventions may, on the other hand, enhance intrinsic 
motivation under some conditions (Crowding-In Effect). 
(iv) Changes in intrinsic motivation may spill over to areas not 
directly affected by monetary incentives or regulations (Spill-
Over Effect). 
 
For example, when a child is paid for doing household chores, she is 
unlikely to contribute without compensation (crowding-out effect). Yet if 
her father gives her a surprise present as she has been helpful in the house, 
it is likely to reinforce her intrinsic willingness to help out (crowding-in 
effect). As a general rule, when external intervention is perceived as 
controlling or failing to recognize the intrinsic value of a non-instrumental 
relationship, it crowds out intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, when it 
is perceived as supportive, self-esteem is fostered and people feel they are 
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encouraged to act with self-determination. As will be seen shortly, these 
considerations have great relevance for better regulation. 
Fairness and moral emotions. The theory of intrinsic motivation shows 
that rational self-interest cannot be reduced to external interests and 
benefits. Evidence on altruistic behavior goes further away from the 
narrow concept of rationality found in mainstream economic models: 
ordinary people often act in other-regarding ways even at the a substantial 
cost to themselves (see Frank, 1988). However, fairness-based behavior is 
usually complex and dynamic. According to Rabin (1993), the empirical 
evidence can be summarized in three simple principles: 
(a) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being 
especially to help those who are being kind.12 
(b) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to 
punish those who are being unkind. 
(c) Both motivation (a) and (b) have a greater effect on behavior as the 
material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller. 
 
In other words, most people care about fairness in two ways. On the one 
hand, they want to treat others fairly, treating them well especially when 
they have received good treatment. On the other hand, people tend to 
retaliate against those who have treated them badly. But importantly, the 
extent of fairness-based behavior nevertheless varies according to various 
criteria, such as reputation effects, amount of material loss, standards of 
fairness, and self-image. 
Moral character. Yet moral behavior is not a question of emotions 
alone. Already the ancient Greeks thought that human persons can become 
morally better or worse, according to their education and their own free 
choices. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a systematic exposition of such 
virtue ethics, which sees good moral character as the result of good habits, 
i.e. internal capabilities of acting justly, wisely, honestly, maturely etc. 
Through a consistent attempt to use one’s reason, to give each person their 
due, to overcome internal inertia, and to channel one’s various desires 
according to reason, one develops the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance – habits which in turn make it easier for that 
person to do the right thing in concrete situations.13 
                                                            
12 This is not to deny that people can act altruistically regardless of how the others 
behave; one thinks of all kinds of voluntary workers. However, that probably requires 
stronger internal commitment to help others, and also the positive response of those 
being helped is likely to reinforce one’s willingness to make sacrifices for them. 
13 For a modern exposition of virtue ethics, see Pieper (1966). 
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It cannot be denied that the moral character of persons and citizens is 
fundamental for the well-being of communities and nations. If all men and 
women are just and reasonable, law has merely a marginal and supportive 
role to play. Yet if everyone is cruel, selfish, dishonest and irrational, there 
is no legal and regulatory solution in the world to deal with all the resulting 
social problems. Indeed, it can be argued that the optimal extent and 
manner of law and regulation greatly depends on the moral character of the 
relevant people (see George, 1993). 
 
 
Strategies for Better Regulation 
In this section I outline some implications of these perspectives for better 
regulation. They have been divided into three categories. First, there are 
alignment strategies, i.e. regulatory approaches that seek to align law and 
regulation with supportive social norms and intrinsic motivations. The 
second category is entitled culture-building and habit-formation strategies, 
which focus on influencing social norms for the better and helping persons 
to adopt good habits. Thirdly, enforcement strategies seek to replace or 
combine legal and formal enforcement with informal enforcement through 
internal constraints and other non-legal sanctions. 
 
 
Alignment Strategies 
There are various possibilities for aligning laws and regulations with 
positive social norms and intrinsic motivations. Here are some general 
guidelines and examples. 
Align regulation with positive social norms. Broadly speaking, positive 
social norms are those that are constructive, cooperative, pro-social etc. 
When such norms are strong in the relevant regulatory context, the most 
effective strategy is likely to one that builds upon and reinforces those 
norms. Generally, it is likely that in such situations there is no need for 
heavy, top-down regulation, because a light-touch, grass-roots approach 
will be sufficient, less costly and more effective. This is one reason why 
some form of self-regulation may be advisable (see generally Ogus, 2000). 
This is not to say that self-regulation is the right solution to all situations, 
for reasons discussed later in more detail. The point is that when there are 
positive, pre-existing social norms, giving them a semi-formal regulatory 
status through self- or co-regulatory schemes is likely to reinforce those 
norms – and to suppress less positive social norms and attitudes. 
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Avoid law and regulation that corrodes valuable social norms. An 
interesting example in this respect is the effect of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) on social norms in research communities (see Menell, 2000: 
144). Although it is generally agreed that some form of intervention may 
be necessary to provide incentives for research and development, it has 
been argued that IPR may undermine progress in science by promoting 
values that conflict with the traditional norms of collaboration, 
disinterestedness and the emphasis on path-breaking basic discoveries 
(Merton, 1973). The adverse effect of IPR may be especially strong in 
biomedical research, which traditionally has favored the sharing of 
research to promote progress and serve humanity (Eisenberg, 1987). There 
is no simple solution to this dilemma, but such proposals as compulsory 
licensing may be worth consideration – not only for economic efficiency, 
but also to foster a cooperative culture of research. 
It is interesting to note that in countries such as the UK, law reform 
proposals have began to given significant weight to surveys on public 
opinion (which closely relates to social norms).14 In light of the present 
paper this is a step forward, because more precise knowledge of public 
attitudes is vital to the design of good rules. It is however important to 
understand that public opinion should not be seen as an automatic source of 
legal normativity, because public attitudes may be poorly founded or 
incoherent, and social norms may also be manifestly negative and harmful, 
as is discussed shortly in more detail. 
Support positive intrinsic motivation; avoid creating a ‘culture of 
minimal compliance’. The theory of intrinsic motivation gives additional 
support to light-touch regulation in certain circumstances. Over-intrusive 
and formalistic regulatory approaches signal mistrust and confrontational 
attitudes, which are likely to weaken intrinsic motivation to do what is 
right. If regulatory subjects feel they are being treated mistrustfully and 
unfairly, they will also tend to respond with spiteful behavior, even to the 
point of making the job of regulatory authorities as difficult as possible just 
to ‘get even’ (see Bardach and Kagan, 1982). In the worse case, the 
regulators will in response feel their authority being undermined, and will 
retaliate with even worse treatment, giving rise to a spiral of hostility. 
Frey (1997) advises that positive intrinsic motivation is reinforced by 
external intervention that is perceived as supportive. This perception can be 
fostered numerous ways. One way is to develop personal relationships 
between regulators and regulatees. Another is to give the regulatees a sense 
of autonomy and to provide participation opportunities; self- and co-
                                                            
14 See for example Law Commission (2006: 1.21, 5.74-77, 5.84, 7.12-17, 7.47). 
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regulation are clear instances of such participation, but one can think of 
many other possibilities too. Thirdly, the message implied by external 
intervention is important; for example, rewards may be more fruitful in 
some contexts than punishments and commands. 
It will also be better at times to rely on soft, non-enforceable directives 
implemented by agreement instead of hard rules backed up by harsh 
sanctions. Building on evidence from health and safety regulation, Bardach 
and Kagan (1982) argue that hard regulation tends to cause crowding-out 
of intrinsic motivation among the better manager, who otherwise would 
have gone beyond the regulations. A similar argument could probably be 
made about environmental regulation, where too much emphasis on prices 
and regulations may actually have an adverse effect on intrinsic 
motivations to be pro-environment; the consequences will be even worse if 
hard regulations are poorly designed. 
It is obvious that tough sanctions are sometimes needed. However, 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that regulation should always start 
with a persuasive approach, and it should provide differentiated treatment 
for the ‘good guys’ (those who comply voluntarily) and the ‘bad guys’ 
(those prone to cheating). Punishing misbehavior is also important for the 
intrinsic motivation of others, because they will otherwise feel that the 
rules are unfair and there is a ‘law of the jungle’ in place. 
Use broad, flexible standards instead of detailed rules. In alignment 
strategies, flexible and principles-based standards are likely to work better 
than narrow, detailed rules. The reason is simple: broad standards are 
similar in kind to social norms – and indeed moral principles – because 
they focus more on fairness and reasonableness than on formal rights and 
duties. They are also more flexible and adaptive, which is why many 
authors claim that they are the best approach in rapidly changing 
environments. For example, UK industrial safety legislation has been 
criticized for failing to create any substantial reduction in accidents, partly 
because the laws center too heavily on machinery accidents that are less 
relevant in today’s workplaces, and also because the mandated safety 
devices fail to take into account broader factors such as the adaptive 
responses of workers (Veljanovski, 2007). 
Once again, the optimal strategy will depend on the details of each case. 
Strict rules – or at least demanding interpretation of broad standards – may 
be necessary when there are strong adverse incentives to depart from 
cooperative and pro-social behavior. 
Identify the proper role, scope and style of law and regulation. The 
theory of social norms highlights the difference between social and legal 
norms: they operate differently, and this means that it is important to give 
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each a suitable role. In legal and regulatory design, one implication is that 
we should be conscious and discerning of the relevant social context. In 
some situations, legal categories and principles cannot adequately reflect 
the relevant factors that the participants themselves feel should determine 
the outcome of certain conduct or dispute. Family problems are the most 
obvious case, but the issue is relevant to all the examples discussed so far. 
It is also important to be conscious of and sensitive to cultural 
differences. They are, for example, a fundamental factor when it comes to 
the success of ‘legal transplants’ (see generally Watson, 1993). Boettke 
(1998) argues that one cannot understand differences of economic 
development without taking into account the role of culture. The twist in 
Boettke’s argument is that on the general level, we know what kinds of 
institutions are necessary for economic development – institutions such as 
private property, sound money, and freedom of contract – but we do not 
know how to implement them successfully: ‘Economics may establish the 
properties of alternative rules, but culture and the imprint of history 
determine which rules can stick in certain environments. The problem is 
not one of private property and freedom of contract generating perverse 
consequences, but the fact that some social conventions and customary 
practices simply do not legitimate these institutions. If market transactions 
– which are universal – are constrained to a sub rosa existence, the 
commercial life and development will be limited. To move from that sub 
rosa existence, legal-political institutions must be adopted, but such 
adoption is only possible if there is a cultural fit.’ (Boettke, 1998: 13) 
A topic example of the role of cultural differences is intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection in China. The central government seems to 
be making an effort to enforce Western-style patents and copyrights, but 
practices in regional courts and other public bodies can be very different, 
because Chinese attitudes towards Western rights and privileges are 
influenced by many factors other than formal legal provisions alone (see 
Fung, 1996, and Allison and Lin, 1999). The role of culture is also relevant 
closer to home: the European Union consists of countries with very 
different histories and cultures, which is one reason why ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
solutions may become ‘one-size-fits-none’ regulations. Thus the social 
norms perspective cautions us against excessive centralization of regulation 
in a setting of large cultural differences. 
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Culture-Building and Habit-Formation Strategies 
Foster cooperation by combining fairness with toughness. Most of the time 
social problems are caused by various kinds of destructive, anti-social and 
uncooperative habits and norms. Can anything be done to improve the 
situation? One way of looking at it is that, assuming the issue is important 
and persuasive regulation does not deliver results, tough sanctions are 
needed. The general idea here is that when people are not freely willing to 
act fairly and reasonably, external intervention of some type may be 
needed. An interesting case to consider is the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), which has been criticized for having adopted an unduly 
light-touch approach to financial regulation. The criticism has been raised 
after serious failings and abuses in the UK financial sector, and it is based 
on the idea that financial market participants are often tempted by powerful 
monetary incentives to act less-than-completely altruistically. 
But the issue is complex: not all finance professionals are selfish and 
greedy. How should regulation be framed in contexts that include multiple 
actors with different kinds of motivations and values? Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) propose an interesting strategy, called the ‘benign big 
gun’ approach. The idea is to create a regulatory system that combines 
persuasion – and thus recognition of positive intrinsic motivation – with 
severe but targeted sanctions on misbehaving persons. This approach 
builds on the game-theoretic notion of tit-for-tat strategies, which imply 
that regulators should normally treat regulatees well, but if their trust is 
broken, they should respond with punishments, the severity of which is 
measured in accordance with the seriousness of the offense. Importantly, 
the success of the benign-big-gun strategy hinges on the ability of 
regulators to play both reasonable and tough, and also on the credibility of 
their threat to raise the severity of punishments as the offenses get dirtier. 
The argument is that, in the optimal case, most actors will perceive the 
rules as fair and reasonable, because the ordinary approach is flexible and 
persuasive; and in addition, there will be no incentives to break the rules, 
because the punishments for violations are sufficiently tough and certain to 
come. 
One might suppose that the benign-big-gun proposal is perfectly 
obvious and that is how most regulators operate. Unfortunately that is not 
the case. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 49) cite the case of the US 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), which seems to 
operate with the completely opposite logic: ‘They constantly nip at firms 
with flea-bite fines. In most encounters with OSHA inspectors, petty 
punitiveness is in the foreground and no big guns are in the background. 
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The result of flea-biting is that cooperation is destroyed without any of the 
benefits that can flow from tough enforcement being secured. When 
scholars point to an agency like OSHA to conclude that punishment and 
persuasion are incompatible, they have not understood the foregrounding 
of cooperation and backgrounding of punishment that benign big guns can 
accomplish.’ 
Indeed, there are numerous examples regulations that fail to combine 
persuasion with serious sanctions. In the context of financial markets 
regulation, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is famed 
for its tendency to churn out complex and expensive-to-comply regulations 
that signal a mistrust of anyone participating in financial markets; but when 
it comes to dirty play involving multi-million dollar pay-offs, the SEC’s 
punitive responses appear more symbolic than real.15 Perhaps the same 
could be said about Finnish competition law and its enforcement: even 
after a recent decision that raises punishment standards in anti-competitive 
agreement cases, the level of fines is arguably too low (given low 
probabilities of getting caught) to create a real deterrent effect.16 In light of 
the present discussion, such approaches to regulation are likely to fail on 
both counts: they cultivate both opposition and disobedience. 
Use creative strategies to promote positive social norms. The 
interesting question is whether other – less interventionist and less costly – 
strategies could be adopted to foster the formation of positive social norms. 
The ideas cited in this paper suggest that are various ways in which this can 
be done. Considered in isolation, their impact may be limited, but many of 
them could be combined to create a holistic solution to a specific social 
problem. 
Frey’s (1997) strategies for encouraging intrinsic motivation were 
already mentioned earlier, but they are equally relevant here: developing 
personal relationships, giving participation opportunities, providing 
rewards (instead of, or in addition to, punishments), etc. Now if we are 
assuming that the initial situation is rather more negative than positive, 
such light-touch approaches alone may not be enough, but they should 
never be completely ignored as if some people were beyond any possibility 
of change. As Goethe famously said, ‘Treat a man as he is and he will 
remain as he is. Treat a man as he can and should be, and he will become 
as he can and should be.’ 
In the literature on social norms and law, some commentators have 
advocated the notion of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ (Sunstein, 1996b). The 
                                                            
15 See Partnoy (2003) for a series of case studies. 
16 On the optimal level of fines for antitrust practices, see Wils (2006). 
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idea, common in sociology, is that some individuals have a special role in 
transforming established social norms through their words and example. 
The concept can be taken in a value-free sense: ‘norm entrepreneurs’ may 
change social norms for better or for worse. 
From the viewpoint of regulation, the idea of norm entrepreneurship is 
highly important. It may of course be difficult for politicians and regulators 
to change powerful social norms (Posner, 2000). Ordinarily, the only way 
to change social norms is to violate them in a public and decisive way, and 
such behavior can be especially risky for public officials, who are so 
dependent on their acceptance by the public. However, law and regulation 
may play a role in supporting actions and role models – for example 
authors, artists and actors – that are committed to challenging harmful 
social norms. Such support may include, among others, financial and moral 
support, and protecting such social actors against persecution in the public 
square. 17 In economic terms, we could say that such legal and regulatory 
strategies aim to alter the payoffs of potential norm-entrepreneurs. Such 
strategies obviously call for a high degree of prudence, because they may 
backfire, and it is difficult to predict all the unintended consequences 
flowing from attempts to manipulate social norms. 
Use creative strategies to cultivate other-regarding behavior. It may 
also be possible to encourage altruistic behavior in some regulatory 
settings. As Frank (1987, 1988) has pointed out, personal face-to-face 
contact tends to advance mutual understanding and altruism. This can be 
illustrated by a counterexample that is familiar to most readers: car-driving. 
Most drivers become impatient and annoyed much more easily behind the 
wheel than they would in other situations. According psychologists, the 
explanation is that conflict situations between different drivers are faceless 
and non-communicative, which obstructs the development of mutual 
understanding. 
This has at least two implications for regulatory strategy. The first is 
that when cooperation is needed, the enforcement of laws and regulations 
should be designed in such a manner that there are sufficient opportunities 
for personal, face-to-face contact. This strategy can also be used when the 
challenge is to obtain cooperation in the sense of fairness and honesty; it is 
simply much more difficult (even for physiological reasons) to lie face-to-
face than in an impersonal letter. One can think of many potential areas of 
application, including the enforcement of tax and competition laws. Note 
however that in order to promote cooperation and fairness, the rules being 
                                                            
17 Posner (2000: 30) points out that some famous ‘norm entrepreneurs’ were fabricated, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., being perhaps the most famous example. 
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enforced must also be seen as fair and reasonable; but the positive side is 
that personal contact and the exchange of ideas will normally help to create 
a more affirmative attitude toward the rules too.18 
The second implication is that laws can be employed to frame the 
relevant institutional set-ups so as to reduce to need for external 
intervention. For example, when the aim is to reduce egoistic or greedy 
conduct by certain individuals, the problem may be alleviated by reducing 
the amount of impersonal dealings and obliging more personal, face-to-
face contact between the relevant transactors. Financial markets and 
company law are just some potential areas of application. 
These examples demonstrate the importance of taking altruistic and 
fairness-based behavior into account in all legislative and regulatory 
deliberations. However, altruism cannot always be relied on, and it is 
necessary to understand the influence of the context. For example, when 
there are powerful financial or other incentives to cheat or to be selfish, 
high ideals and internal constraints are more likely to be pushed aside 
(Rabin, 1993). 
Encourage good moral habits and protect the ‘moral ecology’ of the 
society. Finally, it is possible to encourage good moral habits. Law has an 
obvious role of play in this regard in the sense of promoting basic fairness 
and justice: in the absence of criminal, contract and accident law, many 
more people would be tempted to opt for unjust modes of conduct. In light 
of virtue ethics, such conduct would reinforce bad habits in those persons, 
making them morally worse. 
However, virtue in the fullest sense cannot be forced from without; it 
must involve the free decision of the person to do the good. In this sense, 
law can play a limited role only. Good moral habits are fostered mainly 
through one’s upbringing, education, role models, example of one’s peer 
group etc. The main responsibility lies therefore in the various institutions 
of the civil society: families, schools, churches, associations and so on. 
Nevertheless, the state can make important decisions in this respect too. 
Just like laws and regulations facilitate the activity of certain ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’, similarly they influence the institutional setting in which 
the civil society operates. Educational laws give direction to the curricula 
of schools and universities; laws on marriage and the family influence the 
stability and health of natural families; laws on religious freedom, and even 
tax laws, influence the ability of religious communities to take formative 
activities upon themselves; and through its budgetary choices, the state 
                                                            
18 For further discussion in the context of tax policy, see Cowell (1992) and Vihanto 
(2003). 
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makes numerous decisions that sustain certain social and cultural activities 
instead of others. Note also that, because of crowding-out problems, even 
basic social policy choices have complex but powerful consequences on 
the vitality and social role of various kinds of voluntary associations and 
charitable organizations (see Beito, 1992, and Arffman, 2008). 
This perspective of moral habits is not much talked upon today, and it 
would be easy to dismiss it as secondary, unimportant, or simply too 
vague. Such skepticism is not warranted. There is a wealth of evidence 
supporting the view that people are significantly influenced by various 
educational and social factors, and that good influence can help change 
them for the better. Perceptions of good life – based on one’s upbringing, 
education, and books and movies – have an empirically measurable effect 
on moral attitudes.19 There are also encouraging results from certain 
programs aimed at helping prisoners avoid a criminal career.20 
In order to cultivate moral virtues, it is also necessary to protect what 
some have called the moral ecology of the society (George, 1993). This 
broad concept refers to the totality of moral and cultural factors which 
helps the upright moral development of persons and groups. The protection 
strategy here can mean many things, including the regulation of advertising 
so that the natural desire of companies to do more business will not corrupt 
individuals (young persons in particular) by promoting images and ideals 
that display materialistic and hedonistic lifestyles, fail to reflect and respect 
the dignity and rationality of human persons. Similarly, in such fields as 
entertainment, there is a danger that sales are boosted by way of resorting 
to the exploitation of human temptation and moral weakness, and public 
authorities can legitimately act to restrain such influences, especially 
because the logic of competition may otherwise create pressures for all 
market participants to engage in dubious practices. Laws might also 
deliberately aim to protect the public against harmful norm entrepreneurs, 
i.e. influential individuals that spread norms and values that are destructive 
of life in society. 
                                                            
19 For example, economics and business education has been criticized for implicitly 
promoting an egoistic and materialistic ideal of life. Individual cases may differ, but 
empirical studies confirm that economics, finance and business students display 
substantially more greed in ultimatum game experiments than do control groups. 
20 One study finds that Prison Fellowship’s InnerChange Freedom Initiative participants 
were 60 percent less likely to be re-incarcerated and 50 percent less likely to be re-
arrested than the comparison group (see Johnson, 2003). 
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Obviously, much prudence is needed.21 Intrusive intervention in social 
life risks giving rise to moral paternalism, which may backfire in the longer 
term. Fundamental values such as freedom of expression are also involved; 
and taking a moral stand in a pluralistic society provokes the question of 
conflicting values. Nevertheless, these difficulties alone may not be a 
sufficient reason to go from one extreme to the other, from paternalism to 
libertinism. It is generally acknowledged that freedom of expression is not 
an absolute value, as it needs to be balanced against other human and 
fundamental rights. Similarly the mere existence of different values is not 
in and of itself a good reason for taking (whether actively or passively) a 
particular stand in the debate; and to treat all norms and values as equally 
laudable is also a position that calls for justification by independent 
reasons. 
 
 
Enforcement Strategies 
There are numerous reasons why social norms and internal constraints – 
either alone or supported by legal enforcement – may provide an attractive 
basis for enforcing socially desirable regulations. They may yield more 
effective results; they may imply lower costs for both regulators and 
regulatees; they may be more flexible and also more deeply rooted in those 
concerns that matter (for example, in the case of personal, long-term 
relationships); and they may reduce formalistic confrontation, which tends 
to corrode cooperative attitudes and positive social norms. 
It is not easy to formulate any general principles or guidelines for 
social-norms-based enforcement strategies, and in any case the 
enforcement aspect of social norms has been implicit in the foregoing 
analysis of alignment and culture-building regulatory strategies. Here I 
would only like to make some additional comments. 
One question concerns the conditions that make non-legal enforcement 
advisable and effective. As is clear from the previous sections, this depends 
on the nature and strength of the relevant social norms and moral values. 
For example, many aspects of business ethics (such as corporate 
responsibility programs) are not enforced legally, but there are reputational 
incentives for implementing effective ethics programs in companies. To 
some extent, these reputational incentives depend on institutional 
arrangements and social expectations, which in turn are shaped by various 
                                                            
21 See George (1993: 42) for an insightful discussion of the various prudential 
considerations which might militate in favor of a policy of tolerating certain moral evils. 
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social-norm entrepreneurs. It can be argued that many aspects of corporate 
responsibility should not be legally enforced, because the complex and 
aspirational character of business ethics implies that codifying its 
requirements in legal enforceable codes would be likely to stultify its 
development and to discourage ethically-orientated businesspeople; the 
difficulties involved in measuring and verifying corporate responsibility 
variables also argues against the over-judicialization of the field. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of informal enforcement depends 
on many factors such as the financial incentives to violate social and moral 
norms. It may also be that, although the general public strongly 
disapproves of certain conduct, the disapproval remains mostly a private 
matter because it is not transformed into concrete and relevant action. 
These concerns seem to hold in the context of anti-competitive agreements 
among businesses: the expected financial gain can be significant, and the 
reputational penalty seems to be less significant.22 
The other important question concerns the role of law and the state in 
the design of non-legal enforcement. For example, reputation effects can be 
deliberately influenced by laws and regulations. A topical example is the 
decision of the Estonian Ministry of Justice to publicly ‘name and shame’ 
parents who have failed to make maintenance payments after divorce. The 
reason for the decision seems to be that there have been difficulties in 
enforcing maintenance agreements through the court system. 
More generally, law plays a supportive role even when the principal 
method of enforcement is non-legal. Law strengthens social norms through 
its expressive function and may give them necessary moral support. The 
specific content of social norms may also depend on laws and regulations; 
for example, standards of fairness can be shaped by legal rules even when 
they are enforced non-legally. Finally, benign-big-gun strategies of 
regulation require that there exists the threat of powerful legal sanctions, 
which to facilitate cooperation between regulators and regulatees on a more 
flexible basis. 
 
 
                                                            
22 On reputational penalties for corporate crime generally, see Alexander (1999). 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that regulatory strategies could be improved in two ways. 
Firstly by looking beyond laws and regulations to the realm of social norms 
and other sources of normativity that govern human choosing and acting, 
and secondly by becoming more conscious of the role of motivations, 
moral character and culture. I have tried to show that these perspectives 
can fruitfully be translated into regulatory strategies that (i) align laws with 
positive social norms and motivations, (ii) seek to foster positive norms 
and cultivate moral habits, and (iii) rely, when appropriate, on moral and 
social norms for the enforcement of laws. The goal of this paper has not 
been to replace pre-existing wisdom, but to propose ideas that may give 
new insights and show directions for new initiatives. Its application in 
specific fields of regulation requires further discussion, experience and 
learning. 
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THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PRINCIPLED REGULATORY STRATEGY  
On the Conditions of Rationality in Law-Making 
Hannele Isola-Miettinen  
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses the rationality assumption the legislator is presumed to have 
when it is using principled regulatory strategy. That is important aspect because 
legislation is understood to be communication. In this issue two theoretical 
approaches are studied more precisely: Luc Wintgens’ approach concerning the 
rationality of legislation activity and Ota Weinberger’s approach concerning the 
principle of “justice”. Wintgens approaches the issue from the perspective of 
legality. After that Wintgens widens the approach towards freedoms and rights of 
individual. On basis of the “freedom of principium” Wintgens finds some 
“system” principles which should guide the rationality of the legislator. 
Weinberger’s thinking represents non-cognitivism and the institutional legal 
positivism. Along Weinberger the decision-making in case of principles 
(“justice”) is relative question. There exist different theories on justice. There 
exists no stable or absolute “justice”. As a conclusion one can say that legislation 
is merely choices and there exist no absolute knowledge about principles. That is 
the reason why legitimacy is an important aspect in legislation. This paper on 
very general level asks, if the theoretical knowledge is possible in the legislative 
praxis. Namely, theoretical concepts have remarkable effect in the knowledge 
formation concerning the principles in legal system. One argues here, that the 
discussion between theory and praxis is not easy but in some extent possible. It is 
more possible if we understand the concepts and language we use in the 
communication between us.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper is focussing principles in legislation. Paper reflects on 
theoretical level what and how the legislator “knows” about principles 
(principles like privacy, justice, human dignity or competitiveness) which 
it writes into the legislation. The theoretical interest of the paper is what 
kind of cognitive attitude the legal theory/philosophy has taken towards 
rationality and knowing in legislative matters and what position the 
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legal/philosophical theory has taken to the (legal) principles1? The more 
general aim of the paper is to reflect on what conditions to combine 
theoretical knowledge and legislative praxis.  
 
 
1.1 Problem of human rationality and knowing?  
There exist several theories on human rationality, 1) the Kantian principled 
sense of rationality that believes that the possession of a capacity 
generating or recognizing necessary truths and a priori beliefs, the 
conception of rationality, according to which the “reason is the faculty of a 
priori principles”, 2) the Hegelian conception of holistic sense of 
rationality that means the possession of a capacity for systematically 
seeking coherence and 3) the instrumental sense of rationality that means 
the possession of a capacity for generating or recognising contingent rules, 
a posteriori beliefs, contextually normative rules, consequentialist 
obligations, and hypothetical “ought” claims – the Humean concept of 
rationality. 2 In this paper it is satisfactory to know that there exist abstract, 
a priori, knowledge, that is assumed to gain by the deducing operation. In 
the deducing, the validity of the knowledge is based on the rationality, 
independently of the sense of experience. The other mean to gain the 
knowledge is the inductive reasoning which is generalising the truths from 
the single premises and from the sense experience. In the science we 
distinct the streams like philosophical rationalism and empiricism, in the 
legal theory and philosophy we talk about natural law and about positivist 
tradition with several emphasis.  
 
 
1.2 Rational legislator and communication?  
Van Hoecke writes “Law does not describe but prescribes reality, or, more 
precisely, interhuman behaviour.”3 Van Hoecke defines that “law itself 
essentially is based on communication: communication between legislators 
and citizens, between courts and litigants, between the legislator and the 
judiciary…”. Van Hoecke says that this communicational aspect is 
nowadays considered also within the frame of the legitimation of the law: a 
rational dialogue amongst lawyers as the ultimate safeguard for a “correct” 
                                                            
1 See, Tuori, 2007, 150–152, Tuori, Kaarlo, Oikeuden ratio ja voluntas, Vantaa, 2007. 
2 Robert Hanna, 2006, xvii. 
3 Van Hoecke, 2002, 19. 
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interpretation and adjudication of law.”4 One assumes that the legislation 
given by the legislator is rational communication (sender –receiver) 
towards the judges or civil servants or citizens. Usually the legislation that 
is given in the form of written language, is supposed to “mediate” some 
purposed “meanings” to its addressees in society. If the situation is 
otherwise, and the legislation is not mediating purposed meanings, the 
legislation given in the society by its legislator is not rational in the 
communicative context.  
 
  
1.3 Legislation is a source of law  
In modern democratic society we still agree it that, that the “statutes”5 
given by legislator is important “source of law”. Kelsen writes “A Law – a 
product of the legislative process – is essentially a general norm, or 
complex of such norms.” 6? Van Hoecke shows that there is in every legal 
culture a hard core of shared understandings that is very stable. This 
paradigm consist of basic views on the concept of law and legal sources, 
the methodology of law, legal argumentation, legitimating of law, and 
more generally some common values and world view. Such views may 
change over time, but only slowly. Legal rules may be changed from one 
day to the other, but the way these rules will be handled, interpreted and 
applied will still be governed by the, unchanged, legal culture.7 Sometimes 
the concepts “legislation” and “legislative powers” are defined to be very 
close relatives to the political “volition” and to the political power. Along 
Tuori the legislation in its normative dimension is considered to be ‘not-
yet- law’, the raw material for the law, rather than ‘already-law’8.  
                                                            
4 Van Hoecke, 2002, 7. 
5 We know that in legal studies or in legal practice the terminology easily and in the long 
rung, without the critical reflections, begins to live its own life. The legal language 
differs from general language. Trying to avoid the blindness due to the special law 
language, it is reasonable now and then to go to origins of the traditional terms and check 
the balance between the special language and general language. The general language 
defines the term “statute”: a “law made by a legislative authority; permanent rule made 
by an institution or its founder; written law; Act of Parliament.” The term legislation 
refers in general language to “act of making laws; body of laws enacted”. The term 
legislator in same dictionary refers to “maker of laws”.  
6 Kelsen, 1945, 256–257. 
7 Van Hoecke, 2007, 81–99.  
8 Tuori, 2002, 101. 
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2 Principles9 – inside or outside the legislation? 
Along Tuori the legal principles are various and there are found several 
typologies of legal principles like decision-making principles, 
interpretation principles, general principles, principles of sources of law, 
background principles of legislation or so called system principles.10  
 
 
2.1 Independent or integrated principles? 
Some theorists think that the principles, like the moral principles, are 
integrated into the legislation, some theorists see that principles are 
independent type of norms. Assumable Dworkin is the most popular 
defender of the independent legal principles. In legal theory there is no 
agreement on that, if the legal principles are independent norms or definite 
norms or one norm-type like rules, at all. Aarnio writes that he puts 
different norm types on the “sliding scale”, instead of typing them into 
some all-or-nothing categories11. The discussion about rules and principles 
is unsettled and tension goes between the dimensions called “legal 
positivism” and “natural law”. On that basis there is found two kind of 
knowledge in law: 1) knowledge of natural law and 2) knowledge born in 
the decisions of the legislator. Natural law is based on idealism and the 
way we receive our knowledge from that natural law is the deducing. And 
as we well know, the knowledge based on decisions of legislator, we call 
positive law.  
 
 
2.2 Principles based on EU –law? 
Along von Bogdany the legal principles increase the rationality of the 
problem solving in the legal context, they create and secure the 
transparency and the coherence of the law. The legal principles are a kind 
of “framework of orientation” that is helpful in the Union’s fragmented 
legal order. von Bogdany writes “These principles can fulfil the function of 
“gateways” through which the legal order is attached to the broader public 
discourse. A doctrine of principles has the task to prepare and accompany 
                                                            
9 The term principle in general language means: “general truth, doctrine or proposition, 
on which others are based; basic moral rule or conviction; ultimate source; elementary 
constituent; essence; (pl) morality.” 
10 Tuori, 2007, 150–151. 
11 Aarnio, 2006, 304. 
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this process.”12 After a quite short analysis we find in legislation objectives 
like:  
- to promote…, to ensure…services…reasonable conditions to all 
telecommunication operators, to ensure opportunities…with the 
reasonable needs of users, to ensure that the opportunities are 
competitive, technologically advanced, of high quality, reliable, 
safe… 13.  
- to ensure expressed state of affairs, like ensure the confidentiality 
and privacy in electronic communication, to promote some state of 
affairs like to promote information security in electronic 
communications and promote balanced development of a wide 
range of electronic communication services14. 
 - to promote the protection of privacy and other basic rights15.  
 
Modern legislation is more or less vague aims and goals, even ideals or 
open values given in the form of several principles. Such goal oriented 
legislation is teleological, in its nature.  
 
 
2.3 Human right principles, goal principles? 
Along Garapon, in worldwide relations the form of law is regulation, on 
national territory the form of law is legislation and on universal level the 
form of law is declaration16. In the earlier versions of natural law theory 
with the term principle it has been referred to “something divine”. As told 
by Garapon, in modern legal theory the form of law of the universal human 
right principles is the declaration.17 Garapon defines: on national level 
legitimacy of law comes from its political source. On the worldwide level 
the legitimacy of law comes from “its necessity and efficiency”. And what 
legitimates the declarations given on universal level is their “values”.18 
                                                            
12 Armin von Bogdany, 2003, 5–8.  
13 Along the “Communication Market Act” (393/2003, 119/2008) and section 1.  
14 Along “Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications” (516/2004, 
1328/2007), section 1. 
15 The “Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life” (759/2004), section 1, says 
that “The purpose of this Act is to promote the protection of privacy and other basics 
rights safeguarding the protection of privacy in working life.”  
16 Garapon, 2009, 73–74, the term “legislative” we in general language refer the 
adjective “pertaining to legislation; having the duty of law-making; enacted by 
legislation”. The verb to regulate in general language means “govern by rule; put in 
order; control by law; cause to function accurately; cause to conform to standard”.  
17 Garapon, 2009, 73–74. 
18 Garapon, 2009, 73–74. 
 32
Along Westerman next to the so called mandatory rules of the 
prohibitive type we can find new kind of norms: “aspirational norms”, 
norms that directly prescribe the achievement of goals and “result 
prescribing norms”, norms that are prescribing us to obtain results.19 
Westerman does not name aspirational norms principles, although those 
norms are defined that they can be realized to a larger or to a lesser 
extent20. One can argue that principles in legislation and “principled 
regulatory strategy” leaves much “open”. The question is how rational 
legislator is when it is using this strategy? What kind of knowledge the 
legislator uses in its legislating strategy, when it is making its choices over 
the teleological kind of “state of affairs” and over their possible 
“consequences”?  
 
 
3 Theoretical approaches to rationality of the  
 legislator? 
This paper focuses two theorists: firstly, Luc Wintgens writings on the 
“legisprudence”, the rational theory of legislation and secondly Ota 
Weinberger’s approach to rationality and knowing in law.  
 
 
3.1 Wintgens and legalism? 
The principle of legality is a necessary condition for the existence of rules, 
but it is at the same time a sufficient condition because it regulates both the 
unquestionable input (legislation) as well as the output (rule application) in 
legal reasoning.21 Wintgens reflects the legislative activity through lenses 
of this “legalism”.22 Wintgens tries to establish the theoretical approach 
that allows us to explain the absence of theoretical reflections on 
legislation and make some suggestions that may contribute to the 
theoretical study of legislation that allows us to articulate criteria for good 
legislation or as he names it to “legisprudence”.23 Legisprudence offers not 
                                                            
19 Westerman, 2007, 117. 
20 Westerman, 2007, 119. 
21 Wintgens, 2002, 15. 
22 Wintgens, 2002, 9, traditional legal theory deals with the questions of the application 
of law by the judges. Wintgens refers to some writers (for example Noll) favouring the 
approach, which see that judges and legislators, in many respect, do the same things.. 
23 Wintgens, 2002, 10. 
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one but several theoretical approaches to that topic.24 Wintgens focuses not 
on the legislators’ freedom to make choices but rather on the limitations 
due to rules.25 
 
 
3.1.1  External and internal perspective to legislative activity? 
Wintgens takes external and internal perspective to rationality. Rationality 
in this context means that legislative activity deals with the cognitive 
aspect of the rules to be followed by the legislator or, as Wintgens says, 
“more precisely, with the cognitive aspect of the internal point of view of 
the legislator”. Wintgens says that “Rationality in legislation, then, means 
that the legislator does more than just is promulgating, in the form of legal 
rules, his own subjective preferences. Legislative activity becomes more 
rational, in as far as the cognitive aspect of the internal point of view of the 
legislator is taken seriously.” Wintgens asks “How can this be analysed?”26  
One of these cognitive aspects is legal validity. It is a system-internal 
quality of the rule created by the legislator. Validity of legal rules can be 
connected to the volitional aspect of the hermeneutic point of view. It is an 
expression of legislators will to give legal validity to a certain proposition. 
External point of view refers to knowledge about reality. The legislator 
does not look upon the social data as raw material but such knowledge is 
filtered by scholarly work so that they are set up as knowledge about social 
reality that could be relevant for legislation. But Wintgens asks: how it is 
theoretically possible that the extra-legal elements can be introduced in a 
legal system. One instrument is the constitutional review. For example the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has isolated certain criterias that are used to 
measure the quality of the legislation: a duty to establish the facts, 2) a duty 
to balance, 3) a duty of prognosis or prospective evaluation, 4) a duty to 
take future circumstances into the consideration and 5) a duty to correct 
legislation at a later stage, or retrospective evaluation.27 In the European 
countries there are differences in this respect of constitutional review: some 
countries have established constitutional courts with the capacity of 
                                                            
24 Wintgens, 2002, 24–29. 
25 Wintgens, 2002, 29. 
26 Wintgens, 2002, 30. See also Tuori, 2002, 105–106, Tuori’s distinctions about three 
forms of the rationality in legislation: object rationality, internal rationality and normative 
rationality. Along Tuori, one explanation for the alleged decrease in the internal rationality 
of legislation in Finland may lie in the fact that law drafting takes place increasingly 
elsewhere in the state machinery than in the Ministry of Justice. Along Tuori there is the 
expertise required by the monitoring of internal rationality is concentrated.  
27 Wintgens, 2002, 30–32. 
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constitutional review of legislation28. For example, in Finland, it is the 
Constitutional Committee inside the Parliament, which is investigating the 
constitutionally relevant matters, a priori and in abstracto. 
 
 
3.1.2  Freedom as principium 
Wintgens in his later writings says that law has its own method and “the 
legislative” is very difficult to see through the rational theory. Wintgens 
elaborates further his legisprudence approach departing from the 
epistemological reflections concerning the freedom of the individual. 
Wintgens comes again to the concept of legalism and sees that legalism 
mainly attempts to exclude any form of theorising on the legislation. The 
legislation is a matter of choice. And choices are disputable, so that a 
theory that would take them to be the object of knowledge is condemned to 
failure from the very beginning. Wintgens’ solution to that problem is that 
Wintgens takes under the focus the knowledge and the rules that contain 
rights and duties.29 Wintgens sees that the freedom as principium means 
that any limitation of freedom must be justified. Wintgens defines that 
“Legisprudence is defined as a rational theory of legislation”. It consists of 
an elaboration of the idea of freedom as principium.30  
The justification of legislation is marked as a process of weighing and 
balancing the moral and political limitations of freedom. Upon the rational 
character of legislation, a principled framework is then required. With the 
help of this framework, external limitations can be justified. And the 
justification is part of the process of the legitimation. Rational theory of 
legislation, or the legisprudence, does have its basis on the principles: the 
principle of alternativity, the principle of normative density, the principle 
of temporality, and the principle of coherence. Wintgens says that “Upon 
the rational character of legislation, a principled framework is required”.31 
The principle of alternativity requires the priority of subjects’ action. The 
idea is that the sovereign can only intervene on the condition that it is 
argued that his external limitation is preferable to an internal limitation of 
freedom as a reason for action, due to a failure of social interaction.32 
Normative density refers to sanctions that need a special justification 
                                                            
28 Wintgens, 2002, 14. 
29 Wintgens, 2005, 2–6. 
30 Wintgens, 2005, 11. 
31 Wintgens, 2005, 11. 
32 Wintgens, 2005, 11–12. 
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because they include a double restriction of freedom.33 The principle of 
temporality, the perspective of time, constrains the limitations of freedoms 
and the possible sanctions. The “right time” is one critical element of 
principle of temporality. The principle of coherence is the principle of 
justification of external limitations from the perspective of the legal system 
as a whole.34 Along Wintgens politics is matter of disagreements and here 
Wintgens sees that principles of legisprudence are important.35 In his 
conclusions Wintgens stresses the importance of human rights. Wintgens 
stresses the requirement to respect for individual freedom.36 What 
Wintgens says is “The supplementary justification on the principle of 
coherence underpins the connection between the concept of freedom as 
part of the analytical theory of the legal system and the system’s rules.”37. 
Wintgens furthers the epistemological discussion with writing about 
jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic models of legitimation and about 
freedom and about the rights. Wintgens precises the substantive model and 
the model called procedural model in legislation. The result of procedural 
model is born in that legitimation programme. Substantive model demands 
the substantial legitimation and the substantial models basically deal with 
free will. Interestingly, Wintgens writes about the rights, also as political 
rights as participation rights and analyses theoretically the legitimacy 
chains. Wintgens sees that so called strong legalism goes in hand in hand 
with the model of the legitimation that includes the irreversibility of that 
legitimacy chain. Strong legalism includes a “one shot” legitimation, in 
that the legitimation chain is activated at the “moment” of the social 
contract. Reversals in the legitimation chain show some mechanisms which 
are built into the chain that allow subject to contribute to it in active way, 
in elections, in referendum or by challenging the acts of sovereign.38 
In sum, Wintgens sees that legislation as an activity is merely political 
issue and the issue of making choices than the rational issue. Wintgens has 
taken his approach to legislation through solving the critical aspect of 
legalism. Wintgens studied the rationality of legislation departing from the 
concept of freedom. Wintgens developed on that basis some principles of 
legislation: the most important of those rationality principles is the 
principle of coherence. Along Wintgens, partially the legal principles 
should be integrated into the legislation. Wintgens stresses the importance 
                                                            
33 Wintgens 2005, 12. 
34 Wintgens, 2005, 15. 
35 Wintgens, 2005, 22. 
36 Wintgens, 2005, 22. 
37 Wintgens, 2005, 22. 
38 Wintgens, 2007, 39–40. 
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of human rights. But as we well know, all human right aspects are 
impossible to take into account in advance into the legislation. That is why 
it is often the Courts which formulate the human right principles in 
concrete cases.  
 
 
3.2 Weinberger: what it is possible to know? 
Weinbergers approach to justice39 is closely connected to practical 
philosophy, which is non-cognitivistic, legal positivistic and value-
relativist, in its nature. That practical philosophy excludes every form of 
practical cognition in the sense of natural law theory. There is such a thing 
as practical thought and practical argumentation, but no such thing as 
practical cognition.”40 The purpose of Weinbergers’ theory is to establish a 
viable analytical theory of substantive justice which on the one hand grasps 
the reality of human life and on the other hand emphasises the element of 
the moral in our individual and communal existence, without lapsing into 
metaphysical speculation.41  
 Weinberger writes, legal positivism in its strong version says that it is 
only relative to some given system of positive norms that question of 
justice can arise at all. One Weinbergers’ thesis is that problems of justice 
stand at the crossroads between morals, law and politics. In a certain sense, 
these three are complementary, writes Weinberger. They are concerned 
with the relationships of individuals with their fellow humans and with the 
community. Anyhow, Weinberger writes that it is an anthropological fact 
that all humans and social groups of all kinds have convictions about 
justice which they regard as intuitively valid.42 Weinberger’s thesis is that 
                                                            
39 For example, the question what and how to know about the principle of “justice” is not 
irrelevant in legal praxis. The principle of justice is written into the Civil Servant Act 
(750/1994 sect. 2) and into the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act (586/1996, amend. 
435/2003, sect. 33). Along the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act, section 1, the 
object of the Act is “to achieve and promote good administration and access to justice in 
administrative matters.” In the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, for 
example, we speak about “right to a fair trial” (art. 47). The Civil Servant Act, along the 
section 2, is to ensure the civil servants “just” position in relation to the employer. In 
Finnish language the term that is used in the Civil Servant Act is “oikeudenmukainen” 
(justice/fair).  
40 Weinberger, 1986, 145. See, for example, Peczenick, 2009, 42–43, Aleksander 
Peczenick, On Law and Reason, 2009. Also Aarnio, Aulis, 1987, 131–132, in Rational 
and Reasonable: a treatise on legal justification, Holland 1987, about “practical 
reasoning”.  
41 Weinberger, 1986, 153–154. 
42 Weinberger, 1986, 146. 
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the convictions about justice and judgements of what is just are always 
subject to analysis and are based in and developed through rational 
reflections.43 Weinberger goes on saying that, although reflections are 
rational processes which are in principle capable being formalised, they 
cannot be presented in the form of a single deductive chain moving from 
firmly established premise to a conclusion. Weinberger says that 
deliberations about justice often run along several lines, and depend on 
comparisons of value and judgements of preference and both rational and 
empirical processes of proof. The aim of such deliberations is to achieve an 
equilibrium between moral intuitions as shaped by tradition on the one 
hand and critical analyses on the other.44  
Weinberger reflects philosophical theories about justice that are trying 
to establish objectively what is to be deemed just. Those theories settle the 
principles of justice or set up single fundamental principles of such kind 
that other relevant principles are supposed to be derivable from it.45 As 
Weinberger shows, there are various attempts that try to prove the 
objective validity of the principles in order to justify the claim for the 
universal acceptance. Along Weinberger 1) justice as formal principle and 
the principle of formal equality is only an instrument for securing the 
transparent quality of substantive criteria of justice. The establishment of 
categories of relevant facts and of the consequential normative provisions 
is left open. This has to be judged evaluatively as just or unjust. 46 2) 
Justice as a material a priori approach and the existence of substantive 
principles of justice is treated as a material a priori, as Weinberger says, 
discoverable by intuition and/or analysis. Along Weinberger, the existence 
a priori of the substantive principles of justice is a scientifically 
unacceptable hypothesis, scarcely serviceable in reasoning about justice. 
This is true without prejudice to the fact that we intuitively experience 
clear evaluations as to what is just. The fact that we experience something 
as intuitively certain by no means entails that this experience is objectively 
correct and unquestionable in the light of analysis and/or subsequent 
experience. The intuitions of justice can assuredly be turned to good 
account as facts to be reasoned about but they cannot justify a priori 
substantive principles of justice.47 Weinberger says that 3) religiously 
inclined theorists view principles of justice as directives of God to man, 
and thus as also existing a priori. According to this conception, what is to 
                                                            
43 Weinberger, 1986, 146. 
44 Weinberger, 1986, 146. 
45 Weinberger, 1986, 147. 
46 Weinberger, 1986, 149. 
47 Weinberger, 1986, 149. 
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count as just is determined through the belief-system which is accessible to 
human beings through revelation or through some other religious 
experience.48 And finally, 4) anthropologically given principles of justice 
deduce the principles from the essence of humankind, that determine what 
must objectively count as just, on the ground that these principles 
themselves, as implications of anthropological constants, are 
anthropologically necessary “ought” principles.49  
In Weinbergers’ analysis concerning the justice according the standard 
of a normative order Weinberger says, that traditional positivistic teaching 
reduces the problem of justice to a conformity of the conduct to rules as 
enacted, or at any rate to the formally equal decision of cases according to 
the rules in force. Such conformity of conduct to a rule can be objectively 
tested, without any evaluation or justification of the rule in question, which 
is simply taken for granted as a given feature of society. The relativisation 
in respect to the positive system of norms brings about the objectivisation 
of the problem of justice, but at the price of excluding from the 
considerations the very being and the substance of what lies at the core of 
an analysis of justice. About traditional theories of justice Weinberger 
says: they present judgements of justice as a form of objective cognition: 
either out of the conviction in favour of natural law, presupposing some 
kind of practical cognitive faculty or some kind of religious faith according 
to which the normative principles have been pre-ordained for human 
beings or on the ground of a purportedly objective utilian calculus or 
through the relativisation to a positive system of norms.50 
Weinbergers theory among other emphasises the element of moral in 
our individual and communal existence, without lapsing into the 
metaphysical speculation.51 The non-cognitivism in this case means that 
human beings are active beings but their thoughts and perceptions are in 
principle subservient to praxis. To Weinberger the thinking is a processing 
of information, which is an instrument for gaining knowledge and the 
utilisation of cognition in the context of the guidance of conduct. That is, 
thinking is a process which plays an essential role in the structure of 
deliberation determining action and its control.52 One sums up the idea that 
Weinbergers non-cognitivism excludes not only deductive justifications of 
practical conclusions based on purely cognitive arguments, but also every 
other cognitive way of supporting practical sentences. Along Weinberger 
                                                            
48 Weinberger, 1986, 149. 
49 Weinberger, 1986, 150. 
50 Weinberger, 1986, 153. 
51 Weinberger, 1986, 154. 
52 Weinberger, 1986, 154. 
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every practical justification requires some practical arguments which 
express an evaluative attitude, premises drawn from 1) intuition, 2) 
consensus, 3) explicit contractual agreement or 4) other source.53 Along 
Weinberger the non-cognitivism rejects both the absolute values and the 
validity of a priori principles of justice and excludes every sort of the 
practical cognition which might purport to give a purely cognitive basis for 
objective values or correct normative principles.54 About complexity of 
justice Weinberger writes that there exists no fixed judgement about justice 
whose correctness is objectively guaranteed, but on the contrary always 
finds himself only on the search of justice. Judgements about justice are 
not findings of fact which could be confirmed simply by correspondence 
with the actions or with human attitudes or with given standards. Justice is 
not the fact, but a task: a task for our heads and four our harts.55  
 
 
4 Theory and practice and communication 
For example, Weinberger rejects the cognitive knowledge in practical 
thinking, Anyhow, Weinberger stresses that thinking is information 
processing. And we know that thinking takes place in our minds through 
the certain concepts. With the concepts we have in our minds, we can also 
form the meanings. Las is communication, legislation is communication, in 
its nature. Kilpatrick in the study “International handbook on economic 
regulation” (2006) has focused the problem of the communication in 
context of regulation. In the study it has been reflected the problem of 
common knowledge in regulation. It is stated that the regulator is left in a 
state far short of the level of information assumed in several regulatory 
theories. In that study the problem concerns monopoly regulation. The 
issue is important. In the private transactions the principal bears the cost of 
any error in his or her assumptions. Contrast this with a regulator with 
responsibility for a price and quality of an essential good. If the regulator is 
wrong in his or her common knowledge assumption about the agent (the 
regulated firm), it is either consumers or the regulated firm that bear 
consequences.56 Is it possible that theoretical knowledge could contribute 
the praxis? There exist wide amount so called legislative practical 
                                                            
53 Weinberger, 1986, 155–156. 
54 Weinberger, 1986, 162. 
55 Weinberger, 1986, 169. 
56 Kirkpatrick, 2006, passim. 
 40
principles, elaborated by OECD or EU.57 The very interesting aspect would 
be to analyse, what kind of theoretical starting point, if any, there has been 
adopted in these kind of instructions.  
 
 
Conclusions 
The problem of the principled regulatory strategy is taken under more 
effective focus in this paper because of the rationality assumption that 
legislator is presumed to have in its legislative activity. This aspect is 
important because the legislation still is one important source of law. 
Assumption is that the legislator mediates and communicates with its 
legislation the meanings to its addressees, like authorities and citizens. 
Principles are typical to EU –law based legislation, they have integrative 
and coherence creating function. Principles are various, usually they are 
defined to belong to the knowledge, a priori, in their nature. Principles 
contain goals and values. Some theorists do not count principles 
independent norm-types, some theorists like Dworkin argue for legal 
principles. This paper has studied theoretical approaches taken towards 
rationality of legislative activity. Along Wintgens there are found some 
principles which should guide the rationality of the legislator. Wintgens 
bases those principles on the legalism and on the “freedom of principium”. 
The most important legislative principle is the principle of coherence. 
Wintgens seems to think that the legal principles are merely the system 
principles. Weinberger represents the non-cognitivist attitude and the 
institutional legal positivism in theoretical approach concerning principle 
of justice. Weinberger do not accept metaphysical aspects. Weinberger 
does not accept cognitivism as a knowledge, a priori. To Weinberger the 
principles are merely structural principles. Along Weinberger the decision-
making in case of legal principles (“justice”) is relative question. 
Weinberger shows that the formal equality is just guiding the thinking. 
There is no stable or absolute material “justice”. Weinbergers’ reflection 
shows how difficult the rationality is in case of principles.  
                                                            
57 Regulatory policies in OECD countries: from interventionism to regulatory 
governance, 2002, For example OECD –publication on regulatory policies (2002) is 
giving widely “instructions” to “regulatory governance” in the form of “principles” on 
better and good legislation, and aspects integral to democratic governance: transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, adaptability and coherence. Principles given in these “better 
regulation studies” supposed to “guide” drafters and legislative actors in legislative 
processes: how to cope other important (value) principles in legislative activity, in 
drafting, in choosing the legislative strategy, in the legislative decision-making process.  
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The legislation is political choices. That is the reason why modern 
legislator who is legislating by abstract principles, should take into the 
account the discourse by citizens on the societal level. That is the mean that 
increases legitimating rationality of legislation. Such rationality is 
legitimating the substance of the legislation that is important in the very 
problematic principled regulatory strategy. This paper on very general level 
also asks, if the theoretical discussion is possible in praxis. One argues 
here, that the discussion between theory and praxis is not easy, but 
possible. It is possible if we understand our language and the concepts that 
we use in the communication between us.  
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CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN  
PARLIAMENTS 
The Case of Spain 1980–2005 
Xavier Coller & Andrés Santana1 
 
Abstract  
Differences in legislative production hide the fact that some legislatures are more 
conflictive than others in passing laws. Why, then, in some parliaments some 
political groups are able to create consensus over legislation? This paper presents 
an original empirical work based on the analysis of legislation of 17 regional 
chambers in the period 1980–2005 in Spain. Apart from regional differences in 
the legislative production rate, the authors found out that some parliaments are 
more conflictive than others and they try to relate the consensus-conflict rate to 
different socio-political variables like national political climate, parliamentarians’ 
turnover, parliaments’ gender composition, type of majority and government. 
 
 
Variations in lawmaking in regional parliaments 
The main function of any parliament is to legislate.2 That is, to pass laws 
that will rule society. Certainly, parliaments can develop a wide range of 
activities, although the most socially relevant is the lawmaking process. 
There are many types of laws, but I will not get into this debate here. The 
content of any law is the result of a long process of negotiation and reflects 
the point of view of individuals or groups present in the lawmaking process 
as representatives, as lobbyists or as experts. 
In modern politics, the legislative function is largely contingent upon 
the government bringing bills to parliament for their discussion among 
political groups and further approval. The way it works in most chambers 
is as follows. A bill is proposed to the chamber. Usually, the initiative is 
taken by the regional government, although in some rare cases, a 
parliamentary group or a number of deputies can also bring a bill to 
                                                            
1 With the collaboration of Ana Carrillo, Alejandro Luna, Marta Paradés, Andrés 
Vázquez, Adrián del Río, Esther Vargas, Ángela Pérez and María José Fernández. 
Universidad Pablo de Olavide. 
2 About the functions of legislatures see Blondel (1973), chapter 2. 
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parliament.3 Depending on the content of the law, it will be brought for 
discussion to any of the committees of the parliament. For instance, the bill 
of the budget for the government is usually brought to the economic and 
budget committee. A bill related to the creation of a university may be 
brought to the “committee of education”. And so forth. All committees 
reflect the exact political composition of parliament. In the committee, 
MPs debate the bill, amend it and produce a final bill called “dictamen”. 
The dictamen might have incorporated the amendments suggested by some 
MPs or groups or they might have been rejected. The dictamen will be 
discussed then into a plenary session of the regional chamber. Then, in this 
session, MPs may further amend the bill by retrieving the amendments that 
were not accepted in the works of the committee. An informed guess 
indicates that barely 10 % of bills reach the plenary session without 
amendments. During the plenary session the bill may be further amended 
incorporating the point of view of some MPs or groups. Finally, the bill is 
voted, although sometimes, depending on the rules of the chamber, MPs 
have to vote article by article. 
Although there are several indicators of parliamentary activity, law 
making seems to be the most relevant one since the making of laws not 
only requires the participation of MPs from different groups (and 
institutions, like the executive and high officials), but also because laws 
create a line in society indicating what is acceptable and what is not. Laws, 
thus, are a good indicator of the level of activity in a parliament. Law 
making in parliamentarian democracies may approach the consensus 
model, as opposed to the majoritarian model, delineated by Lijphart 
(1999:33) that “emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes 
rather than excludes and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling 
majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority.” 
Some parliaments may be more active than others depending on the 
bills discussed and passed.4 Differences in the rate of lawmaking may be 
due to the level of competences reserved for the regions in any given 
federal system. For instance, if a region has the power to create universities 
and another lacks this capability, then the first will be able to legislate over 
this area increasing the proportion of laws passed vis a vis other regions. 
However, we’ll see soon that these differences are also due to other factors. 
 
                                                            
3 The bill proposed by the government is called proyecto de ley (bill project). In other 
cases is called proposición de ley (bill proposal).  
4 There are other indicators of activity such as questions to the government, law 
proposals, etc. See Subirats and Gallego (2002). 
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Table 1  Law making in regional parliaments (1980–2007) 
       Legislature          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average
Andalucía 44 23 22 7 45 43 56 32.7 
Aragón 44 37 54 53 92 21  51.4 
Asturias 47 33 16 27 42 n.d.  29.5 
Cantabria n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.   
Canarias n.d. n.d. n.d. 42 52 41  45.0 
Castilla-León 30 44 44 42 62 39  46.2 
Castilla-La Mancha 28 22 20 39 65 17  32.6 
Cataluña n.d. 70 76 44 71 108 12 63.5 
C. Valenciana n.d. 39 32 39 52 56  43.6 
Extremadura 24 19 30 41 41 35  33.2 
Galicia 40 42 44 44 32 40  40.4 
Islas Baleares n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.   
La Rioja 14 18 24 33 19 30  24.8 
Madrid n.d. 37 57 95 63 65  63.4 
Murcia 37 32 35 42 55 42  41.2 
Navarra 73 55 78 91 113 11  69.6 
País Vasco n.d. 24 39 37 57 15 31 33.8 
Source: Our own elaboration using information from webpages of regional parliaments 
and official documents. 
Note: Autonomous communities have different electoral cycles. See appendix. 
 
In an ideal world, we can expect regions having similar powers passing a 
similar number of laws in their parliaments. However, this is not the case 
as can be seen in Table 1. 5 Take, for instance, the average of laws passed 
in each legislature in regions with similar powers: Aragon (51), Asturias 
(29), Madrid (63), and Navarre (70). Their averages are quite different and 
the number of laws in each legislature varies significantly. Even in regions 
with a higher level of powers like Catalonia, Basque Country and 
Andalusia there are relevant differences in the average for the period and in 
each legislature. Certainly, the legislative function is contingent upon 
different factors. The amount of bills passed in parliament is the outcome 
of the activity of the executive (which is related to the number of powers 
transferred to the region), the majority in parliament, the length of the 
legislature, and the ability of building pacts among parliamentary groups. 
This can explain why some parliaments seem to be more active than others, 
although further research needs to be done in order to ascertain why some 
legislatures are more active than others. 
                                                            
5 We have obtained data of 12 regional parliaments out of 17, more than two thirds of the 
total. 
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Graphic 1  Average of laws passed between 1980 and 2007 
 
Source: Our own elaboration with data from table 1.  
Note: Numbers in the X axis mean the code for each regional parliament. See appendix. 
 
Also, data in Table 1 indicate that there is some internal variation in the 
rate of laws passed in each region in different legislatures. The differences 
are in some cases so disproportionate that need some explanation. For 
some regions (Aragon, Asturias, Castile-La Mancha, Valencia, and 
Navarre) there is an important growth in the number of bills passed 
between the fourth and fifth legislatures. In part, this growth is explained 
by a package of powers transferred by the central government to the 
regions of the common system.6 More powers transferred means that the 
regional government has the capability of regulating areas that previously 
were in the hands of the central government. Consequently, chances are 
that the regional government will bring to parliament bills to be discussed, 
amended and, eventually, approved.  
In some cases we see in Table 1 that the number of bills passed 
decreases dramatically. This is the case of Andalusia during the fourth 
legislature, and Galicia and Asturias during the third. In these cases, the 
low lawmaking activity of the legislature is the outcome of a deep 
parliamentary conflict between groups whose result was a weak 
government (whose parliamentary support was a simple majority stemming 
from an unstable pact between groups) and/or the shortening of the 
legislative period. 
                                                            
6 The government passed a bill (December 27, 1996) restructuring the way the regions 
were to financed and transferring new powers. 
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Table 2  Proportion of consensus (1980–2007) 
       Legislatures       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average
Andalucía 29.2 47.8 50 57.1 59 55.8 48.2 49.6 
Aragón 84.1 78.3 64.8 56.6 84.8 52.4  70.2 
Asturias 57.4 36.5 25.0 40.0 59.5 36.0  42.4 
Cantabria         
Canarias    88 67.31 75.6  77.0 
Castilla-León 63.3 75 45.4 35.7 38.7 61.5  53.3 
Castilla-La Mancha 61.9 43.6 25.9 73.6 64.6 88.2  59.6 
Cataluña  62.8 75 77.2 70.4 76.14 58.3 70.0 
Valencia  58.9 53.1 20.51 25.5 32.14  39.5 
Extremadura 29 22.2 37.9 57.1 16.28 44.4 54.5 37.3 
Galicia 57.5 45.2 13.6 20.4 25 22.5  30.7 
Baleares         
La Rioja 85.7 66.6 79.1 21.2 26.3 53.3  55.4 
Madrid  72.9 78.9 63.1 39.7 37  58.3 
Murcia 67 69.3 68.5 39.5 41.02 56.8  57.0 
Navarra 42.06 67.7 61.5 67 56.4   58.9 
País Vasco 57.3 58.3 74.3 59.4 50.8 33.8 35.4 52.8 
Source: Our own elaboration using information from webpages of regional parliaments 
and official documents. 
Note: Autonomous communities have different electoral cycles. See appendix. 
 
Any law can be passed in the plenary session of a parliament by unanimity, 
by absolute majority or by simple majority. In general terms, it can be said 
that any law can be passed with or without negative votes. A negative vote 
means that the law is rejected by a portion of MPs although their number is 
not so large as to prevent the bill being approved. Given the intricacies of 
the legislative procedure, in this case, it means that the law approved does 
not reflect the point of view of a part of MPs representing a segment of a 
society. Thus, it can be inferred that in this case the chamber legislates 
against a part of a society. This is the case, say, of a bill proposed by a 
regional government regulating the creation and functioning of a 
professional association of architects. After been amended in the respective 
committee, the bill is brought to the plenary session of the Parliament. 
However, if MPs in the committee are unable to reach a consensus, when 
the bill is discussed in the plenary session, the opposition groups will still 
keep their amendments to the bill. More often than not, if the points of 
view of the opposition groups are not incorporated into the final bill, they 
will vote against it. Thus, the majority group will have created a law that is 
rejected by a portion of the parliament, which is to say by a portion of 
society. In this case, we can say confidently that there is parliamentary 
conflict since a consensus about a bill has not being built. 
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A law without negative votes means that all groups present in the 
chamber accept the law with more or less conviction. A consensus can be 
built over affirmative votes or over non negative votes or abstention. When 
a group or a MP abstains, it means that they are not against the passing of 
the law although they do not give it full support. This might be considered 
“weak consensus” as opposed to “strong consensus” (unanimity) when all 
groups or MPs cast their affirmative votes for any given bill. This is 
usually the case when the majority group makes an effort to incorporate the 
points of view of the opposition groups into the bill being discussed either 
at the committee level or at the plenary session. 
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Source: Our own elaboration from Table 2. 
Note: Autonomous communities have different electoral cycles. See appendix. 
 
I will not get into the debate about whether consensus is better than conflict. 
This is a moral issue I am not interested in as social scientist. A high level of 
consensus in the lawmaking process could be considered more efficient 
since it means that legislators take into account the needs, demands, and 
points of view of different social groups. A high level of parliamentary 
conflict might be less effective and generate conflicts in society since some 
groups might perceive that they are left apart, their interests not taken into 
account or negatively affected, and react accordingly.  
Certainly, the rate of consensus is a good, solid, and clear indicator of 
political conflict in legislatures. A high consensus rate means that different 
political groups (no matter how ideologically distant they are) are able to 
agree and build consensus. A low rate of consensus is an indicator of 
political conflict and controversy, which is quite normal, especially in 
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polarized parliaments. A low consensus rate somehow indicates certain 
inability to reach pacts and build agreements, which is the bottom line of 
parliamentarism.  
One can expect that the proportion of laws passed by consensus would be 
similar in all regions. There seems to be no reason for a parliament to have a 
proportion of laws passed with negative votes much higher or lower than 
other. However, we can see in Table 2 that the behavior of regional 
parliaments also differs. On average, it seems that there are parliaments 
which are more “consensualist” than others. This is the case of Catalonia and 
Aragon, with an average of 70 % of laws passed by consensus. Also, 
Madrid, Castile-La Mancha, and Navarre show and average proportion of 
consensualist lawmaking around 60 %. However, other parliaments show an 
average consensus rate quite low like Asturias (37 %) or Valencia (38 %), 
with barely over a third of the bills passed by agreement of all MPs. 
Differences are not only found among regions. There is also internal 
variation over the years for each region. There are legislatures that show a 
high proportion of laws passed by consensus followed by others in which 
the consensus rate decreases dramatically. Take the case of La Rioja in the 
3rd and 4th legislatures, the Basque Country in the 5th and 6th, Asturias in 
the 2nd and 3rd, and the like. In all of these cases, a legislature with a high 
proportion of bills passed by consensus is followed by a diminishing 
consensus rate in the next legislature. If the consensus rate varies, it is 
worth asking why and why should we care about it. 
 
 
Consensus and conflict in parliaments 
If the consensus rate is an indicator of political conflict in Parliaments and 
might be associated to efficiency in ruling a society, it is worth paying 
attention to the factors that might contribute to explain why the consensus 
rate varies across time and regions. Consensus rate, thus, is the dependent 
variable of my research. As we have seen in Table 2, the proportion of bills 
passed by consensus varies throughout the timeline and across regions. 
There are legislatures in which it is higher than in others. Also, it is different 
in autonomous communities and the differences are quite significant. The 
question, then, is what makes the consensus rate so variable? Which are the 
independent variables? There are several candidates I detail briefly with 
some statistical tests to check their role. Data refer to the following regions: 
Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, Rioja, Madrid, 
Murcia, Navarre, Basque Country, and Valencia. This preliminary analysis 
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covers 12 out of 17 regions and all finished legislatures except the first one. 
So, the total number of cases on which this research project is based is 48 
(out of 89 possible, 54 %). Further analysis will include also more 
legislatures and regions up to a total of 106. 
 
Number of groups. Any bill that is passed with no negative votes needs to 
be approved by all parliamentary groups in the chamber. At first sight, it 
seems easier to build consensus among few groups than among many. 
Contrary, few political groups in parliament may help to build bridges, 
especially if the parliament is not polarized. In the period 1980–2006, the 
number of groups in regional parliaments go from 2 (socialist and 
populares, like in the single case of the fifth legislature in Castile-La 
Mancha) to 8 (like in the single case of the second legislature in Navarre) 
or 7 (like in most legislatures of the Basque Country). The average number 
of groups for the period is 4.7 However, the statistical test indicates that 
there is a weak, although not significant, relationship between the number 
of parliamentary groups and the consensus rate. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is 0.200 and the probability associated is 0.173. The coefficient 
suggests that the more groups, the higher the rate of consensus, which is 
counterintuitive. This is why the original proposition needs to be qualified 
for further research.8 
A look at the results of Sartori’s fragmentation index indicate that there 
is a low but significant association between consensus and the level of 
fragmentation of a parliament. Correlation index is 0.201and its associated 
probability is 0.063. That means that we have to introduce here a 
qualification. 
Parliaments might be highly ideologically polarized to the extent that in 
some cases there are blocks of groups. In previous research I have shown 
that people (and that includes also political elites) perceive some groups 
ideologically closer to others (Coller 2003a, b). Sometimes, this closeness 
ends up in the integration of a political party (or a fraction of it) into 
another.9 It can be said that the higher the polarization, the lower the rate of 
                                                            
7 Actually, the average is 4.48, but there can not be half of a group. 
8 It would be worth to pay attention to the index of effective number of parties developed 
by Laakso and Taagepera and praised by Lijphard (1999:68) as “widely used by 
comparativists in political science”. N = 1/∑ si2, where N = number of effective parties, s 
= proportion of seats in the chamber and i = party. 
9 This was the case of the party Euskadiko Ezkerra, that became integrated into the 
Basque branch of PSOE known as Partido Socialista de Euskadi. It is also de case of 
Nueva Izquierda, a party founded by former members of Izquierda Unida that became 
integrated into the PSOE. Also, Unión del Pueblo Navarro and PP merged in Navarre. 
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consensus could be. Contrary, the ideologically closer the parties are, the 
higher the likelihood of building consensus in the chamber. This 
proposition relies upon the existence of “mediating” groups between two 
major ideological blocks. For instance, the presence of centrist parties in 
parliaments with a left-right divide might help to bring together distant 
political groups and thus help to build consensus. This is what Capo (1992) 
found out in his study about the Congress of Deputies in Spain. It might 
well be the case that my counterintuitive findings (the more groups the 
more consensus) is the result of the presence of mediating groups (like 
CDS or regionalist groups like PA in Andalusia or PAR in Aragon) that are 
less defined in ideological terms and can help thus building consensus. 
 
National political climate. When we are dealing with federations like the 
case of Spain, we have to take into account the political climate at the 
national level. By political climate I refer to the perception that parties are 
willing to cooperate for the common good rather than showing their 
differences in basic areas like defense, terrorism, external relations, or 
education. If the political climate is turbulent, especially among the two 
major contenders, then, consensus at the regional (or even local) level 
might be more difficult than when the political climate is more stable. 
Therefore, the consensus rate might be affected as well in the regional 
parliament.  
Among the many ways of capturing the political conflict in a society in 
a particular period of time, I decided to use the one involving the 
perceptions of qualified independent observers. In that way, we can obtain 
a proxy for the real political conflict. Twenty experts were asked to score 
the level of political conflict in Spain they observed in different legislatures 
of the Congress of Deputies.10 I offered them a scale 0–10 in which 0 is no 
conflict and 10 deep and intense conflict. The average for the period was 
5.88 and the values ranked from the lowest 4.75 of the second legislature 
(absolute majority of the socialist party) to the highest 7.21 of the 8th 
legislature (simple majority of the socialist party) or the 7.21 of the 5th 
legislature (simple majority of the socialist party). The hypothesis is that, 
in federations in which the main contenders at the regional and national 
levels largely coincide, the higher the political conflict at the national level, 
the lower the consensus rate will be because political parties, especially the 
major contenders (socialists and conservative), will be unable to reach 
agreements in the midst of a general political conflict. Certainly, making 
                                                            
10 The experts were journalists, professors, lawyers, but not politicians. 
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agreements with their rivals at the regional level in a moment of political 
turmoil at the national level could be detrimental for the parties, unless 
they agree on very institutional matters. 
However, this does not seem to be the case. The correlation coefficient 
is –0.123, which means that both variables are not related at all. The 
coefficient is not significant (p=0.292). Therefore, political conflict at the 
national level seems to have no effect on the level of consensus reached by 
political parties in regional chambers. It could be that the variable is ill-
defined or ill-built. However, the little dispersion of the measure of the 
variable (standard deviation is 0.8499) indicates that people tended to rank 
their perceptions around the mean more often than not. External 
independent observers largely coincide in their appreciation of political 
conflict, which suggests that the variable is well built. 
 
Abolute and simple majority. Another candidate to explain why consensus 
rate varies so often is the type of majority a party has in the regional 
parliament. In parliamentary systems with a proportional representation 
model, the chamber reflects with more or less accuracy the preferences of 
the voters. The more votes an electoral list gets, the more seats in 
parliament it gets. A party can have the absolute majority of seats (half of 
the seats plus one) or may have a simple majority or largest plurality of 
seats. Since parliament elects the president of the government and supports 
it, and since usually parliaments legislate after the initiative of 
governments, then we should pay attention to different scenarios affecting 
the level of consensus.  
When a party has the absolute majority of seats in a parliament and 
supports a single party government, there is no need to build any 
agreement with other parliamentary groups to have the bills passed. The 
votes of their own MPs are enough to have legislation approved. At the 
national level, most of González governments and the second legislature of 
Aznar enjoyed this situation. Similarly, there are regions where the same 
party has obtained a number of absolute majorities in the chamber (ie., 
Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha, Andalusia). Contrary, when a party gets 
the largest plurality of seats, but not the absolute majority of them, a 
multiple scenario appears. The successful party will need to build 
agreements with other parliamentary groups to have some legislation 
passed. These agreements may be built on a case by case basis or may 
reach the whole legislature period. In this case, it might be expected an 
effort to build agreements and, consequently, the rate of consensus could 
increase. However, this is not always the case. Depending on the number 
of groups, their ideological distance, and the number of seats they got after 
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elections, it might be the case that agreements are impossible and the 
government has only a minority support. In this case, the rest of the groups 
can easily vote against any initiative taken by the executive making the 
task of governing certainly difficult. In this case, the rate of consensus is 
expected to be low, and the government short lived. 
Therefore, absolute majorities may prevent consensus while simple 
majority of seats may foster it. According to data gathered on all of the 48 
legislatures, there is independence between both variables. Running a 
regression with the dummy variable type of majority (1=absolute, 
0=simple), the results is that the regression coefficient of the explanatory 
variable is –0.313, which is not so much, although the coefficient and the 
model are statistically significant (F = 9.790, p = 0.004, R2 = 0.098). That 
means that for the data gathered, consensus rate is not independent on the 
type of majority in parliament.  
There is also an attitudinal variable that can explain the variability of 
the consensus rate in regional parliaments, namely the willingness of 
politicians to reach agreements with their rivals. This is, though, a 
psychological variable that is difficult to measure and will be discarded for 
our analysis here. However, we can use a sort of a proxy to find out about 
this attitudinal variable. 
Taking into account that governments supported by the absolute 
majority of seats controlled by a single party do not need to make 
agreements with their rivals in order to pass bills by consensus, we might 
have a look at whether the party controlling the government and the 
majority of seats makes a difference in the rate of consensus.11 For the 
simplicity of the analysis I will focus only on the two major contenders at 
the national level (PSOE and PP), eliminating from the analysis the cases 
of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have always been governed by 
regional parties.12 PSOE, the socialist party, held the absolute majority of 
seats in Andalusia (2, 3, 5 legislatures), Asturias (5), Castile-La Mancha (2, 
3, 4, 5), Valencia (3), and Murcia (2, 3). PP, the conservative party (or its 
regional branch in Navarre, UPN) enjoyed absolute majorities in Rioja (4, 
5), Madrid (4, 5), Valencia (4, 5), and Murcia (4, 5). With this subset of 
                                                            
11 I need to check the cases of Rioja (2, 3 legislatures), and Aragon (3). Also, the third 
legislature of Navarra, which began with a coalition of PSOE, CDN and EA in the 
regional government, after a year split over and the government went to the hands of 
UPN (PP in Navarre) for the rest of the legislature. I have considered, then the fourth 
legislature of Navarre as governed by UPN but with the largest plurality of votes. 
12 The exception is the 5th legislature in which the PSE-PSOE entered the regional 
government. 
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cases we can see whether the party holding the absolute majority of seats in 
parliament makes a difference in the level of consensus in parliament. 
A look at the consensus rate of the aforementioned legislatures in Table 2 
suggests that with the exception of the fourth legislature of Madrid and the 
third of Castile-La Mancha, the level of consensus achieved when the PSOE 
holds the absolute majority of seats in regional parliaments is considerably 
higher on average than when the PP has the absolute majority. Actually, if we 
perform a simple regression analysis the result is a model like this:13 
 
Consensus rate = 34.471 * 0.606 absolute majority 
 
Consensus rate has been defined previously as the dependent variable of 
this study. The variable “absolute majority” has two values. When the 
PSOE is the party that has the absolute majority of seats in a regional 
chamber in a given legislature, then the value assigned has been 1. When 
the PP held the absolute majority, the assigned value was 0. Note that we 
are dealing here with absolute majorities of a single party, not coalitions of 
parties to produce an absolute majority of seats to support a government. I 
will touch upon this issue later.  
This model indicates that when the PSOE has the absolute majority of 
seats in a regional chamber, the level of consensus is 60 % higher than 
when the PP controls the parliament. Additionally, the model suggests that 
socialist MPs make a larger effort to incorporate the points of view of other 
political groups in the lawmaking process (including the PP) than the 
conservative MPs, even when they do not need the help of other groups to 
have the bills passed. 
The type of bills discussed in parliament might have also an impact in 
the rate of consensus. Bills related to the creation of universities or 
professional associations, those issued to help the victims of natural 
disasters or terrorism, are clear candidates to generate consensus. Other 
bills are less likely to become the ground in which parties build 
agreements. Further analysis will require to elaborate a classification of 
bills according to standard criteria. 
 
Discontinuities. Finally, there is a last factor that can be used to explain the 
consensus rate in regional chambers. Every legislature, a number of 
                                                            
13 The Model is significant since p=0.010. The probability associated to the regression 
coefficient is p=0.010. R square is 0.368, which means that the variable “absolute 
majority” explains more than a third of the variability of the dependent variable 
“consensus rate”. 
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candidates becomes new MPs. The proportion of newcomers in a 
legislature is considered here the circulation rate as opposed to the 
permanence rate.14 This rate might be higher or lower depending on a 
number of factors like the strategy of the party in the making of the 
electoral list, the position of the party in the opposition or the government, 
the existence of quotas, and the like. These new MPs usually come to the 
chamber without contacts and friendship relationships with the rivals. If 
they are young and inexperienced, most likely they will also be 
ideologically rather than pragmatically oriented. All these factors might 
have an effect in their performance in the regional chamber. In essence, 
this is the explanations that advanced Linz to explain the failure of the 
Spanish Second Republic. A bunch of new MPs, highly ideologized and 
largely lacking friendship ties to their rivals, were unable to build the 
necessary consensus to keep the polity stable. 
 
Table 3  Discontinuity of political elites in regional parliaments 
 Legislatures  
 2 3 4 5 6 7 Avge. 
Andalusia 61 49 49 38 49 46 48.66 
Aragon 60 61 58 51 54  56.8 
Asturias 67 44 44 60 36  50.2 
Baleares 56 52 52 56 54  54 
Canarias 58 57 52 63 58  57.6 
Cantabria 74 46 56 51 56  56.6 
Castilla-La Mancha 66 74 74 66 64  68.8 
Castilla-Leon 66 55 51 47 62  56.2 
Cataluna 61 42 43 44 53 56 49.83 
Extremadura 52 51 57 54 43  51.4 
Galicia 55 68 36 64 43 64 55 
La Rioja 67 64 51 58 58  59.6 
Madrid 57 49 54 56 57  54.6 
Murcia 73 64 73 58 54  64.4 
Navarra 62 60 70 72 62  65.2 
Basque Country 61 48 56 57 52 37 51.83 
Valencia 50 49 54 54 58  53 
TOTAL 61.52 54.88 54.70 55.82 53.70 50.75 56.10 
Note: I have not included the first legislature because the circulation rate is 100 % since 
all members are new to parliament. 
 
As data in Table 1 show, the average circulation rate for the period 1980–
2005 in regional parliaments is 56.1.15 That means that on average, more 
                                                            
14 The permanence rate refers to the proportion of MPs that holds a seat in any given 
legislature and the previous one. 
15 To keep into account: % of newcomers in the party supporting the government can be 
an explanatory variable. The older the institution, the lower the circulation rate (Putnam, 
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than half of MPs (56 %) in each legislature are new in the job. MPs tend to 
circulate more in Castilla-La Mancha, Navarre and Murcia, while tend to 
repeat in the chamber more often in Andalusia, Catalonia, and Asturias. 
Given that there are different electoral cycles, I will not discuss variations 
within regions. There are several factors that have been tested to explain 
the circulation rate in parliamentary systems (Coller 2002): changes in 
political leadership, growth of the parliamentary group, expectations of 
winning the elections, and absolute majorities. These elements have an 
effect on the rate of circulation in parliaments. 
Although interesting in itself, the circulation of MPs in regional 
parliaments is just an independent variable among others in this study. As 
we have seen, the consensus rate varies and we try to find out a plausible 
explanation for it. It is worth then to find out whether there is any 
relationship between the consensus rate (dependent variable) and the 
circulation rate. Previous research indicated that for the pair of cases of 
Catalonia and Andalusia, and Valencia and Madrid, the relationship was 
negative so that an increment in the rate of circulation meant a decrease in 
the rate of consensus (Coller 2002). There I warned that more cases needed 
to be added. Now, when I incorporate the 48 cases for which I could gather 
information, the correlation test indicates that the relationship between 
circulation and consensus is non existent. Pearson correlation coefficient is 
0.007, which is to say that both variables are independent (p=0.963). 
In my previous research, as well, I indicated that given that modern 
parliamentarism is mainly based on the decisions of a hyperelite who tends 
to control and coordinate parliamentary groups as well as becoming their 
“public image” appearing constantly in the mass media, it should be 
interesting to see whether circulation of this hyperelite has an effect on the 
consensus reached in parliaments. The idea is that, assuming this group 
makes decisions on what will finally be agreed upon with the rivals and the 
final vote of parliamentary groups, insofar there is a high discontinuity in 
this group, chances are that, following Linz’s hypothesis, they will have 
difficulties reaching agreements with their rivals. 
I run a regression using the variable “circulation in the hyperelite”. The 
variable counted all members holding positions of power in each regional 
parliament in each legislature. By positions of power I considered those 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Loewenberg 106, Blondel 73:86). There is no optimal circulation rate (Coller 1999, 
Uriarte 97:273). Cuanta menos circulación, mayor es la profesionalización. El número de 
legislaturas en las que se está presente permite ver a los políticos profesionales. Factors 
explaining turnover (Matthews 1985:40-1): profesionalization, less party competition, 
attractiveness of parliamentary career, decisión of stepping out, pacts to substitute one 
MP for another. 
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who preside, are vicepresidents or secretaries of legislative committees, 
speakers of the group, and members of the Presidency of the parliament 
(usually a president, two vicepresidents and two secretaries). If there are 
people who make decisions in parliament concerning the points to be 
negotiated in a proposed bill, these MPs are, no doubt, those who decide, to 
use a Wright Mills’ dictum. The lowest circulation rate (only 20 % of 
hyperelite members are new into the group) can be found in Murcia in the 
fifth legislature. The highest proportion of newcomers into the group with 
power in regional chambers (89 %) can be found in the fourth legislature of 
Castile-La Mancha, which is the region together with Navarre and 
Andalusia with the highest proportions of circulation. The average 
circulation rate is 71 %, with a standard deviation of 14 points. The 
regression model is as follows: 
 
Consensus rate = 30.956 * 0.262 Circulation of hyperlite group 
 
The regression model suggests counterintuitive results. On the one hand, it 
indicates that the relationship between both variables is positive. That 
means that the higher the circulation, the higher the consensus. However, 
the impact of the latter in the former is low. For each 1 % that the 
circulation of the hyperelite grows, the consensus rate will grow as well 
2.6 %. The probability associated to the regression coefficient is p=0.072, 
R square is 0.069, which is not much. R square suggests that the 
contribution of the independent variable into the explanation of the 
variability of the dependent variable is quite low (7 %). Notwithstanding 
these counterintuitive results, further research is needed in order to double 
check them and try to find alternative explanations. 
It seems that although circulation might have a very mild and 
counterintuitive effect in the consensus rate of regional parliaments in 
Spain, there are other variables that do not participate at all in the 
explanation of the variability of the variable. However, it seems that there 
is a variable that is quite important. First, the fact that a party has the 
absolute majority of seats in parliament, but additionally, it is very relevant 
whether the party is the conservative or the socialist one. It seems for these 
preliminary results that the socialists are more open to reach pacts with 
their rivals (including the PP) than their conservative rivals are. 
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Research agenda 
No conclusion can be reached at this stage of the research process. This is a 
work in progress that tries to find out the associates of consensus (and 
conflict). We have identified a way of detecting and measuring consensus 
(and conflict) and, consequently, we have explored the possibility of 
explaining it using different variables at hand. Further variables to take into 
account are the electoral competition index, the type of government, the 
ideological polarization, and a set of social variables that account for the 
internal composition of the parliamentarian elite. 
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Appendix. Electoral cycles in regional elections 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
 Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños Fecha Escaños
Andalucía 23-5-82 109 22-6-86 109 23-6-90 109 12-6-94 109 3-3-96 109 12-3-00 109 14-3-04 109 9-3-08 109 
Aragón 8-5-83 66 10-6-87 67 26-5-91 67 28-5-95 67 13-6-99 67 25-5-03 67 20-5-07 67 
Asturias 8-5-83 45 10-6-87 45 26-5-91 45 28-5-95 45 13-6-99 45 25-5-03 45 20-5-07 45 
Canarias 8-5-83 60 10-6-87 60 26-5-91 60 28-5-95 60 13-6-99 60 25-5-03 60 20-5-07 60 
Cantabria 8-5-83 35 10-6-87 39 26-5-91 39 28-5-95 39 13-6-99 39 25-5-03 39 20-5-07 39 
Castilla y León 8-5-83 84 10-6-87 84 26-5-91 84 28-5-95 84 13-6-99 83 25-5-03 82 20-5-07 83 
C-La Mancha 8-5-83 44 10-6-87 47 26-5-91 47 28-5-95 47 13-6-99 47 25-5-03 47 20-5-07 47 
Cataluña 20-3-80 135 29-4-84 135 29-5-88 135 15-3-92 135 19-11-95 135 17-10-99135 16-11-03135 06 135 
C. Valenciana 8-5-83 89 10-6-87 89 26-5-91 89 28-5-95 89 13-6-99 89 25-5-03 89 20-5-07 89 
Extremadura 8-5-83 65 10-6-87 65 26-5-91 65 28-5-95 65 13-6-99 65 25-5-03 65 20-5-07 65 
Galicia 20-10-8171 24-11-85 71 17-12-8975 17-10-9375 19-10-97 75 21-10-0175 19-06-0575 
Islas Baleares 8-5-83 54 10-6-87 59 26-5-91 59 28-5-95 59 13-6-99 59 25-5-03 59 20-5-07 59 
La Rioja 8-5-83 35 10-6-87 33 26-5-91 33 28-5-95 33 13-6-99 33 25-5-03 33 20-5-07 33 
Madrid 8-5-83 94 10-6-87 96 26-5-91 101 28-5-95 103 13-6-99 102 26-10-03111 20-5-07 120 
Murcia 8-5-83 43 10-6-87 45 26-5-91 45 28-5-95 45 13-6-99 45 25-5-03 45 20-5-07 45 
Navarra 8-5-83 50 10-6-87 50 26-5-91 50 28-5-95 50 13-6-99 50 25-5-03 50 20-5-07 50 
País Vasco 9-3-80 60 26-2-84 75 30-11-8675 28-10-9075 23-10-94 75 25-10-9875 13-5-01 75 17-03-0575 
Congreso  1979 350 1982 350 1986 350 1989 350 1993 350 1996 350 2000 350 2004 350 
Senado 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 
 
WHO REGULATES THE FOOD BUSINESS  
– AND WHO SHOULD? 
Anu Lähteenmäki-Uutela 
 
Abstract 
Food business is regulated by international organisations such as the WTO and Co-
dex Alimentarius, parliaments, administrative agencies, food companies, and con-
sumers. Regulation should be based on a strategy that has sustainable food consump-
tion and food security as a goal. The decision on who regulates should be based on 
careful consideration of the benefits of command-and-control vs. voluntary schemes. 
The WTO and the UN organisations must be developed in order to better address 
global issues. Nation-states must work together as food chains are global. Regulatory 
agencies have scientific expertise, but administrative soft-law has problems relating 
to legal certainty and equality. Relying on companies to create self-regulation means 
relying on business ethics. Sometimes, business ethics is based on what the consum-
ers want to buy. Regulation cannot therefore be trusted with businesses only. The 
consumer movement has its important purpose in making companies behave. How-
ever, a large part of consumers are not interested in food issues such as health or 
ethical questions. Sustainability of global food chains cannot be guaranteed by con-
sumer movement only. Food regulation should be based on science (for example: 
food and nutrition science, economics, behavioural sciences) and ethics, and drafted 
jointly among all stakeholders. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper discusses food regulation: who regulates the food business, and 
based on what principles and values. The substance of food regulation is unde-
niably important to humans both as consumers and as citizens. We use the wide 
concept of food regulation here, referring to rules that affect the following ques-
tions: what food is produced, how much food is produced, where food is pro-
duced, how food is produced, how food is marketed, what is the price of food 
sold, how food is consumed, etc. Legal questions involved in food production 
and marketing are often simultaneously questions of ethics. Examples are: 
- How should production animals be treated? 
- Should growth hormones for animals be allowed? 
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- What and how much chemicals should be used in farming and food 
production? 
- Should GMOs be allowed in food? 
- Does origin matter? Should Europeans favour European food? 
- Who is responsible for children’s obesity? 
- How much meat can we eat? 
- Where to put the rubbish? 
 
The food system is global. Likewise, food regulation is increasingly global. 
Food is regulated at least by global organisations, nation-states, food control 
authorities, companies, and consumers. The situation may suitably be called 
pluralism in sources of law. A part of regulation is mandatory, another part is 
voluntary. In this paper, we aim to critically evaluate various regulators in or-
der to form an opinion on who should regulate food business. 
 
 
2 World Trade Organisation 
At the international level, the WTO regime defines boundaries for food regu-
lation, particularly as this regulation relates to food trade. The most important 
agreements here are the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). The SPS Agree-
ment defines the rights and obligations of members with respect to application 
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures meaning laws and standards on food 
safety, animal health and plant health. Basically, the SPS agreement defines 
how food is to be regulated in order to maintain the goals of the more general 
TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) agreement1. The Agreement on Agriculture 
of 15 December 1993 came into effect with the establishment of the WTO at 
the beginning of 1995. The Agreement on Agriculture has three central "pil-
lars": market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. Market access 
means rules that relate to foreign products entering a country’s market: cus-
toms duties and minimum access for imports. Minimum access means import 
quotas by product groups.2 Domestic support means national production sup-
port or subsidies to agriculture. Export subsidies are nationally granted to sup-
port a country’s agricultural exports. The goal of the Agriculture Agreement is 
                                                 
1 Hollo 2008, 26.  
2 European Parliament Fact Sheets. 4.1.7. External agricultural policy: agricultural agreements 
under GATT/WTO. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_1_7_en.htm. 
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to liberalize food trade. This means removing barriers in order to create a 
market where food is produced where it can be done effectively.  
Currently, the WTO negotiations go on under the Doha Development 
Agenda. The Doha meeting was held in 2001. As regards agriculture, the plan 
is to eliminate export subsidies, as well as domestic support that distorts trade. 
Restrictions to market access are to be “substantially reduced”. Food security, 
rural development, and environmental issues are listed as “non-trade con-
cerns” that will be “taken into account”, as provided for in the Agriculture 
Agreement. The objective is to establish a fair and market-oriented trading 
system. The purpose is to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in 
world agricultural markets. The Doha declaration stresses special and differen-
tial treatment for developing countries. The negotiation outcome should en-
able developing countries to meet their needs, particularly as regards food se-
curity and rural development.3 In the Hong Kong meeting in 2005, ministers 
affirmed the decisions and declarations accepted during the Doha conference. 
Agriculture subsidies were a primary matter of discussion. There were pro-
posals that exemptions need to be phased out. Member states agreed to elimi-
nate most of the subsidies by the end of December 2013.4 
The EU is pushing for the precautionary principle and the non-trade con-
cerns to be included in the WTO trade talks. The “European model of agricul-
ture” highlights the multifunctional role of agriculture: farming not only pro-
duces consumable commodities but also offers a whole range of services to 
society in terms of maintaining the environment and the countryside. Accord-
ing to EU negotiators, this multifunctionality must be protected by the public 
authorities. The EU calls for “due consideration for non-trade concerns”: so-
cial, health, cultural and environmental issues.5. The WTO agreements need to 
be clearer on “other legitimate concerns” besides science. The EC food safety 
risk analysis model explicitly permits consideration of these “other legitimate 
factors” when adopting risk regulation.6 
Wilkinson sees civil society and development as two key challenges facing 
the WTO. NGOs critique the WTO for promoting competition between com-
panies and nations leading to suffering of employees and the environment7. 
Simultaneously, developing countries resist putting environmental and em-
                                                 
3 WTO web page: Doha declaration explained.  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#agriculture. 
4 Singh 2008, 17.  
5 European Parliament Fact Sheets. 
6Johnecheck, 2008, 499.  
7 Wilkinson 2000, 140. 
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ployee rights on the WTO agendas. This opposition stems from the fear that 
legislation will be used as veiled protectionism, undermining the competitive-
ness of the South8. According to Singh, developed nations cannot support their 
own industries at the expense of the third world poor. Free trade and fair trade 
must go together. Developed nations must comply with international agree-
ments in good faith. Developed countries cannot block imports from develop-
ing countries and at the same time expect them to pay their debts.9 The role of 
the WTO, and particularly its developed member states, is to let agriculture in 
developing countries grow. Principles of free trade must be accompanied by 
principles of global equity.  
 The WTO could follow the EC model, if the WTO is to address itself to 
global issues other than trade. Like the WTO, the European Union originally 
was about removing barriers to trade. Now, the EU sees other policy goals 
such as consumer protection as autonomous and equally important objec-
tives.10 Could the WTO follow a similar path? The WTO is in its TBT and 
SPS Agreement referring to the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius standards, 
which means global food safety law currently exists under WTO law. This 
global food law under the WTO could in our opinion just as well include other 
standards beside safety standards, such as environmental and ethical standards. 
How about food security? Food safety is included in the wider concept of food 
security, which legally translates into right to food. If food safety is governed 
through the WTO, could the WTO also govern food security as a whole? It 
seems difficult. For creating welfare-enhancing global trade, the approach 
recommended by the FAO involves investing in human capital, institutions, 
and infrastructure, together with establishing safety nets to protect vulnerable 
people during the transition to freer trade11. The WTO cannot force states to 
invest in agriculture, good governance, etc. It is more suitably a job for the 
FAO to coordinate policies and to influence governments. Perhaps it is the 
FAO that should be strengthened, instead of transferring food security gov-
ernance under the WTO. Also the actions of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) affect food security. Like the WTO, the IMF has been accused of pro-
moting globalization regardless of consequences. The IMF is at the moment 
rethinking its mandate in global economic policy. 
                                                 
8 Wilkinson 2000, 143. 
9 Singh 2009, 20. 
10 Johnecheck 2008, 498. European food law is often based on several Articles of the Treaty, 
one Article being free trade. 
11 FAO 2005. 
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In addition to demands for developing the WTO, it has also been proposed 
that the global food system should be restructured by taking it outside the ter-
rain of the WTO altogether. Rosset, for example, sees food as more than a 
commodity. For him, food is about farming and developing rural societies. 
Rosset argues for a food and agricultural system without the WTO that: pro-
vides everyone with adequate, affordable, healthy, tasty and culturally appro-
priate food; offers rural people the opportunity for a life with dignity, in which 
they earn a living wage for their labour; contributes to broad-based, inclusive 
economic development at the local, regional and national levels; and con-
serves rural environments and landscapes, and rural-based cultural and culi-
nary traditions, based on the sustainable long-term management of productive 
natural resources (soil, water, genetic resources and other biodiversity) by ru-
ral people themselves.12 We find it unlikely that the WTO would step out of 
agriculture, as trade in agricultural products is financially important to all the 
powerful WTO members. The WTO regime might still grow into a direction 
where local production of basic food is favored, if such a system is proved to 
better guarantee the legal right to food. The legal agreements on trade must be 
based on economic facts and human rights. 
 
 
3 Codex Alimentarius and other Standards Bodies 
The food business is also regulated by the UN organisations WHO and FAO 
through Codex Alimentarius. Codex Alimentarius is an international organiza-
tion governing foodstuffs and operating under the United Nations organiza-
tions FAO13 and WHO14. Codex documents are global food law15. Codex 
Alimentarius pursues to protect the health of consumers and to promote fair 
international food trade.16’Codex is similar to the EU in harmonizing food 
safety standards in order to facilitate trade. Codex Alimentarius Commission 
is the highest decision-making body, where the representatives of the ap-
proximately 18017 member states meet. The Commission assembles every year. 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is the most important global actor draft-
                                                 
12 Rosset 2006, 14.  
13 Food and Agriculture Organization. 
14 World Health Organization. 
15 Codex Alimentarius means food law. 
16 Codex Alimentarius web page. http://www.codexalimentarius.net. 
17 Counted on Codex web page  
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/members_area.jsp?lang=EN. February 2010. 
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ing food standards. The European Community, represented by the Commis-
sion18, and EU Member States separately are members of Codex. 
Codex documents are in the forms of standards, codes of practice, guide-
lines, principles, recommendations, etc. Standards often relate to product fea-
tures and can be very precise setting for example MRLs (maximum residue 
levels) for pesticides or medicinal substances in foods. For example there is a 
standard for canned baby food and a standard for frozen spinach. Codes of 
practice guide procedure concerning production, preparation, transport and 
storage, including HACCP systems. Guidelines exist on nutrition and health 
claims19whereas principles are more general and relate to import and export 
certificates. The division between different document types is not important as 
none of the Codex documents are directly binding on food industry operators. 
All of the above-mentioned document types are listed under ‘standards’ on the 
Codex web page20. 
Codex Alimentarius is connected to the WTO. In governing international 
trade, international standards are an important source of law. With foods, this 
means Codex Alimentarius standards. In WTO disputes, food standards that 
are stricter than Codex standards will be considered illegal restrictions to 
trade. This happened both in the Hormones case of 199821 and the Sardines 
case of 200222. In the Hormones case, following a complaint from the USA 
and Canada, a WTO panel found that the EU's ban on the import of hormone-
treated meat was incompatible with the SPS Agreement. In the Sardines dis-
pute, initiated by Peru,
 
the WTO’s Appellate Body found that an EU regula-
tion, which allowed only one fish species to be labeled as “sardines,” violated 
the WTO’s TBT Agreement. The Codex standard on sardines was used as a 
reference, and the EU regulation clearly contradicted the Codex standard23.  
There are also other standards organisations that affect the food business, 
such as the ISO. ISO is the International Organisation for Standardisation, and 
has published several standards related to the food industry. For example the 
International Standard ISO 22000:2005 is promoted in the following manner: 
“food safety management system meeting the requirements of the Standard 
                                                 
18 More precisely, its Directorate General on Health and Consumer Protection. 
19 CAC/GL 23. 1997. Revised 2004, amended 2008. 
20 Codex Alimentarius web page. http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do?lang=en. 
21 EC measures concerning meat and meat products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R of 16 
January 1998. (AB-1997-4). 
22 European Communities. Trade Description of Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (decided Sept. 26, 2002) (adopted Oct. 23, 2002).  
23 Park – Wold 2005.  
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could be the entry ticket to increased business in the global market and partici-
pation in cross-border food supply chains”24.25. The TBT Agreement of the 
WTO requires that technical regulations and international standards are devel-
oped and implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, and without creating 
unnecessary obstacles to trade. The TBT Agreement recommends the recourse 
to international standards wherever possible while drafting technical regula-
tions.26 ISO/IEC27 standards are particularly referred to in the TBT Agreement28. 
ISO is a non-governmental organization “forming a bridge between the public 
and private sectors”, and a network of the national standards institutes of its 157 
member countries. Many of the member institutes are part of the governmental 
structure of their countries, while others have been set up by national partner-
ships of industry associations.29 Legally describing ISO standards is difficult. 
They are not agreements between states as Codex standards, and they are not 
self-regulating because governments are involved. They are followed voluntar-
ily, although abiding by a standard might be required in practice.  
 
 
4 National Legislators 
Above, we discussed the international framework for food law. Food business is 
naturally also regulated by states in the form of national legislation, which is 
binding and enforceable by national courts. Besides sovereign states, European 
food business is regulated by the EU. In fact, the EU is responsible for most of 
European food legislation, the role of the member states being limited. The US 
and China, for example, have their own food legislation. National rules are in 
reality copies or modifications of rules in other countries. Above, we stated that 
the food system is global. For example in Finland, the food on the tables is from 
                                                 
24 ISO web page. http://www.iso.org/iso/publications_and_e-products/checklists.htm. 
25 ISO 22000 is the standard on food safety management systems, including requirements for 
any operator in the food chain. Other important standards related to the food industry are: 
ISO/TS 22003:2007, which includes requirements for bodies that provide audits and certifi-
cation of food safety management systems, ISO 22005:2007, which is about traceability in 
the feed and food chain, and ISO 24276:2006, which standardizes methods of analysis for 
detecting GMOs. ISO web page. http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=35466. 
26 Commission Communication on Standards 2004, 7. 
27 “The International Electrotechnical Commission is the international standards and con-
formity assessment body for all fields of electrotechnology.” http://www.iec.ch/. 
28 Annex 1 of the Agreement. 
29 ISO web page. http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm. 
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all over the world. Likewise, Finnish food is exported into several countries. 
Raw materials in a single food product may come from all continents. 
In regulating global business, global rules are considered necessary. The 
main goal of global harmonization of rules is to facilitate trade. National rules 
are often creating obstacles to trade. Sometimes this is the very goal of regula-
tion, sometimes its by-product. With agricultural subsidies and export support, 
the goal is to further national interests. In other situations, national rules may 
be related to traditional products, for example. In international trade law, na-
tional rules that create obstacles to trade are justified only if they are based on 
national protection of citizen’s lawful interests. Likewise in the EU, a member 
state may refrain from implementing EU regulations if an exception is needed 
to serve a national interest, which is for example related to public health. 
We will not go further into the details of national food law here. National 
law, that is rules made by national parliaments, is still relevant in regulating 
food. For example, the US and the EU have different rules on GM foods, pill-
form foods, and food advertising. A part of national food law may be classi-
fied as hard law, another part consists of administrative soft law discussed in 
the next chapter. Food companies must adjust to different national require-
ments, making it impossible to launch global products using single formats for 
contents and labels. Even in the EU, member states interpret the same direc-
tives differently. For example, some countries consider a health-related prod-
uct a medicine, while other countries consider the same product a food. The 
national food law will not seize to exist. Still, the development is towards 
harmonization. This is because harmonized rules benefit large companies and 
developed countries, and they are eager to defend their interests. 
 
 
5 Administrative Agencies 
Today, a large part of regulatory activities lies within the food agencies. They 
give their various guidelines, recommendations, and scientific opinions. Even 
though non-binding in principle, this administrative soft law is followed by 
food companies just as hard law norms. As law-makers are typically not ex-
perts of food science, many questions are left for the implementers to decide 
upon. For example, the European Food Safety Authority decides on what type 
of scientific evidence it requires before it lets food marketers use a certain 
health claim. In Europe, there are also dozens of national food control authori-
ties that implement food law in practice. The United States Food and Drug 
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Administration has created volumes of soft law guidelines. Also in China, the 
role of administrative organs, such as the Ministry of Health and the State 
Food and Drug Administration, is very important in determining the content of 
food regulation in practice.  
Often, hard law norms are fairly general, whereas details are given by ad-
ministrative instruments. The reasons for this division of work are the need for 
scientific expertise, the need for great regulatory detail, and, following the two 
other reasons, the need for constant changes. This means that a large part of 
food regulation is given by the administrators, not the legislators. More impor-
tantly, this is also the detailed part that is particularly relevant from the entre-
preneur’s perspective. The binding nature of ‘guidelines’, ‘notifications’, 
‘procedures’, etc. varies. In Europe, soft law guidelines are typically attached 
with statements of the type “this is not binding; only the laws are binding”. 
This leaves entrepreneurs legally insecure: the agencies presume that soft law 
guidelines are followed, but guidelines can suddenly be abolished or changed, 
or not be adhered to in individual cases.  
According to Koulu, the area of soft law will likely broaden in the future. 
Soft law is favoured by actors who produce it because it is fast and inexpensive 
as there is no need to find a political compromise. The experts can merely draft 
soft law and publish it. Koulu points out that scientific expertise of law-makers 
will not automatically lead to high quality laws. Calls for better soft regulation 
have not emerged, although better regulation as regards hard law has received 
much attention. Soft law is beyond quality control, as the producer of soft law 
can revert to the fact that soft law is non-binding. Problems of legislative com-
petence, legal coherence, legal interpretation, or legal protections for regulation 
targets can similarly be avoided.30 Simultaneously, normative terms are used 
perhaps to make regulation targets overlook the non-binding nature of soft 
law31.We are of the view that if a document comes from a regulatory agency, an 
average citizen will understand it being the law. Legal certainty reasons support 
giving legal weight to guidelines by regulatory agencies. 
Non-binding guidelines are a part of an implementation strategy where 
agencies have a lot of power and implementation is based on co-operation, 
flexibility, and negotiation. Guidance by guidelines is supplemented by indi-
vidual guidance given by agencies to targets of regulation. Implementation 
happens through constant interaction between entrepreneurs and the imple-
menting agencies. Business operators often ask the foodstuff and medicine 
                                                 
30 Koulu 2009, 119–120. 
31 Koulu 2009, 121. 
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agencies for information on how to fulfill their legal requirements, and the 
agencies explain – and create – the law as best they can. Persuading the regu-
lation targets to follow the rules is often cheaper and faster than forcing them 
to follow the rules. Using sanctions might spoil the cooperation spirit. 
The cooperation strategy has its limits, though. First, this kind of imple-
mentation strategy can only work when regulation targets are motivated to 
follow the rules32. Getting caught selling products that are hazardous to health 
will have a strong impact on company image for years. For this reason, most 
food and medicine companies are completely willing to try their best to avoid 
this. ‘Normal’ food industry operators and pharmaceutical companies are re-
sponsible, or at least interested in their responsible image. However, some-
times business operators will not listen to any non-binding guidance or per-
suasion. All kinds of ‘magic’ foods and food supplements marketed for weight 
loss both in Europe and China can be mentioned as examples. These products 
are continuously marketed with false and misleading claims, and the agencies 
must use sanctions to get them off the markets. For these companies, short-
term financial gains are more important than long-term credibility. 
Secondly, there is the risk of so-called regulatory capture, where the ob-
jects of regulation push their demands so far that they actually get to decide 
how they are regulated. Agencies must be careful of not giving too much 
weight on the industry opinion only. Cooperation and mutual understanding 
does not mean that the agencies must always please the industry. It merely 
means that, if possible, industry efforts are recognized, and overly burden-
some measures are avoided. The third important challenge of the strategy is 
treating entrepreneurs equally. The use of non-binding guidelines and case-by-
case information guidance means that implementation is flexible in a certain 
meaning. This brings the negotiation element into the picture. The information 
and negotiation strategy is based on trust, and it will lose its foundation if im-
plementation takes place on unequal terms. Flexibility cannot mean that com-
panies with similar risks are treated in a different manner. Equal treatment is 
the responsibility of the agencies. Ethical rules and implementation principles 
must be discussed among agency staff. In the supranational context, the deci-
sion-making rules are even more important. 
Scientific risk assessments and scientific guidelines are the most suitable 
tasks for food agencies. If we want impartial risk assessments based on science, 
we must guarantee independence of the agencies from political actors. This is 
because in political reality, it is tempting to pursue local short-term interests 
                                                 
32 Tala 2001, 271.  
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instead of common good. Creating total independence of an agency, on the 
other hand, creates a control problem. The agency might develop a will of its 
own. The control problem can be avoided by setting substantive decision-
making criteria by law, in which case it is possible to subject decisions of regu-
latory agencies to review by courts. This is what Krapohl suggests33. This 
means the political actors must set the legal principles under which an agency 
acts. Only after this can implementation be trusted within the regulatory agency. 
 
 
6 Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation also has its role in the food business. Self-regulation is per-
formed by business organisations such as the CIAA34, and by single food 
businesses themselves. Food companies and their representatives do use vari-
ous ethics guidelines. Compared to law, food companies prefer self-regulation 
and focus on business ethics. Law is often mentioned merely as a side note in 
an ethics report. The U.S. legal system leaves more room to business ethics 
and relies on the civil society to resolve ethical issues, whereas the European 
legal system traditionally focuses on binding legislation. 
In Europe, food legislation is getting increasingly complicated, and also 
stricter as more areas are covered. The European food industry has attempted 
to hold back the tide of legislation, and instead favours self-regulation. The 
most important actor speaking for self-regulation is the CIAA, Confederation 
of the Food and Drink Industries in the EU.35 CIAA calls for simpler, clearer 
legislation and shorter, less burdensome legal procedures. According to the 
CIAA, the food and drink industry is one of the most regulated sectors in 
Europe. They claim “better regulation, including industry self-regulation, can 
deliver benefits to European consumers faster and help to promote higher 
growth and employment”. They are working for “a better functioning single 
market, fewer administrative burdens, and a more supportive business envi-
ronment”. According to the CIAA, this is needed particularly to help small 
and medium-sized companies.36  
                                                 
33 Krapohl 2004. 
34 Confédération des industries agro-alimentaires de l'UE – Confederation of the food and 
drink industries of the EU. 
35 CIAA membership is made up of 25 National Federations, including 3 observers, 30 EU sector 
associations representing different food industry sectors, and 20 major food and drink companies. 
36 http://www.ciaa.be/pages_en/homepage.asp. 
 74
The CIAA considers that “many of the problems faced by the food and 
drink industry with existing legislation should be solved through a better, sim-
pler, more proportionate and a more competitive EU regulatory framework”. 
They recommend the following principles on food law: 
- Legislation must be clear to prevent diverging interpretation, 
- Legal requirements must be practically achievable and enforceable, 
- Legislation must be based on science, 
- Procedures must be clear and predictable, including precise timetables, 
- Sufficient lead-in times, where possible, are needed to minimize im-
plementation costs.37 
 
To support their argument that self-regulation is a viable alternative, the CIAA 
has indeed drafted numerous documents that can be classified as soft law. The 
CIAA for example created a voluntary nutrition labelling scheme. The food 
industry’s concerns and suggestions need to be taken seriously by the European 
Commission. In particular, the regulatory procedures should be transparent and 
not waste the efforts of all the parties involved. However, the food industry 
might not actually want to understand all the substantial laws as some of the 
complicated and inconveniently strict laws are burdensome. By demanding 
‘simple’, we suspect that they simultaneously wish for ‘less restrictive’.  
ElAmin urges the industry to take self-regulation much more seriously if 
they want the legislators to step aside. The industry organizations are giving 
vague promises that they will follow a common line over issues such as adver-
tising, obesity, health claims and nutritional content. If they really believe 
their own codes could be used instead of EU legislation, they should take up 
the challenge and actually draft these codes.38 Irresponsible companies cannot 
be given the responsibility of people’s health. General problems with self-
regulation relate to unclear responsibilities, free riders, implementation and 
control, and restricting competition39. Interests of dominant companies might 
overweigh public and societal interests40. Future business regulation might 
increasingly be in the form of co-regulation, combining the benefits of law 
and self-regulation41. According to Parker and Braithwaite, it is necessary to 
                                                 
37 Review of CIAA Priorities and Objectives for Better Regulation in light of the Commission 
proposals to simplify EU legislation. CPT/003/07E-Final Brussels, 28 February 2007. Page 5. 
38 ElAmin 2006.  
39 Tala 2009, 330–331. 
40 Tala 2009, 330. 
41 See Tala 2009, 331–332 on benefits and problems of co-regulation. 
 75
understand how law connects with other sources of normative ordering42. 
Regulation is pluralized and decentralized, where the new role of states is to 
steer public-private partnerships43. 
 
 
7 Consumers as Regulators 
Consumers and their organisations can also be seen as regulators as consumer 
activism may force companies to change their products and behaviour. We see 
self-regulation and consumer activism closely connected. This relates to a basic 
question of business law vs. business ethics. Either businesses are: 1) forced to 
act in a sustainable manner, or 2) trusted to do it by themselves. The latter op-
tion of trusting companies in practice means leaving it to consumers to force 
businesses to act responsibly, presumably through the price mechanism and 
boycotts. This means that self-regulation relies on active consumerism. Few 
people believe that businesses will act responsibly merely because they want to 
do the right thing: they do it for their reputation and image as these affect sales. 
In our opinion, the question of why companies are responsible is not particu-
larly significant. If the consumer movement is strong enough, companies will 
presumably stay responsible and business laws are not needed. Consumer de-
mands in product safety and marketing information are in practice always oppo-
site to the industry propositions. Perhaps consumers are trying to get more than 
they actually want in order to get at least something. Consumers often ask for 
things that they don’t actually need, and certainly don’t want if there is a cost to 
it. They also ask for things that are certainly not good for them. Consumers are 
often ignorant, indifferent, or even self-destructive. These human traits and hab-
its need to be examined before leaving regulation to consumers only. 
In practice, law has often been stricter than food company codes. Focus on 
business ethics might be used to block binding legislation or to blur consumers. 
Consumers do not always have adequate information on agricultural trade, 
food politics, or nutrition. Often, they are not even interested on these issues. 
The irrational part of human brain will probably not feel as responsible over 
producers in third-world countries as it should. Neither will the irrational per-
son start eating healthy. This is because the primitive part of human brain is 
still concerned over avoiding starvation, and feeding the family. Therefore, we 
                                                 
42 Parker & Braithwaite 2005, 137. 
43 Parker & Braithwaite 2005, 129. 
 76
need to carefully consider before letting consumers take responsibility over 
global food chains. Regulators need to focus on the ultimate goals of food law, 
and ethics and sustainable development need to be at the top of the list. Gov-
ernments need to consider alternatives to legislation, such as co-regulation, 
self-regulation or information guidance. If consumers lack necessary expertise 
or interest in ethical issues, legislators might be wise not to let markets decide. 
This means governments might need to enact laws that will make all food 
business fair trade. The scientific community is responsible for providing the 
necessary information for decision-making, including information on con-
sumer behaviour and future trends. Guiding consumer minds through taxation 
might be considered necessary, and is already done in several countries. 
 
 
8 Conclusions 
8.1 Who should regulate food? 
We are of the view that food should be regulated by everyone involved: the 
stakeholders should regulate the food business together. A consumer cannot 
be presumed to have adequate time and resources for long-time planning of 
food chain sustainability. Above, we concluded that we cannot leave food 
regulation to food companies and rely on business ethics only. Self-regulation 
should not exist just because the legislator is too busy to react on some issue, 
the legislator wants to get the easy way out, or just because the industry claims 
that legislation is not welcome. However, both businesses and consumers need 
to be heard and closely connected to regulatory procedures.  
International cooperation between public and private actors is needed, en-
gaging governments, NGOs, companies, and consumers. NGOs promoting 
human rights and environmental issues are increasingly active. In practice, the 
most powerful players tend to get the last word on regulation. This means 
powerful companies and industry groups that act through lobbying govern-
ments and food control authorities. Governments, on the other hand, look out 
for their interests. For example, the EU is willing to diffuse European stan-
dards internationally, particularly to neighboring countries.44 It is beneficial to 
European companies if European standards are diffused into other markets, as 
the need to modify processes and products gets smaller. The lead for countries 
                                                 
44 Commission Communication on Standards 2004, 3–4. 
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in developing globally accepted standards is seen as a lead for companies to 
accessing markets. A shift of balance in international negotiation powers will 
affect the negotiation result on food regulation. 
Codex Alimentarius is where international food standards are currently 
drafted. Codex is important particularly because Codex standards are ac-
knowledged by the WTO agreements as a source of international food law. 
The power struggles inside Codex are crucial to global food regulation, and 
further developing Codex Alimentarius mechanisms is needed. The WTO re-
gime includes the dispute resolution mechanism, which makes WTO agree-
ments more binding and stronger than for example UN resolutions. UN or-
ganizations govern food safety and also the wider issue of food security issues 
but are not as powerful as the WTO. 
In between command-and-control regulation and self-regulation, there is a 
third approach to regulation that combines government involvement and com-
pany involvement. This is called co-regulation. The European Union calls it 
the New Approach. Several researchers are of the view that the concept of law 
needs to be redefined, as it is no longer a question of command and control, or 
state vs. citizen. In the future, law might mean a means to organise the coop-
eration between government and citizens, between public and private. Law 
would mean guaranteeing the legitimacy of the process of creating rules: hear-
ing all parties concerned. With European food regulation, the EFSA could for 
example reform its panel structure so as to allow representation of all stake-
holders. In global scale, it is the Codex panels that need to be reformulated in 
order to hear various interests. 
 
 
8.2 The scientific base of food regulation 
Above, we discussed on who should regulate food and the process of deciding 
on food regulation. In this last chapter, we touch upon the science that these 
decisions should be based upon. Firstly, regulation must be based on a certain 
need. It must solve a problem in a society or correct an unethical situation, 
rather both. For example, we might consider regulation that somehow tackles 
the problem of juvenile obesity. There are different modes of regulation, and 
the choice of a regulatory instrument should be a conscious decision. Food 
regulation should be consistent with other regulation, such as the environ-
mental standards. We will not go further into the discussion of criteria for bet-
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ter regulation here45. Food regulation is sometimes seen as “technical” stan-
dards rather than “law”. Even though economists, epidemiologists, and nutri-
tionists, etc. are important in making food regulation, the expertise of lawyers 
is still needed. In addition to legal science, we are of the view that food regu-
lation should be based on food and nutrition science, economics, behavioural 
science, and ethics.  
Nutrition science is needed to determine how certain chemicals react in a 
human body. For example, it is needed for determining health effects of com-
ponents such as fatty acids, fibres, minerals such as calcium, and vitamins 
such as riboflavin. We need to know about the amounts of pesticides and resi-
dues that cause health risks too great, and on what causes allergies. On addi-
tives, flavourings, and enzymes, we need scientific research. Health claims on 
foods need to be scientifically substantiated. In Europe, these kinds of scien-
tific evaluations are the task of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
Economics in connection with the law is called law and economics. Re-
search on law and economics is a part of a wider scientific field of institutional 
economics. Economics in connection with the food chain is called agricultural 
economics. Economic science is needed in determining how regulation affects 
location, methods, processes, and profitability of farming and food businesses 
in the global food chains. The understanding of economic consequences of 
certain regulation is a basis for conscious evaluation of regulation goals and 
their fulfilment. Of course, economic considerations are seldom the only fac-
tor when deciding on a piece of food regulation. 
By behavioural science, we mean sociology and psychology. Sociology fo-
cuses on human behaviour of groups of people, where psychology focuses on 
individuals. Evolutionary psychology, for example, is gaining interest in under-
standing economic behaviour46. It could also have a role in understanding regu-
lation, particularly its making and implementation. For example, compliance 
and non-compliance of rules is probably related to evolutionary mechanisms 
where sometimes the human brain sees it fit to abide by the rules. Sometimes 
the brain figures it wiser to break a rule. Consumer behaviour related to food is 
for an important part related to evolutionary mechanisms which guide consum-
ers towards diets that have kept us alive through the Stone Age and further. In 
practice, this means that the brain decides what tastes good to us. Regulators 
need to be aware of psychological factors in selecting food, as regulation is 
supposed to guide human behaviour. Rational thought is one of the mechanisms 
                                                 
45 See Tala 2005. 
46 Cohen 2005. 
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going on in the human brain, but not the only one. Therefore, regulation should 
not be entirely based on an assumption of rational market actors.  
Our attitudes towards ethical questions are also partly inherited through 
our brain structure and brain activities. The instinct-part of our brain often 
seems to guide ethical action, and this part of the brain is old. The oldest part 
of the human brain is also called “monkey brain”. In the beginning of human-
ity, humans lived in rather small societies, tribes. There was no need for mo-
rale extending beyond familiar people.47 We suspect this is the reason for our 
incapability to resolve global problems related to poverty and hunger, for ex-
ample. Our brain simply does not see the connection between our actions and 
global problems. Our indifference towards animal suffering might be related 
to similar disregard of our brain for anything that is not related to keeping our 
own species alive. 
It is fairly easy to agree that food regulation should be based on ethics. 
Ethics means that besides being profitable, food business should be sustain-
able in social and ecological sense. However, opinions on what is ethical vary 
greatly. Natural science related to chemicals or non-human biological material 
is seen as more objective than science on emotions such as suspicion or fear of 
something that is considered wrong. For example with genetically modified 
organisms, the “rational” side often calls the arguments of the GMO-
suspicious side irrational. International human rights should serve as a lead to 
what is ethical. Worker’s rights according to ILO standards should be guaran-
teed in the food chain. The right to food was recognized already in Article 25 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. More comprehensively 
it is defined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.48 The health and safety of consumers and the environment must be 
fulfilled, and animal rights also need to be acknowledged. 
Besides science, food regulation should also be based on politics, if poli-
tics is understood as negotiation and compromises between stakeholder inter-
ests. These stakeholders include farmers, food producers, marketers, consum-
ers, the environment, states, and societies. States have their interests in sup-
porting national economy, national health, and employment. Societal values 
such as tradition and culture cannot directly me measured in money. “Other 
legitimate factors” besides pure science are officially given weight in food 
regulation, and perhaps even more in the future. These other factors include 
economics, traditional food cultures, and rural development. Food is a con-
                                                 
47 Cohen 2005. 
48 See Mechlem 2004 on right to food. 
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sumer issue but also a trade issue, a cultural issue, and an environmental issue. 
Food is more than just a commodity, and regulating food will be more compli-
cated than regulating less emotion-provoking, less culture-bound commodities, 
such as mobile phones. 
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SELF-REGULATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN  
– A TRADE BARRIER OR AN OPPORTUNITY  
FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-OPERATION? 
Kaisa Sorsa 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to address and analyze the use of different self-regulation 
systems in the global value chains by asking why companies voluntarily co-
operate by self-regulating, even though they compete, also with each other, in the 
market. Secondly, it is argued that the lawmaker should take self-regulation more 
seriously as a regulatory strategy because of its benefits and feasibility in the dy-
namic, global business environment. First, the use of self-regulation in value 
chain is analysed based on empirical evidence as presented in international and 
Finnish research papers. Secondly, the results are reflected on with more theoreti-
cal arguments.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
Regulatory policy is critical to the welfare of a country. On the positive 
side, regulations have an essential role to play in protecting the environ-
ment, assuring a safe workplace, providing protection to consumers and in 
other ways addressing the needs of the people. Since the 1990s, however, it 
has become increasingly evident that national and supranational rules and 
regulations are not sufficient when it comes to achieving social, environ-
mental and competitive objectives within the framework of the global eco-
nomic and trade system (Sherman & Pitts 2008, 6; Usher & Newitt 2009, 
11). In many cases the slow process of developing government policy and 
accompanying regulations does not satisfy the market's need for clarity and 
communication (Codron, Sirieix and Reardon 2006). In order to fill the 
gap, civil society actors such as NGOs or in other cases the private sector 
has stepped in. Both have resulted in voluntary standards and codes of 
conduct which have been developed to complement legal rules. The chal-
lenges companies face cannot wait the slow movement of the lawmakers 
who use to react to the problems. Regulation is also usually seen more as a 
risk management tool than as a tool to promote good business practices (as 
an opportunity management tool). It is argued, that the lawmakers should 
move to a more proactive law approach strategy, learning from the good 
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practices developed by private regulation and encouraging the use of self-
regulation instead of keeping in the reactive, command and control regula-
tion road. 
This article addresses the role of self-regulation in global value chain. 
Firms generally do not become competitive on their own, i.e. without a 
supportive environment of related suppliers and service providers as well 
as customers which are both reliable and demanding. All firms are more or 
less embedded in networks of firms that provide externalities such as easy 
access to information, material inputs, specialized business services and a 
skilled workforce. The more developed these complementary networks are, 
the more can an individual enterprise specialize in certain core capabilities, 
which in turn tend to raise the competitiveness of the network which the 
firm is embedded in. (Altenburg 2007, 6; Schmitz 2005, 7). Value chain 
analysis helps the policymaker find out where the bottlenecks are. Which 
part of the chain holds up progress in others? Which deserve the priority in 
government attention? Which can be expected to be resolved by the private 
sector and which require public-private partnership? (Schmitz 2005, 11). 
Value chains are one of the most important elements of these networks 
or production systems. Value chains can be defined as the full range of ac-
tivities (primary and supportive activities) that are required to bring a 
product from its conception to its end use. These include design, produc-
tion, marketing, distribution, and support to deliver the product to the final 
user. The activities that comprise a value chain may be contained within a 
single firm or may embrace many firms, NGOs and civil society organisa-
tions. They can be limited to a single country or stretch across national 
boundaries. (Porter 2004, 33–35; Altenburg 2007, 6). 
This article focuses mainly on the use of self-regulation tools in the 
field of business to business (B2B) and business to consumer (B2C) rela-
tionships in global value chains in different industry sectors in order to 
show, how private actors aim not only to manage risks but also to create a 
competitive advantage by using self-regulation. Self-regulation is under-
stood here as regulation of the conduct of individual organisations, or 
groups of organisations by themselves. Regulatory rules are self-specified, 
conduct is self-monitored and the rules are self-enforced. There is also usu-
ally a sanction system in use. (Tala 2007a, 9). The content of the rules is 
also relevant in this research. (Sorsa 2009b, 1–2). It varies from the defini-
tion of quality of actions and processes to the quality of management of 
stakeholder relationships. Recent years have seen a substantial growth in 
private self-regulation schemes. Regardless of their exact number (appr. 
400), based on the date of their establishment, it is evident that the period 
from 1990 until today has seen a dramatic increase in the number of for 
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example Food Quality Certification Schemes at the business-to-consumer 
(B2C) level in EU, some of them are competing self-regulation systems1. 
Decision-making processes in global value chains can be considered 
analogous to the legislative, executive and judicial functions of public gov-
ernment. These roles correspond to the authority to set, implement and ver-
ify compliance with the rules for value chain participation. Voluntary stan-
dards institute new rules and rule-making processes for value chain partici-
pation. In other words, they alter legislative governance conventions, the 
rules that less-powerful actors must comply with to participate in the value 
chain and to have access to the end market. Legislative power is typically 
formalized through the operations of an implementing organization’s board 
of directors, standards development committees or implementation secre-
tariat. (Sexsmith & Potts 2009, 7–8). 
 
 
2 Self-regulation in value chain – reviewing 
 retail, food, clothing and chemical industry 
2.1 Aims and objectives 
Self-regulation includes a host of options available to address specific 
problems and objectives, including codes of conduct, industry service char-
ters, guidelines and standards, as well as industry-based accreditation and 
complaint handling schemes. This research distinguishes between individ-
ual self-regulation (where an entity regulates itself, independently from 
others) and self-regulation by groups (corporations, professional communi-
ties, trade associations etc.) focusing primarily on the latter. 
This article is mainly based on the research conducted in 2009 (Sorsa 
2009b). The research had two main aims. The most important was to un-
derstand 1) how and why businesses co-operate by using self-regulation 
methods in order to resolve challenges or the problems related to their 
business. The other aim was 2) to find out when and under which condi-
tions trade associations and other entities engage in self-regulation. Within 
this research I am concerned with self-regulation that becomes binding 
those who formally adhere to the self-regulation system and also with those 
who are bound to the rules by contracts2. 
Answering to the ‘how’ question reveals the different kind of self-
regulation tools which are in use (codes of conduct, standards, certifica-
                                                 
1 See http://foodqualityschemes.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/documents/inventory_FQAS_Nov_2006.xls 
2 E.g. Caffaggi has focused on private regulation with general or ultra partes effects in 
his paper “Private Regulation in European Private Law” 2009. 
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tion-, verification – and accreditation schemes). Answers to the ‘why’ ques-
tion bring into the light the drivers of self-regulation, and also the object of 
self-regulation. When self-regulation takes place highlights the market 
conditions which enable or restrict the use of self-regulation. As one can 
distinguish between different forms of self-regulation by the degree of 
government involvement ranging from pure self-regulation to mandated 
self-regulation, the rich variety of different self-regulation tools and meth-
ods were highlighted in sector specific examples.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical insights 
Understanding how and why, when and under which conditions trade asso-
ciations and other networks see self-regulation relevant and reasonable to 
them provides insights into the role of private regulation and legislation in 
business. The explanations have so far applied both the theory of new insti-
tutional economics and transaction cost theory, but less the theories known 
in the field of strategic management.  
The Value Chain3 framework of Michael Porter – a model that helps to 
analyze specific activities through which firms can create value and com-
petitive advantage – was used as a contextual framework. Porter strongly 
underpins the argument that competitiveness at the firm’s level decisively 
depends on its local embededness. While management sciences have al-
ways dealt with firm strategy and inter-firm linkages, it is Porter’s merit to 
have attracted attention to additional location-specific factors as local de-
mand and rivalry.  
The traditional way of explaining the reasons and motives of self-
regulation assumes the following order: avoidance of regulation (Héritier 
& Eckert 2008, 116; King & Toffel 2007; Kyttä & Tala 2008, 88), re-
sponse to global social activism (Vogel 2006, 8; Giovannucci & Potts 
2009; Nadgrodkiewicz 2009, 2–5; Kyttä & Tala 2008, 94 and Héritier & 
Eckert 2008, 116–117), protection of self-interests and protection of the 
company’s reputation and brands (Vogel 2006, 7). These explanations 
seem to be based on a single or a couple of self-regulation schemes or fo-
cused only on one industry sector.  
The theoretical analysis model was developed combining the earlier re-
search results. Four dimensions were used as hypothetical explanations for 
the drivers of self-regulatory regimes: market failure -dimension, opinion –
responsive -dimension (ethical issues), interest-driven -dimension and 
                                                 
3 In some of the EU official documents the chain perspective is also taken into account, 
see the “agricultural product quality policy: impact assessment”. 
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competitive advantage -dimension. (Sorsa 2009b, 6). The potential sources 
of competitive advantages on the company level can be: 1) product differ-
entiation in the market place, 2) quality signals, 3) reduced insurance pre-
miums, and 4) maintenance of standards along the supply chain (Bondy et 
al. (2004). These sources are here taken as a starting point for the devel-
opment of self-regulation schemes in industry level. Opinion responsive 
dimension represents the idea that the self-regulation initiative is created in 
order to promote ethical values. Market failure describes conditions under 
which market outcomes are not guaranteed to serve the public interest. 
Market failure often generates regulation. 
 
 
Market failures   Competitive advantage  
 
 
          Self-Regulatory  
                system 
 
 
Public opinion                 Professional interest groups 
(Ethical issues in general)    
 
Reactive approaches   Proactive approaches 
 
Figure 1  Forces which influence the self-regulatory system (Bartle & Vass 2005) 
 
This model was challenged and reflected in sector specific value chain 
analysis. Examples from retail business, food industry, clothing industry 
and chemical industry are under a more detailed analysis. From the policy 
maker’s viewpoint the idea of a value chain becomes useful for analytical 
and policy purposes, once three features are included: first, the activities 
are often carried out in different parts of the world; second, some activities 
add more value and are more lucrative that others (the policy maker’s con-
cern is to help local enterprises move into the lucrative activities); third, 
some actors in the chain have power over the others. (Schmitz 2005, 4). 
Reacting to market failures or to the public opinion is argued to be the 
main reason for self-regulation. They both represent the reactive way of 
action. On the other hand, creation or promotion of competitive advantage 
or the interests of one interest group like trade association, are more proac-
tive ways of action. (Sorsa 2009b). 
Usually the research related to self-regulation is focused on one single 
self-regulation system analysing its strengths and weaknesses. There are 
however rare exceptions (Dankers 2003; Kirk-Wilson 2008). This research 
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started from a different viewpoint: the aim was to capture the reality of the 
business context where the different self-regulation rules are embedded, 
where they compete with each others or with the legal rules or supplement 
them. The retail business, food industry, clothing industry and agriculture 
were in focus. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
This article is mainly based on the research conducted and published by the 
writer in 2009: “Self-regulation and co-regulation in value chain – review-
ing retail, food and chemical industry examples” (Sorsa 2009b). It was 
based on a literature review and the materials of different self-regulation 
schemes. The self-regulation schemes were selected based on their global 
or broad local coverage and the fact that most of them are relevant also 
from the Finnish companies’ viewpoint and in the Finnish markets. The 
research data included books, articles and studies related to self- and co-
regulation. This secondary data used in the research covered approximately 
200 scientific research reports and articles published during 2000–2009. 
Important criteria selecting from the materials was the use of the empirical 
research methods. The material covered research based on quantitative, 
qualitative or case methods in order to capture the diversity and reality of 
the phenomenon in business. The preliminary explanations were reflected 
during the analysis of industry related examples. (Sorsa 2009b, 34–85 and 
101–119). 
The different self-regulation schemes which were under a more thor-
ough analysis are listed in the appendix 1. During the research process it 
was found out that the self-regulation schemes had some differences de-
pending on the level they operate. The schemes are divided into two differ-
ent groups according to the level on which they operate: 1) business to 
business (B2B) level and 2) business to consumer (B2C) level schemes. 
Base on some earlier research findings this division seemed to have some 
significance from the motivation viewpoint.  
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3 Self-regulation in business to business  
 relationships 
3.1 Self-regulation as a way of co-operation in the  
 global network 
The preliminary theoretical analysis model was extended by the theoretical 
ideas related to the relevance of stakeholder relationships in the value 
creation of business. Looking at stakeholder relations either from an ethical 
point of view or from a business point of view is not enough; these issues 
are inextricably linked. Stakeholders other than customers and owners are 
also important in the value creation process, which has usually been de-
fined through the lenses of customer-firm relationships or from the view-
point of creating value to owners. (Myllykangas 2009). Globalisation of 
production has accelerated demand for greater control over quality assur-
ance in production processes. This is especially significant where suppliers 
are located at a great distance from their customers.  
Voluntary standards and codes of conduct are seen as a tool to manage 
these challenges. The networks required to define complex standards often 
come about because the resources required to formulate the standard, and 
to make it credible, are distributed amongst a variety of actors. Moreover, 
there is an element of interdependence amongst such actors because they 
have specific core competencies but they also need each other in order to 
make a standard reliable, transparent, efficient, and legitimate (Nadvi & 
Wältring 2004; Abbott & Snidal 2008, 3).  
In the present-day global business environment, it is not enough to con-
centrate only on the customers in order to create value and in order to have 
sustainable competitiveness. Rather, it is necessary to take the broader 
stakeholder view because the value is created with the broader stakeholder 
network than before. It is no longer enough to concentrate only to one’s 
own company and its shareholders4. The whole value chain and its possi-
bilities need to be taken into account. (Sorsa 2009b, 127–137).  
 
Business firms have started to engage in activities that traditionally 
have been regarded as genuine governmental activities. The private ac-
                                                 
4 E.g. in the UK, Section 172 of the 2006 UK Companies Act embraces a concept of 
enlightened shareholder value by requiring UK companies to “have regard” for the social 
impact of their decisions on such stakeholders as the company’s employees, the need to 
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others, the 
impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, and the 
desirability of maintaining a reputation fro high standards of business conduct. (Sherman 
& Pitts 2008, 8). 
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tors are willing to take responsibility of the social issues which have 
traditionally been on the responsibility of the government. Many busi-
ness firms have started to assume social and political responsibilities 
that go beyond legal requirements and fill the regulatory vacuum in 
global governance. Especially transnational corporations (TNC) en-
gage in public health, education, social security, and protection of hu-
man rights while operating in countries with failed state agencies, they 
define ethic codes and engage in self-regulation to fill global gaps in 
legal regulation and moral orientation (Vogel 2008, 268–269; KOM 
(2009) 215; Nadgrodkiewicz 2009, 2–5; Porter & Kramer 2006). From 
a practical point in global business, a principal driving force for the 
self-regulation is the preference of individuals in importing countries 
for sustainable practices in exporting countries. In many situations 
those preferences cannot be exercised effectively by civic behaviour 
(voting, public commentary directed at government, etc.). Instead indi-
viduals act on those preferences through their private market behaviour 
(as consumers or investors) or through their behaviour as employees 
and managers of firms. (Vadenbergh 2007, 8). 
 
 
3.2 Competitive advantage as a motive to self- 
 regulation  
3.2.1 Self-regulation as a tool for cost efficiency and  
differentiation 
The principal explanation to self-regulation seemed to be the desire to pro-
actively develop and sustain the companies’ competitive advantage and the 
threat of future regulation did not seem to be as important an explanatory 
factor as the earlier research had suggested. (Sorsa 2009b, 127–137; Sorsa 
2010b, 17–19 and 61–64).  
 
According to the empirical research conducted in Australia consumer 
market, a common reason for self-regulation, often in conjunction with 
other reasons, is the desire to raise industry standards. Self-regulation is 
a means to exceed minimum legal requirements and can also enhance 
understanding and compliance with regulations. In a competitive envi-
ronment there is a strong incentive for businesses to continually im-
prove standards and exceed the benchmark service levels in order to 
gain market share. Various forms of self-regulation can set a bench-
mark for minimum service levels, and allow businesses flexibility in 
how these services are to be met and exceeded Raising industry stan-
dards often refers to the ability to deal with rogue players or poor repu-
tation. The role of reputation can be very important to a business, par-
ticularly when the business is operating in a competitive environment. 
(Australian Government, Treasery 1999, Chapter 3). 
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The sources of competitive advantage were in most cases cost efficiency or 
differentiation based on corporate social responsibility issues and the moti-
vation of self-regulation seemed to rise from this foundation (Sorsa 2009b, 
127–137). Ponte and Gibbon have found out in their research that e.g. food 
consumption is increasingly characterized by food and/or user safety aware-
ness, the parallel processes of globalization and localization of consumer 
tastes, and social and environmental concerns (Ponte & Gibbon 2005, 2). 
Under such process, the agro-food production system has drastically trans-
formed to attain economic efficiency through applying uniform criteria for 
product to take advantage on integration of production system across the 
borders while accommodating diverse market preferences through differen-
tiations. In this context, the use of global standards has increased and trans-
formed from conventional ways of ensuring minimum standards for food 
safety and quality at national level to the coordination tool for global food 
production system as well as the means of product differentiation (such as 
organic, fair trade, socially responsible to name a few). 
In retail business the BSCI standard aims to avoid multiple and redun-
dant auditing systems. There are several platforms where supplier social 
audits can be shared by buyers and brands in order to minimise “audit fa-
tigue”. These include Sedex5 and the Fair factories Clearing House6. (Sorsa 
2010b, 25–26 and 61–64). 
The different value chains were either buyer driven or producer driven7 
and the methods and tools of self-regulation varied depending on the value 
chain model. Also, differences between the self-regulation methods were 
dependent on the relationship type. In business to business (B2B) -relation-
                                                 
5 Sedex is a not-for-profit organisation based in London, UK, open for membership to 
any company anywhere in the world. Sedex will be the knowledge management provider 
of choice for measuring and improving ethical and responsible business practices in 
global supply chains. Sedex focuses on four pillars: Labour Standards, Health & Safety, 
Environment and Business Integrity. www.sedex.org 
6 Reebok International Ltd., the National Retail Federation, Retail Council of Canada and 
World Monitors joined forces and created a not-for-profit organisation, the Fair Factories 
Clearinghouse in late 2004. The FFC was established to use technology to lower the cost of 
entry for those seeking to manage compliance programs and to improve the availability, 
comprehensiveness, and standardization of compliance standards and audits through the 
use of a global management system to track workplace conditions. www.fairfactories.org 
7 An earlier, but still very active body of research on Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) 
developed a key distinction between global chains that are "driven" by two kinds of lead 
firms: buyers and producers. Today, global-scale networks of legally independent firms 
no longer make only simple items, but technology- and capital-intensive goods and ser-
vices as well. The GVC framework specifies a more elaborate set of governance forms 
and crucially provides a method to explain changes in governance patterns over time. As 
a starting-point, however, we can say that buyer-driven chains tend to be coordinated via 
market, modular, or relational governance, and producer-driven chains tend to be coor-
dinated via captive or hierarchical governance. 
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ships mainly different product or process standards (ISO 9000, ISO 22 000) 
and codes of conduct (ETI8) were in use in order to guarantee the quality, 
product safety, environmental aspects, ethical or social aspects (ISO 14000, 
SA8000, BSCI9, OHSAS 18000) of the production to the buyer. In these 
self-regulation schemes the approach to self-regulate seems to be preventive, 
minimisation of the own risks. (Sorsa 2009b,128; Sorsa 2010b, 76–86)). All 
these standards and codes of conduct were in use in buyer driven value 
chains. In business-to consumer relationships, instead, different labelling 
schemes (e.g. Utz Certified, Fair Trade, Swan, Eco-Flower) played a rele-
vant role. (Sorsa 2009b; 2010b, 88–98). 
 
 
3.2.2 Self-regulation as a tool for setting process  
standards 
The importance and role of the process standards instead of product stan-
dards seemed to be growing. This finding is congruent with the findings of 
several researchers (Nadvi & Wältring 2004; Broberg 2009, 11). The proc-
ess standards refer to management practices (quality management or man-
agement of environmental issues) of the company (Sorsa 2010b, 64–70). In 
some cases, these include clearly defined and measurable benchmarks, al-
lowing firms to gauge how well they perform in reaching particular targets. 
According to Josling et al. research related to food regulation and trade 
(2004, 104) with the increased focus upon food safety has come a shift to-
ward process requirements and away from product requirements. 
                                                 
8 Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) is a multi stakeholder initiative (brand companies, 
NGOs, trade unions). The initiative started in the late nineties, when companies selling 
food and clothing to UK consumers were coming under increasing pressure to ensure 
decent working conditions for the people who produce the goods they sell. ETI was set 
up in 1998 to bring the combined knowledge and influence of relevant NGOs and the 
international trade union movement to work alongside. van Yperen 2006, 31. According 
to Moilala (2006, 20–21), when companies import products from outside the EU the 
assurance of the product quality comes more and more important to them.  
9 The Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) is an industry-led platform, an initia-
tive of European retail companies initiated by the Brussels based Foreign Trade Associa-
tion (FTA). In 2002 a common platform was established for the various different Euro-
pean Codes of Conduct and monitoring systems and to lay the groundwork for a com-
mon European monitoring system for social compliance. In 2002 and 2003, retail com-
panies and associations held several workshops to determine the framework for such a 
system. In March 2003 the FTA formally founded the Business Social Compliance Ini-
tiative (BSCI). Audited suppliers are registered in the BSCI Database so that there is no 
need for other BSCI members to assess the same supplier. This decreases the costs for 
the supplier and enhances the efficiency of the improvement process. 
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What comes to the quality management standards, the ISO 9000 is the 
most popular of global process standards. It provides assurance that the 
firm or service provider has in place appropriate quality management pro-
cedures. The standard is seen as promoting better, and more assured, con-
trol of quality within international supply chains, improving market trans-
parency of suppliers, and reducing transaction costs related to quality man-
agement. The standard is generic, and can be applied to manufacturing, 
service, and public sectors. Within the private sector many companies use 
it as a filtering mechanism to assess the process competencies of their sup-
pliers; those without ISO 9000 certification are often excluded from the 
supply chain in various sectors and markets. The standard is seen by many 
developing country firms as key to obtaining access, and enhancing com-
petitiveness, in global markets (Nadvi & Wältring 2002, 12–13).  
The content of process standards has extended to cover environmental, 
social and economic aspects.10 The aim is to balance shareholder interests 
against the interest of the wider community and to respond positively to 
emerging societal priorities and expectations. This phenomenon illustrates 
that the business of business is no longer only profit seeking. Instead 
broader aspects are also important to the companies. With self-regulation 
companies are able to address these challenges faster than lawmakers.  
The main emphasis of most sustainability standards is ensuring that a 
product has been brought to market using sustainable production and trad-
ing methods. Conventional value chain relationships, by contract, specify 
the physical attributes of a product upon its delivery. Sustainability stan-
dards represent a unique, explicit effort to establish non-product-related 
rules for production and processing. When such rules apply exclusively to 
producers, the implementation of standards can reduce the relative author-
ity of producers in decisions about their production practices. (Sexsmith & 
Potts 2009, 8).  
 
 
3.2.3 Social standards for general and sector specific use 
3.2.3.1 Business and multi-stakeholder initiatives tackling same  
problems 
Self-regulation schemes focusing on labour rights and social aspects are 
diverse and also geographically fragmented. Social Accountability 
                                                 
10 The distinction between product and process standards, while widely used, is becoming 
hazy. Some standards, such as those for organic food for example, reflect both product and 
process characteristics, and thus more hybrid in nature. (Nadvi & Wältring 2004). 
 94
(SA8000), Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) and OHSAS11 
schemes are focused on social aspects of sustainability. SA8000 is a multi-
stakeholder initiative, in operation since 1997, a voluntary standard for 
workplaces. SA 8000 is a factory certification model. It is a uniform, au-
ditable standard for a third party verification system on social issues. The 
rationale for creating SA8000 was to provide a unifying framework for 
various workplace codes of conduct and verification methodologies. 
(Nadgrodkiewicz 2009, 4). While there are several other widely applied 
multi-stakeholder initiatives codes of labour practice in the field (such as 
the ETI Base Code, textile industry codes: Fair Labour Association (FLA) 
and Fair Wear Foundation), SA8000 has a relatively long history and high 
level of international recognition. Any changes to it may be seen as a ba-
rometer of the evolution of private labour standards, their methods of 
monitoring and implementation. In the US market SA competes with the 
FLA. Compared to SA, FLA seems to put more emphasis on involving lo-
cal NGOs in the monitoring process than other code initiatives by capacity 
building. FLA has been at the forefront of efforts to develop initiatives be-
yond monitoring to address labour right issues. (FLA 2009, 3–5; Usher & 
Newitt 2009, 21–25; Abbott & Duncan 2008, 5–6, 10).  
 
Social Accountability International (SAI) has produced a new ver-
sion SA8000:2008. The definition of a child now goes beyond ILO 
Conventions in excluding the allowance of work by 14 year olds in 
developing countries. SA8000:2008 defines a child as anyone below 
the age of 15 in all countries. All in all, the tone of voice is different 
– empowerment, dignity, respect, dialogue and stakeholders all re-
ceive much more prominence, reflecting the zeitgeist. There is more 
onus on companies to take certain actions and record and demon-
strate them. There are explicit statements of workers rights, beyond 
referencing relevant conventions. There is more mention of tackling 
root causes and taking prompt and preventative action, not just ac-
tion when they are ready. These changes take SA8000 in some im-
portant new directions. 
 
The BSCI is a European business initiative to improve the social perform-
ance in supplier countries through a uniform social standards monitoring 
solution for retail, industry and importers. BSCI is not a verification or cer-
tification system and therefore does not issue a certificate. Certification is 
                                                 
11 OHSAS 18000 is an international occupational health and safety management system. 
It helps companies to control occupational health and safety risks. OHSAS 18001 was 
created via a concerted effort from a number of the worlds leading national standards 
bodies, certification bodies, and specialist consultancies. This was outside of the ISO 
process, owing to decisions by ISO not to enter into this field of activity at that time. van 
Yperen 2006, 39. 
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possible via SA8000. (van Yperen 2006, 21, 25). BSCI focuses also in-
creasingly on capacity building to raise the awareness of suppliers, to em-
power workers and ensure sustainable change in the factory and/or farm. 
(Usher & Newitt 2009, 26). 
OHSAS 18000 is a multi-stakeholder initiative, applicable to all sectors, 
a typical management system, focusing on the management of health and 
safety issues. Companies can obtain certification by an external accredited 
organisation. Since its publication 1999, OHSAS 18001 has become the de-
facto international standard for the certification of (occupational) health & 
safety management systems, and is being adopted as a national standard by a 
constantly increasing number of national standards bodies. 
 
 
Case Retail business – buyers’ perspective to BSCI 
Social standards have entered the Finnish retail business during the last ten 
years (Sorsa 2010b, 25–26 and 54–59). According to the company reports 
all the major retail companies covering 86 % market share of Finnish retail 
markets are committed to the BSCI initiative. This means that the compa-
nies exporting to Finnish retail markets have to comply with the BSCI 
standard. At present, members have to commit themselves to audit and in-
tegrate 2/3 of their suppliers or 2/3 of their buying volume in defined risk 
countries into the compliance programme. This auditing and integrating 
must be carried out within a timeframe of 3 1/2 years. Kesko Group has 
progressed well with its auditing effort even though it has not reached its 
goals in 2008 (Kesko 2008, 55–56). 
 
The BSCI is becoming an important EU market access requirement. 
BSCI members include big retailers such as C&A, HEMA, WE and 
Wehkamp (Netherlands), Karstadt, Metro Group, Quelle and Neck-
ermann (Germany), Kesko and Stockmann (Finland), Lindex, Kap-
pAhl and Unibrands (Sweden), Inditex (Spain), Vögele, Calida and 
Coop (Switzerland), The Cotton Group (Belgium) and Celio 
(France). (See also Sorsa 2010, 27–30). 
 
Case Ningbo in China – sellers’ perspective 
The fact that textile and apparel enterprises often take the lead in Corporate 
Social Responsibility initiatives is not an aggregation of many coinci-
dences; instead, there are some deep-rooted reasons. First, from a micro 
point of view, among industries close to consumers, the textile and apparel 
industry is the most market-oriented one, while most of the CSR concerns 
are from consumers. Another reason lies in the international trade relations. 
The worldwide transfer of production capacity started from labor-intensive 
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industries, while textile and apparel industry is the first to bear the brunt. 
Multinational corporations move their production, especially labor-
intensive textile and apparel production to developing countries where 
cheap labor is often accompanied with labour, environment and corruption 
issues.12 (Sorsa 2010b, 103–106). 
Social process standards has become an issue of increasing importance 
in regard to outsourcing by developed countries of low-tech, labor inten-
sive production to developing countries. China’s manufacture industry is 
deeply embedded in the global production networks (GPN). Ningbo city, 
the biggest clothing industrial cluster in China, accounting approximately 
1/9 of total domestic garment production, specializes in knitting wear, 
man’s suits and shirts, kids’ wear and casual wear. Most products in 
Ningbo apparel firms are exported to EU, USA and Japan.  
 
 
Table 1  Certifications in Ningbo apparel firms (Linfei & Qingliang 2009) 
 
The Kind of Certifications  Frequency  % 
ISO9000  53  58.2 
ISO14000  23  25.3 
OHSAS18000    2  2.2 
SA8000    1  1.1 
CSC9000T    3  3.3 
COC 24  26.4 
Others    5  5.5 
None  30  33.0 
 
CSC9000T = China Social Compliance 9000 for Textile Industry 
COC = Code of Conduct 
 
Ningbo clothing industry presents a good case to reflect the current situa-
tion of China apparel industry in GPN and the status of CSR in China’s 
                                                 
12 Annual Report on Social Responsibility of China Textile and Apparel Industry 2006, 
8. China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) invited delegates inside and 
outside China to conference discuss issues of strategic significance on building a respon-
sible global supply chain for the industry in 2006. The conference passed “Declaration 
on the Social Compliance by China Textile and Apparel Industry”. Chinese textile and 
apparel enterprises will persevere with the self-discipline of CSR on a voluntary basis. In 
2005 China social Compliance for textile and Apparel Industry (CSC9000T) – Principles 
and Guidelines was released. CNTAC begun to provide guidance to Chinese textile and 
clothing businesses and encourages to take more active measures to addressing CSR 
related issues by the implementation of CSC9000T. Responsible Supply Chain Associa-
tion (RSCA) is an industry-wide and professional body for the promotion of social re-
sponsibilities, which is directly under the administration of CNTAC. RSCA Through 
pooling efforts and resources, RSCA members are promoting a common monitoring and 
factory development system with BSCI.  
http://www.csc9000.org.cn/en/AboutCSC9000T_Introduction.asp?DID=237 
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garment industry and to investigate the performance of CSR. The clothing 
industry is labour intensive in character and quite market oriented and pri-
vatized. Nearly 2/3 firms’ 90% production are exported, and the export 
mostly concentrates on the EU, USA & Japan. It verifies that as a typical 
buyer-driven chain, the leading companies in developed countries control 
the apparel chain (branding and marketing) and gain high value-added, and 
the apparel firms in developing countries stay in the low value-added proc-
essing and manufacturing segments. More firms nowadays pay attention to 
the management of quality, environment and social responsibility. The 
state of the certifications of every kind of standards can be seen in Table 1. 
According to the survey, the pressure of certification also comes from the 
buyers, whose orders, more or less, force 80% firms of the samples to fulfil 
the social responsibility standard. (Linfei & Qingliang 2009, 218–222). 
 
 
3.2.3.2  International Framework Agreements as a new instrument 
The lack of enforcement of national labour laws and the limited protection 
of workers’ rights in developing countries have led workers’ rights repre-
sentatives to attempt to establish transnational industrial relations systems 
to complement existing national systems. In practice, these attempts have 
mainly been operationalised in codes of conduct and recently international 
framework agreements (IFAs) have been proposed as an alternative. 
International (or global) Framework Agreements are agreements 
negotiated between a multinational company and an international or 
global union federation concerning the international activities of that 
company. Their main purpose is to establish a formal ongoing relationship 
between the multinational company and the global union federation which 
can solve problems and work in the interests of both parties. (Sorsa 2010b, 
44–52). 
Codes of conduct and IFAs serve the same purpose, namely, to improve 
workers’ rights, but represent different ways of governing workers’ rights 
transnationally. (Egels-Zandén 2009, 530) Although codes commonly in-
clude requirements on worker representation and freedom of association, 
many companies’ experience of working with suppliers indicates that 
communication between management and workers is often very poor. This 
is also an area where problems remain undetected by auditing. (Usher & 
Newitt 2009, 24). 
Why IFAs were borne can be explained referring to the criticism which 
the Global Union Federations (GUFs) have presented about the monitoring 
of the codes of conduct. GUFs are very sceptical towards the so-called “in-
dependent monitoring” of codes of conduct performed by external auditing 
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and accounting companies. The main points of criticism are: 1) due to the 
complexity of the supply chain, it is not possible for external auditors to 
monitor each of the company’s suppliers on a continuous basis; 2) external 
auditing and accounting companies often do not have much experience in 
dealing with fundamental trade union rights, such as freedom of associa-
tion and the right to free collective bargaining in particular; 3) where exter-
nal auditing and accounting companies are engaged, trade unions are often 
excluded from the monitoring and verification process; and 4) by engaging 
external auditors on a contractual basis, the company essentially retains 
control over the whole process (Telljohan et al. 2009, 55). IFAs are devel-
oped as a response to these deficits and in order to establish an ongoing 
dialogue with the transnational organisations through the conclusion of an 
IFA. 
Spanish fashion retailer Inditex has made its partnership with global 
trade union ITGWLF a cornerstone of its strategy for implementing its code 
of conduct and addressing labour standards issue in the supply chain. As the 
first for the garment industry, Inditex signed a Global Framework Agree-
ment (GFA) with ITGWLF13 in 2007, establishing a formal framework for 
dialoque and cooperation. Inditex signed the GFA to co-operate on 
tackling workers' rights throughout the company's supply chain. The part-
nership enables Inditex to take a more preventative approach to worker is-
sues, rather than a solely reactive approach, by responding to problems be-
fore they have been flagged by auditors or escalated into a dispute. (Usher 
& Newitt 2009, 24). Inditex’s alliance with the global garment union has 
started to bear fruit. In the case of one of Inditex's Cambodian suppliers, 
River Rich, GFA provided a framework for a rapid, collective response to 
the breach of workers rights in 2007. There have been ‘hard' business 
benefits too, in the shape of a 30 percent increase in productivity and an 
increase in orders from Inditex from 9 million to 11 million garments 
annually. (www.ethicaltrading.org, 21 May 2009). 
According to Egels-Zandén’s recent research why corporations adopt 
IFAs, the explanation he found to be the desire to retain a trusting 
relationship with the labour union movement especially at the enterprise 
level (Egel-Zandén 2009, 540). Prior research, instead, has identified four 
main plausible reasons why corporations adopt IFAs: (i) to retain, restore, 
and/or improve legitimacy, (ii) to avoid governmental interference, (iii) 
for ethical reasons, and (iv) to achieve competitive advantage. The 
legitimacy explanation is the one best supported in previous research 
(Egel-Zandén 2009, 538). Egels-Zandén’s research result can be 
compared with the model I have presented in this article. In figure 1, it is 
                                                 
13 International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation. 
 99
suggested four reasons why self-regulation schemes are created and one of 
them is the desire to promote the interests of “professional interest 
groups”. Egels-Zandén found out that the IFA was driven by a stakeholder 
pressure from inside the company, from the enterprise level union which 
is an integral part of the company. In such firm, stakeholder relationships, 
the relationship itself can be seen by the firm as a valuable resource. 
Several EuroCorp managers claimed that the trusting relationship was 
seen as a source of competitive advantage vis-á-vis EuroCorp’s 
competitors. (Egel-Zandén 2009, 543). 
 
 
3.2.4 Self-regulating environmental issues in different  
phases of value chain 
The motives behind the creation of self-regulation schemes can be shed 
light on also by focusing on the problems they aim to resolve. Self-
regulation schemes can be categorised according to the level of the value 
chain they are applied. Food industry self-regulation schemes can be di-
vided to pre-farm gate, post-farm gate and to whole chain self-regulation 
schemes. (S0rsa 2010, 30–38). 
 
Food assurance schemes (pre-farm gate and whole chain) 
So far the primary producers are not obliged to put into place a HACCP 
system in EU, but only have to comply with some less farreaching hygiene 
provisions14. In order to give retailers and consumers assurance about 
product safety and certain aspects of production methods, “food assurance 
schemes” at the farm level, and sometimes covering the whole food supply 
chain, were developed. The most prominent example in this category is 
GlobalGAP (formerly EurepGAP). According to the Agri 238 report, these 
schemes often do not add any particular characteristic to the product or its 
production method but assure that all legal requirements have been com-
plied with. (Agri 238, 6). This may be true in Europe but when the re-
quirements of GlobalGAP are applied in the farms or packaging processes 
in developing countries, the situation is totally different. Compared to the 
developing countries legislation, these requirements go far beyond the re-
quirements of the local legislation. 
Where for example a large European supermarket chain imports food 
products into the European Community, this will be done under a contract 
specifying matters e.g. the quality of the product including food safety. In 
general these food safety requirements go further than what is required by 
                                                 
14 Regulation 852/2004, supra note 35, Article 5(3), Annex I. 
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law, for example laying down stricter maximum limit value of a pesticide 
in certain crops, by requiring certification, or by requiring that the food is 
subject to full traceability (or other additional process requirements). Often 
the private standards are not established by the individual food importer, 
but instead by private associations that cover substantial parts of the dis-
tributers in the European Community. These private food safety require-
ments impose an additional burden on the food businesses in the develop-
ing countries; and sometimes this burden may be much heavier than the 
one imposed by public food safety legislation. (Broberg 2009, 24). 
  
Food safety and liability schemes (post-farm gate) 
In principle, these schemes allow for efficiency gains for suppliers that 
should lead to improved supply conditions (HACCP15, ISO 22 000, ISO 
9000, ISO 14 000). These schemes operate almost exclusively at the busi-
ness-to-business level for post-farm gate food processing. Their foremost 
concerns are food safety issues. HACCP is a preventative risk based ap-
proach to food safety which seeks to minimize risks but cannot eliminate 
them. They are not normally communicated to the final consumer by means 
of logo or label and therefore certification does not result in a price pre-
mium. However, most retailers demand certification from their suppliers, 
thereby making it a de-facto requirement for market access. (Agri 238, 
2009, 4). 
The use of these standards and code of conduct has become relevant in 
international value chains. In some EU Member States they are accepted as 
a sign of due diligence.16  
 
 
                                                 
15 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a systemic preventive ap-
proach that is set up to identify potential food safety hazard being realised. It is the food 
business operators who must analyse their own processes in order to themselves put into 
place a HACCP system. 
16 Many different retailer control schemes in UK were designed to meet the legal obliga-
tion of UK 1990 Food Safety Act, the basis of food law changed from one of strict liability 
to a recognition that problematic incidents can and do happen no matter how diligent a 
manufacturer is. Since then, if a manufacturer can show that all reasonable precautions 
have been taken and all due diligence applied so as to prevent a food law offence occur-
ring, then the courts will accept that as a sufficient defence. (Agri 238, 2009, 4). 
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4 Self-regulation in business to consumer  
 relationships 
4.1 Self-regulation of marketing – number of motives  
 to self-regulate 
The achievement of acceptable advertising through self-regulatory systems 
is a topic that has been debated in the leading marketing journals for over 
twenty years. This extant literature can be classified into two key areas.  
 
The first provides a significant, body of knowledge of advertising 
self-regulation in general and examines, for example, how various 
schemes function around the world and the second area is more pre-
scriptive and provides normative guides for regulators and advertis-
ers to develop effective advertising self-regulation programs. 
 
The core question in this article is why companies self-regulate and in this 
case, why do they self-regulate marketing activities? The Consolidated ICC 
Code for Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice (CAMCP 
200717) adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce (first issued in 
1937) was as an example and some industry specific self-regulation schemes 
as well. The ICC Code of marketing18 aims to demonstrate responsibility 
and good practice in advertising and marketing communications by promot-
ing high standards of ethics in marketing across the world and to enhance 
overall public confidence in marketing communication. It also aims to pro-
vide practical guidance for companies (CAMCP 2007, 9). According to the 
European Advertising Standards Alliance’s the advertising must enjoy a 
high level of consumer trust and confidence (Blue Book 2007, 13). 
The motive behind the CAMCP seems to be congruent with a common 
reason for self-regulation, which is the desire to raise industry standards. 
Self-regulation is often used as a means to exceed minimum legal require-
ments and also as a means to enhance understanding and compliance with 
regulations. This is mentioned also in CAMCP. In a competitive environ-
ment there is a strong incentive for businesses to continually improve stan-
                                                 
17 The eighth revision of ICC’s Code of Advertising Practice. 
18 The Consolidated International Chamber of Commerce’s Code was drawn up by a 
specific task force of ICC’s Commission on Marketing and Advertising, the Task Force 
on Code Revision, composed of advertising practitioners (advertisers, agencies and me-
dia) and self-regulation experts. The ICC’s Task Force on Code Revision will regularly 
review the Code’s provisions, to ensure that they continue to reflect the latest develop-
ments in technology, marketing practice and society. ICC has been a major rule-setter in 
the field of international marketing and advertising since 1937 when the first ICC code 
on advertising practice was issued. 
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dards and exceed the benchmark service levels in order to gain market 
share19. Various forms of self-regulation can set a benchmark for minimum 
service levels, and allow businesses flexibility in how these services are to 
be met and exceeded (e.g. in GlobalGAP). Raising industry standards often 
refers to the ability to deal with rogue players or poor reputation.  
The role of reputation can be very important to a business, particularly 
when the business is operating in a competitive environment. Using self-
regulation as a marketing tool is another reason why self-regulation has been 
developed by industry. Membership of a recognised form of self-regulation 
(e.g. code of conduct) can often constitute an important selling point for 
businesses to attract new customers, and may increase the bargaining power 
of the business when entering new arrangements with other parties 
(OFT964). This is highlighted with the examples of next chapter. 
Increasing the level of information on products and services is a further 
reason for self-regulation (e.g. CIAA20 Guideline Daily Amount). By en-
hancing information flows like traceability in food industry, businesses can 
boost consumer confidence in products. The actual or perceived `threat' of 
government regulation, or a `push' by government because of poor industry 
practices was found to be a further reason for industry to self-regulate. This 
was the case when time-share industry started its self-regulation efforts in 
1980s. (Sorsa 2003). Often there will be a number of reasons to self-
regulate.  
 
 
4.2 Self-regulation tools to promote competitive  
 advantage 
Many self-regulation systems use the ethical issues as a source of differen-
tiation and aim to distinguish certified products from others by highlighting 
certain product or process attributes (e.g., observance of strict environ-
mental requirements; social standards; animal welfare; organic farming; 
origin; etc.). (Sorsa 2009b, 58–65). 
Utz Certified highlights the all dimensions of corporate social re-
sponsibility (ecological, social and economical) as well as the trace-
                                                 
19 The UK consumer authority Office of Fair Trading (OFT) encourages businesses to 
higher standards when using tools other than enforcement, such as guidance and train-
ing, and in particular through Consumer Codes Approval Scheme (CCAS). The CCAS 
rewards those who adopt best practice, giving them a competitive edge in attracting and 
retaining customers. What is exceptional when providing advice and guidance, OFT 
distinguishes between what is necessary to meet statutory obligations and what is desir-
able for the purposes of achieving improvements above the minimum required by law. 
(OFT964). See more in Sorsa 2010. 
20 Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries in the EU. 
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ability. It is market-oriented sustainability program which is open to 
farms of all sizes. Rainforest Alliance focuses more on the biodiver-
city and social aspects. It awards certification to farms that meet a 
set of standards developed by the Sustainable Agriculture Network 
(SAN), a coalition of conservation and sustainable development 
NGOs with origins in Latin America. Fair Trade focuses mainly on 
social and economical dimensions. It aims at fair access to markets 
with a focus on sustainable production and improved living condi-
tions for small scale producers or farmers.  
 
In the business to consumer relationship different origin labels (The Key 
Flag) or eco-labels (The Swan21, Eco-Flower) were developed in order to 
offer consumers the possibility to make better choices as regards the product 
and process characteristics of their purchases and in order to raise the trust 
and image of the business in general (Sorsa 2009b, 44–51; Agri 238, 7).  
 
The Key Flag is issued by the Association for Finnish Work, and it 
is a registered collective trade mark that proves a product or service 
is Finnish-made. The right to use the Key Flag symbol is issued 
upon application to the origin mark committee of the Association for 
Finnish Work. The Key Flag may be used for brand marketing and 
corporate profiling, with some reservations. The right to use the Key 
Flag is issued for a maximum period of three years at a time. Key 
Flag products and services must be produced in Finland. Further-
more, at least 50 percent of their production must be of Finnish ori-
gin, in terms of cost value. The use of the Key Flag is regulated by 
the Association for Finnish Work, that has been promoting Finnish 
know-how already for over 95 years.  
 
Eco-labels which are based on self-regulatory systems play a relevant role 
in all sectors as well. There is however, also ecolabels which are based on 
the EU regulations22. In Nordic countries the two eco-labels, one based on 
self-regulation, and another based on EU regulation, are competing with 
each other. There is a revision process going on with the EU Ecolabel. The 
Swan is better known in Nordic countries that the EU Ecolabel. The aim of 
the revision process is that the Ecolabel will be well harmonised with other 
labels, nationally and globally and that the Ecolabel can be attained by 
                                                 
21 The Swan is the official Nordic eco-label, introduced by the Nordic Council of Minis-
ters. The green symbol is available for around 60 product groups for which it is felt that 
eco-labelling is needed and will be beneficial. http://www.ymparistomerkki.fi/en 
22 The European Ecolabel is a voluntary scheme, established in 1992 to encourage 
businesses to market products and services that are kinder to the environment. Products 
and services awarded the Ecolabel carry the flower logo, allowing consumers – including 
public and private purchasers – to identify them easily. The voluntary nature of the 
scheme means that it does not create barriers to trade. On the contrary – many producers 
find that it gives them a competitive advantage. 
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companies with limited costs and efforts for them while still maintaining a 
high ambition23. From the consumer viewpoint one could ask that do we 
need so many different ecolabel systems? From the consumer’s view point 
the large number of standards and the diversity between them can lead to 
confusion.24. 
From the retail business viewpoint different labels are a source of dif-
ferentiation, as it is to the food industry. The retailers choose different la-
bels in order to create the image for the company. On the other hand, in 
retail sector the labels produced in self-regulation systems face more and 
more competition from the so called private labels which the big retail 
companies have produced. From the consumer viewpoint this trend is wel-
comed because usually it means lower prices for the consumers. In food 
value chain these self-regulation tools are used in order to guarantee the 
quality or safety of food products or production and also in order to com-
municate this to the final consumer by means of a logo or label. (Sorsa 
2009b, 127. See also Sexsmith & Potts 2009, 47 – 59).  
 
 
5 Self-regulation as a response to the threat  
 or pressure 
Self-regulation is often explained to be born as a consequence of the threat 
from the lawmakers reaction to market failures or the threat from public 
opinion. This explanation did not seem to get much support in this research. 
It seems that only the chemical industry self-regulation system, Responsible 
Care, was born as a reaction to the threat from lawmakers as well as the self-
regulation of pharmaceutical industry (Kyttä & Tala 2008), which is a sub 
category of chemical industry. In the chemical industry business operators 
wanted to raise the trustworthiness of the sector after the serious accidents in 
different part of the world in chemical plants. Nowadays, however, it seems 
that the Responsible care programme is more based on the desire of the in-
dustry to show to the public that it wants to take responsibility of the envi-
ronment and its workers. (Sorsa 2009b, 77–85). 
ISO 14000 is a most well known standard for environmental manage-
ment. According to Nadvi & Wältring, in contrast to ISO 9000, whose in-
troduction is based on the needs of business for quality assured supply 
chain management, ISO 14000 has evolved under different pressures. Its 
                                                 
23 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/about_ecolabel/revision_of_ecolabel_en.htm 
24 Same conclusion was received in Agri 238, 7; van Yperen 2006, 59 and Nadgrodkiewicz 
2009, 4. 
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emergence has to be seen as a response by industry to the growing envi-
ronmental consciousness of the 1980s and 1990s, and the demands of 
NGOs and multilateral bodies for environmentally sustainable practices in 
production. It is generally believed however that, the ISO 14000 series 
emerged as a result of both the Uruguay round of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariff (GATT) negotiations and the UN Rio Summit on the 
environment held in 1992 (Navdi & Wältring 2004; Hewitt and Gary, 
1998). According to the standardisation organisation’s information in ISO 
(1996), the main purpose of the standard is to “provide a systematic, 
documented, consistent procedure that provides clear evidence of the rela-
tionship between organizations’ publicly stated environmental policy and 
the implementation of this policy in practice”. 
 
 
6 Self-regulation in the context of better  
 regulation 
It is evident that from 1990 until today there has been a dramatic increase 
in the number of self-regulation schemes not only in the food industry at 
the business-to-consumer level in the EU but also in other industries. As a 
consequence, it is argued that the lawmakers should take self-regulation 
more seriously as a regulatory strategy because of its benefits and feasibil-
ity in dynamic, global business environment (Sorsa 2009b, 52–55).  
The aim of this article was to find out why do companies voluntarily co-
operate by self-regulating with their competitors and with the members of 
civil society and NGOs and to find out when and under which conditions 
trade associations and other entities engage in self-regulation. The most 
important motive for self-regulation seemed to be the desire to promote or 
to create competitive advantage. It was shown also that sustainable devel-
opment has framed the development of different self-regulation schemes. 
This seems to serve a public regulatory function in the global environ-
mental arena. Self-regulation networks fill the regulatory gaps25 that are 
created when global trade increases the exploitation of global commons 
resources and shifts production to exporting countries with lax environ-
mental or social standards. Public responses are often inadequate to address 
the attendant environmental harms, especially since most of them are re-
gionally restricted.  
                                                 
25 According to Caffaggi public and private regulation (e.g. self-regulation) complement 
rather than substitute one another, although in many contexts, private law-making has 
anticipated public regulation (e.g. HACCP) or, in de-regulatory ages, has substituted 
public legislation. Caffaggi 2009, 9. 
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The reason why companies try to tackle problems related to social and 
environmental aspects is because these are seen on the one hand as opportu-
nities for growth and competitive advantage (e.g. Nadgrodkiewicz 2009, 2–
3) and on the other hand ethical issues are an integral part of the business 
without emphasis to competitive issues. That is reflected as a growing num-
ber or self-regulation schemes focusing on social or environmental issues.  
This research on self-regulatory mechanisms breaks down the classical 
orthodoxy that regulation only occurs through a mechanism of deterrence 
that works via commands against misconduct spelled out in legal rules, 
monitoring of compliance by a state regulatory agency, and application of 
punitive sanctions for breach. In self-regulation informal sanctions (nega-
tive publicity, public criticism, shame) have a greater motivating impact 
than formal legal sanctions. These questions are part of the implementation 
and compliance issues which are raised high in the BR agenda. Regulatory 
effects always depends on the extent to which regulatory norms are incor-
porated into informal and self-regulation, whether at the level of a corpora-
tion’s management, an industry or a local community. It is also illustrated 
in this research like in Schmitz’s report that the entrepreneurs are reluctant 
to comply with the command and control rules and they are sceptical of the 
advice they receive from government agencies. Instead, they listen to their 
customers. If policy-makers would start with this fact, they can be more 
productively engage with the private sector (Schmitz 2005, 15). 
It came up in this research that we live in a buyer-driven world (Sorsa 
2009b; Sorsa 2010b, 100–116). As market become more differentiated and 
complex, and as buyers become more demanding, the policy-makers, in 
order to be effective, need to learn to work with these drivers of change. 
(Shmitz 2005, 21). The UK Government has taken this already seriously. It 
believes that by engaging better with business, and developing a better un-
derstanding of supply chains, a more complete understanding of the costs 
and opportunities created by policy choices would be achievable. In par-
ticular, the UK Government is keen to understand how better supply chain 
analysis26 can help policy-makers identify economic opportunities that 
might flow from certain policy choices. Understanding supply chains as 
part of the policy-making process can be a useful approach to identify 
where and how to act within markets for the benefit of the economy and to 
capture business opportunities. (Thinking Business in Policy 2009, 4–5). 
                                                 
26 Supply chain analysis is the systematic mapping and analysis of the physical commercial 
and cost linkages that exist between businesses. It aims to identify the opportunities and 
barriers created by Government policy decisions or actions connected to a particular pol-
icy. These chains can be confined to a particular sector in a specific geographic location or 
divided between different sectors spanning across different regions. 
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These findings highlight the relevance of information in all phases of law 
drafting and the role of impact assessment. The information should come 
from different sources (Tala 2007b, 9; Sorsa 2010b, 117–119) and not only 
from political science researchers. It was found out in this research that the 
way of analysing the same issues varied a lot depending on the scientific 
discipline the writer came from. Management sciences can be a rich source 
of information for law makers because it approaches the issues from more 
business oriented perspective than do the political scientists. 
This research should wake up the law makers to realise that self-
regulation as an alternative option27 to command and control regulation 
can be taken seriously. The purpose was to show how innovatively busi-
nesses, NGOs and civil society actors find solutions to the problems (con-
cerns about quality assurance, health and safety, as well as ethical, social 
and environmental aspects of production) which seem to be insuperable to 
the EU lawmaker or the international public organisations like WTO, ILO 
or OECD. The rules of international conventions are packed to manageable 
code of conducts or IFAs and implemented to business practices by con-
tracts. The serious problems of non-compliance of legal rules are translated 
to self-regulation rules integrated to company cultures of multinational 
companies and their suppliers. Customers, NGOs, civil society actors and 
researchers take care of the monitoring of the compliance of the self-
regulation rules. The number of the reports available about the pros and 
cons, efficiency and effectiveness of the different self-regulation schemes 
is tremendous. There is more and more scientific research which aims to 
develop instruments to measure the impacts of different self-regulation 
schemes (Lloyd et al. 2008; Nadgrodkiewicz 2009; Giovannucci & Potts 
2008; Telljohan et al. 2009). From the law maker’s viewpoint it is a ques-
tion of negligence that this information is not better used in law making. 
There are some EU policy documents which already note the develop-
ment of private trade-related sustainability assurance schemes, and their 
relevance in relation to sustainable development objectives (e.g. COM 
(2009) 215; COM(2008) 641). EU Commission has also considered its role 
related in this process and highlights that regulating criteria and standards 
would limit a dynamic element of private initiatives in this field and could 
stand in the way of the further development of Fair Trade and other private 
schemes and their standards. It is however important for good market func-
tioning that consumers and producers should have access to reliable infor-
mation on the schemes, standards and criteria should be objective and non-
discriminatory to avoid any negative impact on e.g. small and medium size 
companies and producers of developing countries. There should be also 
                                                 
27 Paremman sääntelyn toimintaohjelma, 168–169. 
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independent monitoring to guarantee that the products are the result of 
practices carried out according to a specific set of criteria balancing eco-
logical, economic and social considerations. The nature and results of the 
auditing process should be available for inspection. (COM(2009) 215).  
These elements of assessing good practice of the private sector opera-
tors are mentioned in several other research papers and public documents 
as well. The important question today and in future is, to what extent could 
the drafting, implementation and control of different marketing standards 
(or parts of them) or other self-regulation schemes be left to self-
regulation? (Sorsa 2010a) What role should the EU or national law makers 
play in this process?  
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     APPENDIX 
 
Business to business -schemes Industry sector 
 
Business Social Compliance Initiative general, retail business 
Utz Certified certification food industry, retail business 
Fair trade certification food industry, retail business 
Rainforest Alliance food industry, retail business  
Responsible Care chemical industry 
Social Accountability 8000 –standard general 
GlobalGAP food industry 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control  
Points (HACCP) food industry 
Ethical Trading Initiative general 
 
ISO 14000 general 
ISO 9000 general 
ISO 65 standard general 
International Food Standard food industry 
Global Food Safety Initiative food industry 
Guideline Daily Amount, GDA food industry 
 
 
Business to consumer -schemes   
 
The Key Flag several industries 
The Swan several industries 
Fair Trade retail business 
EU Ecolabel 23-three different product groups 
Private labels retail business 
 
Charter for Sustainable Cleaning chemical industry 
 
ICC – Code of Advertising and   
Marketing Communication Practice, PA general 
ICC Guidelines of Ethical marketing, PA general 
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COULD EU-LEVEL REGULATORY PRIVATE 
INTEREST ORGANISATIONS PROMOTE OR  
DISCOURAGE HARMONISATION OF  
CONSUMER LAW IN EU? 
Ellinoora Peltonen 
 
1 Introduction 
In the recent years the European legislature and, particularly, European 
Commission have experimented with self- and co-regulatory solutions as a 
part of EU consumer policy. Several consumer protection Directives 
implicitly or explicitly allow for or promote complementary self- and co-
regulatory schemes to be implemented by regulatory private interest 
organisations (hereinafter RePIOs). Most commonly the Directives merely 
acknowledge or promote RePIOs’ role in complementing implementation 
of EU’s consumer policy at the Member State (MS) level1. This is an 
approach that could increase the flexibility, but also the heterogeneity of 
EU law implementation. On the other hand, there is also limited number of 
Directives, which promote EU wide self- or co-regulatory schemes2. The 
                                                            
1 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version), Article 6, 
stipulates that Directive does not exclude the MS level voluntary control of misleading or 
comparative advertising by means of regulation by RePIOs. 
Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 
2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term 
holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, Article 14, stipulates that MS may 
encourage RePIOs to inform consumers of their codes of conducts and the setting up or 
development of out-of-court complaints and redress procedures. 
European Commission’s (2009) proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in MSs concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive), COM(2009)185 final: Article 3.3, stipulates 
that MSs are obliged encourage RePIOs’ work at MS level to the extent permitted by 
their legal systems. 
However, the European Commission’s (2008) proposal for a Directive of the 
European parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, COM(2008) 614 final, 
seems to envisage a more modest role for MS level RePIOs than the Directives, which it 
will replace. The proposed Article 44 encourages traders and code owners (e.g. RePIOs) 
to inform consumers of their codes of conduct. 
2 To name few consumer policy Directives promoting private regulatory schemes by 
RePIOs at EU level: Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
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existence of such provisions in special field of consumer policy indicates 
that, in that particular regulatory field of consumer policy the European 
legislature has aspired for a more harmonised and, at the same time, 
flexible implementation of consumer policy.  
This study demonstrates that only modest progress has been made in 
view of furthering harmonisation of EU’s consumer policy by means of 
RePIOs assisted self-or co-regulatory implementation at the EU level. At 
current state many EU level RePIOs lack in their effective organisation and 
in their mandate, which makes it difficult for them to contribute to the 
more harmonised implementation of EU’s consumer policy. In particular, 
the European legislature has not standardised procedures by which it could 
better engage the EU level RePIOs in consumer policy implementation. 
 However, the study also demonstrates that within some specific old and 
new policy fields the European legislature and European Commission have 
managed to effectively trigger an increasingly harmonised EU wide 
implementation of consumer policy with the help of EU level RePIOs. 
                                                                                                                                          
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market: It is stated in paragraph 
115 of the Directive that “Codes of conduct at Community level ... do not preclude MSs, 
in accordance with Community law, from taking more stringent measures in law or 
national professional bodies from providing for greater protection in their national codes 
of conduct.” Furthermore, Article 22.2e and Article 27.4 recognise, indirectly, that MSs 
may allow for the use of codes of conduct as what comes to regulating, monitoring and 
enforcing professional services. 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) states 
in its recital that at MS and EU levels, “[i]t is appropriate to provide a role for codes of 
conduct, which enable traders to apply the principles of this Directive effectively in specific 
economic fields ...” Furthermore, the Article 3.8 states that “This Directive is without 
prejudice to any conditions of establishment or of authorisation regimes, or to the 
deontological codes of conduct or other specific rules governing regulated professions in 
order to uphold high standards of integrity on the part of the professional, which MSs may, 
in conformity with Community law, impose on professionals. 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') in its Article 8.2, 
stipulates that the MSs and the European Commission are obliged to encourage 
professional RePIOs to establish codes of conduct at the EU level. Also, Article 16 
stipulates that for implementation purposes MSs and the European Commission are 
obliged encourage the drawing up of EU level codes of conduct.  
In the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, Article 27 encourages the drawing up of MS 
and EU level RePIOs’ schemes to contribute to the proper implementation of the data 
protection provisions. Furthermore, the Article 17 encourages complementary out-of-
court dispute settlement systems to be organised by RePIOs. 
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These EU level RePIOs posses, not only sufficient determination, but also 
organisational capacities and mandate for EU wide implementation of 
particular consumer protection stipulations. The regulatory powers of these 
RePIOs transcend the MS borders, which makes it possible for them to 
oversee and enforce their private regulatory schemes, directly, across the 
MSs – at the business-specific level. These RePIOs also openly aim for 
further harmonisation of single market and their tasks are intended to fully 
support EU’s consumer policy. New Approach to Standardisation 
(hereinafter NA) is one of the promising examples of (now, already “old 
school”) consumer safety policy utilising EU level RePIOs – European 
standardisation organisations – in harmonising European product 
standards. Recently, the NA was freshened up also to include formally 
recognised EU level RePIO-run oversight organisation – European co-
ordination for Accreditation (EA). The EA is now mandated to oversee 
private contract agents, Notified Bodies, that verify individual business 
compliance to NA standards3; and to oversee (predominantly private) 
national accreditation bodies that accredit the contract agents4. This is in 
contrast to previous policy within NA, where overseeing the Notified 
Bodies and accreditation bodies was largely left for the MSs’ discretion.  
In addition to NA, there are promising and, on the other hand, 
discouraging case studies of EU wide RePIOs, which attempt to contribute 
to the more harmonised EU consumer policy by means of EU level RePIO-
led frameworks that include private implementing measures. The most 
promising case studies can be found in the “new” regulatory fields, such as 
e-commerce (Marsden, C. & Simmons, S. & Brow, I. & Woods, L. & 
Peake, A. & Robinson, N. & Hoorens, S. & Klautzer, L., 2008, p. xxi, 171–
181 p. xxi, 171–181).  
The case studies indicate that some EU-level RePIOs have been able to 
implement their self- and co-regulatory codes of conduct so that they do 
appear to support the harmonisation of EU’s consumer policy. However, 
these cases are often found only in very specific consumer policy fields: In 
sectors, where the product or service markets are already close in finding 
their way of being genuinely integrated across the MSs. In fact, in these 
sectors the EU level RePIO-assisted harmonised implementation of EU’s 
                                                            
3 The so called Notified Bodies: Notified Bodies and their accreditation is an integral 
part of checks and balances related to NA to Standardisation Directives that allow for 
manufacturing businesses to demonstrate that the products conform to principles-based 
standards. Sometimes, product conformity is demonstrated by means of external 
verification services provided by Notified Bodies.  
4 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to 
the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93. 
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consumer policy should improve the functioning of the business-sector as a 
whole and, therewith, provide genuine advantages for consumers. 
However, more generally applicable EU level RePIO-led self- and co-
regulatory schemes that intend to assist in implementation and 
harmonisation of EU’s consumer policy remain challenging.   
 
 
2 RePIOs may exert soft control at EU level 
2.1 Introduction  
As noted in the introduction, occasionally the EU legislation provides 
possibilities to use EU wide RePIOs in implementing consumer policy: 
Some Directives do encourage self-regulation; self-monitoring and 
enforcement to be drawn up by professional- and industry-RePIOs at the 
EU level. The Directive 2006/123/EC concerning services, Article 37, 
provides for RePIOs’ codes of conduct at the EU level. Also Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC recital 20 makes reference to 
EU level codes. Furthermore, Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of 
consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare contracts Article 14; 
Data protection Directive 95/46/EC Article 27.3; and Directive on 
electronic commerce 2000/31/EC in its Articles 8.3 and 16 promote codes 
of conduct at EU level.  
However, there appears only few case studies in which European 
Commission and/or legislature have successfully delegated, either 
informally or formally, significant implementing tasks to certain 
recognised EU wide RePIOs in the field of consumer protection. This is 
due to the fact that powerful RePIOs operational at the EU level are 
lacking: Many of the EU level industry or professional confederations 
simply are not able to carry out implementing tasks as they lack mandates 
and sufficient organisational and financial resources. Acquiring mandates 
from member organisation would be even impossible due to differing legal 
traditions that the RePIOs operating at the MS level face (Zeijden (van 
der), Paul & Horst (van der), Rob, 2008; European Commission, 
Directorate General for Internal Market, 2007; Hans-Bredow-Institut and 
the Institute of European Media Law, 2006). 
In addition, it is noteworthy that harmonisation of the consumer law in 
EU via EU wide RePIOs is not often even a policy objective. This is 
demonstrated, for example, in that the MS level self- or co-regulation is 
often promoted instead of EU level self- or co-regulation. In addition, MS 
level self- or co-regulation is always optional, considered as mere 
 119
supplementary to legislative implementing measures. Thus, the Directives 
granting a possibility for self- and co-regulation at MS level are actually 
promoting or, at least, accepting regulatory plurality. In fact, self- and co-
regulation is often encouraged, because in several fields MSs already do 
have legal traditions that rely partly on self- or co-regulation implemented 
by national RePIOs, and the European legislature has not dared to provoke 
this delicate balance between legislation and self- or co-regulation5.  
The next Chapters will primarily scrutinise case studies, where EU level 
industry- and professional-RePIOs operate self- or co-regulatory schemes 
that are supported or influenced by either European Commission and/or 
legislature. The study made an effort to find case studies in which the EU 
level RePIOs are able or, at least, intending to exert tangible, continuous 
and uniform control over individual business compliance across the MSs. 
Under such circumstances the RePIOs should have real capabilities to 
improve the implementation and, therewith, also the harmonisation of 
consumer policy in EU. On the other hand, if there is an evident lack of 
tangible, continuous and uniform business-specific control as what comes 
to EU wide RePIO-led self-and co-regulatory schemes, this could be seen 
as an indication that EU level RePIOs are not able to provide for further 
harmonisation of the EU consumer policy – beyond that of the legislative 
harmonisation.  
Therefore, the primary interest of the study is on RePIO-led self- and 
co-regulatory schemes that entail a permanent and organisationally 
independent entity responsible for compliance monitoring and enforcement 
of individual business compliance across several MSs. 
However, even if the number of case studies of such EU level self- and 
co-regulatory schemes was found to be very limited, the more 
heterogeneous schemes – strategies that depend on various policies at MS 
level in monitoring and enforcing individual business compliance to EU 
level codes of conduct – did not seem to be totally insignificant in terms of 
EU consumer policy harmonisation.  
                                                            
5 This tendency to foster national path-dependency is particularly visible in the Directive 
2006/123/EC concerning the services in the internal market; the unfair commercial 
practices Directive 2005/29/EC; Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising; and the proposed codified version of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive, which even states in its recital 45: “Directive encourages the use of ... 
[self- and co-regulation]. This neither obliges MSs to set up co- and/or self-regulatory 
regimes nor disrupts or jeopardises current co- or self-regulatory initiatives which are 
already in place within MSs and which are working effectively.” 
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2.2 Case: Advertising self-regulation by EASA 
Permanent and uniform control and enforcement at business-specific level 
across several MSs by an EU-wide RePIO is a rarity. However, “soft” 
control and enforcement strategies of EU-wide RePIO are more common. 
These strategies are particularly well demonstrated on the account of 
advertising self-regulation. Currently, advertising self- and co-regulation is 
overseen by European Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA), which is 
an EU level RePIO.  
Followed by a political pressure from the European Commission 
(European Advertising Standards Alliance, 2005)6 EASA brought together 
representatives from all sectors of the advertising industry for a Self-
Regulatory Summit in 2004. In the presence of representatives of the 
European Commission a Self-Regulatory Charter was signed. The Charter 
commits advertising industry and individual self-and co-regulatory 
organisations operational at the MS level to efficient self-regulatory 
systems across Europe. What is perceived as efficient is elaborated by 
EASA (European Advertising Standards Alliance, 2004)7.   
In fact, the European Commission has viewed EASA as an active 
controller of the self-and co-regulatory organisations operational at the MS 
level. The EASA dedicates substantial resources to encourage best practice 
adoption of self- and co-regulatory organisations at MS level. It also 
periodically updates its reference documents and engages all MS-level self- 
or co-regulatory RePIOs to EU level deliberations. For example, it 
periodically publishes a report, called Blue Book (European Advertising 
Standards Alliance, 2007), where all the national self- and co-regulatory –
approaches in advertising sector are represented (European Commission, 
Health and Consumers Directorate General, 2006). Thus, even if EASA 
does not exert business-specific self-regulatory monitoring, it exerts sector-
                                                            
6 In October 2003, Commissioner Byrne challenged the advertising industry1 to “show 
that self-regulation can have comprehensive coverage and can be made to work”, 
asserting that “if greater reliance is to be placed on self-regulation then substantial 
further efforts will be required”, in particular with regard to: lacking European-wide 
coverage in terms of the use of codes, levels of compliance, and the application of 
sanctions; hard-to-control advertising methods, including rogue direct marketing and 
claims published on traders’ own websites. 
Thus, this indicates that the EASA self-regulatory measures were perceived as 
having potential in providing for more harmonised EU consumer policy.  
Source: European Advertising Standards Alliance, 2005.  
7 The Charter builds upon the EASA’s Statement of Common Principles and Operating 
Standards of Best Practice and EASA’s Best Practice Self-Regulatory Model. The 
Charter also recognises that self-regulation should be based on the universally-accepted 
ICC Codes of Marketing and Advertising Practice. Source: European Advertising 
Standards Alliance, 2004. 
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specific monitoring and compliance improving by actively overseeing and 
softly re-steering its national member organisations.  
Currently, the advertising sector’s self-and co-regulatory traditions are 
different across MSs. This cuts short the aspirations of the harmonised self-
regulatory rules and centralised organisation of monitoring and 
enforcement at business-specific level across MSs. On the other hand, 
currently, it also seems that there is no political pressure to move towards 
more uniform EU level self- or co-regulatory (or legislative) framework8 – 
the soft sector-specific control suffices.  
 
 
2.3 Case: Advertising self-regulation by EFRD 
There are also other EU level advertising industry-RePIOs than EASA that 
represent specific advertising fields. They normally co-operate and co-
ordinate their self-regulatory activities with EASA, however, having their 
own codes of conduct and associated monitoring strategy. For example, the 
alcohol industry’s European Forum for Responsible Drinking (EFRD) has 
agreed on the Common Standards for Commercial Communications 
(CSCC) (European Forum for Responsible Drinking, 2006).  
One can detect a level of political pressure that has contributed to the 
development of CSCC, thus, indicating that the CSCC is perceived as 
providing for the EU consumer policy9. Nevertheless, the current EFRDs 
formal commitment of implementing, monitoring compliance and 
enforcement of the CSCC at the EU level seems to be weak. The CSCC 
states on the account of monitoring and imposing sanctions: “The general 
aim of these Common Standards is not to replace existing national systems, 
but rather to provide general criteria that should be met by national self-
regulatory mechanisms, sector and company codes. Complaints based on 
/concerning an infraction of the Common Standards are dealt with by the 
member organizations of the European Advertising Standards Alliance 
(EASA) … at national level. These national organizations are best placed 
                                                            
8 This is particular demonstrated in the proposed Audiovisual Media Services Directive, 
recital 45. Source: COM(2009)185 final. 
9 The CSCC reflects many of the issues addressed by the European Council of Ministers 
in the 2001: Council Recommendation of 5 June 2001 on the drinking of alcohol by 
young people, in particular children and adolescents.The CSCCs is also based in the 
Guidelines for Commercial Communications on Alcoholic Beverages developed in 1994 
by the Amsterdam Group (TAG). The European Commission also encourages the self-
regulatory approach in its 2006 Communication: “Actors in the alcohol beverage chain 
have been actively engaged in most MSs in enforcement of national regulations, and 
have declared their willingness to become more proactive in enforcing regulatory and 
self-regulatory measures.” Source: COM(2006) 625 final, p. 9.  
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to deal with complaints, as only they will be able to assess and understand 
fully the national context and local sensitivities (European Forum for 
Responsible Drinking, 2006).” Thus, implementation is left entirely to the 
member organisations of the EFRD at MS-level. On the other hand, the 
MS-level approaches of the member organisations vary considerably: from 
command-and-control to virtually no visible action as what comes to self-
monitoring and self-enforcing compliance10.  
Despite of the apparent EFRD’s disengagement to EU level compliance 
monitoring and enforcement of the CSCC scheme, the general compliance 
levels of the industry in view of the CSCC has been monitored by means of 
relatively comprehensive (independent) compliance monitoring report on 
yearly basis, commissioned by the EFRD (Bouis, Lucien, 2008). In 
addition to this, EU has funded project called Enforcement of national 
Laws and Self-regulation on advertising and marketing of Alcohol (ELSA) 
has gathered compliance data from the MSs, industry-REPIOs and 
businesses that have signed in to the CSCC (ELSA, 2009) 11. Thus, quite 
significant work is done in view of sector-specific control by the EFRD 
itself and also by the EU institutions: The learning processes generated by 
the ELSA-project and independent reports commissioned on yearly basis 
by the EFDR can be perceived as a strategy to softly steer and harmonise 
the alcohol industry’s advertising practices across the EU.  
Therefore, it appears that even if implementation of a EU wide RePIO 
scheme is not uniform – exerting control at business-specific level by a 
permanent and independent EU level entity – this does not necessarily 
equal to a failed policy harmonisation. The primary added value of the EU 
level codes and their subsequent sector-specific monitoring is that they 
                                                            
10 In France, for example, the CSCC is monitored by means of pre-launch advice provided 
by Bureau de Vérification de la Publicité (BVP). This is an NGO composed by the TV 
advertisers and financed by the industry. In the UK there are several self-and co-regulatory 
bodies that monitor issues related to CSCC. In television advertisements, a pre-launch 
advice is provided by co-regulatory Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre (BACC) 
funded by commercial broadcasters. On the other hand, the search for violations is done by 
self-regulatory Advertising Standards Authority ASA (Broadcasting) and co-regulatory 
Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP). In Finland, the marketing of 
alcohol is limited by legal Act and supervised by public authorities. Therefore, there is not 
much scope for self- or co-regulatory initiatives. However, there is Council of Ethics in 
Advertising (MEN) which deals mainly with complaints from consumers and with issues 
that are deemed to have public significance. The MEN handles complaints from consumers 
and advertisers regarding commercial communications in all media. There is no right of 
appeal. No sanctions are available to the Council if its decisions are ignored because its 
statements are recommendations. Sources: National Foundation for Alcohol Prevention, 
2007, p. 59, 66–68, 193–207. 
11 The main objective of the ELSA project is to examine the degree of implementation of 
the Council recommendation on responsible drinking. The project is co-financed by the 
European Commission.  
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render self-and co-regulatory (MS level) member organisations and 
individual business industry members more aware, responsive and 
responsible of their legal and private regulatory obligations; and also 
expectations laid on them by the European legislature. Thus, even if 
harmonised monitoring and enforcement strategy is lacking at EU level, 
there is a potential significance in EU level codes of conducts, which is 
embedded in their reflexivity: Subscription to EU level codes of conduct 
and (even a minimum level of) oversight and policy deliberation may 
encourage industry’s and individual business’ willingness to learn and to 
implement more harmonised policies across EU.  
 
 
2.4 Case: Distance selling Directive and EMOTA 
The Distance selling Directive 1997/712 that is destined to cease to exist 
after introduction of Consumer rights Directive, entails provision that 
encourages compliance control to be executed by RePIOs in its Article 
11(4)13. Despite that only MS-level self-regulatory and monitoring 
initiatives are promoted in the Directive, the recent study commissioned by 
the European Commission found (Zeijden (van der), Paul – Horst (van der), 
Rob,2008.) that – on its own initiative – the EU level RePIO, European e-
commerce and Mail order Association (EMOTA), is assisting in 
implementation of the Distance Selling Directive. This is done by means of 
European Convention on Cross Border Mail Order and Distance Selling 
(CBMO-DS)( European e-commerce and Mail order Association,2002.)  
In the CBMO-DS the 17 signatories of national member associations of 
EMOTA “pledge to abide” by the rules set in the Convention “respecting 
international and European legislation, regulations and conventions as 
well as national legislation and deontological regulations the national 
Associations and their member companies”. The Article 12 stipulates that 
provisions of the CBMO-DS are implemented by the national member 
associations within their existing national deontological framework and by 
the individual businesses according to the conditions specified by the 
national member associations. Thus, the CBMO-DS does not envisage EU 
level entity for monitoring business-specific compliance or enforcement. It 
                                                            
12 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on 
the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts. The proposed Consumer 
rights Directive (COM(2008) 614 final) does not entail such optional provision. 
13 “MSs may provide for voluntary supervision by self-regulatory bodies of compliance 
with the provisions of this Directive and recourse to such bodies for the settlement of 
disputes to be added to the means which MSs must provided to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of this Directive.“ 
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simply implements a system of referral, where consumers may receive 
information on the dispute resolution possibilities provided by EMOTA 
member associations in the other MSs. 
The CBMO-DS is intended to be implemented, for example, by Finnish 
and French member associations of EMOTA. However, they compliance 
monitoring and dispute resolution services that the Finnish and French 
RePIOs provide for differ considerably14.  
Generally, as what comes to EMOTA and its convention, it seems to be 
suffering from a very common problem amongst many self-regulators: 
There is a lack of transparency and visibility on the account of its self-
regulatory code of conduct and/or its implementation at MS level. Despite, 
after several years of signing the CBMO-MD that is supposedly 
implemented across several MSs, several of the MSs’ authorities have 
either had no knowledge of, or interest in, the existence of such self-
regulatory code of conduct. This is demonstrated in a recent comparative 
study noting that majority of the MSs’ authorities reported they had chosen 
not to implement Article 11(4) of the Distance Selling Directive (Schulte-
Nölke, Hans & Twigg-Flesner, Christian & Ebers, Martin (eds.), 2008). 
This signifies that the majority of the MSs have had no contact to or 
information on their national RePIOs that have implemented the EU level 
CBMO-MD. Alternatively, the MS authorities consider that the existence 
of such national code of conduct has had no significance to the 
implementation of the Directive.  
One can question the significance of such EU level code of conduct for 
the harmonisation of EU’s consumer policy, as it is not uniformly 
                                                            
14 The Finnish RePIO, Asiakkuusmarkinointiliitto, does not even make a reference to this 
EMOTA convention in its Internet pages nor does its code: The Finnish Direct Selling 
Industry Code of Conduct of the Finnish Direct Marketing Association (FDMA). As 
what comes to the handling of complaints it is stipulated in FDMA that: “The Code 
Administrator shall monitor Companies’ and Direct Sellers’ observance of the Code 
and, when necessary, take the appropriate actions in accordance with the regulations 
pertaining to an ethical Code Administrator. In addition, the Code Administrator shall 
prepare an annual Code report. The FDMA shall establish procedures for handling 
complaints.” However, in the www-pages of the DMA there is no reference to published 
annual Code reports; and no information on whether or how the complaints could be 
handled by the FDMA. In addition, the provision concerning FDMAs engagement to 
provide assistance in cross-border disputes stipulated in the CBMO-MD is not to be 
found from the Finnish code. On the other hand, in France, Fédération des Entreprises de 
Vente à Distance (FEVAD) has also code for professional conduct for the distance 
selling, where the complaints handling procedures are clearly delineated. Separation of 
powers has also been taken into account as the complaint handling body is independent 
from the FEVAD and its member organisations. In addition, the FEVAD has taken 
EMOTA convention as an Annex to the FEVAD code of professional conduct (Suomen 
Asiakkuusmarkkinointiliitto, 2009; Suomen Asiakkuusmarkkinointiliitto, 2005; 
Fédération des Entreprises de Vente à Distance, 2009). 
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implemented at business-specific level, it is clearly not well advertised and 
promoted by member associations at MS level, and as EMOTA does not 
publicise (and probably even does not even periodically conduct) sector-
specific control and deliberation measures at the EU level.  
 
 
3 Hardening the soft-spots 
3.1 How to support EU level RePIOs?  
It appears from the previous Chapter that the European legislature and 
Commission have accepted that many industry- and professional-RePIO 
confederations operational at the EU level are merely possessing “soft 
means for control”. Their control is not exerted directly towards (self- or 
co-)regulated businesses, but they exercise secondary sector-specific 
control over their member associations that, in turn, implement the EU 
level self- or co-regulation at the MS level. This renders the EU-level 
RePIO confederations’ influence to be based on deliberation and not on 
fixed institution and uniform commands. 
In the above discussed case studies the EU-wide RePIOs did not have 
EU-level monitoring and enforcement entities or uniform rules and 
strategies for monitoring and enforcing individual business non-
compliance. Nevertheless, two of the cases presented aimed for relatively 
established and uniform processes of sector-specific control over their 
national member associations, which implement (monitor and enforce) the 
EU level self-regulations vis-a-vis the individual member businesses. This 
approach appears to be working for EASA, in particular.  
However, even if there were well-functioning strategies of “soft means 
of control” in place at the EU-level, for example, insufficient coverage (e.g. 
RePIOs lacking in some MSs) may render such EU-wide self-regulatory 
implementation totally inconvenient.  
In addition, it should also be noted that the above Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 
presented cases were amongst the few stronger ones in terms of sector-
specific control over member associations and subsequent deliberation by 
the EU level RePIO. Generally, informal dialogue between European 
RePIO confederations and the European legislature and the Commission, in 
particular, has led to a plurality of non-binding collaborations and 
memorandums of understandings signed between industry-REPIOs, 
professional-REPIOs and the European Commission, for example, 
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European wide recommended codes of conduct15( Vever, Bruno, 2005). 
However, such dialogue has not generally led to EU level self-regulation 
that is in any way concerned with compliance monitoring and enforcement 
at individual business-specific or at sector-specific (MS) levels. They 
merely declare the aspirations and common coals towards which the 
signatories agree to progress. 
The reasons for no-show of the EU-wide RePIO codes of conduct can 
not solely be explained by irresolvable differences in MSs’ legal and self-
regulatory traditions, and weak EU level RePIOs, as suggested in the 
Chapter above. The EU legislature and the Commission are also partly 
culpable for the lack of institutionalised and uniform self- and co-
regulatory schemes at the EU-level.  
The Treaty16 and, consecutively, the European legislation do not stipulate 
whether it is possible to formally recognise and to delegate regulatory tasks 
to EU wide RePIOs. However, in the 2003 Inter-institutional agreement on 
better law making17 it is recognised that European legislature can resort to 
formal delegation by means of legislative act.  
Nevertheless, the problem-solving capacity seems to be weak and 
heterogeneous in view of how to effectively promote or to formally 
delegate self- and co-regulatory tasks to EU-wide RePIOs. The lack of 
effective and efficient tools and procedures to assist and encourage 
RePIO’s work towards more harmonised European consumer policy is well 
demonstrated in a recent study (Zeijden (van der), Paul & Horst (van der), 
                                                            
15 “Self-regulation in the professions has developed at European level in the last twenty 
years in a very broad range of activities, not least within the liberal professions, which 
had already been widely self-regulating at national level for a long time... These 
examples of self-regulation, generally based on codes of conduct, supported where 
appropriate by the social partners of the sector, have helped to establish codes of ethics 
and common practices, thereby facilitating the implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition. We can refer in this context to European self-regulation in the following 
professions: engineers (1982), lawyers (1988), perfusion nurses (1991), advertising 
agencies and consultants (1992), restaurateurs (1993), solicitors (1995), travel agents 
(1996), Internet service providers, hairdressers, asset managers, estate agents (2001), 
hoteliers (2003).” Source: Vever, Bruno, 2005. 
16 Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 9.5.2008, 
OJ 115, p. 47–199. 
17 See: European Parliament, Council, Commission (2003): Inter-institutional Agreement 
on Better Law-Making. Co-regulation is seen as possibility under the paragraph 21. 
Under co-regulation a legislative act must serve as the basis of private regulatory action. 
The delegating act indicates the extent of co-regulation in the area concerned, and the 
relevant measures in case of non-compliance by one or more parties, or if the co-
regulatory agreement fails. Relevant measures may provide, for example, for the regular 
supply of information by the Commission to the legislative authority on follow-up to 
application; or for a revision clause under which the Commission will report at the end 
of a specific period and, if necessary, propose an amendment to the legislative act or 
other appropriate legislative measure. 
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Rob, 2008, p. 43.), which scrutinised the present EU-wide self-and co-
regulatory schemes in the field of consumer policy sector. The study 
suggested that there is a special model of European level co-regulation 
named as co-regulation with final agreement by the Commission 
(hereinafter CoReFAC). This “CoReFAC-approach” seems to be similar to 
the Commission’s ex post recognition procedure, which was originally 
designed for voluntary environmental agreements18. However, 
unfortunately this “CoReFAC-approach” is a non-binding to the 
signatories: the European Commission and the RePIO: Therefore, it brings 
in no powers besides those of persuasion.  
Currently, the legislature and the Commission appear to be on the view 
that, if specific tasks need to be mandated to a particular EU wide RePIO, 
this RePIO must be recognised and its tasks need to be approved by each 
individual MSs and by the EU legislature. Such MS-level approval 
procedure has recently been used on the account of EA, which is an 
organisation relevant the NA to Standardisation discussed in more detail in 
the coming Chapter.  
Thus, the next Chapters discuss some potentially promising strategies in 
which the European legislator and the Commission have surpassed their 
deficient and uncertain powers to “delegate” regulatory tasks to EU level 
RePIOs.  
 
 
3.2 Case: Co-regulatory policy making – self-regulatory 
 implementation in the Internet environment 
The case studies discussed above viewed traditional sectors of self- and co-
regulation. However there is some evidence that the new regulatory sectors 
could surpass the burden of differing legal traditions at the MS level. 
Particularly, in the field of Internet self-regulation, there have been recent 
attempts for the European legislature and Commission to encourage 
European wide self-regulatory schemes. Special case studies bring light 
into the nature of co-operation between the European legislature, 
Commission and the RePIOs in this sector and the deliverables.  
In 1999–2000, the European Commission launched a special dialogue 
between stakeholders, which later became known as the “e-Confidence 
initiative” aiming to promote consumer confidence in electronic commerce 
through flexible regulatory approaches, i.e. thorough codes of conduct 
                                                            
18 On the procedure, see for example: Schnabl, G., 2005, p.93.  
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and/or trust marks19) negotiated and implemented by industry- and/or 
consumer-RePIOs or other private entity ( COM(1999)687, p. 9).  
This preference to private (self-)regulatory approach is not surprising in 
view of the Directive on Electronic Commerce 2000/31/EC20, where in the 
Article 16 the drafting of codes of conduct for the purpose of electronic 
commerce (to enhance implementation of Articles 5–15) at Community 
level is encouraged, by trade, professional and consumer associations or 
other organisations. The Directive also promotes the voluntary 
transmission of draft codes of conduct at national or EU level to the 
Commission; the accessibility of these codes of conduct in the EU 
languages by electronic means; communication between RePIOs and 
authorities as what comes to assessment of codes of conduct and their 
impact upon business practices, habits or customs relating to electronic 
commerce; and the drawing up of codes of conduct regarding the 
protection of minors and human dignity. In connection to this, the Article 
17 promotes out-of-court dispute settlement in electronic commerce.  
The Commission’s strategy for promoting European wide RePIO-led 
regulatory approach in e-commerce actually resembles some other 
strategies promoting the work of RePIOs: To some extent it approaches the 
process of negotiating voluntary environmental agreements in the field of 
environmental policy and, on the other hand, the social dialogue process of 
the social policy sector.  
In environmental policy, the European Commission generally validates 
voluntary environmental agreements, ex post, through recommendations 
(COM(96)561 final, p. 20–21). Similar type of Commission recommendation 
was also foreseen in the initial rounds of e-Confidence initiative negotiations 
between stakeholders (SEC(2004) 1390, p. 8.). The Commission also used the 
same threats in its e-Confidence initiative as on the account of environmental 
agreements (COM(2002)412 final) noting that “a lack of success in this area 
[e-Confidence initiative] would augur badly for the concept of self-regulation, 
resulting in a need for greater reliance on legislation to adequately protect 
consumers’ interests (SEC(2004) 1390, p. 8).” 
The e-Confidence initiative also has some elements of social dialogue in 
its aspirations to build a regulatory framework together with all the 
stakeholders. However, the e-Confidence initiative surfaced some the 
                                                            
19 A trustmark is similar to a “quality seal”. It conveys the message that a certain business 
has agreed to adhere to a set of common good practices, principles or guidelines and, 
possibly, to provide redress mechanisms for a customer. The trustmark may involve a third 
party assessment (verification) of the business practices prior to granting the mark. 
20 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market. 
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teething problems related to transferring “social dialogue” –approach from 
one sector to another. Initially, the Commission set up for the purpose of e-
Confidence initiative a group consisting of several RePIOs and businesses. 
At the time, the Commission took the position that they would follow-up 
on work of the stakeholders, possibly, backing it up with a Commission 
Recommendation (SEC(2004) 1390, p. 6). The Commission also acted as a 
secretariat to the core group: convening and hosting meetings, preparing 
the minutes of the meetings, maintaining website created for the purpose of 
e-Confidence initiative (UNICE, 2002, p. 7).  
However, the process towards codes of conduct or trust marks between 
the stakeholders did not progress according to the Commission’s initial 
plans. At the final stage, the group of negotiators diminished to only two: 
European Consumers Organisation (BEUC), and Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE) finally agreed to take on 
bilateral negotiations, which resulted to a draft of European Trustmark 
Agreement setting voluntary codes of conduct “European Trustmark 
Requirements” for e-commerce businesses who wish to display a special 
European trust mark in their e-commerce Internet-pages. The agreement 
foresaw a system of independent third party verification and ex post 
compliance monitoring and dispute settlement. The agreement was a result 
of several rounds of deliberations, at first, between several participants and, 
at later stage, only between the BEUC and UNICE (UNICE, 2002, p. 7–12).  
In particular, the European Trustmark Agreement anticipated a special 
European level e-Confidence Committee that would have had the task to 
oversee e-commerce businesses that displayed European trust marks in 
accordance with the requirements set in the European Trustmark 
Agreement. The e-Confidence Committee would have been composed of 
equal number of persons proposed and appointed by common accord 
between industry- and consumer-REPIOs: UNICE and BEUC. 
Furthermore, BEUC would have also had the task to appoint by common 
accord an independent chairman in consultation with the European 
Commission.  
The e-Confidence Committee would have had the task of: dealing with 
complaints (regarding to non-compliance by participating e-businesses) 
and elaborating its internal rules of procedure in view of complaints 
handling, including a possible appeal mechanism via arbitration; 
elaborating the content of “declaration of compliance” and “annual 
compliance report” of participating e-businesses that were foreseen in the 
European Trustmark Agreement; and organizing the modalities of the 
validation processes of the participating e-businesses. In the case of dispute 
arising from the interpretation of the European Trustmark Requirements, 
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the Committee would have made the final decision. It would have also 
reviewed the whole e-Confidence scheme; and managed the e-Confidence 
website (European Consumers’ Organisation, BEUC, 2001). In short, the 
European Trustmark Agreement would have set up special permanent 
institutions and processes for implementing, compliance monitoring and 
follow-up by the social partners (BEUC and UNICE) at European level 
and, in addition, the scheme was designed to be adopted at business-
specific level. 
Despite the BEUC and UNICE were able to agree on main aspects and 
modalities of the Trustmark-scheme, they found it difficult to reach consensus 
on few minor points21. Therefore, UNICE and BEUC agreed to invite the 
Commission to play a role as mediator to resolve the remaining points of 
dispute. However, the Commission did not take a role of a negotiator nor did 
it issue Recommendation in support for European Trustmark Agreement. 
Finally, no agreement could be reached between the UNICE and BEUC 
(Zeijden (van der), Paul – Horst (van der), Rob, 2008, p. 34).  
The European Commission seemed to back away from the Trustmark 
scheme specially, because the formal role in compliance monitoring the 
UNICE and BEUC had foreseen for the Commission. It perceived that 
Commission’s “role does not include involvement in the oversight of an 
organisation which is aimed at policing the application of what is 
essentially a self-regulatory code of best practice (SEC(2004) 1390, p. 6).”  
The above negotiations represented a novel and unprecedented example 
of cooperation between interest organisations and the European 
Commission specifically aiming to establish a new RePIO based on 
balanced interest representation. As a result of the e-Confidence initiative, 
UNICE has stated that it “encourages public authorities to promote and to 
act as a ‘facilitator’ of more dialogue between stakeholders at EU level 
(UNICE, 2002).” However, the Commission’s role in the negotiations and 
final deliverables fell short from the initial aspirations. In fact, if this type 
of “social dialogue” in aiming for tangible results in terms of self- or co-
regulatory solutions is to be promoted by the European Commission, on the 
basis of the experience gained from the e-Confidence initiative, some 
essential aspects need to be taken into account. As UNICE has positioned 
it: Objectives of the initiative, criteria for participation and procedural 
criteria need to be clear from the outset; role and the possible final 
endorsement by the Commission need to be identified from the beginning; 
clear and adequate timetable for the proceedings needs to be established; 
                                                            
21 The points of disagreement were: definition of the e-business; how the e-Commerce 
order should be acknowledged by the e-business; and the available payment options.  
Source: European Consumers’ Organisation, BEUC, 2001. 
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transparency throughout the process is essential for stakeholders to make 
informed decisions; and the right to initiate such proceedings should be 
open to all stakeholders as well as the autonomy to participate to the 
process (Zeijden (van der), Paul – Horst (van der), Rob, 2008, p. 34). This 
is without a doubt a voice of reason coming from an experienced 
participant to European social dialogue.  
There is also another EU level RePIO-led code of conduct that deserves 
closer scrutiny: Pan European Game Information System (PEGI) created 
by Interactive Software Federation of Europe. PEGI issues age-ratings 
(labels) for entertainment software and ensures that these ratings are used 
according to PEGI’s code of conduct. The code reflects the industry’s 
commitment and concern that information is provided to the public in a 
responsible manner about the content of its products. The industry’s 
contribution is intended to complement existing national laws, regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms. What is different in PEGI from the above 
discussed case studies concerning EASA and the EFRD is that the PEGI is 
engaging the game-industry businesses directly – at business-specific level 
– to its self-regulatory scheme, i.e. not through national member 
organisations as, for example, on the account of advertising sector 
discussed above (Interactive Software Federation of Europe, 2009).  
In fact, Interactive Software Federation of Europe has implemented 
PEGI by means of relatively comprehensive monitoring and enforcement 
organisation and strategy that is targeted to ensure individual business 
compliance. The PEGI Code of conduct for the European interactive 
software industry regarding age rating labeling, promotion and advertising 
of interactive software products sets: An Advisory Board (PAB), a 
Complaints Board (PCB), and an Enforcement Committee (PEC). The PAB 
and PCB include representatives from chief stakeholders (parents, 
consumers associations, child psychology experts, academics, media 
experts and the interactive software industry)22. The PEC is in charge of 
implementing the recommendations of the PAB and, more generally, of 
seeing to the enforcement of the rules and sanctions included in the present 
Code, including decisions of the PCB (Interactive Software Federation of 
Europe, 2009). 
                                                            
22 PAB has the task of continuing adjustment of the Code to social, legal and 
technological developments. The PCB also includes representatives from stakeholders 
similarly to the PAB. It is entrusted with the tasks to: handle possible complaints; and 
handle conflicts about the PEGI age ratings including any publisher or consumer 
complaints about those ratings. 
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An addition to PEGI, another scheme, PEGI Online23, was implemented 
by Interactive Software Federation of Europe in 2007 after to the growth of 
interactive games in the Internet and after some political pressure and 
stimulus was exerted on online gaming industry on the side of the European 
legislature. In fact, PEGI Online was launched by Commissioner Reding in 
June 2007. Its coordination has been viewed as a type of “co-regulatory 
policy making with self-regulatory implementation (Marsden, C. & 
Simmons, S. & Brow, I. & Woods, L. & Peake, A. & Robinson, N. & 
Hoorens, S. & Klautzer, L., 2008, p. 21, 173)”: Which probably points to the 
fact that PEGI Online was created as a result of successful, co-operation, 
persuasion and/or legislative threat on the side of European legislature. 
Furthermore, the PEGI online scheme was co-funded by EU’s Safer 
Internet Action Plan (COM(2003)776 final). On the other hand, the PEGI 
Online is also said to be stemming from Council 2002 Resolution on the 
protection of consumers, in particular young people, through the labeling 
of certain video games and computer games according to age group; and 
Council 2006 Recommendation on the protection of minors and human 
dignity and on the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of the 
European audiovisual and on-line information services industry. 
PEGI Online safety code (Interactive Software Federation of Europe, 
2007) is a code of conduct for the European interactive software industry. 
The code reflects the interactive software industry’s commitment and 
concern that information provided to the public in a responsible manner 
about the content of interactive software products. The industry’s 
contribution is intended to complement existing national laws, regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms. Monitoring and enforcement of the code is 
conducted mainly by the same private regulatory bodies created in PEGI 
Code of conduct, i.e. PAB, PCB, and PEC (Interactive Software Federation 
of Europe, 2009). The bodies operate along the same lines and have similar 
regulatory powers towards the businesses that have subscribed to the 
code(s) as based on PEGI Code of conduct. 
The PEGI and PEGI Online schemes have been generally considered as 
success stories of EU level RePIO-led Internet self-regulation in the 
                                                            
23 The PEGI Online project is a supplement to the Pan European Game Information 
system (PEGI) to cover online electronic games. Started by the Interactive Software 
Federation of Europe (ISFE) in 2003 with a view to help European parents and 
gatekeepers to make more informed decisions when it comes to buying offline and online 
games, the PEGI system provides pointers, in the form of age logos and content 
descriptors, pertaining to the age suitability of the games concerned. It later included also 
Netherlands Institute for the Classification of Audio-visual Media (NICAM). However, 
despite of its pan-European nature, also PEGI relies on monitoring that is executed by 
national member organisations. Source: Marsden, C. & Simmons, S. & Brow, I. & Woods, 
L. & Peake, A. & Robinson, N. & Hoorens, S. & Klautzer, L., 2008, p. xxi, 171–181.  
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independent reports that have reviewed them(Marsden, C. & Simmons, S. 
& Brow, I. & Woods, L. & Peake, A. & Robinson, N. & Hoorens, S. & 
Klautzer, L., 2008)24.  
 
 
3.3 Case: Formal mandates under Standardisation  
The New Approach (NA) to Standardisation25 is often perceived as 
particularly meaningful tool for EU level RePIO-led process of setting 
product standards aiming for truly harmonised single market in view of 
products. The NA to Standardisation was originally designed to the field of 
technical harmonisation of products. Since the mid-1980s, the EC made an 
increasing use of standards in support of its policies and legislation (hence 
it is the “New Approach”). Recently, NA is also perceived as having 
potential to move for new regulatory fields, e.g. to standardisation of 
services. Since 1998, approximately 25 new legislative acts and projects in 
which standards play a supportive role have been developed and 
implemented. The future prospects for using the NA to standardisation 
across several sectors have been viewed promising by the Commission 
(Verheugen, Günter, 2005).  
Innovative features of the NA technique include, of course, the RePIO-
led standard drafting process; but also the setting up of appropriate 
conformity assessment procedures (CAs) to demonstrate compliance with 
the NA Directives that set essential requirements (ERs); and the 
introduction of CE marking to those products that conform to the ERs 
(European Commission, electronic source, 2009)  
Thus, the NA to standardisation relies on Directives that define ERs – a 
kind of principles-based standards for products produced and distributed in 
the European market. Thus, the ERs are laid down in a normal legislative 
process. Thereafter, three European standardisation organisations26 have 
the task to specify how these ERs can be fulfilled through the path of 
                                                            
24 The only points of criticism have been the fact that online game providers in Germany 
have decided to exclude themselves from the PEGI Online scheme, because Germany 
already has its own national self-regulatory scheme in place. The other point of critique 
has been that the enforcement board does not include lay members 
25 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards. 
26 CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), CENELEC (European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardisation) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute)  
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harmonised European standards27. These technical specifications are drawn 
up on the basis of the Council Resolution of 7 May 198528; and the 
Directive 98/34/EC29. Drafting the harmonised standards is a voluntary 
process based on consensus amongst different economic actors: industry-
RePIOs, SMEs, consumer-RePIOs, labour-RePIOs, environmental-
RePIOs, public authorities, etc.  
The implementation of NA, particularly, the monitoring of business-
specific and general market compliance to NA Directives is a multilayer 
exercise consisting of several private and public actors and organisations: 
private contract agents, Notified Bodies, check the conformity of products 
at individual business-specific level; (private) accreditation bodies accredit 
the contract agents; the EU level standardisation related RePIO, EA, 
oversees the accreditation bodies and the accredited contract agents; and, 
the MS’s and European authorities monitor the general compliance levels 
within the market and issue notifications and monitor the accredited 
contract agents.  
The private contract agents, e.g. Notified Bodies, used under NA are 
normally private organisations or individuals that have been accredited to 
carry out CAs to check product conformity to ERs30. After accreditation 
the Notified Bodies are approved and notified by MSs31. They operate in 
an area of public interest. Generally, accreditation bodies that accredit 
                                                            
27 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations, OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, 37–48.  
28 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 setting out a New Approach to technical 
harmonisation and to standardisation. 
29 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations. 
30 Recently the rules and procedures for accreditation and verification of Notified Bodies 
are harmonised and defined with aim to address the uneven implementation in individual 
MSs that often undermines the credibility of schemes by Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. 
NA Directives establish different procedures for CAs of ERs according to the categories 
of products covered. The NA Directive may leave businesses no choice or give them a 
wide freedom of choice for demonstrating product conformity. The procedures are 
categorized to special modules. However, a relatively recent Decision No 768/2008/EC 
sets common: definitions; more uniform modules outlining the different common 
conformity assessment procedures; obligations for businesses (manufacturers, importers 
and distributors); specific rules for the use of the EC marking; notification criteria for the 
conformity assessment bodies (Notified Bodies); and specific safeguard procedures 
concerning market monitoring by public authorities. In essence, it re-introduces a more 
unified the common framework for future sectoral NA Directives  
31Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council 
Decision 93/465/EEC. See the Articles R23 and R24 of the “model Directive” intended 
to be the basis of the future New Approach Directives.  
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Notified Bodies are private entities. However, accrediting bodies are 
considered as executing public authority activity and, thus, their 
accreditation activities must be based on a formal recognition by the MSs 
(European Commission, 2003, Chapter 6.4.; Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. 
Article 4.532). 
Recently, the NA experienced some changes. Product’s CA procedures; 
Notified Bodies’ qualifications; and criteria for Notified Body accreditation 
were renewed and further harmonised. New legislative framework was 
adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. Furthermore, a recent 
Decision No 768/2008/EC also establishes a common legal framework that 
can be used for any industrial product that would benefit from European 
harmonised standards: The Decision is a kind of template to be used when 
drafting NA Directives. It therefore introduces common definitions and 
procedures for future sectoral legislation relying on NA to become more 
consistent and easier to implement. 
What is particularly interesting is that, in this context, the Regulation 
765/2008 also reinforces and solidifies the role of European co-operation 
for accreditation (EA), which was originally a private body providing 
European network of nationally recognised accreditation bodies. Thus, the 
EA is now one of the few EU wide RePIOs that currently enjoy the 
privilege (or burden) of having a formal authorisation of the EU to conduct 
certain monitoring tasks, which it carries out as a service of general 
interest with a public authority status. 
In the absence of clear Treaty provisions that would allow for regulatory 
tasks for such private institutions, the European legislature and authorities 
saw it necessary that EA also acquires this formal status from the MSs 
individually. As part of the process of formal recognition of the EA: 
European Commission, MSs and the EA have signed General Guidelines 
for cooperation between the EA and the European Commission, the 
European Free Trade Association and the competent national authorities 
in April 2009 (European Commission, EA, competent national authorities, 
2009). In fact, the 765/2008 Regulation, Article 14, had already provided 
for this agreement to take place by stating that: “The Commission shall …. 
recognize a body ... which … shall conclude an agreement with the 
Commission … The first body recognised under this Regulation shall be 
the European cooperation for accreditation, provided that it has concluded 
an agreement as specified in paragraph 2.” The Article 14 also 
necessitates that the agreement specifies detailed tasks for the EA, funding 
                                                            
32Article 4.5. “Where accreditation is not operated directly by the public authorities 
themselves, a MS shall entrust its national accreditation body with the operation of 
accreditation as a public authority activity and grant it formal recognition.” 
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provisions and provisions for its supervision33. Therefore, relying on the 
definition of the inter-institutional agreement (European Parliament, 
Council, Commission, 2003), the EA can be seen as a co-regulatory body 
operating at the EU level.  
According to the General Guidelines for cooperation the EA “serves as 
the last and authoritative level of control of conformity assessment 
activities with regard to technical competence and professional integrity of 
conformity assessment bodies, in order to create mutual confidence.” In 
compliance with the Regulation 765/2008, the EA members, i.e. the 
accreditation bodies, develop and monitor accreditation services34.  
Thus, the EA – as the newly recognised EU level RePIO – certainly has 
the obligation and the means (the mandate and financial resources35) to 
steer and to control the accreditation of Notified Bodies and their CA 
procedures. Thus, it is providing for a more harmonised consumer (safety) 
policy across EU.  
 
 
4 Conclusions 
In very specific areas of EU consumer policy there are self- and co-
regulatory schemes that do provide for an increasingly harmonised 
consumer policy at EU level. These schemes may be operating under 
formal regulatory mandate (co-regulation) or have been induced with right 
combination of incentives or deterrence by the European legislature (self-
regulation). 
The case studies indicate that EU level RePIOs transcending the MS 
borders by implementing their self- or co-regulation directly and uniformly 
at business-specific level are most often found in very specific consumer 
policy fields: In sectors where the product or service markets are already 
close in finding their way of being genuinely integrated across the MSs. 
This market integration may have been induced by limited number of 
                                                            
33 The Annex I of the Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 stipulates that the body (EA) must 
be established within the Community, and under the its constitution, national 
accreditation bodies from within the Community shall be entitled to be members of it, 
provided that they comply with the rules and objectives of the EA and with the other 
conditions set out herein and as agreed with the Commission in the framework 
agreement. The EA must consult all relevant stakeholders and provide its members with 
peer evaluation services satisfying the requirements of Articles 10 and 11. The EA must 
also cooperate with the Commission in accordance with the Regulation. 
34 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, Article 5.3. states that “National accreditation bodies 
shall monitor the conformity assessment bodies to which they have issued an 
accreditation certificate.”  
35 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. The Chapter V provides for financing of EA. 
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business-operators and/or specificity of products or services produced (e.g. 
as demonstrated above in view of accreditation services and EA or gaming 
industry and PEGI). 
In some consumer policy fields (e.g. in advertising) it would be difficult 
to envisage a uniform self- or co-regulatory scheme across the EU due to 
particularities of self- and co-regulatory traditions at the MS level and the 
plurality of business-operators. However, some case studies detected that 
heterogonous implementation at MS level and sector-specific monitoring 
combined with reflexive negotiation strategies by EU level RePIOs could, 
nevertheless, provide for an increasingly harmonised consumer policy 
across EU.  
Finally, it is recognised that one particular EU level RePIO-led 
implementing strategy for self- or co-regulation does not fit all the private 
regulatory fields, but considerable lessons could be learned from one field 
to another.  
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HOW ARE THE ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF 
COHABITANTS BEST PROTECTED?  
Law or Contract? 
Viola Boström 
 
1 Introduction 
Compared to other areas of law, family law develops rather slowly. It is 
easy to find traces of ideas from the French Revolution and even the 
Middle Ages in the regulation of e.g. inheritance law. Family law has had 
something inherently slow or sluggish about it, and the reforms have often 
been well founded and launched only after long periods of economic, 
social, demographic and other changes.  
One of the major changes during the last 40 years is the decline of the 
marriage rate and the increasing number of cohabitant families. Both in 
Finland and Sweden, as elsewhere in Europe, this is a clear trend. The 
question is; what strategy should the legislator apply to this change? The 
question can surely not be answered without knowledge of what the 
legislator seeks to accomplish, but some of the key elements to the answer 
can, according to my opinion, be phrased with the following questions:  
• What are the Svenssons and the Virtanens doing? 
• What is the legislator doing?  
• In what way are the doings of the Svenssons and the Virtanens 
and the legislator interfering and interacting with each other? 
 
It seems clear that there is some kind of interaction between the cohabitants 
and the legislator. But how does it work? To what extent, if any, are the 
actions of the legislator determining the actions of the Svenssons and the 
Virtanens? And vice versa? The assumed relation can be described with the 
following illustration, which will be further discussed later on.  
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Figure 1 Picture of the assumed relation between the actions of the cohabitants and of 
the legislator 
 
 
2 Demographic Changes 
Marriage has ever since the Christianizing of the Nordic countries been the 
family form promoted by the church, the legislator and, in time, also the 
society as a whole. Cohabitation has however always existed alongside 
marriage, but to a rather small extent. (SOU 1978:55, p. 33–34) For a long 
period of time, about 10 % of the children in Sweden were born by 
unmarried women, including both cohabiting mothers and single mothers. 
(SOU 1981:85, p. 518) At the end of the 1960`s, there was a change. The 
number of children born out of wedlock rose quickly, and the reason was 
the increasing number of cohabitants. Today, almost 50 % of the children 
in Sweden are born by cohabiting mothers. Although there is no reliable 
statistics in Sweden, the cohabiting couples are estimated to about 29 % of 
all couples living together, and about 71 % of the couples living together 
are married. (Walleng, 2009) 
The development in Finland is similar, although not as early or far-
reaching. In 1985 about 12 % of all couples living together were 
cohabitants. Since then the rate has steadily increased, and today about 
24 % of all couples living together are cohabitants, and about 76 % are 
married. About 33 % of all children in Finland are born by mothers living 
as cohabitants. (www.stat.fi) 
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Figure 2 Proportion of cohabiting couples and married couples in Sweden and Finland 
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Figure 3 Proportion of children born by cohabiting mothers and married mothers in 
Sweden and Finland  
 
These statistics clearly show that cohabiting couples as well as children 
living in families with cohabiting couples is no longer a minor issue. It is a 
social reality. The normative function of the law implies that the legislator 
is obliged to address such questions. (Wahlgren, 2008) If this is accepted, it 
is reasonable to argue that the legislator, whether in Sweden or in Finland, 
must have an opinion on the regulation of cohabiting couples. The 
demographic change does however not infer anything about the content of 
the legislator’s opinion. The legislator can decide to refrain from regulating 
the issue – like in Finland, so far, or decide to regulate the issue – as in 
Sweden. The content of the regulation may be – whichever, depending on 
what the legislator wants to accomplish. 
 The regulation on marriage in both Sweden and Finland includes rules 
on property division in case of divorce or death as well as rules on 
inheritance and alimony. Is it therefore also reasonable to argue that the 
legislator should address all these questions regarding cohabiting couples? 
Well, if the statistics indicate that these situations – separation, death and 
economic cooperation leading to economic dependence after a separation – 
frequently occur among cohabiting couples, it would seem reasonable.  
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There is reason to believe that the economic cooperation in a long term 
cohabitation relationship often leads to economic dependence. However, 
even claims for alimony after a divorce are very rare in Sweden. Based on 
the fact that Finnish women are professionally very active, it may be 
assumed that the same is true for Finland. It is therefore not likely that the 
legislator will ever expand the possibilities to receive alimony, neither for 
spouses, nor for cohabitants. The issue of alimony is therefore, on political 
grounds, a non-issue, and will be left out of the further discussions.  
Separation is, however, certainly a social reality for cohabitants. 
Although many cohabitation relationships end when the couple gets 
married, it is also true that many end by separation. In 2008 more than 
23 000 children in Sweden experienced that their cohabiting parents 
separated. (www.scb.se) In Finland about 4 000 children experience that 
their cohabiting parents separate every year. (Kangas, 2009) A cohabitation 
relationship is more likely to end in separation than a marriage to end in a 
divorce. However, it is difficult to argue that a typical cohabitation 
relationship is so short that the legislator can ignore the question of 
property division. The only available recent Nordic statistics is from 
Iceland, and it indicates that although about half of the cohabitation 
relationships are ended within two years, about 12 % of the relations last 
ten years or longer. (Walleng, 2009)  
Cohabitant relationships ending by the death of one of the cohabitants 
are not as usual as those ending in separation. In a Swedish public 
investigation from 1981, it was assumed that cohabitation relationships 
ending with the death of one of the cohabitants, more seldom occurred. 
(SOU 1981:85, p. 110 and 115) Present statistics from Sweden and Finland 
is, to my knowledge, not available. Statistics from Sweden published in 
1990 shows that only about 2 000 cohabitant relationships a year ended by 
death of one of the cohabitants. (SCB, 1990, p. 9) Although it might be 
assumed that this number has increased, it is still far from the number of 
marriages ended by death of one of the spouses. However, death of one of 
the members in a family leads to substantial changes, both economic and 
social, and this indicates that these family dissolutions, however not that 
many in absolute figures, should be taken seriously.  
A conclusion of the demographic changes is that the normative function 
of the law requires the legislator both in Finland and in Sweden to form an 
opinion on whether to regulate or not. This is true at least for the question 
of property division in case of separation and death, and for the question of 
the cohabitants´ right to inherit.  
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3 Legal Development 
In both Sweden and Finland, the first reforms to place cohabitants on an 
equal footing with spouses were launched within tax law and social 
security law. Sometimes spouses were treated like cohabiting couples, 
sometimes cohabitants were treated as spouses. The reason was inter alia to 
achieve fairness between different types of families regardless of whether 
they were married or not. (SOU 1972:41 p. 92) 
The first Swedish law regulating the mutual rights and responsibilities for 
cohabitants was the law (1973:651) on the common dwelling of unmarried 
cohabitants. In case of separation, the cohabitant in better need of the joint 
dwelling could claim the right to keep it. If the cohabitants had never had 
common children the cohabitant in better need had to present particular 
reasons for his or her right to keep the dwelling. However, the law was not 
applicable to real estate and did not grant the cohabitants any economic rights. 
If one cohabitant was given the right to stay in the other cohabitant’s 
condominium, he or she would have to pay the full price. The law offered the 
cohabitants a social security rather than an economic security. 
About twenty years ago, in 1987, the Swedish (1987:232) Cohabitees 
Act was adopted.1 The cohabitants, whether heterosexual or homosexual, 
were given a minimum protection in case of separation or death. In case of 
separation, a property division can be required by either of the cohabitants. 
In case one of the cohabitants has died, the right to ask for a property 
division is only granted the surviving cohabitant. The property division 
includes the joint dwelling and the joint household-goods that has been 
acquired for joint use. Any debts connected to this property, should be 
deducted, and the net value should be divided equally between the two. 
The cohabitants have no right to inherit, but if the property division does 
not grant the surviving cohabitant at least about 8 000 Euro, he or she can 
ask for a bigger part in the property division. The right to keep the joint 
dwelling, if in bigger need, still prevails.2  
In Finland there has been no family law regulation on the mutual rights 
and responsibilities of cohabitants. If one of the cohabitants dies, the 
surviving cohabitant has no right to ask for a property division, nor any 
right to inherit. Both in case of separation or death, there may however be 
reasons to divide some of the property. If the cohabitants own e.g. a house 
together, it may be sold, and the purchase sum will be divided between the 
cohabitants or the heirs of the deceased and the surviving cohabitant. This 
follows from the fact that the cohabitants had a joint ownership, and does 
                                                 
1 The law (1987:813) on Homosexual Cohabitees was adopted at the same time.  
2 The two laws were replaced in 2003 by the (2003:376) Cohabitees Act.  
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not grant the cohabitant any right to receive a bigger part than he or she 
had acquired with ownership. There is however also some relevant case 
law in Finland. One example is that a cohabitant after a separation was 
granted a reasonable compensation for her contribution to the purchase of 
the house in which the family had been living, although she had no part in 
it as a formal owner. (HD 1993:168) In another case, a car had been bought 
for the joint use of the cohabitants, although formally only the man was the 
owner. The woman managed to show that the car had been bought with the 
intention that it should be jointly owned, and that they had both contributed 
financially. The court found that they both owned the car, and that the man 
had to pay her compensation. (HD 1992:48)  
If the cohabitants are living together in a rented flat when one of them 
dies, the surviving cohabitant has a right to take over the lease. This is a 
social right rather than an economic right. Other than that the surviving 
cohabitant has no specific rights according to Finnish law – so far.  
 
 
4 Legislative Policy 
As one of the previous chapters shows, the demographic changes in 
Sweden and Finland are similar. What conclusion has the legislator drawn 
from these changes? What legislative policies has the legislator adopted, 
and what underlying assumptions are the policies based upon?  
In Sweden, the principle of neutrality was adopted at an early stage. 
The idea was launched by the minister of justice in 1969. It indicated that 
the legislator should be neutral toward different forms of family life and 
different moral opinions. (Agell, 2004, p. 228–229) Two possible 
interpretations were suggested. 
• The same rules should apply to couples regardless of whether they are 
married or cohabiting – the same rules policy.  
• The rules that apply to married couples should not apply to the 
couples that are cohabiting – the different rules policy. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the legislator had to some extent already chosen the 
same rules policy for the tax law and social security law area, in order to 
achieve a fair system that would not discriminate either spouses or 
cohabitants. When it came to the mutual rights and responsibilities of the 
cohabitants, the choice was trickier. The same rules policy would imply 
that the same rules as for married couples should apply. The different rules 
policy would – probably – imply that no specific rules should be made for 
cohabitants. That would have meant that the cohabitants would have had to 
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make their own individual arrangements or that they would have had to 
rely on other applicable regulation from e.g. the area of law of property. 
The legislator chose none of the two policies.  
In addition to adopting the neutrality principle, the legislator decided to 
carry out an empirical study of married couples and cohabiting couples. 
This was done in 1974 and the result of the inquiry was presented in 1978. 
It became clear that cohabiting couples began to cooperate financially 
when living together and when building their home. This has also been 
argued by scholars from other Nordic countries. (Sverdrup, 2009, p. 25.) In 
short, the legislator came to the conclusion that many cohabitants were in 
need of at least basic protective rules in case of separation or death.  
The Finnish legislator on the other hand, has been reluctant to accept 
this view. It has been argued that the legislator should not interfere with the 
mutual rights and responsibilities of the cohabitants. If the cohabitants 
want protection, they can always get married or regulate it in some other 
way. And if they do not want protection it should be possible to refrain 
from it. It is seen as a question of freedom for the cohabitants – the 
freedom of contract as well as the freedom to refrain from contract.  
 
 
5 Possible Effects of the Legal Policy 
The Swedish legislator has assumed that there is little possibility to 
influence the inclination to marry by using family law regulation. This was 
one of the outcomes of the interview study mentioned earlier. However, 
there are some well known examples of new regulation inspiring people to 
get married. In 1989, the marriage rate in Sweden rose from 39 300 the 
year before until 106 500 in 1989. The reason was a change in the social 
security system; the widower pension was abolished. (Agell, 1998, p. 23) 
Economic incentives seem to have a great influence on people’s 
behaviour. Is it possible that the feeling of security may also influence 
people’s behaviour? Will a false sense of security make people refrain 
from regulating the ownership of their assets or setting up a will? Is there a 
risk that the Swedish Cohabitees Act, with its minimum protection, has led 
to a sense of false security for some cohabitants? Is there a risk that 
Swedish cohabitants are less protected than the Finnish cohabitants, 
although the Swedish legislator has regulated the mutual rights of 
cohabitants, and the Finnish legislator has not?  
It seems reasonable to assume that the legal policy and the regulation or 
non-regulation it leads to, at least to some extent influence the individual 
regulation of the cohabitants. In order to evaluate the overall protection of 
  
150
cohabitants, both the legislative regulation and the individual regulation 
would have to be taken into account. It can be described in the following 
manner.  
 
Overall protection ?? ?? 
Individual regulation ?? ?? 
Regulation No regulation Minimum regulation 
Legal policy Freedom of contract Neutrality and need of 
economic protection 
Empirical facts Demographic similarities Demographic smilarities 
Country Finland Sweden 
 
 
6 What are the Svenssons and the Virtanens  
 Doing? 
So the question is; what are the Svenssons and the Virtanens doing? And to 
what extent are their actions influenced by the actions of the legislator? In 
order to receive some insight into the reasoning of the Svenssons and the 
Virtanens, an interview study is going to be made. The empirical study will 
consist of interviews with five cohabiting couples in Finland, and 
interviews with five cohabiting couples in Sweden. The interviews will be 
conducted with one cohabitant at the time, since the presence of the partner 
might make it more difficult to receive frank answers to some of the 
questions, e.g. regarding their individual knowledge and opinion on the 
regulation as well as their strategies regarding distribution of assets and 
debts and legal transactions. A test interview has been performed in order 
to adjust the questionnaire and on the basis of the discussion with these 
persons it was decided that the rest of the interviews, if possible, should be 
conducted with each cohabitant separately. 
The couples will be chosen with three different categories in mind; age, 
parenthood and persons who have previously been married or cohabiting, 
and now have started a new family, since it can be assumed that these 
factors influence their knowledge of and their interest in the regulation, as 
well as the likelihood to act in order to regulate their mutual rights and 
responsibilities.  
So far, only four interviews have been conducted, in Finland with two 
young couples in their 20s, one of which are still students, and one of 
which have recently started working. In Sweden, the interviews were 
conducted with two couples in their mid 30s. One of the couples had a 
child, and one had no children. Both these couples were homosexual.  
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 Although there is no reason to predict what the outcome of the 
interviews will be, a few preliminary points will be made.  
• Finland is described as a rather traditional society, where marriage is 
expected, and people more inclined to marry. “There is a cultural 
pressure to make a public declaration of love, and put the ring on the 
finger…” 
• The banks seem to be key informants where legal issues are 
concerned. “All the banks we went to discuss a house loan with have 
mentioned that…they all wanted us to protect ourselves.” 
• Specific events, such as the buying of a house or the raising of a loan, 
rather than the time, seem to influence the actions of the cohabitants. 
“When we were raising this loan… that is when I, or we both, felt that 
we have to regulate this in some way.” 
• Family law is not the only area of law influencing the inclination to 
marry or to regulate ownership or loans etc. Examples such as tax law, 
bankruptcy law and the regulation of housing loans were mentioned 
both in Finland and in Sweden.”It is as if the society has decided that 
one should be married.” “I understand that we have to make 
maximum use of the tax deduction possibilities.”  
 
These preliminary results have led to an adjustment of the project. Since 
other areas of law seem to be so influential as to the actions of the 
cohabitants, I have decided to include a basic investigation of the rules on 
taxation, and the rules involved in buying and owning a home. Hopefully, 
this will cover most of the relevant regulation that influence the cohabitants 
in this respect.  
I will also include three interviews with bank personnel and three 
interviews with real estate agents in each country, in order to get a broader 
picture of how cohabitants regulate, and how the banks and the real estate 
agents influence this regulation.  
 
 
7 Conclusions 
So far, there are no final conclusions of this project. However, the first 
picture of the assumed relation between the actions of the legislator and the 
cohabitants will be shown again. This time, it obtains some of the different 
stages in the regulation and contract cycle. It also shows the assumed 
impact of the legislator, of the cohabitants and of other actors, such as 
banks and real estate agents. Hopefully, at the end of this project, it will 
give a reasonable description of some examples of how cohabitants and 
legislators interact.  
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TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF  
EXCESSIVE PRICING 
Maria Pakarinen 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the paradox between the theory and practice of 
the regulation of excessive pricing. Discrepancy arises since the competition authori-
ties are reluctant to intervene in unfair prices although excessive pricing is one of the 
most noticeable forms of abuse of the dominant position. Since ex post regulation 
does not seem to be an adequate means to resolve the problem of excessive pricing, 
attention should be focused more on proactive measures. This paper examines the 
problems concerning the ex post regulation of excessive pricing as well as considers 
the proactive approach as a means of controlling unfairly high prices. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The abuse of the dominant position may consist in “directly or indirectly im-
posing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”.1 A 
price is considered excessive when it has no reasonable relation to the eco-
nomic value of the service or product supplied.2 Excessive pricing can be ex-
                                                 
1 The abuse of the dominant position is prohibited under the EU competition rules and 
equivalently under the national provisions of the most EU member states; see Article 102 (a) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and e.g. Article 6 (1) of the 
Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992). It should be noted that the Article 102 
of the TFEU was known as Article 82 of the EC Treaty until the Treaty of Lisbon was en-
tered into force on 1 December 2009. However, the first remarkable change in the applica-
tion of the EU competition rules took place already when the Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty had come into force on 1 May 2004. E.g. the Finnish Act on the Amendment of 
the Competition Restrictions (318/2004) was entered into force at the same time. Hereby the 
national competition regulation was harmonised with the EU competition rules. At the mo-
ment, the new Finnish Competition Act is in preparation (see the report of the Competition 
Act 2010 Working Group); nevertheless, any direct changes for the regulation of excessive 
pricing are not expected to come.  
2 See e.g. case 26/75, General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Com-
munities 1975, para 12, and case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Conti-
nentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities 1978, para 250. 
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ploitative abuse which is direct exploitation of customers, or it can be exclu-
sionary abuse which seeks to strengthen the market position at rivals’ ex-
pense.3 This paper analyses excessive pricing as an exploitative abuse since its 
controversial nature raises questions for a more detailed analysis. 
Undertakings with a dominant position may have an incentive to utilise the 
lack of competition by strengthening their market position and charging ex-
cessive prices without acceptable justification. Therefore, undertakings have 
been imposed a special responsibility not to allow their conduct to impair 
genuine undistorted competition.4 Although competition authorities have fo-
cused more attention to anti-competitive behaviour aiming to foreclose com-
petitors rather than to direct exploitation of consumers, excessive pricing is an 
issue that should not be shrugged off. Despite the subsidiary role excessive 
pricing has in the case law, there has been a relatively vigorous policy debate 
on it during the past few years. The growing interest in this topic is at least 
partly due to the dissatisfaction with the outcome of the liberalisation process 
in deregulated fields as well as to the European Commission’s forthcoming 
review of the enforcement priorities for Article 102 of the TFEU with regard 
to exploitative abuses.5 The price level has importance also in general since it 
has been recognised that a price rise can be detrimental to consumers and to 
the economy although the prices would not be so clearly unfair that interven-
tion would take place.6 However, it is unarguable that intervention against ex-
cessive pricing by means of ex ante price regulation or ex post price control is 
not usually reasonable when a competitive market situation is desirable. There 
is also a wide consensus that competition authorities should not regulate prices 
which is a task more suitable for sector-specific regulators. 
Interestingly, while excessive pricing is considered as an abuse of the 
dominant position in the European Union, it is not regulated as such in the 
United States. However, the difference is not as significant as it may at first 
appear. Even though exploitative excessive pricing is considered as an abuse 
of the dominant position in the European Union, the ex post intervention is 
largely exceptional in practice. 
The aim of this paper is to give an overview of excessive pricing and ana-
lyse the paradox between the theory and practice of its regulation. Firstly, the 
                                                 
3 However, the term ‘excessive pricing’ is usually understood by exploitative nature. After 
this, ‘excessive pricing’ is used to refer to exploitative abuse. 
4 OJ C 45/02, 24.2.2009, para 1. 
5 See e.g. Motta and de Streel 2007, pp. 14–15. 
6 HE 243/1997 vp. 
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theory of regulation is examined, secondly the problems concerning ex post 
regulation are analysed, thirdly a few alternative regulatory strategies are dis-
cussed, and fourthly the proactive approach is introduced as a means of con-
trolling exploitative conduct. Finally, the main findings are summarised in the 
last chapter.  
 
 
2 Perspectives on the theory of regulation 
The theory of regulation deals with the fundamental question of the market 
functioning: whether the market is able to correct its failures itself or is gov-
ernment intervention needed? Either way, in a situation where the costs of the 
regulation would be higher than the benefits followed from the rules imposed, 
law-making is often considered undesirable.7 
The regulation theory can be divided into two parts: the normative and 
positive theory of regulation. The normative theory of regulation discusses 
which alternative regulation measure is the most expedient for reaching a cer-
tain political goal – if the regulation is considered necessary in the first place. 
Conversely, the positive theory of regulation analyses the underlying motives 
that are actually affecting the legislators’ decisions. Although both the norma-
tive and positive theory of regulation can be distinguished, they are not com-
pletely separate approaches. On the contrary, those approaches are closely in-
terconnected and both are necessary in the critical analysis of the legislation as 
well as in the research work on law-drafting.8 
The regulation of market power is considered necessary since the markets 
can never work perfectly and imperfect competition leads to market failures. 
Market failures may result in allocative, productive and dynamic inefficien-
cies. Moreover, asymmetric information, public goods and externalities can 
often be seen as a justification for the regulation of market power. External-
ities can be small-group externalities or mass externalities according to the 
amount of the parties that have been affected; in the case of the small-group 
externalities, there are only a few parties affected, while the mass externalities 
involve a large group of people. The Coase theorem is considered to fit well in 
a situation characterised by the small-group externalities, while the Pigouvian 
approach applies better if there are mass externalities involved. According to 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Määttä 2005a, p. 19. 
8 See e.g. Määttä 2004, pp.195–198.  
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the Coase theorem, the lower the transaction costs, the more efficiently scarce 
resources can be allocated without government intervention.9 
The assessment of costs is important since imperfect markets are character-
ised by high transaction costs. Transaction costs can be divided into ex ante 
and ex post costs, according to the stage when the costs are born. The ex ante 
transaction costs cover costs such as search costs, bargaining costs and en-
forcement costs, whereas the ex post transaction costs involve maladaption 
costs which occur when a given performance does not realise, haggling costs 
which occur when parties strive together to fix or minimise the effects of mal-
adaption, system costs which stem from the mechanisms that assist to solve 
the disputes, and implementation costs which are followed from the enforce-
ment of monitoring and precautionary measures.10 
According to the Coasian approach, market actors can bargain an efficient 
outcome if there are zero transaction costs and the property rights are well-
defined. The Pigouvian approach instead emphasizes the necessity of govern-
ment intervention in correcting the market failures.11 Excessive prices are 
likely to be mass externalities since there is rather a large group of people in-
volved; however, the Pigouvian interventionist approach is unlikely to be the 
most appropriate measure to correct the market failure if the market entry is 
free. In that case, parties can, as Coase’s model suggests, negotiate and agree 
on an efficient outcome without government intervention. If the market situa-
tion is not self-corrective, the intervention comes to be considered as an alter-
native means to correct the unhealthy market situation. 
 
 
3 Problems of ex post regulation of excessive  
 prices 
The EU competition rules as well as the member states’ national competition 
laws are mostly based on ex post regulation. However, the competition policy 
with regard to excessive pricing has also features of ex ante regulation which 
occurs through the sector-specific regulation. Sector-specific regulation com-
plements the regulation carried out by competition law. With special legisla-
tion, it is possible to provide stricter rules than by competition law. Special 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Pigou 1920 and Coase 1960. 
10 See e.g. Kanniainen et al. 1996, p. 27 and Cooter and Ulen 2004, p. 92. 
11 See e.g. Pigou 1920 and Coase 1960. 
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legislation is usual especially in those fields where legislation or natural mo-
nopoly prevents the existence of competition.12  
Ex ante regulation is used in sectors where competition law by itself is in-
adequate in creating and maintaining effective competition. In infrastructure 
sectors with constant market failures, such as the telecommunications and en-
ergy, competition law is considered insufficient to create competition. None-
theless, even if sector-specific regulation was suitable for promoting competi-
tion on such market opened up for competition, it should be employed with 
extreme caution. Ex ante sectoral regulation should not be used in general as it 
creates higher administrative costs in the form of implementation of legisla-
tion, monitoring of markets and sanctioning of infringements. Moreover, spe-
cial legislation may distort incentives on the market as well as encourage regu-
lated firms to allocate their resources in order to circumvent regulation.13 To 
determine whether to regulate in the electronic communications sector, the 
Commission has identified a ‘three criteria test’ in which all the three criteria 
have to be cumulatively met before regulation can take place. First, there 
should be high and non-transitory barriers to entry, second, the market struc-
ture is not able to create effective competition and third, the competition law is 
insufficient to deal with the market failures. In addition to these criteria, sig-
nificant market power is also required.14 Anyhow, the problem situation that 
competition authorities have to encounter, relates to ex post regulation; thus, 
ex ante control is not covered in this paper. 
Excessive pricing is a controversial type of abuse of the dominant position: 
it is one of the most blatant forms of abuse, and still at the same time govern-
ment intervention is highly exceptional. Price intervention is not considered 
desirable if the market situation is self-corrective: when the market entry is 
free and the goods are valuable to consumers, it is likely that new entrants ap-
pear and prices decline without intervention.15 High prices and excessive prof-
its may act as market signals to attract new competitors into the market, and if 
there are no remarkable barriers to entry, therefore, any intervention that re-
duces the profits of an incumbent could just prolong the monopoly situation 
by preventing market signals which could attract the potential entrants into the 
market.16 From this point of view, confining the freedom of pricing is detri-
                                                 
12 Kilpailuneuvosto 18.6.2001, dnro 151/690/1999 and dnro 173/690/2000. 
13 See e.g. Report from the Nordic competition authorities 2004, pp. 33–34 and Kroes 2009. 
14 Commission recommendation 2007/879/EC, OJ L 344, 28.12.2007. 
15 See e.g. Motta 2004, p. 25. 
16 See e.g. Motta and de Streel 2007, pp. 17–18 and Williams 2007, p. 144. 
 160
mental to market functioning because intervention might only increase ineffi-
ciency and reduce competition on the market although these would have been 
the underlying motives for the intervention in the first place.17 There is conse-
quently a broad consensus that price intervention should be limited to excep-
tional cases. 
It is thought that various problems are likely to arise due to intervention. 
Nevertheless, it has been noticed that under certain circumstances problems 
may also arise if intervention against high prices does not take place. Al-
though excessive prices may harm consumers in the short run, pricing may be 
reasonable in a longer period of time, providing that there are no barriers to 
entry keeping the entrants off the market. Thus, pricing should always be 
looked at from a long time perspective. The existence of barriers to entry is 
commonly seen as a reason for intervention. If the market is characterised by 
high or insuperable barriers to entry, intervention might be the only means to 
achieve the competitive market structure. On the contrary, if the market has 
free entry, it is likely that new entrants will come and the market structure will 
normalise without intervention.18 
It is essential to regulate monopolies since a monopoly is likely to involve 
welfare losses. A monopoly produces less output and charges a higher price 
than a competitive market. This will result in a deadweight loss of the monop-
oly because some consumers who would have bought the monopoly product at 
the competitive price will substitute other products. The welfare loss is a result 
from the fact that the substitute product is more expensive to produce and thus 
its price is higher than the price of the monopoly product would be if it was sold 
at its competitive price. Therefore, the monopoly causes some consumers to 
switch to substitute products that cost society more to produce than the produc-
tion of the monopoly products.19 Meeting the needs of society is thus far more 
expensive than would actually be necessary.20 Allocative inefficiency is not, 
however, the only source of welfare loss, since productive inefficiency as well 
as dynamic inefficiency may also increase the welfare loss due to monopoly 
power. Productive inefficiency exists when a monopoly firm has higher costs 
than it would have if acting in a competitive market. The reason behind this is 
that a monopoly has less incentive to cut its costs since it does not face any 
competition, and thus, adopts a less efficient technology than the firms operat-
                                                 
17 See e.g. Vihanto 2000, p. 45. 
18 See also e.g. Lowe 2003, Motta and de Streel 2007 and Paulis 2008. 
19 See e.g. Posner 1998, p. 301. 
20 See e.g. Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 12. 
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ing under competition. A monopoly might also result in dynamic inefficiency 
because it might not have incentives to innovate either; albeit the role of the 
market power in creating innovations is actually somewhat controversial.21 
When excessive prices are considered to attract new entrants into the mar-
ket, there should be no intervention since that may result in a decrease in 
competition. On the other hand, intervention against excessive pricing can also 
be detrimental for it may discourage the investments and innovations of the 
dominant firms. Because high prices and profits can be seen as rewards for 
firms’ efforts, then if no benefits are expected from investments, the incentive 
to invest disappears.22 There is also the risk of misjudgements and the costs of 
these errors are likely to rise high. Type I error implies false condemnation, 
i.e. intervention where it should not have taken place, whereas type II error 
means false acquittal, i.e. failure of intervention where involvement would ac-
tually have been needed. The false condemnations create costs especially by 
decreased incentives to invest and innovate which could have led to higher 
consumer welfare. Thus the costs of type I errors in the form of dynamic inef-
ficiency are higher than the costs of type II errors in the form of allocative in-
efficiency.23 In addition, it is extremely difficult to define whether the prices 
charged are excessive. There is no generally accepted definition of an exces-
sive price and, furthermore, it is impossible to argue what exactly constitutes 
an excessive price ─ prices can certainly be high without being anti-
competitive. The problem thus arises as how to distinct unfairly high prices 
from competitive high prices. 
Although there are many reasons why intervention against excessive pric-
ing is not reasonable except for certain rare cases, the non-interventionist ap-
proach may include drawbacks too. The non-interventionist approach by the 
competition authorities can be harmful for it can encourage firms with a 
dominant position to price excessively without a fear of getting condemned. 
In addition, the non-interventionist approach may set an undesirable signal 
to firms which wish to co-operate with each other on pricing for higher profits. 
Since a cartel is an unsure arrangement prohibited by competition law, firms 
may be more tempted to merge and raise the price level after the market power 
has been acquired. However, although a merger may be a more enticing alter-
native than a cartel, it can be generally more detrimental due to the permanent 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Motta 2004, pp. 45–64. See also Arrow 1962 and Schumpeter 1943 on different 
views on the interaction between market power and innovations. 
22 See e.g. Motta and de Streel 2007, p. 18. 
23 Ibid., p. 20 and Evans and Padilla 2005, p. 113. 
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nature of the agreement, provided that the merger has taken place with the in-
tention to restrain competition.24 The ex post regulation of abuse of dominant 
position is not sufficient to eliminate all harmful effects, such as a price rise 
brought about by a merger which is the reason why merger control should be 
paid attention to.25 
Although the competition authorities usually favour the non-interventionist 
approach, there are situations where intervention needs to take place. Exploita-
tive conduct may be intervened in, especially where the protection of consum-
ers and the competent functioning of the internal market cannot be adequately 
ensured by any other means.26 If a firm’s dominant position is due to a natural 
monopoly, competition is considered socially undesirable and thus cannot be 
increased in the market. That is due to the economies of scale which imply 
that a firm operating under a natural monopoly produces more efficiently than 
two or more firms together. The flip side of this efficiency benefit emerges 
since a natural monopoly, while being the only actor in the market, has the in-
centive to exploit its dominant position in order to maximise the profits. 
Therefore, the intervention situation often occurs with natural monopolies. 
Although the aim of this paper is to deal only with exploitative pricing, it 
should be noted that if excessive pricing is of exclusionary type, the need for 
intervention is clearer. Exclusionary abuse is aimed to foreclose competitors 
and restrict competition in the market. For example, a price squeeze emerges 
when a vertically integrated firm charges an excess price of a wholesale product 
from its competitors in the upstream market, and thus weakens their opportuni-
ties to compete in the production of downstream products. The size of the mar-
gin between the firm’s wholesale price and retail price indicates a price squeeze 
when the margin is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient competitor to ob-
tain a regular profit on the market.27 Price squeeze is an exclusionary type of 
abuse as it harms the competitors directly and the consumers only indirectly. 
Therefore, the need for intervention is more obvious since the conduct impairs 
undistorted competition and the market is not able to correct the failure itself. 
Although excessive pricing is regarded as an abuse of the dominant posi-
tion in the European Union, there is no such regulation in the antitrust law of 
the United States. The belief in market functioning diverges, which can be 
seen in a form of non-interventionist approach to excessive pricing under Sec-
                                                 
24 See e.g. Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 243. 
25 See e.g. HE 243/1997 vp. 
26 See OJ C 45/02, 24.2.2009, para 7. 
27 See OJ C 265/02, 22.8.1998. 
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tion 2 of the Sherman Act. The charging of monopoly prices in the United 
States is considered not only lawful, but it is also seen as an important element 
of a free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices at least 
for a short period attracts business acumen; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth.28 As it has already been noted, the differ-
ence between the two sides of the Atlantic is not that significant as one may 
think on the grounds of the legislation. Hence, after all, it can be stated that 
although the legal states of the United States and the European Union differ in 
theory from each other regarding the prohibition of excessive pricing, the dif-
ference rarely exists in practice. Moreover, those times when pricing has been 
considered as an abuse of the dominant position in the European Union, the 
price has had to be outstandingly excessive and other circumstances have 
clearly favoured the judgment too. Because the competition authorities do not 
want to be price regulators, they have not, however, addressed what the rea-
sonable price would be, but they have left it for firms to assess it themselves. 
 
 
4 Alternatives to the regulation of excessive  
 pricing 
The alternatives to regulation range from a pure legal regulation to a situation 
where no regulation exists. The alternatives should be understood widely. The 
traditional legislation is based on a command-and-control regulation; however, 
there are various means that do not require legal regulation, such as information 
and education, self-regulation or threatening with regulatory actions.29 The form 
of regulation to be chosen derives from the objectives of the law.  
The main objective of Article 102 is the protection of competition as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation 
of resources. If competition is effective, it may bring benefits to consumers in 
the form of low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and 
services, and innovation. Therefore an important concern is to prevent the ex-
clusionary conduct of the dominant firm which is likely to limit the remaining 
competitive constraints on the dominant company, including the entry of new 
competitors, so as to avoid consumers are harmed. Thus, the main objective of 
                                                 
28 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 157 L. Ed. 2d 823, 
836 (2004). 
29 See e.g. Tala 1999, pp. 76–84 and Tala 2005, p. 14. 
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the competition policy is the protection of competition, not the protection of 
competitors.30 National competition law is neither primarily supposed to pro-
tect the undertaking from unfair actions performed by rivals unless that is at 
the same time an action necessary to examine for ensuring healthy and well-
functioning competition in the market. As concerns the objectives of the com-
petition law, it is important that the competition authorities can handle matters 
with sufficient efficiency and speed.31 This can be understood also in the 
meaning of not to intervene in excessive pricing since it is often a time-
consuming, expensive and rather unnecessary task to perform. 
Determining the best possible means to reach the pursued objectives of the 
law requires a careful assessment of alternative regulatory strategies. Even if the 
need for a clearer legal state was recognised, the legal regulation is not often 
what should be altered. Instead, various non-legal strategies may come to be 
considered. At the moment, the European Commission reconsiders its policy on 
Article 102. The commission has already finished the first stage of the review 
and published a guidance paper on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty (present Article 102 of the TFEU) to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings.32 The ultimate aim of the article is to protect 
consumers.33 Thus the guidance indicates that the Commission’s priority is in 
cases where the exclusionary conduct is liable to have harmful effects on con-
sumers. The review of the enforcement priorities for Article 102 with regard to 
exploitative abuses is still in preparation and will be published in due course. 
The guidance Commission will provide on exploitative abuses will denote 
largely needed directions to market actors and the national competition law en-
forcers on how the Commission uses its economic and effects-based approach 
in applying Article 102 to abusive exploitative conduct. 
The generality of legal rules is characteristic of competition law. In this re-
gard, it is possible to refer to the delegation of legislative power. That is due to 
the fact that by flexible rules, legislative power is shifted to courts and other 
enforcers of the law.34 Since legal competition rules are general by nature, in-
tervention is to a large degree feasible when needed. On the other hand, gen-
eral rules may lead to a misinterpretation and non-uniformity in applying the 
law. Therefore, even if the general rules are practical in the sense that they en-
                                                 
30 See European Commission 2005, paras 4 and 54. 
31 Report of the Competition Act 2010 Working Group. 
32 See OJ C 45/02, 24.2.2009. 
33 Kroes 2005. 
34 See e.g. Määttä 2005b, p. 51. 
 165
able flexible intervention, they also create uncertainty. For example, it is diffi-
cult for undertakings to determine whether their pricing is excessive since the 
defining of an excessive price is impossible by legal competition rules. Ac-
cording to the opinion of the EESC, legal certainty comes actually with the 
basics of a well functioning society; the law can work if the users of the law 
know and understand it.35 However, although the legal state is to some extent 
unclear, there is still no need to regulate the competition rules more exactly. 
The legal certainty can instead be enhanced with other means, such as guid-
ance and counselling. For example, the Finnish Competition Authority has 
published its evaluation criteria it uses when it assesses the possibility of a 
price squeeze in the broadband market. The memorandum is published as it is 
expected to assist companies offering broadband services in the fixed network 
to evaluate the fairness of their pricing from the viewpoint of competition 
law.36 Likewise, guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in ap-
plying Article 102 of the TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct by the domi-
nant undertakings can be seen as a means of a better non-legal regulation. The 
Commission’s forthcoming guidance on exploitative conduct is also likely to 
increase the legal certainty with regard to excessive pricing. 
 
 
5 Proactive approach as a means of controlling  
 excessive pricing 
The regulation of abuse of the dominant position is ex post facto. The ex post 
regulation of excessive pricing is challenging in more than one way. Since 
there are many problems involved, the prevention of excessive pricing is 
likely to be less complicated and less costly than ex post intervention. Because 
the ex post control of abuse of the dominant position is not adequate to prevent 
excessive pricing, the competition policy should focus more on ex ante inter-
vention. This is the course which the EU Commission has already taken. The 
Commission “does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as 
such. Rather it examines the behaviour of the dominant company designed to 
preserve its dominance, usually directly against competitors or new entrants 
who would normally bring about effective competition and the price level as-
                                                 
35 OJ C 175/05, 28.7.2009, para 2.1. 
36 FCA 3 September 2009. 
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sociated with it”.37 Priority should thus be given to exclusionary abuses since 
exclusion is often the ground for later exploitation of customers.38 This is the 
same approach the national competition authorities have followed in their own 
decision-making practice.  
Price regulation is not always the most appropriate remedy to handle exces-
sive prices. Because excessive pricing echoes more a problem in the market 
structure rather than in the behaviour of the dominant firm, the appropriate rem-
edy should change the market structure for the future instead of only punishing 
the dominant firm for its past actions.39 Excessive pricing is a form of abuse, 
where ex post regulation has proved to be unworkable too. This is where the 
proactive law approach comes in useful. While the ex post approach becomes 
often expensive in the form of the costs of time and money, proactive law ap-
proach aims to prevent the possibilities to price excessively in the first place. 
To be precise, the word proactive implies acting in anticipation, taking con-
trol and self-initiation. The proactive law approach also differentiates two fur-
ther aspects of proactivity. The first aspect is a promotive dimension and the 
other one is a preventive dimension. The promotive dimension implies promot-
ing desirable outcomes and encouraging good behaviour, whereas the preven-
tive dimension implies preventing undesirable outcomes and keeping legal risks 
from materializing. Consequently, the focus of the proactive approach is on 
success rather than on failure which implies taking the initiative to promote and 
strengthen factors that aim to success.40 The proactive approach to excessive 
pricing should thus be understood in a broad sense: not only in the preventive 
manner, but also promotive measures should be pursued. 
Since the emphasis of the legal field has traditionally been on the past, the 
legal research has been mainly concerned with failures too. Contrary to this 
kind of reactive approach to the law, proactive law approach looks forward 
and seeks to promote desirable goals and maximise opportunities in advance, 
while minimizing problems and risks.41 This approach can be useful as a 
means to solve the problem of excessive pricing. After all, it is better to pre-
vent than to cure. The costs of ex post intervention are likely to rise high; 
however, by predicting the problems, those costs can be prevented. 
                                                 
37 European Commission 1994, para 207. 
38 Kroes 2005. 
39 Motta and de Streel 2007, p. 40. 
40 OJ C 175/05, 28.7.2009, paras 5.3. and 5.4. 
41 Ibid., paras 1.3., 1.4., 2.1. and 5.1. 
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In applying Article 102 to exclusionary conduct by the dominant undertak-
ings, the Commission’s focus lies on the types of conduct that are the most 
harmful to consumers. The enforcement will therefore be directed to ensuring 
that markets function correctly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency 
and productivity which is a consequence of effective competition.42 Exclu-
sionary conduct impairs the effective competition by foreclosing rivals in the 
anti-competitive way. Exclusionary conduct by a dominant undertaking is 
harmful since by weakening the position of its competitors, the dominant firm 
strives for increasing its own market power which might eventually give rise 
to the opportunity to price significantly above the competitive level. 
Preventing the artificial increase in market power is thus in the key posi-
tion in the fight against excessive pricing. That is because, at the same time, 
the opportunities to price excessively can indirectly be decreased. However, a 
rise of market power is not necessarily bad. The dominant position often in-
volves efficiency benefits that it would not have if acting under competition. It 
is not illegal to be in a dominant position; a dominant firm is entitled to com-
pete on its merits, but it is not allowed to succeed because of abusive conduct. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
This study has concentrated on excessive pricing as an exploitative abuse. Al-
though excessive pricing is prohibited under the EU competition rules as well as 
under the national provisions of the most EU member states, the competition 
authorities have repeatedly refused to intervene in excessive pricing. There are, 
however, many reasons for this inconsistency. First and most importantly, high 
prices tend to attract new entrants into the market which will result in a decrease 
in price level without government intervention. It has also been noticed that in-
tervention may discourage the dominant firms’ investments and innovations, 
and it is remarkably difficult to define whether a certain price is excessive. In 
addition, there is a high risk of false condemnation which can become very ex-
pensive. For the reasons above, intervention is considered necessary only in 
cases where other means have proved to be inadequate. 
The aim of this paper was to give an overview of excessive pricing and 
analyse the paradox between the theory and practice of its regulation. Because 
ex post regulation is an inadequate means to resolve the problem of excessive 
                                                 
42 See OJ C 45/02, 24.2.2009, para 5. 
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pricing, the focus should be more on preventive measures. The essential role 
should be in the prevention of the creation of artificial barriers to competition. 
Although the emphasis of the legal field has traditionally been on the past, it 
can often be better to look forward. While ex post intervention is often a time-
consuming and expensive means, ex ante intervention may prevent those 
drawbacks from arising. Therefore, the proactive approach to the law can be 
considered as a means of controlling excessive pricing. Preventive measures 
should not, though, be understood as alternatives to traditional ex post regula-
tion, but more as complements to each other. Moreover, it is worth bearing in 
mind that a price rise can occur ─ besides in the form of excessive pricing ─ 
with cartels and mergers or exclusionary abuses which are often at the basis of 
later exploitation of consumers. Thus, the merger control, cartel control and 
control of abuse of dominant position should be seen equally since each divi-
sion has importance in the fight against excessively high prices. 
It has been shown that the problem of excessive pricing does exist and the 
legal state cannot be seen very successful in this respect. However, the ex post 
regulation of excessive pricing forms at least a token deterrent for not to over-
price although the deterrent has not worked well in practice. Therefore, the 
rule can be useful as a last resort as it gives an opportunity to intervene in 
prices totally over the top. After all, consumers should be protected from the 
clearly unfair exploitation of market power. 
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LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUES AND ICT 
In the Wake of Law Keeping Pace with  
Technology 
John Ubena  
 
Abstract 
This article explores Legislative Techniques and ICT. Often the legislator bears a 
blame for overlegislating as a price for its failure to pay attention to legislative 
techniques.1 Overlegislation is a result of enacting a new law for every change 
and or convergence of technologies. Additionally, the legislator is seen to be 
guilty of legislating laws which are not sustainable as the laws become obsolete 
after a short while.2 The aforesaid reactive tendency increases unpredictability of 
the laws which in turn hampers ICT innovation. The problem is worsened by the 
internationalization nature of ICT.3 The legislator is often left unguided and 
consequently does not know what to do in the transition from one regulatory 
phase to another. The question this article seeks to answer is whether the change 
and convergence of ICT can be overcome by revisiting legislative techniques. 
The author argues that, legislative techniques being the determinants of 
legislative process and implementation or enforcement of legislation are good 
means to eliminate problems occasioned by ICT change and convergence.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
The importance of mechanisms of legislative techniques is seen in both 
developed and developing countries as one of the pillars of a legal system. 
The vitality increases now because of the change and convergence of 
Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) which leaves legislation 
                                                            
* This is a work in progress; what is presented in this paper is partially a brief highlight 
of my doctoral project. For more details visit  
http://www.juridicum.su.se/iri/organisation/Ubena_John/project/ or  
http://www.juridicum.su.se/jurweb/forskning/dr_projekt_visa.asp?projekt_id=132&lang=eng  
1 Enacting of too many laws than citizens ability to handle and comprehend them. See 
foot note 3 
2 Biegel, S., infra not 57, p. 21; Eng, S., infra note 21; ‘hyperregulation’ concept in 
Susskind, R., infra note 5, pp. 12–17; Brenner, S. (2007). Law in an Era of Smart 
Technology, New York: Oxford University Press Inc; Lyria Bennet Moses, infra note 20. 
3 See: Wahlgren, P. (2004). IT and Legislative development in Wahlgren, P., ed IT Law, 
Stockholm: Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, Scandinavia Studies in Law, Vol. 
47, pp. 601–617; Wahlgren, P. (2008), infra note 9. 
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obsolete. The legislator ought to deal with this problem in a visionary way. 
Nowadays it is the order of the day that any change or convergence of ICT 
triggers the legislator to enact new law. Indeed this is done regardless of 
the citizens’ inability to comprehend such voluminous and scattered pieces 
of legislation.4 Without guidance the legislators are stranded as to what 
legislative techniques should be adopted to curb these problems. However, 
before proceeding further in this discussion, it is worthwhile to elaborate 
some key concepts such as ICT and legislative techniques which are central 
to the article.  
ICT embody technical and application standards. It is admitted that 
such distinction is fundamental to any designing and determination of ICT 
regulation. It is emphasized, though, that this article being an inventory is 
not exploring that distinction in details. ICT includes, among other things, 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Internet and Multimedia. ICT is a fast 
growing field of technology. The rapid advancement of ICT leaves many 
laws redundant. The attempt to develop sustainable laws is weakened by 
the legislator’s tendency to enact technology specific legislation. ICT is 
changing and converging at an amazing pace. The article focuses on ICT as 
a case study and because of its far reaching economic, legal, political and 
social impacts. ICT being a sub set of field of technologies implies that the 
conclusion drawn will be relevant to other technologies. 
In this article legislative technique5 is defined as an approach or 
methodology which legislators employ in the process of enacting and 
implementing legislation to achieve a specified goal(s) in a particular 
country depending on the socio economic need, cultural background and 
general legal and constitutional heritage of that country.6 The legislative 
technique chosen depends on the rationale of the legislation and overall 
need of the society in which is to be implemented and for what period of 
                                                            
4 See: Susskind, R. (1996). The Future of Law, Facing the challenges of IT, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 12–17 on 'hyperregulation' concept; Wahlgren, P. (2004) 
supra note 4. 
5 There is no universally accepted meaning of the concept ‘legislative techniques,’ thus it 
is used in different senses and contexts. In Common Law legal system this concept is 
linked with legislative drafting, while in Civil Law legal system some scholars have 
pointed out that the concept is more than legislative drafting. See: Wahlgren, P. (2008), 
infra note 9; Willem van der Velden (1987). Infra note 8 at p. 53; For Common Law legal 
system uses of this concept, see: Francis Benion, Statute Law; Michael Zender, Law 
Making Process; Sir William Dale (1977). Legislative Drafting-A New Approach, 
London: Butterworths. 
6 The fact that a country is a civil law or common law legal system/jurisdiction has a role 
or bearing on legislative techniques employed. It must also be noted that legislative 
techniques is broader than legislative drafting, thus legislative drafting is a subset of 
legislative techniques.  
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time. The assumption is that the legislators adopt an approach to legislative 
techniques which guarantees that the legislation suits technological 
changes and the convergence of technologies.7 But in practice that is not 
the case. The article explores that in detail. 
In order to appreciate why there are such a variety of legislative 
techniques one has to know the philosophies underlying them. The 
approaches to legislation are employed as tools to achieve a certain goal. 
Meaning that, legislative techniques are means to achieve legislation’s 
goal(s).8 This is called law operative perspectives. It assumes law to be an 
instrument. The said law constitutes an independent variable and the goals 
are the dependent variables.9 Since such philosophy considers law a tool,10 
the society has no influence upon the law. The law is made independent of 
the society. Consequently the law is imposed upon the society. Hence the 
interests of the society are subordinate to the interests of legislator.11 
Therefore, the law will be made regardless of the society’s protest against 
the said law.12 A good example is the Instrumental Approach [part 2.4]. 
However, other approaches exhibit different features rendering them 
somewhat non instrumental. Evolutionary approach [see part 2.5] for 
example, considers law as the mirror of the will of society.13 The law must 
therefore reflect the interests of the society. This is typical law generic 
perspectives. In this respect law is a dependent variable.14 Thus the society 
shapes the law and in turn, the law preserves values in the society.15  
                                                            
7 Willem van der Velden (1987). The value-and goal-dependency of legislation and its 
methodology. In Åke Frändberg and Mark Van Hoecke, eds., The Structure of Law, 
Uppsala: Iustus Förslag, at pp. 55. Although a term ‘method’ or technics’ of legislation is 
used to mean legislative techniques. He defines the said term as a set of ordered and 
specified activities to achieve a certain goal (or goals) in relation to certain domain and 
certain conditions. See also: Wahlgren P. (2008), infra note 9. 
8 Wahlgren, P. (2008). Lagstiftning: Problem, teknik, möjligheter, Stockholm: Norstedts 
Juridik AB, pp. 25–29;Willem van der Velden, supra note 8 at p. 56. 
9 See: Willem van der Velden, supra note 8 at pp. 56, 75–76; Koen Van Aeken infra note 68. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Wojciech Cyrul, (2005). How Rational is the Rational Lawmaking? In Wintgens, 
L.J.ed., The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Essays in Legisprudence. England: 
Ashgate Publishing Co. Ltd., p. 98. 
12 Typical Instrumental voluntarism dominated by Instrumental rationality as explained 
by Wojciech Cyrul, supra note 12, at pp. 96–99; Wahlgren, P. (2008) supra note 9. 
13 See: Roscoe Pound, Social Engineering-law in books and law in action; Eugen Ehrlich 
concept of ‘the living law’ ;Willem van der Velden supra note 8 at pp. 62–68; Wahlgren, 
P. (2008)., at pp. 25–29: and more generally see the Sociological jurisprudence. 
14 Law as a social system i.e. the social concept of law; law consists of non formulated 
conceptual elements, thus besides consisting elements of a non-conceptual nature is also 
brought forth by other social units than sovereign or government agencies; see: Willem 
van der Velden, supra note 8, at pp 62–68. 
15 The values like privacy (data protection), and not subjecting human beings to 
 174
This article therefore, is divided into three parts. The first part covers 
introduction, background and problem description. The second part is 
devoted at elucidating approaches to legislative techniques and rationale of 
the approaches in addressing ICT problems. And finally part three will 
entail a brief concluding remark of the entire discussion. 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Adoption of a particular legislative technique is dictated by an area to be 
regulated. If the area to be regulated is characterized by constant change 
like ICT, regulating such area becomes difficult. ICT is evolving; from 
telegraphy to voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)16, from broadcasting to 
podcasting and webcasting.17 As if that is not enough, the technologies are 
converging at a rapid pace. Similarly, there is convergence of sound, 
image, text, data, voice, wireless, public networks and private networks. Of 
importance is the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunication and 
Internet.18 Nowadays one can have these technologies in a single device. 
Although these changes were not contemplated years ago, they have been 
created and are here to stay. 
The changes challenge legislators and the legislative techniques 
adopted in designing and drafting ICT legislation. To remedy the situation 
the legislator adopted the traditional or piecemeal approach. This approach 
entails the legislating of a new law for every change and convergence of 
ICTs. This culture proves to be a fallacy as legislation is increasingly 
becoming obsolete19 and in other instances lacunae in the legislation are 
                                                                                                                                                                 
automated decision making systems, etc., have attracted attention of the EU law makers 
and other legislators in other parts of the globe.  
16 For legal challenges of VoIP see: Wessner, C. W., infra note 19 at pp. 8–9. 
17 For more about convergence of ICT, Telecommunication and media sector see: 
Joachim Benno Why the Use of ICT Engenders Legal Problems-in Search of a Common 
Denominator in SOU 2002:112 at pp 44–54. 
18 Wessner, C. W., ed. (2006).The Telecommunications Challenge: Changing 
Technologies & Evolving Policies–US Technology and Science Report of a Symposium. 
Committee on the Telecommunications Challenge, Changing Technologies and Evolving 
Policies., National Academy of Science, National Academic Press, Washington D.C., at 
p. 22, Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11680 
19 See also: Lyria Bennett Moses in her Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up 
with Technological Change have identified four reasons of change of law following 
technological change, they include the need for special laws, uncertainty, Over-
inclusiveness and Under-inclusiveness and obsolescence.  
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observed. On top of that legislation is voluminous and of poor quality20 
which in turn makes it incomprehensible.  
As a reaction to sporadic and constant change and convergence of ICT, 
the EU introduced the New Regulatory Framework (NRF).21 This is 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework constituted of six 
Directives. Given this casuistic approach one may warn that the legislators 
are yet to overcome the changes. To justify this, the EU has introduced 
another approach. This approach is called the “Better Regulation 
Approach”. The approach was introduced as a result of Lisbon Strategy.22 
It is thus worth stressing that despite adopting these ambitious efforts to 
address the challenges posed by evolving ICTs, the efforts are short of 
success. 
Since quite a few legislators if any, have offered serious attention to 
legislative techniques,23 the author claim that there is a clear oversight of 
legislative techniques.24 Certainly, such techniques are important in the 
wake of law keeping pace with ICT.  
As stated earlier on, the purpose of this article is to explore the relation 
between legislative techniques25 and ICT. Thus phenomenon of legislative 
techniques is revisited to uncover whether these approaches can be 
employed to guarantees the sustainability of law in the evolving 
technologies.  
 
                                                            
20 See: Eng, S. (2002).Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law. In Witgens,L. 
ed.,Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
65–79; Susskind, R. supra note 5. 
21 The NRF came in force in 25th July 2003: NRF available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new_rf/index_en.htm. 
22 For details about better regulation  
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm  
23 The EU and OECD have set precedent on the initiatives to improve quality of 
legislation. They did that by introducing Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The same 
was endorsed by UK and USA since long ago. As for Sweden, there is a Legislative 
Council 'lagrådet' to scrutinize legislative bills hence improving quality of legislation. 
Furthermore, Sweden is embracing Better Regulation through RIA, see: Magnus 
Erlandsson, Regelförenkling genom konsekvensutredningar Rapport ( Sieps 2010:1); see 
also: Swedish Better Regulation Council ‘Regelradet’ at  
http://www.regelradet.se/Bazment/regelradet-eng/sv/startpage.aspx. Further see: Alfred 
Kellermann at el (1998). Improving Quality of Legislation in Europe. The Hague: TCM 
Asser. However, it must be stated that none of these initiatives thoroughly covered 
legislative techniques.  
24 Joachim Benno supra note 18, is of the view that Legislative Techniques are the ones 
to handle the problem of change and convergence of ICTs. 
25 Similar views on importance of Legislative Techniques are offered by Wahlgren, P. 
(2004), supra note 4; Wahlgren, P. (2008) supra note 9; Lessig, L., infra note 53, Lessig 
appeal for the regulation of architecture of the code by the legislator; Joachim Benno, 
supra note 18. 
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1.2 Problem description 
The legislators both in developed and developing countries have a tradition 
of enacting legislation in various compartments and in a piecemeal 
approach. But now they are facing a dilemma as a result of the 
technological changes and convergence of technologies. Such changes and 
convergence are posing a challenge to the legislators, who must decide 
which legislative techniques should be adopted in order to address the said 
changes and convergence. The serious impact of such changes and 
convergence is that of legislation becoming obsolete, while in other 
instances lacuna in the law are observed. This brings in a difficulty not 
only in legal interpretation of ICT legislation but also in the administration 
and enforcement of the law as the legislation is voluminous and too 
scattered to be comprehended.26  
As stated herein, the article albeit briefly explores the legislative 
techniques in a changing world of ICT. In particular, the focus is on the 
impacts the chosen legislative technique will have on technological 
innovation on the one hand and enforcement of such legislation on the 
other. In connection to that the sustainability of that legislation is also an 
area of interest considering the fact that ICT is evolving. 
It is worthwhile to state that, the theoretical foundation of this article is 
partially founded on the theory of legislation, popularly known as 
legisprudence as postulated by Luc Wintgens. Wintgens is credited for 
reiterating inter alia the overwhelming complaints about volume and poor 
quality of legislation.27 As a theory, legisprudence places emphasis on 
structure and function of legal systems, particularly the theoretical 
reflection on legislation.  
Admittedly, problems such as poor quality and obsolete legislation have 
tempted scholars to blame legislators. Arguably, the scholars are equally 
blameworthy. This is confirmed by Wintgen’s argument that, for a long 
time legal theory focused on interpretation and systematisation of law; 
thus, there are few studies on creation of law.28 Such gap necessitated 
development of legisprudence as a rational theory of legislation aimed at 
theoretical reflection of law. 
                                                            
26 Supra note 3  
27 Wintgens L.J.(2002). Rationality in Legislation-Legal Theory as legisprudence. In 
Wintgens, L. ed., Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, p. 1 
28 Wintgens L.J. (2005). Theory and Practice of Legislation, Essays in Legisprudence, In 
Wintgens, L.J.ed., The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Essays in Legisprudence. 
England: Ashgate Publishing Co. Ltd., pp. ix–x  
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While endorsing democratic credibility of alternatives to legal 
regulations and based on the concept of freedom as principium, Wintgens 
reminds legal scholars that there is want of research on the principles of 
legislation.29 Wintgens further appeals for ways of assessing and striking 
the necessary balance in developing legislation that is sound on the one 
hand and that secures an equilibrium or coherence in the legal system on 
the other.30 Although this makes legisprudence a field in which legislative 
techniques is destined to be propagated, approaches to legislative 
techniques focus on the creation and application of law in the fast changing 
and converging technologies.  
Despite legislation being a nucleus of any legal system it is surprising 
to find that there are quite a few scholars who have explored legislative 
techniques.31 The majority of scholars have not covered legislative 
techniques hence leaving legislators with little knowledge of that 
phenomenon.32 This explains why the legislator has resorted to the 
traditional approach [see part 2.0]. Presumably that is the only approach 
which the legislator is well acquainted with. 
The scholars have done little to assist the legislator in this respect. 
There is a clear confusion between legislative techniques and legislative 
drafting. Moreover, there is confusion between legislative techniques 
(form) and legislative politics (content).33 The literature does not provide 
any guidance as to what techniques the legislator should adopt in rapidly 
changing or developing sectors like ICT.34 The legislator’s neglect of 
legislative techniques has resulted into a lack of clear established elements 
of legislative techniques to be employed in a particular sector.  
In the light of foregoing background and the problem statement it is 
pertinent to explore the phenomenon of legislative techniques. By so doing 
the interaction between the approaches to legislative techniques and the 
impact of such approaches on ICT will be pinpointed. This forms a thesis 
of discussion hereunder. 
                                                            
29 Ibid pp. 11–25 
30 Ibid; see also: http://www.cwrl.be/eng/legisprud_journal.htm ; legisprudence journal 
online at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/legis  
31 Scholars whose works appear to have somehow covered legislative techniques include 
Jeremy Bentham, Savigny, Hans Kelsen; Willem van der Velden supra note 8; Wahlgren, 
P. (2004), supra note 4; Wahlgren, P. (2008), supra note 9; just to mention a few. On the 
other hand, there are others like Francis Benion, Statute law book; Michel Zender, Law 
Making Process; Sir William Dale, Legislative drafting-A New Approach, have covered 
legislative drafting techniques. 
32 Scholars who have indirectly covered legislative techniques include among others; 
Lessig,L., Bert-Jaap Koops, Biegel,S., Brownsword, R., Wintgens,L.J., etc. 
33 See also: Willem van der Velden supra note 8 at p. 73.  
34 Ibid at p. 89, general conditions to be considered in developing methods of legislation. 
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2.0 Legislative Techniques 
Legislative techniques are like a tool box in the hands of legislators 
designed to serve different purposes or goals. Since legal problems are 
complex issues that cannot be addressed by one technique. The legislator 
with such a toolbox is capable of addressing technology problems without 
retarding its innovation. The legislative techniques investigated in this 
article have been divided into five major approaches namely; Traditional 
Approach, Technological or Embedded Approach, Utopian Approach, 
Instrumental Approach and Evolutionary Approach. The said approaches 
are addressed under a separate heading in the sections below.  
 
 
2.1 Traditional Approach 
It must be stated that, no matter the nomenclature one uses in describing 
the traditional approach to legislative techniques, this approach remains to 
be the most preferred approach in many legal systems. The approach has 
three subdivisions that define its features. The subdivisions include the 
quantitative approach, the hands off approach and qualitative approach as 
indicated below. 
 
 
2.1.1 Quantitative Strategy 
Quantitative strategy depicts a legislator who reacts to new problem by 
enacting new law. Therefore, more problems imply more legislation. 
Admittedly, society generally believes that problems exist because there is 
insufficient legislation.35 This must be seen in the light of the fact that a 
politician’s popularity usually grows with his or her ability to address 
problems in the society.36 As a result the legislator is accustomed to 
enacting new law for every new problem without caring about the quality 
of the legislation and citizens’ inability to comprehend the legislation.37  
Ironically, the quantitative approach is increasingly becoming a 
favourite of the legislator as a deployment of ICT in legislative process has 
lessened the task which would have otherwise remained burdensome. ICT 
is rescuing the traditional approach; the said approach is overwhelmed with 
complex legislative problems which keep on piling up. ICT makes the 
                                                            
35 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, pp. 601–61. 
36 Ibid 
37 See Eng, S. supra note 21, see also: Susskind, R. Supra note 5. 
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legislation manageable no matter how voluminous it could be. A quick 
glance at this move though, reveals that basic problems such as 
unsustainability and poor quality of legislation are likely to be obscured.38 
 
 
2.1.2 Hands – off strategy “legal free zones” 
The hands off strategy, is an approach that is inclined towards deregulation 
and self regulation of some sectors like ICT. The argument put forward is 
that government interference hampers the development of ICT. Examples 
of self regulation in the ICT sector include domain names disputes 
resolution and fixing of ICT Standards. However, currently, government is 
increasingly involved in standards regulation.  
Although the merit of employing self regulation is acknowledged the 
same has several flaws e.g. there is a lack of penal sanctions. Since the role 
of the law is to balance interests in the society,39 such balance cannot be 
secured with this strategy.40 Furthermore, crimes involving ICTs as 
intermediary are redressed by penal sanctions.41 Self regulation mostly 
involves self reporting.42 Thus a framework for self regulation ought to be 
set by legislation. Self regulation is not necessarily a no legislation 
approach.  
 
 
2.1.3 Qualitative Strategy 
Although the traditional approach has many flaws, attempts have been 
made to reform it. Currently many legislators are improving the quality of 
legislation by reforming the drafting of legislation. The use of general 
technology neutral provisions has been suggested.43 Efforts are further 
being made to improve the language of legislation.44 At the EU level some 
                                                            
38 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4; see also p. 605. 
39 Interests like, Privacy, Intellectual Property Rights, fair competition and other 
consumers’ rights. 
40 For more details on self regulation see Senden, S. (2005). Soft law, self regulation, and 
co-regulation in European Law, where do they meet? Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law, vol. 9.,available at <http://www.ejcl.org/>  
41 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, p. 607 
42 For more on self regulation and self reporting see: Enequist, A.L.E.(2009). Self 
Regulation through quality management systems. Paper presented on 20th October 2009 
at the Department of Law, Stockholm University. (Unpublished paper). 
43 This saves the legislation from being obsolete and therefore become sustainable. The 
adoption of technological specificity texts in the legislation is nowadays discouraged. 
44 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, p. 609. 
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projects have been undertaken to improve legislation texts, such as the use 
of general technology neutral provisions. Scholars have also suggested the 
use of the sociological method of Regulatory Impact Assessment.45 This is 
emphasized by the EU and the OECD Better Regulation and Regulatory 
Impact Assessment programmes. Another possible way to improve the 
quality of legislation is by establishing domain specific ad hoc committees 
or observatories.46 A good example is the Swedish IT Law Observatory 
under the IT Commission.47 
In many legal systems for a law to be legitimate the subjects ought to be 
able to comprehend the legislation. Hence legislation is promulgated.48 
However, it does not make sense if the law to be promulgated is 
voluminous or of poor quality. 
Adding salt to the sore, the traditional approach is problematic as it 
makes the laws unpredictable. This drives away investors wishing to invest 
in technology because it minimizes incentive to innovate.49 That is why 
some technologists have blamed legal systems for interfering with ICT 
industry. The technologists are arguing that, there is a right to innovate and 
they are defending that right.50 However, others have backed the current 
legal framework, arguing that the increase of technology goods and 
services is a result of free market and less government interference.51 One 
may sum up this part by an observation that, although the traditional 
approach has serious flaws, it has paved way to the development of all ICT 
goods and services available today. 
However, the existence of flaws in the traditional approach makes it 
pertinent to explore other approaches so as to make an informed 
conclusion.  
                                                            
45 Ibid p. 608. 
46 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, p. 608. 
47 IT Law Observatory was a team of IT Law experts who could see and foresee the 
problems and advise the government whether to change the law or make new law. The IT 
Law Observatory was established in 1996 by virtue of the Government Bill 1995/96:38. 
The business of the ICT Commission and IT Law Observatory were set to last by 2003. 
It is worth noting that the ICT Commission exists in phases and for a particular period of 
time. 
48 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4 p. 609, See also: Van Hoecke, Mark (2002). Law as 
Communication. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
49 See Willow A. Sheremata (1998). ”New”issues in competition policy raised by 
information technology industries, The Antitrust Bulletin/Fall-Winter 1998 at p. 554; see 
also: David J. Teece & Mary Coleman (1998). The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust 
Anlysis in the High-Tchnology Industries, The Antitrust Bulletin/Fall-Winter 1998; see 
also Wessner, C.W., supra note 18 at p. 90. 
50 Bill Gates comments on the US v. Microsoft antitrust case of 1998; available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1998/bill-economist.mspx  
51 Wessner, C. W., supra note 19, at p. 18 & 90. 
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2.2 Technological Approach 
The problems posed by ICT cannot be addressed by an excellent legislative 
text in the statutes because law enforcement acts after fact and not before 
fact. The legislation has to be embedded in physical or technological 
measures. The citizens cannot leave the doors of their homes unlocked 
expecting that the law against burglary will guarantee security. Similarly, 
the provisions of legislation banning spread of computer viruses cannot in 
any case protect our personal computers against risk of viruses unless one 
has installed anti viruses.52 That is why the ICT sector increasingly 
demands code to be a solution.53 ICT is both a sword and a shield. As the 
sword it inflicts harm on human beings while at the same time it is the 
shield against that harm.54 
One may rightly argue that such innovations are not without a price and 
therefore have to be done cautiously as the developers may influence the 
technical system(s) to be developed. This of course is advantageous to ICT 
developers. A good example is Digital Rights Management Systems 
(DRMs) which can work to the advantage of copyright owners where the 
developers have ended up developing lock in technologies. For instance, 
Apple developed iTunes that were not interoperable and hence jeopardising 
consumers’ rights and fair competition.55 Similarly, Secure Digital Music 
Initiative (SDMI) is likely to be in conflict with fair use or fair deal 
doctrine as it has ability to deny access even to legitimate users.56 
The other cost likely to arise, is that, democracy is challenged by 
technocratic approaches like this approach.57 Therefore, there could be a 
lack of transparency on the part of ICT vendors particularly when 
developing products. Additionally, code lacks legitimacy and affects other 
interests like privacy. However, these problems should not deter the efforts 
                                                            
52 See: Code as a regulator has been stressed by Lessig, L. (1999). Code & Other Laws 
of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books; Bert-Jaap Koops. Infra note 58 ; also: 
Brownsword, R., infra note 55, pp. 1–6; pp. 215–240 and pp. 240–247. 
53 Other examples include; E-signatures, Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), etc. 
54 Brownsword, R. (2008). Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–6; pp. 215–240; pp. 240–247. 
55 To address the problem the French Parliament enacted DADVSI 2006 Act, for more 
detail on this see Nicolas Jondet, Apple v. French who’s the DADVSI in DRMs? 
.available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/jondet.asp See also part 2.4 
on Instrumental Approach. 
56 Biegel, S. (2003). Beyond Our Control-confronting the limits of our Legal System in 
the Age of the Cyberspace, Massachusetts, MIT press, Chapter 7 at p. 209. 
57 Bert-Jaap Koops, Criteria for Normative Technology, An essay on the acceptability of 
‘code as law’ in light of democratic and constitutional values, TILT Law & Technology 
Working Paper No.005/2007 Version 0.4. 
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to embrace code as regulatory mechanism.58 The approach is vital as it 
warrants more effectiveness and efficiency. Also it promotes technological 
innovation. Since there are problems in this approach it is therefore 
necessary to inquire into other approaches as well. 
 
 
2.3 Utopian Approach 
The Utopian approach is an ambitious approach purposed at pre-empting 
legal problems. Under this approach law is sought to address problems that 
exist or will exist in the future, hence ensuring that problems do not arise at 
all.59 The approach works in a society where individuals are able to plan 
ahead. An analogy can be made with the way in which parties to a 
contractual transaction are able to foresee the possible risks and manage 
them before they occur.60 The emphasis is on timely and regular legal 
guidance and earlier consultation to pre-empt legal problems, that essence 
is risk analysis.61 Such a proactive approach includes also the use of 
checklists, certifications and licensing.62 In broad perspective one may 
contemplate development of culture of planning in technology and 
economy.63 In this regard pattern recognition may be employed as a 
planning tool particularly in identifying and recognizing problems which 
require legislative actions. This may help to realize that there are few 
situations culminating into real legal problems. Thus, a problem may be 
addressed before its occurance.64 
It is argued that a traditional role of government and law is to react 
against problems, thus any attempt to eliminate problems before such 
problems emerge is not welcome. The reactive approach to problems is the 
                                                            
58 Technological approach is the use of technology in which legal rules are embedded in 
physical measures like the use of DRMs or e-signature, etc. 
59 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, pp. 613–617. 
60 Susskind, R., supra note 3, pp. 25–27 has elaborated the use of ICT as a dispute 
preemption tool or mechanism. Susskind’s explanation “from legal problem solving to 
legal risk management” is typical utopian approach. 
61 Ibid 
62 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4 pp. 615–616, see also Wahlgren, P. (ed), (2005). 
Proactive Law, Stockholm: Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, Scandinavia 
Studies in Law, Vol. 49., essentially dealing with proactive law which other scholars 
refers to as preventive law; the same is somewhat similar to utopian approach. 
63 The Utopian approach may be credited for its capability to keep pace with changes and 
convergence of ICTs. See also: Gilchrist, B. and Wessel, M.R. (1972) Government 
Regulation of the Computer Industry, Montvale New Jersey: AFIPS Press, pp. 1–22.  
64 Wahlgren, P. (2004), supra note 4, p. 614. 
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survival kit of politicians.65 Besides, the citizens expect the government 
and law to react promptly to any emerging technology problem.66  
Truly, the increase in magnitude of crimes and other problems 
necessitate the employment of the Utopian approach. This approach is an 
attempt to eliminate inter alia crimes before they arise. Thus, regardless of 
the risk of undermining other interests such as privacy, the approach 
employs surveillance technologies, Biotechnology and DNA. 
Metaphorically speaking, the Utopian approach may be viewed as a 
vaccine against ICT problems. This is vital as it is anticipated that a 
convergence of ICT, biotechnology and nanotechnology will bring more 
problems. Significantly, the approach fosters ICT innovation as more 
technological solutions are required to eliminate problems before they 
occur. That being said, society and legislator ought to be educated on the 
merits of exploiting this approach. Therefore, the future of the Utopian 
approach is quite promising. 
 
 
2.4 Instrumental Approach 
While all legislative techniques have instrumental traits, the Instrumental 
approach as such is a distinct approach. The trend indicates that modern 
legislators are increasingly resorting to instrumental legislative technique. 
That reveals how important the approach is. 
The Instrumental approach as a technique regards legal rule as a tool for 
realizing a certain goal in the society. It assumes that the rule is developed 
to achieve a specified goal.67 ICT is used in many sectors like commerce, 
banking, government, and health. Therefore ICTs as tool for regulation is 
used to secure the enforcement of law. 
The embedding of law in ICT tools for efficient and effective 
enforcement is a bold step. Such instrumental approaches have resulted in 
Copyright legislation with Digital Rights Management Systems (DRMs).68 
                                                            
65 Ibid pp. 604–605. 
66 The Utopian approach is controversial as presumably law and government exist mainly 
because there are legal problems in the society. And if there are no problems one may 
argue why should there be law? The interdependence between law and other values 
either positive or negative cannot be separated. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that law does not serve other purposes other than addressing legal problems. 
67 See: Koen Van Aeken, (2005).Legal Instrumentalism Revisited. In Wintgens, L.J.ed., The 
Theory and Practice of Legislation, Essays in Legisprudence. England: Ashgate Publishing 
Co. Ltd., pp. 67–68; see also Willem van der Velden, supra note 8 at pp. 56, 75–76. 
68 Consider Article 6 & 7 of EU Copyright Directive- Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. Yet other legislation is 
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Though, the Instrumental technique involves the cooperation of 
legislator and technology engineers, quite a few technology engineers do 
fully cooperate with the legislator. In many instances the ICT vendors care 
about profit making or Intellectual Property Rights.69 In turn there is a risk 
of developing normative technology which is not based on the spirit of the 
legislator.70 The fact that some of aspects of technological approaches are 
similar to Instrumental approach, does not necessarily mean that such 
approaches are supported by the legislators; since the same could be a 
result of technologists’ fantasy.71 
Central to the Instrumental approach there is legal instrumentalism. 
This is based on S-M-R relation; where (S) Sender-legislator, (M) 
Message-rule and (R) Receptor-subjects.72 The legislator being the sender 
of the message is presumed to develop clear and unambiguous norms. 
Scholars have rightly pointed out that such sender is also influenced by 
receptor and other interest groups and lobbyists.73 It has been assumed that 
the Message is transmitted without being destructed: thus reaching the 
receptor without interference and hence producing the desired results. 
However there is noise in the media of transmission which distorts the 
Message. Hence the legislator promulgates the laws. The media through 
which the message is transmitted normally range from statute books, 
ordinances, to technologies like (DRMs). 
One of the fundamental setbacks of S-M-R model is that it ignores 
media’s profound ability to affect the message transmitted. The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Privacy legislation which allows Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) like the 
Platform for Privacy Prevention Preferences (P3P). The increasing surveillance 
technology like Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a good example of instrumental 
legislative techniques aimed at eliminating crimes. 
69 See footnote 71 
70 A good example is French DADVSI legislation of 2006 geared at addressing the Apple 
customer lock-in iTunes. The main issue was interoperability; the Apple iTunes could 
only play on Apple iPods hence undermining consumer rights, fair competition and 
innovation. The overall intention of the French legislator was to deter lock-in attitudes. 
See: Nicolas Jondet, supra note 56; Nicolas Jondet, Better Regulation for Consumers: 
Integrating ICT Standards and Consumer Protection, available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1303061  
71 The difference between Instrumental approach and Technological approach is that the 
former is broad and always must be legislator’s initiative complemented by the engineers 
developing ICT tools onto which rules are embedded. The latter is narrow and does not 
always involve the legislator as in some instances it is technologists’ fantasy. This 
challenges the legitimacy of the legislation and the entire legislative process. 
72 See: Mark Van Hoecke, (2002). Law as Communication, Oxford: Hart Publishing; 
Koen Van Aeken, supra note 68, pp.74–77; Isola-Miettinen Hannele, Theoretical 
Reflections on the principled regulatory strategy-About the conditions of Rationality in 
Law Making?, The paper presented in the 2nd International Conference on Legislative 
Studies. Better Regulation-A Ciritical Assessment, March 1–2, 2010, Helsinki Finland. 
73 Koen Van Aeken supra note 68, pp. 75–76. 
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construction of such media by ICT engineers is sometimes ignored by the 
legislator, hence ignoring possible manipulation. For instance, DRMs as a 
medium for transmitting copyright norms can be manipulated to the extent 
that such copyrighted work cannot be utilized by the public74 sometimes, 
even where there are legal exceptions. Unfortunately most copyright 
legislation has banned circumvention technologies.75 In this case therefore 
the public and legitimate consumers are at risk.76  
However, it is important to note that the Instrumental Approach has 
several problems which include among others totalitarianism and 
effectiveness problem.77 Such problems make it imperative to revisit 
another approach which is not suffering from such defects. The approach 
referred to is the Evolutionary approach discussed below.  
 
 
2.5 Evolutionary Approach78 
The Evolutionary approach is a legislative technique involving the 
blending of various approaches. The legislator looks at society and 
develops a rule or law that suits the society. The said rule is neither 
arbitrary nor static. This approach is embraced with law generic 
perspective. Moreover the approach demands consultation with society. 
This ensures that the societal values are preserved. This approach is akin to 
the utopian instrumentalism.79     
Since ICT is changing and converging bringing in new challenges every 
now and then, it is more ideal to adopt this dynamic approach. Such an 
approach neither hampers the area to be regulated nor does it assume that 
the area to be regulated is unchangeable. In order to address threats posed 
by the emerging technologies such as ICT, the approach at hand ought to 
be adopted.  
Although the Evolutionary approach resembles the Utopian approach as 
it emphasizes planning such approaches are dissimilar. Unlike Utopian 
approach Evolutionary approach is appealing for use of legislation as a 
                                                            
74 See footnote 71. 
75 See: Article 7(1)(c)Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs; EU Copyright 
Directive, supra note 69. 
76 The same could be said a bout the possibility of manoeuvring with the duration for 
protection of copyright. The copyright owner can manoeuvre by devising a Digital 
Rights Management System (DRM) which last beyond the time stated by the legislator. 
77 See also: Koen Van Aeken, supra note 68 pp. 69–72 
78 Albeit differently this approach has been explored by Koen Van Aeken, supra note 68 
pp. 77–88 
79 Ibid  
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legal framework in which approaches could work. The approach 
recognizes that for legislation to be sustainable it must be drafted in general 
provisions to avoid technology specificity. As for ICT penal legislation and 
as a requirement of Criminal law jurisprudence, the approach strives to 
guarantee certainty in penal legislation. Since, the role of the approach at 
hand is to secure the interests of the society; technologies such as 
Biotechnology, DNA and CCTV80 are employed to protect the society 
against crimes. 
As opposed to the Instrumental approach, the Evolutionary approach 
acknowledges that the process of formulating and transmitting a rule to the 
subjects is not free from encumbrances which may affect the entire rule. 
Thus the approach demands Regulatory Impact Assessment and alternative 
to regulation.81 It is imperative that legislators and regulators employ such 
assessment as change and convergence of ICTs leaves legislation 
redundant. This approach therefore is more pragmatic as the legislation’s 
operating context has become more complex. Moreover, there are many 
factors hindering the linear legislative goal attainment.82 In as far as the 
modern world influenced by ICTs is concerned it is not surprising to find 
that the law enacted fails to attain the goal so set. The attainment of the 
legislation’s goal is a probability in the changing and converging world of 
ICTs.83 This could however be true even to other sectors and therefore not 
limited to ICTs. For that reason legislation should therefore be evaluated 
and shaped accordingly. This is the essence of Better Regulation (BR) and 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA).  
 
 
                                                            
80 Brownsword, R. supra note 58 p. 5 citing the case of R v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police, ex parte, LS and Marper (2004) reported in (2004) UKHL 39 quoting 
Lord Steyn who advocated for the resort to technolgy. 
81 See: Koen Van Aeken; supra note 68, pp. 79–88  
82 Ibid. p. 80. 
83 Use of Surveillance Cameras under which the goal set by the legislator is to eliminate 
crimes has never been achieved. Crimes are being committed even in places where there 
are surveillance cameras. Law has a probability of reaching its goals; see: Koen Van 
Aeken, supra note 68 pp. 80–82. 
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3 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this article has been to take the debate further a field. Thus, it 
has tentatively explored the question of whether the change and 
convergence of ICTs can be overcome by the legislator. The aim has been 
to analyse the possibility of employing legislative technique as a cure to 
malaise among others the obsolescence of legislation resulting from change 
and convergence of ICTs. The article has therefore, albeit briefly, explored 
the approaches to legislative techniques. It is envisaged that, the article 
offers contribution to the field of theory of legislation or legisprudence. It 
is also expected to contribute to a foundation built by other legal scholars 
in this wake of law keeping pace with technology.  
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IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE MULTI-LEVEL  
CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION1 
Anne Meuwese 
 
Abstract 
‘Anglo-Saxon style’ impact assessment (IA) has made its way to the European 
Union (EU) policy process. Introduced as a mere change in internal procedures, the 
tool has had a remarkable impact on the way law and policy are being developed and 
decided upon in the EU. Specific characteristics of EU IA are its function as an 
‘information tool’ rather than a ‘decision tool’ and the unique involvement of ‘non-
executive’ bodies such as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The 
paper highlights one particular dimension of the progressive institutionalisation of 
IA, namely how regulatory oversight mechanisms are emerging. In the final section, 
the paper deals with IA in the multi-level context of EU lawmaking: what use can 
Member States make of EU IA? 
 
 
1 Introduction 
An enthusiasm for what was long considered an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach to 
lawmaking has swept the EU in the past five years. After many doomed 
attempts to reform the regulatory environment in the 1990s, the European 
Commission put in place an ambitious set of regulatory reform initiatives 
under the label ‘Better Regulation’ from 2002 onwards. A simplification 
programme, a screening exercise of all pending legislative proposals and in 
2005 a dedicated programme to reduce administrative burdens triggered by 
EU policies by 25 % by 2012, just to mention some of the biggest eye-
catchers. However, putting in place a comprehensive and integrated impact 
assessment (IA) system could be said to be the most ambitious initiative of 
all.2 The commitment to systematically carry out, in an early stage of the 
policy cycle, assessments of the potential economic, social and environmental 
                                                 
1 This article is originally published in P. Kovač (ed.), Presoja učinkov regulacije v 
Sloveniji, Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana Press, 2009. 
2 Not to be confused with the Community law obligation for Member States to carry out 
‘environmental impact assessments’ on projects or plans. See Council Directive 97/11 
amending Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment, and Directive 2001/42 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the 
Environment. 
 196
effects of all policy initiatives has required a complete overhaul of the 
traditional way of lawmaking in the European Commission and the other EU 
Institutions. 
After a few years of remarkable silence, considering that the tool – by 
some accounts at least – is a “conscious exercise of legal borrowing” 
(Wiener, 2006) from the United States, impact assessment has been thrown 
into the limelight. Academic interest in European IA (hereafter ‘EU IA’) has 
boomed recently, raising or provoking as many new questions as the 
research it sparked has managed to answer. Who profits from IA? Can it 
ever be objective? How will the Commission’s commitment to assess 
impacts from the three pillars (economic, social and environmental) on an 
equal footing play out in practice when at the same time the new political 
direction for better regulation is tied to the Lisbon agenda (Radaelli, 2007)? 
Is this technocracy going crazy or have we finally become rational about 
lawmaking? This chapter is relevant for answering these questions but does 
not deal with them in-depth. The chapter starts from the assumption that EU 
IA tool is a procedural device for infusing the lawmaking process with 
economic analysis and scientific evidence. In the words of the policy 
documents on the subject: IA should “inform the legislator” by functioning 
as “an aid to decision-making, not a substitute for political judgment” 
(European Commission, 2002b). The chapter analyses the new impact 
assessment system from its early days as a pilot in 2003 to the current, 
highly institutionalized framework that is in place today. The main source of 
the potential transformative power of EU IA stems from the developing 
regulatory oversight mechanisms. Thus, this aspect will be dealt with in 
greater detail. Finally, the capacities of EU IA to serve as a multi-level tool, 
facilitating the involvement of actors from other levels than the 
supranational one, and in particular the Member States will be touched upon. 
 
 
2 What is IA? 
Impact assessment provides a format for assessing ex ante a range of 
regulatory activities. The core of IA is to assess the environmental, social 
and/or economic impacts of proposed regulatory interventions various 
societal groups. It is important to stress that although cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) is an important component of many types of IA, IA does not equal 
CBA. CBA is a method for decision-making; impact assessment is a highly 
structured process of policy formulation which shows the methods adopted 
to assess different options and the test used for comparing them (which 
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could be a net-benefit test, but not necessarily so) and possibly reaching a 
decision, who was consulted and what type of evidence was collected. 
Another common misunderstanding is that ‘an IA’ is a document. 
However, IA is first and foremost a process that forces or encourages 
decision-makers to follow certain analytical steps. True, an IA document 
which documents the process and its findings is a crucial element which 
guarantees the transparency of the process. The absence of such a 
comprehensive, public, IA report has even led experts to question whether 
certain national ex ante assessment frameworks the label ‘impact 
assessment’ (Jacob et al., 2008). But the opposite situation: a tangible IA 
report which contains nothing more than a checklist or which only pays lip-
service to an otherwise highly politicised process is worse on all accounts. 
In the strongest, and some would argue ‘original’ type of IA, we often find 
a legal requirement that only regulation which passes a cost-benefit test can 
be enacted. This means that maximisation of net benefits decision criterion 
has been laid down in a statutory provision beforehand. Often, this type of 
strong IA is meant to compensate for the delegation of regulatory power 
and to exercise a control function over, for example, US federal agencies. 
As we will see below, the type of impact assessment that the European 
Commission put in place differs markedly from this. 
 
 
3 Putting in place an IA system in the  
European Commission 
In the wake of the White Paper on Governance, the European Commission 
first set the tone with a report on Improving and Simplifying the 
Regulatory Environment (European Commission, 2001) and subsequently 
adopted a Communication on Better Lawmaking in 2002 (European 
Commission, 2002a) . In this latter communication three main categories of 
measures to improve the EU lawmaking process were announced: 
1) A programme to simplify and update the existing body of European 
law; 
2) The promotion a culture of dialogue and participation, through the 
establishment of minimum standards for external consultations; 
3) The systematic use of integrated impact assessment by the 
Commission when preparing policy proposals. 
 
The Action Plan also mentioned the long-term objective of developing a 
‘common legislative culture’, which seemed to imply a call for greater 
convergence among Member States’ lawmaking procedures (see section on 
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IA as a tool for multi-level lawmaking below). The 2002 package also 
contained a special communication on impact assessment which outlined 
the three main features of what was to develop as the integrated approach 
to impact assessment: 
1) An integrated approach including the three ‘pillars’: environment, 
society and economy; 
2) IA as an aid for decision-making; 
3) A link with subsidiarity and proportionality. (European 
Commission, 2002b) 
 
 
3.1 Specific features of EU impact assessment 
The European Commission’s IA procedure conforms to the ‘text book’ 
template in the sense that it consists of a series of key analytic steps: 
problem identification, definition of the objectives, development of the 
main policy options, impact analysis, comparison of the options in the light 
of their impact and an outline for policy monitoring and evaluation. EU is 
said to be ‘integrated’, which means that a wide range of impacts 
(economic, social and environmental) expected from various options for 
new policies are considered.  
Arguably, the one defining feature of EU IA is that there is no fixed 
decision criterion. The IA Guidelines by the European Commission 
recommend applying cost-benefit analysis where possible and without any 
obligation to choose the least costly policy option. Because IA is used in 
the first instance as an internal tool by non-democratically elected officials 
who are only mandated to prepare proposals and not decide on them, care 
is being taken to leave the final decision on what the content of a proposal 
should be to the College of Commissioners. But even the College does not 
have a ‘blank mandate’ to propose just anything. The Commission’s 
lawmaking powers are heavily restricted by the Treaty, which for many 
policy areas specifies certain policy goals to be pursued or certain 
considerations to be taken into account. A new framework for policy-
making such as EU IA, which has not been put in place by a Treaty 
revision, but by ‘soft law’ and by changes in internal procedures only, 
cannot superimpose any decision criterion. Instead, the European 
Commission opted for a ‘soft touch’ procedural type of IA, where the main 
goal is to make lawmakers aware of the costs and benefits – or ‘impacts’ in 
the terminology preferred by the European Commission – associated with 
the legislation they plan to adopt and to make them aware of possible 
alternatives (Meuwese and Senden, forthcoming 2009). But IA is not only 
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meant to simply inform those involved in the formation of law and policy 
at the EU level. By structuring the policy process and by highlighting the 
trade-offs that the political decision-makers face, IA is envisaged to make 
more transparent the way in which various actors exercise their powers. 
The primary attraction of IA as a tool of Better Regulation is thus that it 
makes legislative actors more intelligent and more accountable. (Radaelli 
and Meuwese, 2009). However, it should be noted that this ‘soft touch’ 
comes at a price. EU IA, by not replacing political decision-making, has to 
accommodate other tools that support the political process, such as 
pressure from interest groups, political discussion in the cabinet, white 
papers and evidence produced by expert committees. 
The above also means that the concrete uses that the policy process 
makes of IA can vary widely. In 2002 the impact assessment procedure 
was established by the European Commission following recommendations 
from the Mandelkern group on better regulation as a “general purpose 
impact analysis tool”. The ambition was to “integrate, reinforce, streamline 
and replace” all existing practices in the field of ex ante evaluation 
(European Commission, 2002c). EU impact assessment in its original form 
was based on the idea that competitiveness, sustainability and governance 
form a set of interlinked drivers of legislation, generating trade-offs that 
must be highlighted in the legislative process (Radaelli and Meuwese, 
2009). Thus the original IA framework was set up as part of a Better 
Regulation strategy that was centralised and non-sector specific, relying on 
a regulatory philosophy according to which ‘quality’ comes before 
‘quantity’ (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2009). But as the Better Regulation 
programme matured, things shifted slightly towards a clear political 
preoccupation with administrative burden reduction, with IA partially 
being put to the service of this much narrower, cost-oriented goal. 
Impact assessment starts as early in the policy process as possible, long 
before the proposal is published or even prepared. At the stage of the 
Annual Policy Strategy (APS) Commission services publish a Roadmap 
which indicates what its plans and planning roughly are with regard to 
specific policy initiatives and what is envisaged in terms of impact 
assessment. The European Commission’s impact assessment procedure 
then follows the key analytical steps already mentioned above: problem 
identification, definition of the objectives, development of the main policy 
options, impact analysis, comparison of the options in the light of their 
impact and an outline for policy monitoring and evaluation (European 
Commission, 2005b). Stakeholder consultation and collection of expertise 
are integrated in the IA process and inform the wider assessment process. 
At the end of this internal assessment process, the Commission publishes 
 200
an IA report together with the proposal, which summarises the results and 
– ideally – highlights the trade-offs between the impacts associated with 
various policy options.3  
 
 
3.2 The transition to a fully-fledged IA system 
The Commission started off with a carefully orchestrated pilot phase in 
2003, which was extended in 2004 to prepare for full operationality in 
2005, when IA became obligatory for all proposals in the Commission’s 
Legislative and Work Programme (European Commission, 2005a). 
Recently, the Commission has decided to stretch the scope of application 
of IA beyond the Work Programme; where appropriate this could also 
include Comitology items (delegated lawmaking). 
Part of the relative success of the IA tool, established also by an 
external evaluation of the Commission’s IA system in 2006–2007 (The 
Evaluation Partnership, 2007), is due to the fact that it has been integrated 
into the policy-making process (rather than superimposed at the end of it as 
an obligatory checklist). As such it has primarily become a tool for policy 
coordination among the various parts of the Commission administration, 
notably the Directorates-General (DGs). The IA Guidelines from 2005 
already imposed an obligation to establish Inter-Service Steering Groups 
(ISSG) for each impact assessment process (European Commission, 
2005b). The revised Guidelines of 2008, at least in the draft version that 
was available at the time of writing, tellingly renames those groups ‘Impact 
Assessment Steering Groups’ (European Commission, 2008a). Thus, the 
process through which DGs are supposed to agree on the content of a 
proposal is structured by the IA template. In the wider context of EU 
lawmaking, so outside of the preparatory phase at the Commission, IA is 
obviously only one mechanism among many that can play a role in 
operationalising principles in the daily practice of EU lawmaking, others 
being for instance pre-legislative scrutiny by national parliaments and 
judicial review. However, of all these mechanisms, IA is the one that most 
explicitly plays a role as a vehicle for various trade-off devices already at 
work in EU lawmaking such as subsidiarity, proportionality and the 
precautionary principle. 
The year 2005 was a crucial one in the institutionalisation of EU IA in 
more than one respect. The ‘Common Approach to Impact Assessment’ was 
                                                 
3 Often simply referred to as the ‘impact assessment’ even if in fact the term ‘impact 
assessment’ covers the whole process and not just the report. All impact assessment 
reports can be downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/practice_en.htm. 
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one of the key documents to be adopted in that. Although it has limited 
authority – at most it is one of the ‘informal’ inter-institutional agreements 
(Snyder, 1996) – it gave hands and feet to earlier commitments on the part of 
the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers in the 2003 
Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking to use Commission IAs 
and produce their own IAs on ‘substantive amendments’. Yet, these 
commitments have so far proved difficult for both Institutions to deliver on.  
The Parliament has struggled to integrate the production of impact 
assessments on amendments in its working procedures. Since all 
amendments are prepared at the Committee stage, it is mainly up to the 
‘rapporteur’ to commission an impact assessment. Yet time is usually short 
and those who have pioneered EP IA, such as rapporteur Toubon in the 
case of the pre-packed products directive, have not necessarily achieved 
results (Meuwese, 2008, p. 236). More than the Commission, the 
Parliament is a hyper-political body, where the language of ‘interests’ and 
the decision-making mode of ‘negotiation’ are not easily replaced by 
‘impacts’ and ‘highlighting trade-offs’. Another problem that the 
Parliament faced was a lack of expertise and a lack of dedicated budget. As 
a result impact assessments were commissioned from external consultants 
using the general research budget which on quite a few occasions led to a 
re-labelling of the reports as ‘studies’ because Members did not like the 
findings and were afraid that the impact assessment label would carry too 
much weight. However, the Parliament has set aside a special budget for 
impact assessments and there have been initiatives to train staff. 
As for the Council, integrating impact assessment into the procedures 
has not proved the most difficult element, at least not at Working Party 
level. Under the Austrian Presidency an internal guidance document for 
Working Party Chairs was issued. And although the finer details of this 
guide seem to have gone lost in practice, the underlying idea of getting the 
Commission to illustrate its proposals by giving a presentation based on the 
impact assessment has caught on. The first problem, however, is to make 
IA part of the decision-making at the higher and more political levels, 
mainly COREPER. The second problem is that using Commission impact 
assessments is one thing, producing them on amendments is quite another. 
The emerging practice shows that much depends on the goodwill of the 
Member State holding the Presidency. Early on, The Netherlands led a 
successful experiment on one dossier, the directive on batteries and 
accumulators, and the United Kingdom has initiated a few. The Slovenian 
Presidency also made it a priority to make substantial progress on the use 
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of impact assessment in Council and even to learn from the European 
Parliament in this area.4 
 
 
4 Regulatory review 
No aspect of the design of the EU IA framework has received as much 
attention as the issue of quality control. Many commentators and 
stakeholders have argued in favour of an independent review body for IA, 
often from a conviction that such a mechanism would increase the chances 
of success for parliamentary review of IA. However, establishing such an 
independent, specialised body or awarding the task of IA review to an 
existing body has proved a few bridges too far at the moment, not in the 
least because of the constitutional problems such a move would trigger. 
But there are some incipient developments. A different kind of review 
mechanism has presented itself in the capacity of the newly established 
Impact Assessment Board (IAB), a purely internal body, but one with 
increasing internal and external leverage. Also, the Court of Justice, as 
final arbiter on the validity of EU law, has shown some signs of an 
ambition to play a role in IA oversight (Alemanno, 2009), albeit indirectly. 
Finally, in a recent development that will not be dealt with in-depth here 
for lack of published results so far, the Court of Auditors, long proposed as 
a candidate (Mather and Vibert, 2006), is venturing into the grey area 
between audit and regulatory oversight, previously only treaded on by the 
British National Audit Office (NAO). 
 
 
4.1 The Impact Assessment Board 
On 4 April 2006 President Barroso committed himself at a plenary debate 
at the European Parliament to establishing a quality control body for 
Commission impact assessments. Subsequently, on 14 November 2006, the 
European Commission officially confirmed this commitment (European 
Commission, 2006). A note by the President officially established the 
Impact Assessment Board (IAB), a novel type of body within the 
Commission and a hybrid between a control body and an advisory organ. 
The Board consists of five Directors from different DGs who have been 
appointed in personal capacities, which means that they cannot commit their 
DGs concerning individual IAs and may not receive instructions from their 
                                                 
4 Speech of the Minister of Public Administration Dr Gregor Virant at the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, 21 January 2008. 
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DGs.5 The current compilation includes DG Enterprise, DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, DG Economic and Financial Affairs 
and DG Environment.6 These DGs were selected because they represent all 
three pillars of IA and because they have considerable experience in IA, 
having been actively involved in the pilot phase and the IA Working Group. 
The composition of the Board was a sensitive issue, raising concerns in the 
Commission services that the IAB would become a tool to block initiatives 
for substantive reasons even before they reach the stage of Inter-Service 
Consultation (DGs are required to submit their draft IAs one month before 
the launch of the ISC). The Board is chaired by the Deputy Secretary 
General and works under the direct authority of the President and reports 
directly to him. The Board members are supported by a secretariat consisting 
of officials from the Secretariat-General. Both internal and external expertise 
may be used on a case-by-case basis. The term of office of IAB members is 
two years with the possibility of extension.  
The IAB is a hybrid body because it is part of subtle system of checks 
and balances rather than clearly exercising a regulatory overview task as 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the United 
States Office of Management and Budget does. The IAB operates 
alongside internal Commission quality control mechanisms such as the 
support units in the DG, the presence of the SecGen in Inter-Service 
Steering Groups, the informal economists’ IA network which meets once a 
month over lunch, the IA working group which was continued after the 
2005 stock-taking operation and the high-level group of national regulatory 
experts whose mandate covers only general policy advice. The task of the 
IAB is to “provide widespread quality advice and control whilst ensuring 
that the responsibility for preparing assessments and the relevant proposals 
remains with the relevant departments and Commissioners” and 
“contribute to ensure that impact assessments are of high quality, that they 
examine different policy options and that they can be used throughout the 
legislative process” (European Commission, 2006). It is envisaged that 
although quality control at the level of individual impact assessments will 
be the initial focus of the board, its activities will gradually broaden to 
“advice on methodology and on the approach at the early stages of impact 
assessment preparation” (European Commission, 2006). In the medium 
term the Commission expects the IAB to “offer advice and support in 
                                                 
5 See the Rules of procedure of the Impact Assessment Board  
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/iab_rules_of_procedure_final.pdf. 
6 This composition is entrenched in the current mandate of the IAB, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/iab_mandate_annex_sec_2006_14
57_3.pdf. 
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developing a culture of impact assessment inside the Commission” and “to 
develop into a centre of excellence”. 
The competences of the IAB were formulated whilst balancing 
carefully between the constitutional position of the Commission in terms of 
the Treaty and existing internal procedural rules. For instance, the idea of 
lending the IAB the power to issue ‘return letters’ – a competence many 
stakeholders in favour of strong review of IA would have liked to see 
included – was thwarted because it would breach the principle of 
collegiality (Article 217 EC Treaty) since the possibility of delegation to 
one commissioner only is limited to administrative acts. In other words: the 
Commission cannot simply establish a new body that has the de facto 
power to decide on legislative and policy proposals when this is a 
prerogative of the College of Commissioners. The outcome is that the IAB 
has no veto power but it is entitled to ask for resubmission of draft IAs, 
with the Secretariat General, represented on the Board in the person of the 
Deputy Secretary General, expected to guard the line between quality 
control and control over substance will become blurred. The IAB opinions 
are not binding but experience has shown that they are influential. The IAB 
also has the power to send DGs so-called ‘prompt letters’, asking them to 
carry out and IAs on items falling outside the current obligatory scope of 
items included in the Commission’s Work Programme.  
Crucially, all IAB opinions are published online but only once the 
proposal and the IA themselves have been published. This is in order to 
avoid the IAB opinions being regarded as ‘previews’ of the real IAs by 
stakeholders. Probably for that very reason, stakeholders would have liked 
to see the opinions be made public earlier, but the Commission holds on to 
the position that this would undermine the necessary and constitutional 
space in which it can exercise discretion. 7  
In January 2008, the Impact Assessment Board presented its first 
annual report on its experiences in the first full year of its existence, 
followed by a second one in 2009 (European Commission, 2008b, 2009). 
In the former report the Impact Assessment Board noted that it will, among 
other things, take an active role in encouraging the consideration of 
regulatory alternatives. A further suggestion is that its ‘early quality 
support function’ could be strengthened, if there are more explicit 
requirements for Roadmaps, such as more detailed information on the need 
for EU action, objectives of the initiative, options for action, provisions for 
appropriate data collection and stakeholder consultation.  
                                                 
7 Regulation 2001/1049 would probably have obliged the Commission to grant access to 
most of these opinions upon application by members of the public anyway. 
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A survey of the IA reportss scrutinised by the IAB reveals a careful 
tone with a preference for incremental improvements, such as clearer 
justifications and the inclusion of more tables (Meuwese and Senden, 
forthcoming 2009). However, this approach is understandable given that 
the influence of the IAB clearly relies on (very) soft power. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the Impact Assessment Board does have an impact 
on the way Commission officials approach impact assessments and 
preparing proposals more generally, especially because it raises awareness 
of the tool among the higher ranks of the Commission administration. 
 
 
4.2 The Court of Justice and IA 
A quotation from Vice-President Verheugen nicely illustrates the possible 
link between the EU IA framework and the activities of the Court of 
Justice: 
 
“If in the co-decision process Parliament and/or Council produce 
amendments, changes which are not only just minor but real 
changes, then there should be an Impact Assessment. If it is not there 
the Commission will make it very clear that the Commission does 
not feel that there is a sound basis for a proper decision.”8 
 
Since EU IA is meant to strengthen the evidence-base of EU legislative and 
policy measures it could become part of the grounds of review applied by 
the Court of Justice. But awareness of IA has only come to the Court fairly 
recently. For the moment, the threat of judicial review is having more of an 
impact on the lawmaking process than the actual case law, much along the 
lines of Stone Sweet’s remark that “[t]he spectre of constitutional censure 
hovers over the legislative process” (Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 119). Alemanno 
has pointed to a link between this judicial threat and the establishment and 
development of the IAB, asking whether Better Regulation and the IA 
framework in particular is not some sort of ‘trojan horse’ that the 
Commission will regret to have welcomed in its ranks (Alemanno, 
forthcoming 2009). Apart from some anecdotal evidence that IAs have 
been used by parties in judicial proceedings in front of the Court, there is 
one notable example of a case in which IA played a role. In case C-310/04 
Spain v. Council9 the issue at hand was that Commission and Council had 
amended the rules on the aid to cotton farmers, decoupling, aid from actual 
                                                 
8 Vice-President Verheugen at his examination by the European Union Committee of the 
House of Lords on 4 July 2005. 
9 Judgment of 7 Sept ember 2006, C-310/04 Spain v Council, [2006] ECR I-7285. 
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production because the old system only led to overproduction. Spain 
objected and took the case to court, putting forward the argument that 
Commission and Council had failed to take labour costs into account, 
leading to a disproportionate outcome in the regulation concerned. On 16 
March 2006 Advocate-General Sharpston in her opinion on this case 
explicitly mentioned impact assessment. She regarded IA, or rather the lack 
of it, as a factor in concluding that proportionality had been breached 
because it made choices by the Commission and the Council appear 
arbitrary, ignoring the Commission’s defence that no IA was required in 
this case. The Court agreed on the outcome of her conclusion and annulled 
part of Council Regulation 864/2004 for breach of the principle of 
proportionality. It also concurred with the Advocate-General in that failure 
by the Council and Commission to take into account certain relevant costs, 
were of crucial importance, but it did not attach similar importance to the 
absence of an official IA as such. 
The limited engagement of the Court of Justice with IA could perhaps 
be expected given the established case law on the marginal review of the 
reason-giving requirement of Article 253 EC Treaty and the wide margin 
granted to the Institutions when it comes to applying the proportionality 
principle. And yet, the case has caused quite a stir within the EU 
Institutions, where civil servants are preparing for more involvement of the 
Court in IA through an increased judicial interest in the the evidence-base 
of lawmaking. 
 
 
5 IA as a tool for multi-level lawmaking 
The development and adoption of law and policy at the EU level takes 
place in a rather special setting: that of a multi-level environment in which 
the Member States still take up a very prominent position. The involvement 
of the Member States in their Council capacity has already been touched 
upon briefly above. The issue of what individual Member States can do to 
improve their involvement in EU lawmaking through impact assessment is 
a different matter. On the surface, Member States, who have always pushed 
the European Commission to carry out IA, are not very keen on getting too 
involved in the actual process themselves: the EU IA framework even 
contains a notable exception for legislative proposals under the so-called 
‘Third Pillar’. Whenever Member States put forward a proposal in this area 
for which they have the exclusive right of initiative, an impact assessment 
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is not required.10 However, looking beyond the surface, we find plenty of 
initiatives from Member States in the field of impact assessment. Not only 
have many among them adopted IA-like tools in their national lawmaking 
processes (Jacob et al., 2008),11 they have also shown an increasing interest 
in the European tool (Meuwese, 2008).  
From the side of the Commission, Member States are being encouraged 
to intervene using the means that are open to all stakeholders. The German 
federal government has taken this up by producing a guide for its civil 
servants, which has been translated into English, presumably for the sake 
of sharing best practices, explaining how to lobby effectively using impact 
assessments (German federal administration, 2006). The chapter on 
‘Recommendations for action within the relevant ministry divisions’ offers 
the following piece of advice: 
 
“The quality and usefulness of IAs depend not only on Commission 
measures, but also on the active participation of Germany and other 
Member States. In order to ensure that German interests are 
effectively taken into account, it is important to assist the Commission 
in carrying out IAs and to keep a critical eye on the process from the 
very beginning. (…) By remaining aware of/participating in IA, 
Germany can also influence Commission proposals from an early 
stage, depending on the circumstances. In particular, it is important to 
clarify the possible impacts of a planned proposal on German 
interests” (German federal administration, 2006, p. 20). 
 
There are two main paths that Member States can follow to ensure 
Commission impact assessments take specific national impacts into 
account. The first is an initial check at the Roadmap stage to make sure the 
IA work is planned in such a way that country-specific impacts are not 
overlooked. The second is a monitoring of the IA process, informally or 
through the consultation process while the Commission is still undertaking 
the work, and more formally once the IA has been published. For the IA 
process is not finished with the publication of the IA report. There is still 
the question of how the IA findings will be used from then on by the other 
Institutions involved in EU lawmaking. Impact assessments are also useful 
                                                 
10 The European Commission considers this an instance of ‘institutional inequality’ and 
hopes to renegotiate the point when the Common Approach is next revised, see 
Meuwese, Anne C.M. 2008. Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking. Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague.. 
11 However, it should be noted that some domestic ‘impact assessment’ tools bear very little 
resemblance to ‘text book’ IA. The most common deviations are the absence of a 
comprehensive IA report, a limited range of considered impacts and little or no economic 
analysis. For more information on IA procedures in Member States see the project website of 
the European Network for Better Regulation http://www.enbr.org/diadem.php.  
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tools as a basis for discussion with the Commission, other Member States 
and the European Parliament before and during the negotiations. 
The United Kingdom, where impact assessment has long been an 
established tool domestically, is the Member State that is most active when 
it comes to integrating the use of this instrument into its standard procedure 
for negotiating European legislation. One concrete example is the UK 
‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ – as the British tool was then called – 
which helped convince other Member States that that the European 
Commission proposal to set new emissions limits for vehicles undergoing a 
roadworthiness test had many practical weaknesses, including that the 
proposed limit values were not suitable for the timescale, and could in fact 
result in vehicles incorrectly failing the test. The UK government’s 
‘Transposition Guide’ on ‘how to implement European directives 
effectively’ teaches civil servants that ‘[a]n RIA can be very effective as a 
tool, both to inform the negotiation and the transposition of a European 
directive’ (Cabinet Office). In line with the British habit of producing IA 
systematically at home, the guide focuses on the complementarity of the 
national IA and the Commission IA. The reasoning is that information that 
has been collected for a domestic IA is more likely to be relevant to an EU 
IA as well, since it can be presented already in an IA template. Also, given 
the special status that IA has acquired in EU lawmaking over a relatively 
short period of time, papers that are labelled ‘impact assessment’ are likely 
to have more authority in Brussels. This is partly a dangerous development. 
A simple re-labelling of position papers as impact assessment may give 
subjective advocacy an objective flavour with overburdened civil servants 
and lawmakers who do not have time to check the source of an ‘IA’ that is 
in front of them. However, if the popularity of the IA template gives 
stakeholders (in the broadest sense of the word, so including public 
stakeholders such as regions and Member States) an incentive to carry out 
more rigorous research by imposing the need to justify any methods used 
and reveal data sources, the development could be a good one.  
A final way in which Member States can get involved in IAs is through 
their parliaments. One specific exercise to encourage this use was the one 
on joint subsidiarity scrutiny by national parliaments coordinated by the 
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC). Two collective subsidiarity 
and proportionality checks were conducted; one on the Commission 
proposal on jurisdiction and applicable law in matrimonial matters 
(COM(2006) 399 final) and the second on the Commission proposal on the 
liberalisation of postal services (COM(2006) 594 final). The national 
parliaments repeatedly referred to the Commission’s impact assessment in 
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their reactions, often even to specific findings. On the whole the reactions 
to this experiment were positive, but many parliaments reported problems 
due to translation and, more importantly, to ‘information overkill’. This 
experiment suggests that ‘pre-digesting’ Commission impact assessment 
for use by national lawmakers is helpful. At the same time, research has 
shown that IA findings easily get misrepresented (Meuwese, 2008), so 
safeguards like the one-on-one transposition of tables used in the 
Commission IA to compare trade-offs are commendable. 
An example of how governments can facilitate scrutiny of European 
proposals by national parliaments through impact assessment comes from 
the Netherlands. There it has long been a tradition to prepare ‘fiches’ 
which contain a summary of new EU proposals, specifically tailored to the 
needs of the Dutch Parliament. Since 2007 these fiches systematically 
contain a section on the Commission’s impact assessment for the proposal, 
including references to the opinion of the Impact Assessment Board and a 
link to the Commission’s IA website. It is unclear whether there is a causal 
link, but recently the findings of EU IA have been mentioned regularly in 
legislative debates in the Netherlands (Meuwese, 2009). Again, the risk 
here is that the government quotes too eagerly those parts of an impact 
assessment that support its preferred negotiation stance, whilst ignoring 
other parts. Also, the status of an impact assessment as an information tool 
only cannot be emphasised enough: an IA rarely proves anything, it merely 
structures the debate on a regulatory problem. 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated that impact assessment as it is used in the 
EU context, is more than just a superfluous checklist that nobody cares 
about. By elevating IA to the main tool for internal policy coordination and 
by watering down the ‘strong version’ of IA to a mere information tool, the 
European Commission has adapted impact assessment to the needs of the 
European lawmaking and policy processes. The establishment of an Impact 
Assessment Board has ensured that IA is taken more seriously by both 
internal stakeholders (the Commission services) and external stakeholders 
(mainly lobby groups, but also Member States for instance). The question 
always on everyone’s lips is ‘does it work?’. Do we really have better 
regulation because of impact assessment? This question has not been 
answered in this chapter, nor has it been anywhere really, not in the least 
because economists are still arguing over whether there is a good way to 
measure a macro-level effect of this kind. Evaluations of the effects of the 
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introduction of IA have to limit themselves to findings on a smaller scale. 
A slight culture change within the Commission towards more transparency, 
enhanced regulatory oversight and more ‘munition’ for Member States to 
scrutinise EU lawmaking are among those dealt with in this paper. A lot of 
problems surrounding EU IA remain, not in the least with its 
implementation in the European Parliament and the Council, but there are 
at least as many existing flaws that were only exposed by the introduction 
of IA, such as the difficulty of processing evidence in politicised processes.  
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MEASURING AND REDUCING 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AS AN 
INSTRUMENT FOR REALISING BETTER 
REGULATION IN EUROPE: 
Recommendations for Improving the Standard  
Cost Model by Using Management Accounting  
Expertise 
Lena Deuschinger and Gunther Friedl 
 
Abstract 
During the last few years the measurement and reduction of administrative costs 
has become a very important instrument for improving regulation in the European 
Union (EU) and its Member States. Administrative costs are defined as the costs 
incurred by enterprises and other institutions in meeting legal obligations to 
provide information on their activities or production, either to public authorities 
or to private parties (European Commission 2009a, p. 45). To quantify this kind 
of cost most governments have chosen the Standard Cost Model, which was 
originally developed in the Netherlands. The application of the model differs 
slightly in each country but the basic assumptions are identical. The Standard 
Cost Model seems to be a practical method and is widely-used. But does it 
quantify the cost of bureaucracy in a realistic and accurate way? 
An analysis from a business point of view shows that the model is based on 
well-founded considerations on the one hand. On the other hand, clear weak 
points are recognizable and an advancement of the model based on findings from 
management accounting research shows promise. Management accounting 
provides solutions for the measurement and structuring of costs and the 
assignment of costs to cost objects in companies. This knowledge can be 
transferred to the measurement of administrative costs. In this paper we are 
examining administrative costs from a company’s point of view and presenting a 
conceptual advancement of the Standard Cost Model. 
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1 The Better Regulation initiative of the  
 European Commission and the role of  
 reducing administrative costs 
In the context of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, the European Commission 
has launched a strategy on Better Regulation to ensure that the regulatory 
framework in the EU contributes to achieving growth and jobs, while 
continuing to take into account the social and environmental objectives and 
the benefits for citizens and national administrations. This policy aims at 
simplifying and improving existing regulation, at better designing new 
regulation and at reinforcing the respect and the effectiveness of the rules, 
all this in line with the EU proportionality principle (European 
Commission 2009b). The European Commission’s target is thus a more 
effective and less burdensome regulation instead of deregulation and 
liberalization of the European market. 
For realising Better Regulation, the European Commission is using an 
array of instruments (European Commission 2006, p. 6): 
• Introducing a system for assessing the impact and improving the 
design of major Commission proposals 
• Implementing a programme of simplification of existing legislation 
• Testing Commission proposals still being looked at by the Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament to see whether they 
should be withdrawn 
• Factoring consultation into all Commission initiatives 
• Looking at alternatives to laws and regulations such as self-
regulation, or co-regulation by the legislator and interested parties. 
 
An important success factor for simplifying and improving legislation is 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA). It allows estimating or calculating the 
economic, social and environmental impacts of existing laws or alternative 
policy options. With the help of RIA proposals can be tailored to the needs 
and negative side effects can be minimised at the same time. Administrative 
costs are one type of impact arising from laws.1 In this article we are going 
to take a closer look at administrative costs, its characteristics and methods 
to quantify them. For this purpose we adopt the definition of administrative 
costs used by the European Commission: “Administrative costs are defined 
as the costs incurred by enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authorities 
and citizens in meeting legal obligations to provide information on their 
action or production, either to public authorities or to private parties. 
Information is to be construed in a broad sense, i.e. including labelling, 
                                                 
1 Nijsen describes different types of costs caused by regulation. See Nijsen et al. 2009, pp. 30. 
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reporting, registration, monitoring and assessment needed to provide the 
information.” (European Commission 2009a, p. 45) 
An example illustrates the definition: “A regulation on air quality sets 
an obligation to keep a register of pollutant emissions and an obligation to 
meet an air pollution threshold. Keeping a register of pollutant emissions is 
an administrative cost, while action taken to meet an air pollution threshold 
is not. That type of compliance cost is sometime referred to as ‘substantive 
cost’ because the obligation affects the essence of the (industry) activity. 
Keeping a register does not entail in itself any obligation to change the 
production process, the nature of the end-products or the treatment of 
emissions. Meeting the pollution threshold will require a substantive 
change at these levels (for instance the installation of new filters).” 
(European Commission 2009a, p. 45) 
The European Commission as well as many European Member States 
are committed to reduce administrative costs by simplifying existing laws 
and improving future legislation. It is important to mention that reducing 
administrative costs does not mean abolishing necessary information 
obligations.2 It is aiming at making laws less time-consuming, easier to 
understand and more effective where possible, instead. Although 
administrative costs are incurred by enterprises as well as by the voluntary 
sector, public authorities and citizens, we will focus on the measurement of 
administrative costs arising in enterprises. We will examine these costs 
from a company’s point of view. 
To quantify this kind of costs the European Commission and several 
governments within the EU Member States have chosen the Standard Cost 
Model (SCM) which had originally been developed in the Netherlands 
(Nijland 2008). The application of the model differs slightly in each 
country, but the basic assumptions are identical. The SCM seems to be a 
practicable method and is widely-used. But does it quantify the cost of 
bureaucracy in a realistic and correct way? And if not which conceptual 
advancements of the SCM are required for supporting the reduction of 
unnecessary administrative costs at the best? 
To be able to answer these questions, we have to consider two major 
challenges which are critical for a permanent successful reduction of 
administrative costs within Europe. 
 
                                                 
2 The term information obligation is as a synonym for legal obligation. 
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• Concerted actions and standardized methods in the EU and its 
Member States 
Success in simplifying existing law and improving future legislation 
depends on the EU Member States to a great extent. They have 
primary responsibility for the correct and timely application of EU 
Treaties and Legislation (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007, p. 3). This affects the transposition and 
implementation of EU law as well as the quality of national and 
regional regulation. Thus, not only the European Commission but 
also the Member States need to have a strategy and an institutional 
structure supporting the reduction of administrative costs. 
Additionally, a model for measuring administrative costs is 
necessary to be able to plan and control the reduction of unnecessary 
costs. As the improvement of legislation has to be a European 
initiative which requires a concerted action of all Member States, a 
standardized way of assessing administrative costs is essential. Only 
if administrative costs in different countries and departments are 
being assessed in the same standardized way, the data is comparable 
and enables to work with on European, national and regional levels. 
• Long-term program which guarantees an enduring decrease in 
administrative costs 
The majority of EU Member States have taken actions in the 
measurement of administrative costs and the reduction of burdens. 
Many ad-hoc initiatives are being launched: Most countries started 
with measuring administrative costs arising from existing national 
laws and developed and determined simplification measures. But 
one-time projects and the focus on improving existing laws is not 
enough for lasting success. Strategic concepts which can be 
integrated in the lawmaking process are necessary for ensuring long-
lasting positive effects. However, only few of the Member States 
have developed a comprehensive simplification programme to date. 
For this reason, it is essential to include new legislative proposals 
systematically in the impact assessment. Draft laws have to be 
evaluated regarding their impact on administrative costs. During the 
legislative process different regulatory alternatives have to be 
compared in terms of different criteria like economic, social and 
environmental impacts. The administrative costs have to be one of 
these criteria. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with an overview 
on academic research and literature on administrative costs. In section 3 we 
will explain the basics of management accounting which are important for 
the analysis and advancement of the Standard Cost Model. Besides, we 
point out the characteristics of administrative costs. The requirements for a 
model for measuring administrative costs are defined in section 4. Based 
on these requirements an analysis of the EU Standard Cost Model will 
show the strengths and weaknesses of this instrument in section 5. Section 
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6 considers the weaknesses of the model and shows how a conceptual 
advancement of the Standard Cost Model enables a more accurate 
measurement of administrative costs. Section 7 concludes and indicates the 
need for further research. 
 
 
2 Academic research and literature on  
 administrative costs 
While Better Regulation is playing an important role in politics at EU and at 
national level research has been relatively slow to respond to the new 
developments. There are few edited books and public policy research papers 
dealing with this topic (Radaelli, Meuwese 2009; Radaelli, Meuwese 2010; 
Wiener 2006). Especially for the evaluation of the results of Better 
Regulation initiatives, measures for quantifying the outcome are necessary 
(Nilsson et al. 2008; Nijsen 2009). Meanwhile, a range of publications on 
RIA is available (Verschuuren, van Gestel 2009; Radaelli 2009). Measuring 
and reducing administrative costs in particular became one of the most 
important instruments for realising and evaluating Better Regulation. 
Already in the 1970s, scholars and consulting companies started to conduct 
studies to quantify administrative or regulatory costs in companies. A 
summary of studies of regulatory costs can be found in Elliehausen 
(Elliehausen 1998, p. 31). Another study to compare administrative costs in 
Europe has been conducted by the OECD (OECD 2007). From 2003 on 
European governments began measuring administrative costs arising from 
laws. There are manuals indicating how to quantify administrative costs 
(European Commission 2009a, Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). They are 
mainly published by governments for promoting and simplifying the 
reduction of administrative costs in their countries. However, there is hardly 
any research dealing with the analysis and improvement of existing methods 
to measure administrative costs (Keyworth 2006; Den Butter et al. 2009). 
In summary research on Better Regulation and the measurement of 
administrative costs in particular exists. There is a focus on describing and 
analysing the historical development and the current situation (Radaelli, 
Meuwese 2009, pp. 642). Besides, scholars started to develop a conceptual 
framework to put available results into context. Existing research shows 
that many countries have still not gone further than pilot projects in RIA 
(Radaelli, Meuwese 2009, p. 644). According to Nilsson et al. the use of 
assessment systems is differentiated and on the whole very limited, in 
particular when it comes to more advanced tools (Nilsson 2008, pp. 335). 
Regarding the measurement of administrative costs a well-founded analysis 
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of the existing measuring instruments is still missing. The existing research 
results are demonstrating that there is need for further research. 
 
 
3 Basics of management accounting and  
 characteristics of administrative costs 
Costs are defined as a resource sacrificed or foregone to achieve a specific 
objective (Bhimani et al. 2008, p. 38). As costs are playing an important 
role in a company, management accounting was developed to help 
managers understand the costs of running a business. Traditionally, costs 
are being measured, structured and assigned to cost objects which are the 
products or services the company sells. It is the company’s goal to plan and 
control its costs and thus maximize its profitability. 
Administrative costs are a special type of costs: As they are arising 
from legal information obligations which have to be fulfilled, companies 
barely have the possibility to control or reduce these costs. Hence, it is the 
lawmaker’s responsibility to create laws in a way that any company 
concerned does not suffer from unnecessary burdens caused by 
administrative costs. To be able to make this burden as low as possible the 
lawmaker has to know the administrative costs arising from different 
information obligations. Administrative costs are being calculated for 
fulfilling one information obligation. The information obligation thus 
serves as a cost object in this case. 
To get precise information on administrative costs, data has to be 
collected from the companies concerned. Elliehausen discusses several 
methods to measure regulatory costs. He compares inferring costs either by 
econometric methods or by collecting the data from companies by using case 
studies or surveys. According to his results case studies “can provide 
accurate and comprehensive information about regulatory costs at the 
institution studied. “ (Elliehausen 1998, p. 11) This task is challenging as 
costs arising from legal compliance are not classified as regulatory or 
administrative costs in a company’s accounting system (Joshi et al. 2001, pp. 
171, 190). Most companies are structuring their costs in cost types like 
material, labour and overhead (Weetman 2003, pp. 500). Then costs are 
being assigned to cost objects. Administrative costs are included in these 
costs. As they are ‘invisible’ and hardly ever reported individually, they are 
hidden costs (Joshi et al. 2001, p. 171). To calculate or assess administrative 
costs the necessary cost data has to be collected for this purpose. Using 
existing data is rarely possible. In the next chapter we are discussing 
requirements for a model for measuring administrative costs. Management 
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accounting supplies solutions for the measurement and structuring of costs 
and the assignment from costs to cost objects in companies. This knowledge 
can be transferred to measuring administrative costs. 
 
 
4 Requirements for a model for measuring  
 administrative costs 
A methodical approach is needed to be able to quantify costs which arise from 
fulfilling a legal information obligation. In this chapter we will define the 
following four requirements for a model for quantifying administrative costs. 
 
 
a A correct, but also clear and comprehensible model 
The various kinds of ex ante and ex post evaluation methods applied for 
assessing the impact of regulation are met with criticism, sometimes. As a 
model for measuring administrative costs is one of these methods, we have 
to deal with these critical comments. There are two major points which have 
to be considered when assessing or designing a model for quantifying 
administrative costs: “Firstly, most evaluations of laws in the past have 
failed to feed the lawmaking process because of bad timing. The policy 
cycle usually revolves quicker than the research cycle, with the result that 
‘real time’ evaluations often have little influence on law and policymaking.” 
(Verschuuren, van Gestel 2009, p. 5) Secondly, the used methodology is 
often unclear (Köck 2002, pp. 1–21). Some governments have published 
manuals explaining their approach of measuring administrative costs but in 
many cases the explanations are rather vague.3 Reports on conducted impact 
assessments are rarely available, especially on national level. For this reason, 
the European Commission claims a more systematic assessment of 
economic, social and environmental impacts and more transparency on the 
results (European Commission 2009c). Consequently, a methodology for 
quantifying administrative costs has to be a systematic and very well 
elaborated approach leaving no lack of clarity. At the same time it has to be 
reduced to its bare essentials to enable the user to do an assessment of 
administrative costs in a relatively short time. Unnecessary complexity 
would make the application of the model too costly and time-consuming. 
Furthermore, the method must be described clearly and comprehensibly in 
order to increase its acceptance. 
                                                 
3 An example will be given later. 
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b Assessing administrative costs imposed by both  
 existing and planned legislation 
Administrative costs can be minimized by simplifying existing laws as well 
as by making new laws less costly. As mentioned above, many European 
governments and the European Commission have started initiatives to 
measure administrative costs imposed by existing laws, the so-called ex 
post assessment, for companies. Simultaneously, potentials to unburden 
companies were identified and the governments have begun simplifying 
information obligations and reducing the cost impact (Verschuuren, van 
Gestel 2009, p. 7). As a next step, the measurement of administrative costs 
with a forward looking perspective, a so-called ex ante evaluation, has to 
be integrated in the legislative process of the Member States: In the future 
there will be a focus on designing new laws as cost-efficient as possible 
while fulfilling the political goals (Commission of the European 
Communities 2009 b, p. 7). Thus, one important requirement for a model is 
the ability of measuring administrative costs from an ex post perspective as 
well as from an ex ante perspective. 
 
 
c Measuring all relevant costs arising from an  
 information obligation 
Costs are a resource of a company sacrificed to achieve a specific 
objective. In the case of administrative costs this objective is to observe a 
law by fulfilling an information obligation. “The total cost of a regulation 
is the cost of performing all the activities that it requires.” (Elliehausen 
1998, p. 3) Relevant costs which have to be considered are thus all costs 
arising from the fulfilment of an information obligation. Traditionally 
management accounting theory is defining different types of costs like 
? Labour costs 
? Material costs 
? Overhead costs (Bhimani et al. 2008, pp. 38) 
 
Referring to costs arising from regulation other cost types are important 
(Elliehausen 1998, p. 3) 
? Legal costs 
? Consultancy costs 
? Costs for restructuring and modifying information systems 
? Costs for programming and testing software 
? Training costs 
? Outsourcing costs (if administrative activities are contracted out) 
? Depreciation costs 
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All these types of costs may arise in a company for complying with an 
information obligation. Categorising costs in cost types helps us getting a 
general idea of relevant costs. A model for measuring administrative costs 
has to consider all these types of costs. 
 
 
d The use of a standardized methodology which  
 supplies comparable data 
Legislation in European Member States is more and more determined on 
EU level. This requires a close cooperation of the concerned countries 
among each other and with the European Commission. A standardized 
methodology and comparable cost data are enabling an efficient teamwork 
within Europe. An EU draft, for example, is often meant to replace 27 
different national legislations and decrease total administrative costs. For 
this purpose, cost data indicating the cost burden before and after the 
unification of the legal rules is necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of 
the simplification measure. Comparable cost data is also useful for 
conducting cross-country or cross-policy area comparisons, benchmarking, 
comparing regulatory alternatives implemented in different countries and 
elaborating best practices. Hence, there should be a standardised model 
which can be used all around Europe and supplies comparable cost data. 
In the next section we will explain the EU Standard Cost Model (EU 
SCM) and examine if the model fulfils the requirements and in which parts 
an improvement of the model is necessary. 
 
 
5 Analysis of the EU Standard Cost Model 
“The SCM was designed to measure the administrative consequences for 
businesses, when complying with legislation.” (OECD 2007, p. 29) It has 
originally been developed in the Netherlands in the 1990s (OECD 2007, p. 
114). Meanwhile, the EU and many of its Member States have adjusted the 
model in order to use it as well. The model offers an approach for 
quantifying administrative costs caused by an information obligation for all 
the businesses concerned. It is an activity-based methodology assuming 
that fulfilling an information obligation can be divided in single activities. 
According to the SCM standardized types of activities can be defined 
which cover most of the activities necessary to fulfil an information 
obligation, for example ‘Retrieving relevant information from existing 
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data’, ‘Producing new data’ or ‘Submitting the information to the relevant 
authority’ (European Commission 2009a, pp. 45–50). 
According to the SCM, administrative costs have to be assessed on the 
basis of the average cost of the required administrative activity (price) 
multiplied by the total number of activities performed per year (quantity). 
The average cost per action is generally estimated by multiplying a tariff 
and the time required per action. The tariff is based on average labour costs 
per hour. In the EU SCM overheads are included; in the manuals of other 
European countries like Germany prorated overheads are not included in 
the administrative costs (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006, p. 22). Other types 
of costs such as outsourcing are taken into account both in the EU SCM 
and in the German model, whereas equipment or supplies’ costs are part of 
the administrative cost on EU level but not in Germany. 
The quantity is being calculated as the frequency of required actions 
multiplied by the number of entities (companies) concerned. In case of 
multiple relevant administrative activities per information obligation these 
need to be summed up to calculate the administrative costs per information 
obligation (European Commission 2009a, p. 46). 
 
Ca = Total administrative costs
n  = number of legal information obligations
ci = average costs per hour to fulfil one legal information obligation
ti = time required to fulfil one legal information obligation
mi = number of companies concerned
fi = frequency of fulfilment  
 
Table 1  The core equation of the EU Standard Cost Model 
 
The Standard Cost Model seems to be a practicable method and is widely-
used. A major part of the European Member States is using the SCM to 
quantify administrative burdens (SCM Network 2010). But does it quantify 
the cost of bureaucracy in a realistic and correct way? And does it fulfil the 
requirements defined above? An analysis of the model will help us to 
answer these questions. As the application of the SCM differs slightly 
within the Member States and on EU-level, we will refer to the EU SCM 
for the analysis (European Commission 2009a, p. 50). 
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a A correct, but also clear and comprehensible model 
Activity-based costing (ABC) is a costing model that identifies activities in 
an organization and assigns the cost of each activity to all products and 
services according to the actual consumption. In a business organisation, the 
ABC methodology assigns an organisation's resource costs through activities 
to the products and services provided to its customers. The SCM uses this 
approach to measure administrative costs. Instead of products or services the 
cost objects in this case are the information obligations. Calculating 
administrative costs based on average costs per action for one company is 
one appropriate way. Other methods like econometric models to calculate 
regulatory costs deliver vague results which are not suitable for the reduction 
of administrative costs (Elliehausen 1998, pp. 5). Using an activity-based 
approach is a comprehensible, practicable and convenient way to estimate 
administrative costs uncomplicated and quickly. The fact it is meanwhile 
used in many countries worldwide shows the acceptance of the SCM. 
 
 
b Assessing administrative costs imposed by both  
existing and planned legislation 
The EU SCM aims at delivering a guideline for measuring administrative 
costs imposed by legislation. There are remarks which make clear that the 
model should be used to assess the impact of both existing and planned 
legislation (European Commission 2009a, pp. 45, 51). But in this approach 
there is no distinction between an ex post assessment and an ex ante 
evaluation. It must be pointed out that the two types of assessment differ: 
Measuring costs of existing laws from an ex post perspective is based on 
existing data. As concerned companies already fulfil the information 
obligations for some time they are able to deliver information about the 
required activities and the costs arising from these activities. Based on 
these data, administrative costs can be calculated. The EU SCM delivers a 
detailed guidance how to proceed in this case (European Commission 
2009a, p. 60). An ex ante evaluation in contrast rests upon a forecast. For 
the planned information obligation the required activities, the activity 
duration and the frequency have to be predetermined as well as the cost 
parameters and the number of entities concerned. The EU SCM gives 
instructions how to do that by giving an overview of possible types of 
actions, a list of relevant cost parameters and an outline on data sources 
respectively a guidance for approximating numbers (European 
Commission 2009a, pp. 50–60). Regarding the planning of the required 
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activities, the activity duration and the anticipated costs the instructions in 
the manual are not sufficient. A concept how to predict these variables in 
an easy and cost-efficient way is missing. 
The distinction between ongoing (recurring) administrative costs and 
start-up (one-off) administrative costs is another important issue. Ongoing 
costs incur each time an information obligation has to be fulfilled. Start-up 
costs arise when a law is enacted and companies have to adapt to a new legal 
situation. In the EU SCM a differentiation is made. “Recurring 
administrative costs and, where significant, one-off administrative costs have 
to be taken into account.” (European Commission 2009a, p. 45) But further 
guidance is missing. Many questions are remaining unanswered: How can 
ongoing costs and start-up costs be distinguished? In which cases are start-
up costs significant? In which way should they be taken into account? 
 
 
c Measuring all relevant costs arising from an  
 information obligation 
According to the EU SCM “it is assumed that the main costs induced by 
information obligations are labour cost.” (European Commission 2009a, p. 
52) They are composed by the gross salary plus 25% overhead costs by 
default. Furthermore, the model considers outsourcing costs. In addition, 
equipment costs (depreciation costs) or supplies’ costs should be taken into 
account where appropriate (European Commission 2009a, p. 52). Several 
cost types which also may arise for fulfilling an information obligation are 
not mentioned in the manual: 
? Legal costs 
? Consultancy costs 
? Costs for restructuring and modifying information systems 
? Costs for programming and testing software 
? Training costs 
The EU SCM is thus neglecting certain costs types. 
 
 
d The use of a standardized methodology which  
 supplies comparable data 
A standardized proceeding for assessing administrative costs would make 
results internationally comparable and help simplifying European law in a 
consistent and harmonized way. But different national interpretations of the 
SCM regarding the relevant costs which are taken into account are 
preventing these possibilities: Data on administrative costs from different 
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European countries is not comparable (Commission of the European 
Communities 2009a, p. 10.). Given different approaches for data collection 
at national level, estimating the total administrative costs of European 
companies is very complex or even impossible. Reducing administrative 
costs on EU level is difficult since the net reduction can’t be calculated and 
the advantage of the initiative can’t be assessed. 
To illustrate the differences and show why administrative cost data 
from different institutions or countries are not comparable we will check 
the EU SCM against the German SCM (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006, pp. 
20). The EU SCM considers labor costs including 25% overhead costs. In 
contrast the German SCM takes labor costs into account without adding an 
overhead rate. In the German SCM supplies’ costs are not taken into 
account (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006, p. 21). Both models consider 
outsourcing costs. According to the German SCM, costs for equipment 
which was only acquired to fulfil a certain information obligation may be 
taken into account. There is no further guidance indicating in which cases 
they should be taken into account (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006, p. 22). 
The analysis shows that approaches of the SCM differ regarding relevant 
costs types which have to be considered. As a consequence cost data are 
not comparable. For this reason also the European Commission sees a need 
for “further data harmonisation and comparability.” (Commission of the 
European Communities 2009a, p. 9) 
A consolidated view indicates that the SCM is based on well-founded 
considerations. An activity-based approach fits very well for this purpose. 
On the other hand, weak points are clearly recognizable: 
• A distinction between ex post and ex ante assessment is missing 
within the SCM. An ex ante evaluation rests upon a forecast and 
predicting all relevant variables is a challenge. Furthermore, new laws 
do not only cause ongoing costs but also start-up costs. Hence, a 
specific guidance is essential for enabling users to conduct a correct 
ex ante evaluation and to distinguish start-up and ongoing costs. 
• The adaption of the SCM differs in European countries, especially 
regarding cost types which have to be considered. This leads to the 
following question: Which cost types are relevant and thus have to 
be considered in a model for measuring administrative costs? A 
consensus in this question will lead to a harmonisation of the 
concept and will be the basis for a standardized model providing 
internationally comparable results. 
 
An improvement of the model based on expertise from management 
accounting research seems to be promising. In the next section we will 
present a conceptual advancement of the SCM in order to eliminate these 
weak points. 
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6 Conceptual advancement of the Standard  
 Cost Model 
6.1 Ex ante evaluation of administrative costs by  
drawing analogies 
The ex ante evaluation aims at assessing the anticipated administrative 
consequences of a draft law, draft executive order or other initiative. It 
forecasts the administrative costs presumably arising from a rule or 
initiative which may be implemented in the future. The results from an ex 
ante assessment deliver information on expected administrative costs and 
provide a basis for choosing the best draft alternative or for improving a 
draft law. For the ex ante evaluation an outline how to proceed is missing 
in the EU SCM. As ex ante measurements differ notably from ex post 
measurements a suitable methodology is necessary. We will present a 
concept how to predict variables like 
• required activities 
• the activity duration 
• the anticipated costs. 
 
By now the SCM proposes to calculate administrative costs using an 
activity-based approach. Calculating administrative costs caused by an 
existing information obligation is based on historical cost information. 
Assessing administrative costs from an ex ante perspective in contrast is 
based on forward looking information. As a calculation is not possible in 
this case, a cost forecast has to be conducted instead. Elliehausen proposes 
to use analogies (Elliehausen 1998, pp. 9. The European Commission also 
proposes to use analogies in the Guidelines, but there is no further 
instruction how to proceed). This means that administrative costs can be 
estimated by drawing analogies between activities required by an 
information obligation and activities for which data are available. This may 
be activities undertaken to comply with already existing information 
obligations or business activities. 
We use an example to demonstrate this method: In 2002 a legislative 
initiative on the energy performance of buildings was adopted in the 
European Union (The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union 2002). As a consequence the Member States have to apply 
minimum requirements regarding the energy performance of new and 
existing buildings, ensure the certification of energy performance and 
require the regular inspection of boilers and air conditioning systems in 
buildings (European Union 2007). Buildings have to be certified for their 
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energy efficiency since the transposition and implementation of this EU 
law in the European countries. Hence, businesses like building companies 
have to fulfil a new information obligation. The companies concerned have 
to make energy performance certificates available for their customers when 
buildings are sold or rented. Before the commencement of the act the 
administrative costs which would be caused by this information obligation 
could have been calculated by using analogies. As mentioned above 
analogies can be drawn from activities undertaken to comply with already 
existing information obligations. For example, an information obligation 
requesting an emissions report from energy suppliers may necessitate 
similar activities and cause similar costs. Equipment to measure the data 
has to be acquired. The data must be detected, collected and subsumed in a 
report. The findings on required activities, activity duration and anticipated 
costs to fulfil this information obligation can be applied to predict the costs 
for the new information obligation on energy efficiency. On the other hand 
business activities can be used to draw a comparison. Building companies 
design real estate flyers to inform their customers about the property 
details. The marketing or sales department of a building company can 
deliver data on required activities, activity duration and anticipated costs to 
design a real state flyer. Based on these data administrative costs arising 
from the creation of an energy performance certificate can be predicted. To 
determine the required activities and the activity duration it is promising to 
use the support from a company’s functional department like purchasing, 
production, marketing, or sales. Potential sources of cost data include the 
departments of controlling, cost accounting and book keeping. 
Drawing analogies between activities required by an information 
obligation and other activities for which data are available may deliver 
results which are not consistent with other data and not representative. 
Hence, it is useful to make several case studies based on analogies to be able 
to test if the findings are consistent. Despite this limitation, this method has 
two important advantages: It is neither time-consuming nor expensive since 
the cost calculation is based on existing data. Besides, even if the resulting 
cost data are not representative the exercise of carefully identifying the 
activities required indicates how burdensome the information obligation will 
be (Elliehausen 1998, pp. 9). Nevertheless using analogies with existing 
activities is a convenient way to forecast administrative costs which will 
probably be caused by a future law. This method can easily be integrated in 
the existing SCM and delivers reliable data. 
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6.2 Differentiation between start-up costs and ongoing  
costs 
There are two different decision situations concerning the reduction of 
administrative costs: the ex post assessment of an existing information 
aims at estimating the current cost burden for companies. The results serve 
as a basis to simplify existing laws and thus reduce administrative costs. In 
contrast, an ex ante evaluation refers to future law which should be 
designed in a way that cost burdens are as low as possible. In each decision 
situation it is important to identify and consider the relevant costs (Hilton 
2009, p. 592). In accounting theory a distinction is being made between 
ongoing costs and start-up costs. Start-up costs are costs “related to one-
time activities for opening a new facility, introducing a new product or 
service, conducting business in a new territory, conducting business with a 
new class of customer, initiating a new process in an existing facility, or 
starting new operation.” (Nikolai et al. 2009, p. 476) In a legal context 
start-up costs are arising in a company each time a new law is enforced: 
“Start-up costs are one-time costs of implementing changes to conform to 
the requirements of a regulation.” (Elliehausen 1998, p. 3) Ongoing costs 
in contrast are the recurring costs of performing the activities required by a 
regulation. In the case of administrative costs, ongoing costs arise each 
time an information obligation has to be fulfilled. 
We made a distinction between measuring administrative costs from an 
ex post perspective and from an ex ante perspective. Are start-up costs and 
ongoing costs relevant in both cases? In case of an ex post assessment of 
administrative costs, the law committing a company to fulfil an information 
obligation already exists. Hence, the company already adapted to the legal 
situation and start-up costs have already incurred. This kind of costs is called 
sunk costs: They are costs that have been created by a decision made in the 
past (the decision of the company to adapt in a way that enables the 
company to comply with the law) and that cannot be changed by any 
decision that will be made in the future (for example by an amendment) 
(Drury 2008, p. 36). For an ex post assessment of administrative costs thus it 
is justified to consider only ongoing costs. Start-up costs are sunk costs in 
this case and no more relevant. Ex ante evaluation of administrative costs is 
being made before a new law is enacted. The company which will probably 
be concerned by the future law does not yet have any costs caused by the 
draft, neither start-up costs nor ongoing costs. In this situation start-up costs 
as well as ongoing costs can still be influenced by the lawmaker. Hence, 
both types of costs are relevant. 
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According to these definitions start-up costs and ongoing costs can be 
specified: Start-up costs include legal costs for interpreting the regulation, 
advising managers and reviewing procedures and forms as well as labour 
costs for reviewing and revising procedures and forms, coordinating 
compliance activities and designing internal audit programs. Furthermore, 
they contain consultancy costs, costs for restructuring and modifying 
processes and information systems, costs for programming and testing 
software and training costs. Ongoing costs contain managerial labour costs 
for monitoring employee compliance and coordinating compliance 
examinations with regulatory agencies. Besides, there are labour costs for 
fulfilling the information obligations, legal costs for reviewing complaints, 
material costs for printing, postage and similar actions, outsourcing costs in 
case of contracting out administrative activities, depreciation costs and 
overhead costs (Elliehausen 1998, p. 3). Table 1 gives an overview. 
 
Start-up costs Ongoing costs 
• Legal costs for 
o interpreting the regulation 
o advising managers 
o reviewing procedures and forms 
• Labour costs for 
o reviewing and revising 
procedures and forms 
o coordinating compliance 
activities 
o designing internal audit programs 
• Consultancy costs 
• Costs for restructuring and modifying 
processes and information systems 
• Costs for programming and testing 
software 
• Training costs 
• Managerial labour costs for 
o monitoring employee compliance 
o coordinating compliance 
examinations with regulatory 
agencies 
• Labour costs for fulfilling the 
information obligations 
• Legal costs for reviewing complaints 
• Material costs (printing, postage 
etc.) 
• Outsourcing costs (if administrative 
activities are contracted out) 
• Depreciation costs 
• Overhead costs  
Table 2  Start-up costs and ongoing costs: Relevant cost types 
 
The distinction between start-up costs and ongoing costs and thus a 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant costs is not always clear-cut. 
For instance equipment like an infrared camera and computer software to 
detect and evaluate the energy performance of a building has to be acquired 
when the new law has been enacted and the information obligation has to 
be fulfilled. Although there is only one acquisition within several years the 
camera and the software will be used each time an energy certification has 
to be prepared. One key accounting principle to help identifying relevant 
costs of a decision is the matching principle. This principle says that 
expenses are recognised not when they are paid but during the period when 
they effectively contribute to the firm’s revenues (Hawawini, Viallet 2007, 
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p. 39). In fact fulfilling an information obligation generally does not 
generate revenues but companies avoid getting a penalty which would have 
a negative effect on their revenue. A fixed asset, for example a computer is 
expected to be used for several years to generate statistical data for an 
information obligation. As time passes the value of this asset is expected to 
decrease. To account for this loss of value the purchase price is 
systematically reduced over the expected useful life. This periodic and 
systematic value-reduction process is called depreciation and discloses the 
annual costs (Hawawini, Viallet 2007, p. 40). Depreciation is an expense 
recorded to allocate a tangible asset's cost over its useful life (Nikolai et al. 
pp. 512). The SCM uses an activity-based concept to calculate 
administrative costs. Thus, we recommend using depreciation based on 
activity in this case. The depreciation rate is calculated as follows (Nikolai 
et al. pp. 519): 
 
 
 
The residual value is the remaining value of an asset at the end of its useful 
life. The depreciation rate indicates the costs of using the equipments for 
one hour. This cost parameter can easily be included in the activity-based 
calculation of administrative costs. 
In each decision situation it is important to consider all relevant costs. 
As we demonstrated above ongoing costs are relevant in an ex post 
assessment, start-up costs and ongoing costs are relevant in an ex ante 
evaluation. An attribution of cost types to start-up costs and ongoing costs 
was made in this section. The costs arising from equipment which can be 
used for many years or activities can be allocated to one information 
obligation by using depreciation. Using these findings will help 
considering all relevant cost types and improving the accuracy of cost 
estimates. 
 
 
6.3 Relevance of different cost types: an example 
A virtual example will illustrate the relevance of start-up costs: Based on 
EU Tariff law and the German Foreign Trade Regulation the proceedings 
for export declarations were changed in Germany during the last years. 
Since July 2009 declarations concerning export goods from Germany to 
non-EU countries can only be submitted electronically. Hardcopies are not 
in use any more. The amendment has also changed the administrative costs 
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which arise in an exemplary company. An exemplary calculation shows the 
impact of the amendment (see table 2): 
 
Table 3  Exemplary calculation of the impact of the amendment 
 Administrative costs for one export 
declaration (transmission using 
hardcopy) in € 
Administrative costs for one 
export declaration (electronic 
transmission) in € 
Ongoing 
costs 
Labour costs 
Depreciation 
Overhead (20%) 
60 
10 
14 
Labour costs 
Depreciation 
Overhead (20%) 
20 
20 
  8 
Total 
ongoing costs  
  
84 
  
48 
 
 Administrative costs to conform to 
the former law in € 
Administrative costs of 
implementing changes to 
conform to the new law in € 
Start-up 
costs 
Not relevant as they are 
sunk costs 
  0 Consultancy costs 
Costs for 
implementing and 
testing new software 
Costs for training for 
employees 
Labour costs 
15,000 
 
  3,000 
 
  3,000 
  9,000 
Total start-
up costs 
 0  30,000 
 
 
Although the costs for depreciation have rosen, the labour costs have gone 
down: All in all the ongoing costs for doing an export declaration based on 
electronic transmission are lower. However, start-up costs have been 
caused by the amendment. The company restructured its logistics process 
with the help of a consulting company to be able to use an electronic 
transmission system. Furthermore, they implemented new software. Two 
employees were trained on that software. Compared to that, the start-up 
costs to conform to the former law based on hardcopies are zero. The 
company had adapted to the former law many years before and the costs 
are not relevant any more as they are sunk costs. 
Ongoing costs are lower after the amendment. If there were no start-up 
costs there would be a positive cost effect for the company immediately. 
But start-up costs of € 30,000 have to be considered. We are calculating the 
breakeven point assuming x = number of export declarations: 
 
84 €/export declarations * x export declarations = 
30,000 € + 48 €/export declarations * x export declarations 
36 € * x = 30,000 € 
x = 833 export declarations 
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With the 833rd export declaration the breakeven point is reached. This 
means that for the first 832 export declarations which are submitted 
electronically the administrative costs in the company are higher than for 
export declarations based on hard copies. We assume that the company has 
to submit 100 export declarations per year: 833 export declarations : 100 
export declarations/year = 8.33 years. Hence, the method change has a 
payback period of more than eight years in the company. 
Taking only the ongoing costs into account, the amendment seems to 
have a positive effect for the concerned companies immediately. Looking 
at the start-up costs shows us that there are considerable costs arising for 
the adaption to the new law. For our company it takes more than eight 
years to benefit from lower administrative costs. This example shows the 
importance of considering all relevant administrative costs during the 
legislative process in order to assess the impact in a correct way and chose 
the best legislative alternative. 
The fourth requirement we defined for a model for quantifying 
administrative costs was “the use of a standardized methodology which 
supplies comparable data”. The application of the SCM within European 
countries still differs. Especially, there is no elaborated method which can 
be used for an ex ante evaluation and there are different opinions regarding 
relevant cost types which have to be considered. Our propositions can 
serve as a basis for the European Commission and the European countries 
for discussing a common approach and for finding an agreement. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed the Standard Cost Model as an instrument 
for measuring administrative costs from a management accounting point of 
view. Using activity-based costing, the SCM is a clear and comprehensible 
model for measuring the regulatory cost burden for all companies that are 
affected by legislation. However, the SCM has significant weaknesses in 
terms of the exact measurement of the administrative costs imposed by 
existing laws and even more so by legislation under consideration. It 
neglects some important cost types and fails to ensure data comparability 
between countries. 
Therefore, we propose important adjustments to the SCM as currently 
used. First and foremost, we recommend using analogies with existing 
activities to estimate administrative costs. This procedure can help to 
enhance the accuracy of cost estimates. Second, we propose incorporating 
a more precise distinction between start-up costs and ongoing costs in the 
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model. We suggest including additional cost types in both start-up costs 
and ongoing costs. Moreover, since start-up costs are only relevant for 
future legislation, we suggest classifying these costs as sunk costs in the 
case of existing legislation. Hence, they should be neglected in this case. 
Based on our findings a harmonisation of the SCM within Europe is 
possible. A common approach following our proposals will allow the 
calculation of comparable data which can support the reduction of 
administrative costs inside Europe. 
We believe that the proposed adjustments will help to make a major 
step towards a more accurate measurement of administrative costs. 
Including all relevant cost types makes it easier to find ways to reduce the 
regulatory cost burden. One important limitation of our proposal is the fact 
that, like the SCM, we are only considering the administrative costs 
without examining the benefits of regulation. Recommendations to 
legislators can only be made if one considers both the costs and the 
benefits. Furthermore, we focus on administrative costs while other types 
of regulatory costs, like substantive compliance costs and financial costs 
are not considered.4 
Future research should be undertaken to develop methods for 
measuring the regulatory benefits and other types of regulatory costs. 
Breaking down costs and benefits to certain groups like large, medium-
sized and small companies would be of particular interest. Small 
companies are perceived to suffer to a larger extent from regulatory 
requirements without having substantial benefits. We also propose doing 
empirical research on our adjustments. A good next step would be 
quantifying the size of the proposed adjustments by using real data in order 
to get an estimate of the importance of our proposal. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF ENTERPRISES:  
Some Critical Remarks 
Kalle Määttä 
 
Abstract 
By administrative costs is meant costs of enterprises resulting from requirements 
to draw up, compile, store and/or submit public agencies or third parties. So-
called Standard Cost Model (SCM) – originally developed in the Netherlands – 
has been in a key position when the amount of administrative burden has been 
quantified. 
However, there are different kinds of loopholes and other drawbacks in the 
measurement of administrative costs. First, only such legal requirements are 
taken into account, which are obligatory to the enterprises. Secondly, taking into 
account this feature of the SCM, it is possible to reach the goals set by the gov-
ernment to reduce administrative burden without reducing the actual cost burden 
of enterprises. Thirdly, not all the costs imposed by the legislation are covered by 
the SCM. Fourthly, many studies have concentrated on administrative costs in 
general, not separately on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). More-
over, transaction costs have been forgotten often in the discussion concerned. 
International studies and proposals have concentrated on the simplification 
and streamlining of legislation in order to reduce the administrative costs of en-
terprises. Even though this approach is difficult to criticise as such, it omits the 
specific position of SMEs, and the potential measures which may be used to 
minimise their relatively large administrative burden. Therefore, so-called legal 
reliefs may be needed: SMEs may be exempted from certain legal obligations or 
at least their obligations may be relieved.  
On the other hand, legal reliefs are not, of course, without problems. One 
problem is threshold effect. Bigger enterprises have an incentive to split their 
activities to smaller firms in order to take advantage of the legal reliefs, or small 
firms do not have incentive to grow since they are confronted with new legal 
obligations. In other words, the purpose is to analyse different kinds of problems 
related to the legal reliefs, and on the other hand, analyse the opportunities to 
solve these problems by legal means.  
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Introduction 
By administrative costs is meant costs of enterprises resulting from 
requirements imposed by law to draw up, compile, store and/or submit to 
public agencies or third parties. Today, European Union has concentrated 
firstly, on the quantification of these costs, and secondly, on the reduction 
of these costs in order to improve the competitiveness of EU and in order 
to guarantee economic growth. Several Member States, like Denmark, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, have taken this task seriously, 
too. Instead, for instance, Finland has still much to be done in this field of 
economic policy. So-called Standard Cost Model (SCM) – originally 
developed in the Netherlands – has been in a key position when the amount 
of administrative burden has been quantified. 
One purpose of this paper is to show how important it is especially for 
SMEs that administrative costs and other regulatory costs imposed by 
legislation, and their reduction would be taken seriously into account both 
in legal and economic policy-making. Or more specifically, the smaller the 
enterprise, the more important this issue is. Another purpose is to analyse 
different kinds of loopholes and other drawbacks in the measurement of 
administrative costs. Moreover, an important approach is to analyse the 
means by which administrative burden may be diminished, and in 
particular the burden of smallest enterprises. Finally, this brief paper may 
show how closely related topics legal and economic policies are with each 
other: on the one hand, many issues in economy are regulated by law, and 
on the other hand, laws have impacts in economy. 
 
 
Some Results about the Administrative Costs of  
Enterprises 
The Netherlands has been a pioneer in measuring the administrative costs 
of enterprises. In recent years, Denmark and Sweden have also devoted 
resources into this task. Moreover, for instance Belgium and Great Britain 
are Member States of EU, which have measured the administrative burden 
of enterprises, at least with respect to certain fields of legislation.1 
Administrative costs imposed by legislation to the enterprises are not 
small figures. These figures have varied in the Member states of EU from 
                                                          
1 See also Commission of the European Communities (2005). 
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1.5 per cent to over 6 per cent in relation to GDP.2 On the other hand, there 
is some uncertainty about the “right” amount of administrative burden of 
enterprises.  
International studies have also shown that tax law, environmental law 
and labour law are the most important sources of administrative costs. Over 
one half the administrative costs are caused by these fields of legislation, 
and approximately so that the two first fields both have generated 
approximately 20 % of these costs and labour law about 10–15 % of these 
costs.3 These figures are based on measurement or estimates made in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
International studies – especially in some European countries – have 
concentrated on administrative costs of enterprises in total. In other words, 
there are only quite few studies which have estimated the administrative 
costs of SMEs. However, it is possible to refer to some results which show 
clearly that the relative administrative burden of small enterprises is much 
larger than that of bigger companies.  
Already studies made during 1990s have shown that administrative 
costs of small enterprises were relatively large. For instance, according to 
German study, administrative burden per employee of micro enterprises 
was over 20 times larger than in large enterprises. Similar kind of study 
from the Netherlands showed that administrative burden per employee was 
six times larger in smaller enterprises than in bigger companies which had 
more than 100 employees.4  
Administrative costs per employee in value-added taxation show very 
well – and drastically – by which way these costs are distributed among 
firms. A reference can be made to a Swedish study. On average, 
administrative costs were 555 crowns per employee and per firm. 
However, this figure shows only one side of the coin. Another side is, of 
course, the distribution of these costs. When it was question about a large 
enterprise – more than 250 employees – administrative costs per employee 
were 9 crowns, but when it was question about micro enterprise, these 
costs were 1.575 crowns. The gap is – by one word – huge.5 On the other 
hand, these figures show that when the policy-making is approaching 
administrative burden of enterprises, SMEs – and especially smallest firms 
– have to be taken separately into account.  
It is also possible to analyse the administrative burden more detailed 
taking into account which kinds of specific legal provisions generate 
                                                          
2 See closer Gelauff & Lejour (2006), 104. See also NUTEK (2004a), 9. 
3 NUTEK (2004a), 8. 
4 SOU 1998:78, 26. 
5 NUTEK (2004b), 12. 
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administrative costs. For instance, the heterogeneity of tax legislation 
across different countries has made it more difficult to small enterprises to 
become important players in foreign trade. Thus, this factor is some kind of 
entry barrier and in particular to the smallest firms.6 Over-regulation is a 
self-evident cause for high administrative costs.7 The regulatory problem is 
– in principle – easy to solve, because under these circumstances fewer 
instruments are sufficient to regulate the social problem. Within this 
context, it has also been discussed about double regulation caused by non-
coordination of national and EC legislation.8 
Moreover, inconsistent definitions in legislation are, of course, a factor 
generating unnecessary administrative costs. For instance, labour law has 
been criticised in Sweden because of this.9 On the other hand, improving 
the consistency of legislation across legal rules, e.g. between tax law and 
other parts of legislation, is one way to reduce administrative burden.10 In 
addition, differentiated VAT rates have caused in practice large 
administrative costs.11 
Certain features of legislation reveal also that the relative administrative 
burden is distributed unevenly among enterprises. First, ex ante regulation 
is often such that the costs generated by it are fixed in nature. In other 
words, for instance the costs of making a plan to promote equality in the 
undertaking are such they are the same irrespective of the size of the 
production or the number of employees. Moreover, against this 
background, the claim that these kinds of costs constitute a market barrier 
for new enterprises is justified.12 What is worth noting too is the threat 
about ‘regulation circle’ due to this kind of entry barriers. This is as such 
leading to the reduction of competition in the markets which may worsen 
the welfare of consumers. This may lead to the tightening of the consumer 
protection law and perhaps other parts of legislation, too; which further 
harms competition since the entry barriers become higher; which may lead 
to stricter and administratively more burdensome legal rules; etc.13  
Another side of the coin concerns mostly ex post regulation. Under 
these circumstances, big companies can make use of the ‘law of big 
number’, while SMEs usually are not well able to self-insure the risks, in 
                                                          
6 See e.g. Cnossen (2002).  
7 NUTEK (2004a). 
8 See also Skr. 2005/06:49, 31. 
9 NUTEK (2004a), 25. 
10 See e.g. Skr. 2005/06:49, 15. 
11 See. e.g. SOU 2005:57, chapter 9, which concerns Swedish VAT system. 
12 See e.g. Haupt (2003), 1163 with respect to the consumer protection law. 
13 Määttä (2006). 
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particular, due to the large damages. Moreover, often third-party-market-
insurance is not obtainable for small enterprises at reasonable cost.14 
Specific legal treatment of small enterprises may be justified still by 
other arguments. From interest group point of view, larger enterprises are 
in a better position than smaller firms in order to affect the content of 
legislation. Several reasons explain this. The starting point is that large 
firms constitute organisations to which only few participators belong, but 
SMEs constitute organisations to which belong plenty of firms. Under 
these circumstances, organisations of large enterprises have smaller 
internal transaction costs. Preferences are also more likely to be similar in 
groups consisting of only few participants. In addition, in smaller groups 
rewards for each firm are bigger. Another side of the coin is that in the 
groups consisting of plenty of firms, they may have incentives to free 
ride.15  
What is finally worth noting is to what extent administrative costs have 
been settled in the preparatory drafts of legislation. Following remarks 
concern Finnish legislation, particularly on the basis of government bills. 
An overview of these preparatory drafts has shown that administrative 
costs of enterprises in general and separately those costs of SMEs have 
been omitted. Instead administrative costs of public sector have been 
emphasised more. This is to some extent paradoxical, because public 
administrative costs are usually much less than private administrative costs. 
In addition, only very few remarks have been made at very general level 
about the relatively large administrative burden of small firms compared 
with bigger companies. In summary, the policy conclusion is clear-cut: 
when new legislation is introduced or existing legislation is amended, 
administrative (and regulatory) costs of private sector have to be studied 
better, and taking into account, too, the uneven distribution of these costs 
among firms.16  
 
 
                                                          
14 See also Haupt (2003), 1163–1164. 
15 See also Olson (1965). 
16 See also Kanniainen & Määttä (2008). 
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Pitfalls in the Measurement of Administrative  
Costs 
Even though it sounds good to cut the administrative costs of enterprises, 
there are quite many pitfalls in this approach.17 First, only such legal 
requirements are taken into account, which are obligatory to the 
enterprises. However, voluntary tasks may generate – and they sometimes 
generate de facto – quite large administrative burden to enterprises. For 
instance, small enterprises are exempted from auditing of the accounts in 
many countries. In practice, however, small enterprises have invested in 
audit even though they do not have any legal obligations to do this, but 
because they may otherwise lose e.g. their right to public grants. Moreover, 
audit is from administrative point of view an important field, since it has 
generated according to international studies approximately 10–15 % of the 
administrative burden of the enterprises. Another example is self-
regulation understood here as “law” formulated by private agencies to 
govern professional and trading activities. Thus, administrative costs of 
self-regulation are not covered by the SCM, and again, the actual total 
administrative burden is larger than the burden measured by SCM. 
Second problem is related to the objectives of reducing administrative 
costs. Taking into account the above-mentioned feature of SCM, it is 
possible to reach the goals without reducing the actual administrative 
burden of enterprises. This may occur e.g. by moving from traditional 
regulation to self-regulation, or by exempting small enterprises from legal 
obligations, which are not actual exemptions. Another kind of problem is 
created by the fact, if different goals are set ex ante to different fields of 
legislation (e.g. reducing administrative costs under tax law by 20 %, as 
well as under environmental law by 20 %). The threat is that the reduction 
of administrative costs does not occur cost-effectively under these 
circumstances.  
Third problem is created by the fact that only administrative costs, but 
not other costs due to the legislation, are taken into account. By the term 
regulatory costs, we refer to the costs covering all the costs to the 
enterprises because of the legislation. For instance, it may be question 
about material costs resulting from requirements that necessitate 
investments in facilities or staff (in addition to administrative costs). 
Environmental law may show well, what kind of problems may emerge if 
we concentrate on administrative costs but omit regulatory costs in general. 
                                                          
17 See also Kanniainen & Määttä (2008). 
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In principle, enterprises should be given choice as to how to meet the 
environmental goals, since that encourages innovations and it is also more 
costs-effective than alternative solution. However, the benefits of such less 
interventionist measures might be outweighed by the costs of administering 
them. On the other hand, if. e.g. a standard compels the enterprise to 
employ certain production methods or materials, administrative costs are 
low. However, this kind of standard induces technological rigidity, etc., 
generating major social welfare losses. In summary, concentrating only on 
the minimisation of the administrative costs may lead to the increase in 
other regulatory costs. And at worst, the regulatory costs in total may 
become larger than otherwise. This result is far away from the aim of the 
SCM: improving the competitiveness and economic growth. What is worth 
noting still is that research in the United States has concentrated more on 
the measurement of regulatory costs, not only on administrative costs.18 
Fourth problem of many studies is that they have concentrated on 
administrative costs of business in general, not separately on small and/or 
medium-sized enterprises. This is very important, since the relative 
administrative costs of small firms seem to be much bigger than the 
relative administrative costs of large firms (e.g. in relation to the number of 
employees). What is worth noting still is that SCM facilitates that the 
administrative costs are measured separately, e.g. according to the size of 
the enterprises. 
Fifthly, when international discussion has concentrated on 
administrative costs, transaction costs have been forgotten – at least – to 
some extent. Nevertheless, transaction costs work also like friction in 
business. Moreover, a realistic assumption here is that the relative burden 
of transaction costs of small firms is larger than this burden of big 
companies. In addition, it is not sufficient that the minimisation of 
transaction costs is emphasised under property and contract law, but that 
the issue would be analysed more specifically.19 
On the other hand, what is of great importance is that the saving of 
administrative costs may cause an increase in the transaction costs, and this 
increase may be larger than the saving of costs. Therefore, the net result 
would be in the economy negative. This may occur simply if each 
customer should settle separately the properties of the product, i.e. this 
could be many times more expensive than if the enterprise would collect 
and publish the information needed. 
                                                          
18 See e.g. Crain (2005). 
19 See also Cooter & Ulen (2004), 91–96. 
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One potential pitfall in the measurement of administrative costs is that 
the research takes into account only certain fields of legislation, such as tax 
law, environmental law and labour law. Under these circumstances, one 
problem is that administrative costs imposed by other parts of legislation 
may increase drastically, but they are outside of the SCM results. 
Moreover, sometimes certain legal provisions may be removed from the 
legal fields studied by the SCM, but they are replaced by other legal 
provisions in other fields of the legislation. An instance for this is tax 
subsidies which may be replaced by direct subsidies to enterprises. From 
this point of view, if the analysis of administrative costs is not 
comprehensive, there is threat that these costs may not decrease in total 
even though SCM may show something else. 
Still one issue is worth noting, and it is best characterised by a brief 
question: how easy should it be to get business licence? If only 
administrative costs are taken into account, the procedure should be as 
simple as possible in order to minimise the administrative costs. But other 
costs have to be taken into account here, too. They are, in particular, 
expected error costs, i.e. those persons getting licence who have not at all 
qualifications for the business. Thus, the regulatory problem is not how to 
minimise the administrative costs but how to minimise the sum of the 
administrative and expected error costs.20  
 
 
Simplification of Legislation or Legal Reliefs for  
SMEs?  
International studies and proposals have concentrated on the simplification 
and streamlining of legislation in order to reduce administrative costs of 
enterprises. Even though this approach is difficult to criticise as such, it 
omits the specific position of SMEs, and the potential measures which may 
be used in order to minimise their administrative burden. What is worth 
noting here are so-called legal reliefs: SMEs may be exempted from certain 
legal obligations or at least their obligations may be relieved.21  
But first, for instance, should we simplify legislation by removing 
certain provisions from legislation? To some extent, a ‘warning’ example 
has been Danish corporate law in this respect. This act was written shorter, 
                                                          
20 See, however, Skr. 2005/06:49, 16.  
21 On the other hand, tax subsidies may be enacted for SMEs but this option is omitted 
from this paper. However, in OECD countries this kind of alternative is in any case quite 
common. 
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but on the other hand, many relevant questions were left unanswered in the 
legislation. Thus, this kind of simplification would increase problems of 
interpretation and thereby administrative burden.22 In addition, one self-
evident remark is that administrative burden may not decrease – but at 
worst increase – if removed legal provisions are replaced by other legal 
provisions.  
In any case, simplifying legislation may be a good means to reduce rent 
seeking. And this may reduce administrative costs for, at least, two 
reasons. First, law would not involve anymore so many exceptions, like 
exemptions, which are sources of interpretation problems. Secondly, there 
would not be anymore so many amendments in legislation, which further 
reduces the administrative burden and also legal uncertainty. 
In practice, legal system involves already nowadays different kinds of 
legal reliefs.23 On the other hand, what is worth noting is that they are not 
directed at SMEs in total but usually to smaller enterprises. Differences are 
reflected by the fact that reliefs are e.g. linked to the number of employees in 
the firm, sometimes to the turnover of the enterprise, and sometimes to the 
start-up stage of the firm.24 And still, for instance the critical number of 
employees may vary from one law to another. An instance of this is Finnish 
Act on Co-operation within Undertakings (725/1978) and on the other hand, 
Act on Equality between Women and Men (609/1986). The former act is 
applied to undertakings normally employing at least 20 persons, whereas the 
latter act is applied – concerning the obligation to make a plan to promote 
equality – to undertakings normally employing at least 30 persons.  
Some further examples about legal reliefs for SMEs may be mentioned. 
Certain obligations of firms are continuous in nature. For instance, firms 
have to pay value-added tax every month in Finland. Under these 
circumstances, legal reliefs are easily implemented by lengthening the 
period of time in which small firms have to fulfil this obligation. In 
Sweden, enterprises have advocated this kind of regulatory option already 
during 1990s.25 Sometimes the legal reliefs have been implemented so that 
the law covers only corporations and other legal persons but not natural 
persons. An instance of this is Finnish Environmental Damage Insurance 
Act (81/1998). 
Even though legal reliefs for SMEs can be justified in order to reduce 
the administrative burden of SMEs, they are not, of course, without 
                                                          
22 See also HE 109/2005 vp. 
23 In principle, outlining legal reliefs is similar task than to outline tax expenditures (or 
tax subsidies) from tax legislation. 
24 See further Kanniainen & Määttä (2008). 
25 SOU 1998:78, 38. 
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problems. Let’s start by the exemption of small firms from value-added 
tax. In Finland, the exemption has covered only enterprises with turnover 
below 8.500 euros. It is easy to see immediately that this kind of legal 
relief concerns only hobbies rather than economic life. On the other hand, 
in Great Britain the level of turnover threshold is much higher and 
approximately two million firms fall there below the threshold.26  
Another problem due to the legal reliefs may be called threshold effect. 
It has at least two ‘faces’. First, bigger enterprises have an incentive to split 
their activities to smaller firms in order to take advantage of legal reliefs. 
However, this kind of impact should not be exaggerated. Legislator may 
require – and often does – that small enterprises should be independent 
from each other in order to get the right to legal relief. Another expression 
of threshold effect is that small firms do not have incentive to grow since 
they are confronted with new legal obligations. One way to mitigate the 
threshold effect here – as well as above – is that the threshold varies across 
legislation, as it does in practice for instance in Finland.  
Third problem related to the legal reliefs concerns the interpretation of 
legal rules. In particular, it is inevitable that borderline problems emerge in 
determining whether the enterprise belongs to the scope of the relief or not. 
Problems of interpretation may be reduced by detailed – not flexible – 
legislation. On the other hand, detailed legal rules may have drawbacks, 
too. First, detailed rules do not take into account individual circumstances 
in which small firms have to act. Second, detailed rules become easily 
outdated requiring, thus, that they have to be amended. And amendments 
involve administrative costs as well as legal uncertainty. Moreover, 
detailed rules may provide – at least sometimes – incentives to 
inappropriate measures to circumvent the law. On the other hand, flexible 
legal rules may generate problems of their own. First, it takes time before 
the final decision has been made in court, especially if the decision has to 
be made in the Supreme Court. Moreover, costs of the legal process may 
be a threshold for small firms to go the court. In summary, this brief 
analysis shows that there is not at all such thing as perfect law and the 
selection has to occur between imperfect options.  
Fourth problem confronted with is the under- or over-inclusiveness of 
legal reliefs. Sometimes reliefs are provided to the firms, which do not 
need for them, and sometimes firms, which may need for reliefs fall 
outside of them. Targeting problems should be taken into account seriously 
since according to the studies made e.g. in the United States regulatory 
                                                          
26 See e.g. Kanniainen & Määttä (2008). 
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costs of industry are approximately and on average two times larger that 
similar costs of service sector.27  
Targeting may become a problem in the longer run, too. In particular, 
turnover-related reliefs are problematic since their ‘threshold value’ 
decreases under inflationary circumstances. Thus, there may emerge a need 
for ‘inflationary corrections’ in order to keep the real value of the threshold 
value unchanged. Another solution would be to link turnover-related reliefs 
to some price index. However, latter mentioned policy option has not 
worked well e.g. under consumption taxation.28  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Even though Standard Cost Method has been useful in analysing the 
amount of the administrative costs of firms, it has still many pitfalls. For 
instance, it takes into account only such legal requirements to enterprises, 
which are formally obligatory to the enterprises, but on the other hand, it 
omits such requirements, which are not formally but actually obligatory to 
firms. From this point of view, the results of SCM are too small in relation 
to the actual administrative burden. 
Moreover, administrative costs are not all the costs imposed by the 
legislation to enterprises. So-called regulatory costs have to be taken into 
account completely, if the purpose is to outline the actual burden imposed 
by legislation to enterprises. This is also compatible with the aims of SCM: 
to improve the competitiveness of EU and to guarantee economic growth. 
Particularly in Europe studies have concentrated on administrative costs 
of enterprises in total. Even though this approach is needed also in the 
future, more resources should be devoted to the analysis of administrative 
burden of SMEs separately. The main reason is simple: administrative 
burden seems to be very unevenly distributed among firms. 
In addition, if the position of smallest enterprises is attempted to be 
corrected, only simplifying and streamlining legislation is not sufficient. 
Political and research interest should be directed more at the legal reliefs 
for small firms.  
 
 
                                                          
27 See also Crain (2000). 
28 See e.g. OECD (1988). 
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UTILIZATION OF LEGAL MONITORING IN  
LAW-DRAFTING 
Larisa Vdovichenko 
 
Legal monitoring is a new technology of an active analysis of legislation 
and of legal enforcement practices, forecasting and planning of the 
development of law-making process. Monitoring of legislation and of legal 
enforcement practices forms an integral part of the system of law-drafting, 
allowing constructing the whole legislative process on a transparent, 
fundamental legal basis. Legal monitoring has great value in a federal state, 
where federal and regional legislations are applied simultaneously. Legal 
monitoring is presently required as a factor unifying the legislative and 
legal enforcement activities of federal and regional bodies of power.  
The discussion about the role of legislative monitoring in Russia and in 
some other countries as for example Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
demonstrated the interest on this new form of empirical studies of the 
policy process. Legal monitoring is an effective means of analysis of 
policy-making process. It helps detect weaknesses in the mechanism of 
state policy implementation and determine legislation’s critical and 
problems points. 
 
 
1 Introduction: what was the original situation 
in law-drafting before the implementation of  
legal monitoring 
At the beginning of XXI century legislation system in Russian Federation 
was in transition. From one side it has new democratic Constitution 
adopted in 1993 and many adopted legal acts in different branches of legal 
regulation.  
But there were many substantive problems that law-drafters couldn’t 
resolve in law-making process such as: 
- low legislation’s quality and inadequate efficiency of legal ground 
work; 
- weaknesses in the mechanism of state policy implementation; 
- many legislation’s critical and problems points; 
- low observance of citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms 
practice and so on. 
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Some law-drafters and scientific experts who analyzed legislation 
understood that it was necessary to elaborate new approach to the law-
making process, to create new groundwork of the legal practice. One of 
these new approaches was named “monitoring of legislation and of legal 
enforcement practice” (herewith, legal monitoring). The subject of my 
article is not devoted to the history of appearance of this term and its 
development. It could be the contents of another article or book. I’ll try to 
show some results of this long track of legal monitoring. 
In 2004 legal monitoring was proposed as an efficient tool of improving 
law-drafting process1. An essential role in coordination of legal monitoring 
activity was played by the Council of Federation – the high chamber of the 
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.  
 
 
2 Definition of legal monitoring 
Legal monitoring is a new technology of an active analysis of legislation 
and of legal enforcement practices, forecasting and planning of the 
development of law-making process. It forms an integral part of the system 
of law-drafting, allowing constructing the whole legislative process on a 
transparent, fundamental legal basis. 
It is called to synchronize legislative activity at the federal and regional 
levels of the Russian Federation. Such an approach to the process of law-
drafting is becoming a vital condition of improvement of the quality of 
legislation. It helps to consolidate efforts by state bodies and civil society 
institutes in securing human and civil rights and freedoms. It completes 
interdisciplinary political, legal and managerial studies at a modern level. 
 
 
3 Methodological base of legal monitoring 
Novelty of the technology of legal monitoring has methodological and 
organizational aspects. Methodological base of legal monitoring 
compounds complex of methods of analysis of adopted laws and practice 
of its implementation, of developing projects of law and planning of law 
activity. Legal monitoring is based on the principles of targeted program 
and long-term planning. 
                                                 
1 Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Report “On 
the State of Legislation in the Russian Federation” (2004). Moscow: Council of 
Federation (Published in Russian). 2006. 
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After the appearance of the idea of legal monitoring it was necessary to 
elaborate more sophisticated methods to solve new tasks. Monitoring as a 
systematic analysis, control and forecast law-drafting involves choosing a 
system of indicators and indices allowing determining the quality of laws 
and degree of its implementation. 
Continuous monitoring is required for the following purposes:  
1. To determine the quality of laws from the point of its impact on the 
quality of life of people, from the social, economic, political and 
other consequences of its implementation, from its accordance with 
others adopted laws and so on; 
2. To find the most efficient methods of data collection of legal 
monitoring and to clarify the procedures of their analysis; 
3. To receive information on efficiency of implementation of adopted 
laws, on the basis of which to work out and to introduce some 
changes into legal strategy and programmes of law-drafting.  
 
Methods of analysis of adopted laws and practice of its implementation are 
oriented to give useful information for good orientation of current law-
drafting process (Find below Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Goals of monitoring of laws and legal enforcement practice 
1. to select the laws 
which don’t operate, 
or operate poorly, or 
impede the full 
implementation of 
other laws or 
subordinate laws 
2. to determine 
causes why this 
or that law does 
not right operate 
normally 
 
3. to track the 
dynamics of selected 
object (law or unit of 
laws) and its 
integration in the 
sphere of legal 
regulation 
4. to receive 
representative 
results that may be 
used in law-
drafting and law 
enforcement, in 
managerial and 
law-protection 
activities 
1.1 determination of 
the real needs of 
society in the sphere 
of operation of 
selected laws 
2.1 changing of 
legislative sphere 
for the purposes of 
adjusting it to the 
state of actual 
affairs of the 
society 
3.1 determination of 
the place of selected 
object of monitoring in 
the legal system by its 
sphere of operation 
4.1 control of the 
attainment of the 
planned social 
results in legal 
enforcement 
practice 
1.2 determination of 
parameters which 
could evaluate 
existing situation to 
the desirable one 
designated by 
monitoring specialists 
2.2 improvement 
of laws by taking 
account of social 
consequences of 
its implementation 
3.2 identification of 
the place and role of 
the object of 
monitoring in the 
system of regulation of 
social relations 
 
4.2 predictions of 
unfavourable 
consequences of 
implementation of 
prescriptions of law 
 2.3 elaboration of 
proposals aimed 
to improve the 
existing 
legislation 
3.3 choice of 
indicators of 
evaluation of legal acts 
from social, juristic 
and other positions 
4.3 forecasting of 
law-drafting 
development 
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4 Organizational base of legal monitoring 
Organizational base of legal monitoring is based on two types of 
potential subjects of legal monitoring: official and public (Find below 
Table 2). Word “potential” means that named institutions and organizations 
could carry out legal monitoring but some of them don’t use such 
possibilities just now. 
Among official subjects of legal monitoring we could cite such 
institutions: legislative (representative) bodies of national (federal) state 
power; Government, Ministries and State agencies; legislative 
(representative) bodies of regional state power; Accounts chambers; 
Agencies of prosecutors; Constitutional, Arbitration and other courts; 
Human rights commissioners. 
Potential public subjects of legal monitoring are: independent public 
associations; scientific organizations (for example Institutes of sociological 
researches); Universities (especially judicial and sociological Faculties); 
special Centres of legal monitoring; Public chambers. In the end every 
citizen has the right to analyse laws and its implementation and to address 
his proposals haw to improve legislative practice to official and public 
institutions. 
 
Table 2 Potential subjects of legal monitoring 
Official 
 
Public 
Legislative (representative) bodies of  
national (federal) state power 
 
Independent public associations 
 
Government, ministries and state  
agencies 
 
Scientific organizations (for example  
Institutes of sociological researches) 
 
Legislative (representative) bodies of  
regional state power 
Universities (especially judicial and  
sociological Faculties) 
 
Accounts chambers Special Centres of legal monitoring 
 
Agencies of prosecutors 
 
Public chambers 
Constitutional, Arbitration and other  
courts 
 
Political parties 
 
Human rights commissioners Bodies of municipal service 
 
 
 
Researches conducted in the context of legal monitoring should have a 
uniform or comparative organizational base. This requires special efforts to 
coordinate methodical support of these researches.  
Organizing monitoring of specific law, it is important to clearly 
determine those groups and communities regarding whom the bodies of 
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power should choose a different strategy of conduct (informational, 
control, of social support, of collaboration, and so forth). 
When organizing legal monitoring, it is necessary also to solve the 
problem of support such activity by state power and local administration. 
Conducting legal monitoring should study real state of legislation with 
consideration of the schedule of law-drafting efforts and of particular 
features of the social and economic situation in the region. 
 
 
5 Theory and practice of choosing parameters  
 of legal monitoring 
The main problem in organizing and conducting monitoring was to define 
indicators and indices which could be used to qualify rating of laws and its 
implementation. The other problem was to find initial data necessary for 
determination of the absolute value of selected indicators and indices. 
Legal monitoring was seen as an effective means of analysis policy-making 
process. It could help to detect weaknesses in the mechanism of state 
policy implementation and determine legislation’s critical and problems 
points. The monitoring results could allow presenting a list of demands for 
the modern legislative process. It is insufficient to simply develop a draft 
law or adopt relevant legislation; it is very important to foresee the actual 
mechanism of its implementation, and the consequences of its 
enforcement. The general theoretical idea of legal monitoring is to a large 
degree grounded on the assumption of social welfare maximization as the 
primary objective of law enforcement. Legal monitoring is aimed to the 
improvement of the mechanism of responsibility of state power and local 
administration for the existing social relations. 
As an example, in the Tomsk Oblast of the Russian Federation the 
process of monitoring is based on more than 300 indicators and indices 
grouped into two basic units: 
1. Indicators of attainment of goals of development of the Oblast and 
indices of fulfilment of tasks, their forecast values which it is 
necessary to reach by 2010; 
2. Dynamics of indices characterizing the expected results of 
implementation of the basic directions of regional policy for social 
and economic development of the Oblast. 
 
Most indicators and indices of legal monitoring (two thirds) are results of 
research and sociological surveys; one third is the data of public statistics. 
Monitoring surveys are carried out: 2,000 small business entities, the 
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sample being formed on the territorial cross-section and for economic 
activities, organization and legal forms (small enterprises, entrepreneurs, 
farms); 200 middle and large enterprises, a sample is also formed with 
taking account of distribution by municipal and urban districts of the 
Oblast and by economic activities; 3,200 households (8 thousand people) 
in the territorial cross-section. 
More than 500 various enterprises, organizations and agencies are 
additionally surveyed for the purpose of monitoring (potential participants 
of clusters, insurance, consulting and financial organizations, leading 
investment institutions). 
Each region (its state power institutions) determines the number of 
controlled indicators and indices: thus, in Tomsk Oblast there are 321 of 
them, in the Republic of Tatarstan 326. Choosing of indicators and indices 
depends on its value in quality rating of law and its implementation. In 
every region there are specific problems appearing in implementation of 
regional laws. That’s why regional institutions conducting monitoring used 
different indicators. 
Some of them note the inconsistency of indices calculated by public 
statistical authorities and information submitted by enterprises and 
organizations. Many statistical indices at the moment of conducting 
monitoring are preliminary and consider revising later. Moreover, in their 
calculation the methodology of «additional counting» is used.  
For a more efficient implementation of a system of continuous 
monitoring by performance indicators in constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation it is advisable:  
1) To ensure the working out of a single conceptual document 
determining the strategic landmarks and the role of each of the 
regions (a group of regions at least) in the long-term development of 
the Russian Federation; 
2) To organize the working out and approval of procedures of 
information exchange between bodies of state power of constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation and federal territorial bodies of 
the Federal Tax Service and the Bureau of Public Statistics in the 
sphere of exchange of operational information on payments to 
Oblast and local budgets of all levels. 
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6 Sociological monitoring of legislation and law  
 enforcement  
Numerous problems in the sphere of legislation and law enforcement have 
brought about an objective need in sociological monitoring of legislation 
and law enforcement. The practice of legal monitoring has shown the 
multiple aspects of the existing problems and has raised the importance of 
their multidimensional sociological analysis. For these purposes in 2008–
2009 the Russian sociological service «Barometer» jointly with the Centre 
of Legal Monitoring under the Council of Federation of the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation conducted a number of sociological 
surveys2. Participants of these surveys compounded: representatives of 
executive, legislative, judicial power (federal and regional), other 
participants of political process (non-governmental organisations), experts 
and scientists.  
Some scientific Institutes of Russian Academy of Science (Institute of 
Sociology, Institute of Social-Political Researches) conduct their own 
independent sociological surveys where they use blocs of questions about 
estimation by population and experts law-making activities. The main task 
is the raising of quality of laws as a most important integral index of law 
making activity. 
Studying the quality of law enforcement activities and the level of legal 
awareness of people implies carrying out of its complex examination. Of 
special interest here is public examination of legislation that may be 
conducted with the help of such sociological methods of research (Find 
below Table 3). 
 
                                                 
2 Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Report “On 
the State of Legislation in the Russian Federation”. Moscow: Council of Federation, 
2009, 203–205.  
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Table 3 Methods of sociological monitoring of laws and legal enforcement practice 
Expert survey Public opinion poll  
 
Focus group 
 
survey of specialists able 
to express a competent, 
professional opinion on 
the issues in which 
researchers are interested 
 
interviewing and (or) 
questioning of 
respondents sampled from 
the general population of 
subjects of legal regulation 
on the basis of the 
methodology of 
probabilistic or quota 
sampling; an analysis and 
generalization of the 
obtained data 
 
discussion in a small but 
sufficiently representative 
group of people who are 
ordinary participants of 
regulated social relations 
An expert’s questionnaire 
should be designed for 
collecting information on 
the condition of the social 
relations, contradictions 
and gaps in their legal 
regulations, on drawbacks 
in the mechanisms for law 
implementation. 
 
A questionnaire for 
respondents should be 
designed for collecting 
information on public 
opinion oriented toward 
study relations of people to 
laws, regulatory legal acts. 
 
Preparation of a scenario 
for discussion should be 
designed for studying 
relations of people to laws, 
regulatory legal acts and 
problems of legal 
enforcement. 
 
The first part of the 
questionnaire should be 
oriented toward collection 
of objectively established 
information. 
The first part of the 
questionnaire should be 
oriented toward studying 
people’s appreciations of 
laws, regulatory legal acts. 
The conduct of discussion 
should be oriented to the 
questions under research. 
 
The second part should be 
oriented toward study of 
evaluations, stances, 
preferences, awareness and 
points of view of public 
civil servants and servants 
of municipal bodies of 
power. 
The second part should be 
oriented toward study of 
people’s appreciations of 
law enforcement activities 
of bodies of state and 
municipal power. 
 
 
 
 
Sociological monitoring of legislation and law enforcement allows 
analyzing wide range of problems in different spheres of legislation aimed 
to identify socially important tasks needed to be solved primarily. But 
sociological research in the context of legal monitoring has its special 
features differing from the other sociological studies (Find below Table 4). 
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Table 4 Stages of sociological research (in context of legal monitoring) 
The first stage of 
sociological monitoring 
 
The second stage of 
sociological monitoring 
 
The third stage of 
sociological monitoring 
 
work out a strategy of 
conducting sociological 
research 
 
determination of the 
priority laws and problems 
which need continuous 
monitoring 
 
analysis and synthesis of 
the materials received in the 
second stage of monitoring 
and in current practices 
formalization of the stages 
of monitoring 
 
 
choice of laws in the social 
sphere as an object of 
research 
 
determination of limits of 
intrusion in the existing 
mechanisms of social 
regulation 
coordination and 
methodical support of 
sociological research 
conducting public polls 
 
forecasting of the 
development of legal 
enforcement practice 
 carrying out of expert 
surveys 
 
forecasting of the 
development of legislation 
 focus group’s researches 
 
 
elaboration of proposals 
haw to develop the 
legislation in the future 
 collection of data about 
relations of people to the 
quality of legal regulation 
 
 including received data into 
a uniform database 
 
 
 
Analytic forms of monitoring of quality of legislation include:  
- departmental examination with the help of such expertises as 
judicial, anticorruptional, economical, ecological and so on (as 
usual, conducted by state institutions); 
- scientific examination with help of such methods of research as an 
expert survey and a focus group; 
- public examination of legislation with help of public opinion polls.  
 
By the results of the conducted surveys3, only insignificant part of 
respondents estimated the quality of laws being passed sufficiently high. 
To the contrary, on the average each second of those interrogated gave a 
critical evaluation. Almost each second of the interrogated considered that 
in this sphere there were no positive changes, or the situation worsened. 
The quality of laws being passed was undoubtedly determined primarily by 
the state of the law making process. The practice showed that there were 
                                                 
3 Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Report “On 
the State of Legislation in the Russian Federation”. Moscow: Council of Federation, 
2009, 203. 
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many unsolved problems, and the results of the conducted surveys proved 
this fact. There were generally critical evaluations of the modern law 
making process. 
Participants of the conducted surveys offered a number of various 
measures to improve the law-making process. A considerable preference 
was given to elaboration of legal strategy of development of Russia, and to 
improvement of the quality of laws as a most important priority, and this 
was done purposefully. According to each second of respondents, the 
quality of laws and improvement of law-drafting were not within the main 
priorities of the state policy. 
By the results of surveys, only the activities of the President received 
the positive index (predominance of positive evaluations over negative 
ones). The law-making activities of the State Duma, federal and regional 
bodies of executive power were evaluated most critically. At the same time 
it should be underlined that it was difficult for a considerable part of the 
participants of the surveys to evaluate the law-making activities of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Arbitration 
Court of the Russian Federation. 
Cooperation of bodies of executive, legislative, judicial power and 
other participants of law-making activities gains special importance in 
today’s conditions. At the same time, by the results of surveys, this 
partnership has not been properly developed. One of the reasons is that far 
from all subjects of law-making activities take active participation in the 
improvement of the legislation.  
To improve the legislation, enhance its quality, of principal importance 
today is the changing role and significance of the parliamentary 
institutions. According to the surveys, there occur contradictory 
evaluations of their activities. Along with the acknowledgement of the 
positive tendencies, not a small part of respondents stated the lessening role 
and importance of the parliamentary institutions in the improvement of the 
quality of legislation. Mostly these evaluations refer to the activities of the 
State Duma. 
The legal support of complex nation-wide objectives should play an 
important role in the implementation of the legal strategy in the sphere of 
law-making. One of the priority objectives of the legislator in this respect 
is the legal support of the implementation of national projects. According 
to the surveys, the level of their legal support was estimated on the whole 
as critical. The most critical was the estimation of the legal support of the 
priority national projects «Development of Agricultural complex», and 
especially «Affordable and comfortable housing to citizens of Russia».  
 
 259
 
7 Some results of sociological impact in legal  
 monitoring 
Nowadays the problem of correlating the legislation with these or those 
social criteria become more relevant. According to the surveys, in the first 
place draft laws should be evaluated in terms of the implementation of the 
constitutional obligation of the state in observance and protection of 
human and civil rights and liberties, the constitutional provisions on the 
assurance of worthy human life, fight with corruption, strengthening of the 
unity of the country, the development of Russia as a federal state. 
The modern state of human measurement of the legislation makes a 
task of reorientation of all subjects of the initiative toward 
acknowledgement, observance, and protection of human and civil rights 
and liberties in the Russian society extremely relevant. By the results of the 
surveys, the legislation in terms of the support of human and civil rights 
and liberties in the Russian society is generally evaluated critically. At the 
same time the corresponding activities of the parliamentary institutions are 
generally critically evaluated. The necessity of improving the legislation 
urgently requires a more active use of the abilities of the civil society. 
Legal monitoring is called upon to become an efficient form of dialogue of 
the authorities and the society.  
There are many unsolved issues in this sphere. By the results of 
surveys, social institutions participate poorly in the improvement of the 
legislation. The cooperation of parliamentary institutions and civil society 
institutes is not being properly developed. There are no efficient legal 
mechanisms of cooperation of the powers and the society. Accounting of 
interests of various social forces in law-making is becoming prominently 
important. According to the respondents, paramount significance will gain 
such phenomena: active participation in law making of civil society 
institutes, great openness of the law making process, development of 
mechanism of feedback of legislators with people, accounting of public 
opinion in law-making process, raising the number of subjects of 
legislative initiative and so on. 
The mechanism of participation of the Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation in the improvement of the legislation also requires further 
improvement. According to the surveys, current activity of the Public 
Chamber is evaluated critically. At the same time respondents supported 
the idea of adoption of the law «On Public examination» which could wide 
possibilities of the Public Chamber in expertises of laws.  
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The conduct of legal monitoring implies a deep and comprehensive 
analysis of law enforcement. According to the surveys, the state of law 
enforcement at the federal, regional, and especially at the municipal level is 
generally evaluated critically. Only an insignificant part of the interrogated 
(4% to 9%) noted positive changes in this sphere.  
An important role in improving the efficiency of law enforcement could 
play the legislation. High number of drawbacks has a negative impact on 
the state of law enforcement. According to the surveys, respondents noted 
such main causes of this: low quality of draft laws being passed, instability 
of the legislation, underdevelopment of codification of the legislation and 
absence of the full register of regulatory legal acts, insignificant number of 
laws of immediate action, considerable number of obsolete regulatory acts, 
non-compliance of a number of draft laws with the international standards.  
According to the surveys, respondents evaluated generally critically the 
law-enforcement and control activities of bodies of state power on various 
levels. Relatively high they evaluated the law-enforcement activities of the 
President of the Russian Federation and of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation. They have, as evaluated by the respondents, a positive 
index. The most critical was evaluated the law enforcement activities of 
executive power and law-enforcement bodies. 
According to the surveys, the present state of law enforcement requires 
carrying out of a complex of measures: rising of responsibility of law-
enforcement structures for their activities, enhancing of legal awareness of 
people and, above all, official persons, overcoming of legal nihilism 
widespread in the society. Sociological surveys aimed to analyze the 
effectiveness of applicable laws and of the passing of new ones would have 
been greatly important. The raising of the role of the parliamentary 
institutions in controlling executive bodies of power would have principal 
importance for improving efficiency of law enforcement. According to the 
surveys, this role is insignificant, and no major changes toward the better 
are observed. 
The social significance and practical relevancy of legal monitoring 
requires today adoption of complex measures for its qualitative 
development. Certainly, over the recent years there have been some 
noticeable positive tendencies in the development of legal monitoring. By 
the results of the conducted surveys, there is generally a positive tendency. 
Many bodies of state power, scientific institutions, civil society institutes 
and the expert community have demonstrated more attention to legal 
monitoring. Sufficiently interesting initiatives of the ideas for accumulating 
positive experience are arising. In a number of regions legal monitoring 
centres have been set up. The setting up of the Centre of Legislative and 
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Legal Enforcement Monitoring (Centre of Legal Monitoring) under the 
Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 
in 2008 has become the logical conclusion of the entire working stage in 
the sphere of legal monitoring. 
At the same time, the process of establishing the national system of 
legal monitoring is sufficiently complex and contradictory. Positive 
changes taking place in this sphere are not yet base on principle. A number 
of factors are still in effect which hold back the development of legal 
monitoring. These are, above all, organizational, financial, manpower and 
political factors. The mechanism itself of the functioning of legal 
monitoring is far from being streamlined; its legal basis is almost missing. 
By the results of the conducted surveys, it’s very important treatment of 
legal monitoring as an independent trend of the state legal policy, adoption 
at the federal and regional levels of legislative acts on organization and 
conduct of legal monitoring. It’s necessary to keep on working out the 
methodological basis and scientifically justified indicators of the 
effectiveness of legal monitoring, to develop intensively the methods of 
preparing manpower for conduct of legal monitoring, to use actively 
abilities of scientific institutions, civil society institutes, of the expert 
community. It is also important to use international expertise.  
Sociological research as part of legal monitoring carries out the 
function of fast feedback. Under the conditions of contradiction, instability 
of the legislative base, the instability of law enforcement, the general goals 
originally inherent in the law are often deformed. As a result, the real goals 
of law enforcement actions essentially begin to contradict the intentions of 
the legislators, the general provisions fixed in laws, programs and the basic 
directions of the development of the social sphere. 
It should be noted that the openness of the law making process is still 
insufficient. Subjects of the right to initiate legislation and the society have 
no timely and complete information on the draft laws reviewed in the State 
Duma, on the contents of responses and expert opinions. The situation can 
be rectified by setting up a special databank, maintaining a «law file» as 
one of the basic and obligatory forms of monitoring the legislation and law 
enforcement ensuring continuous support of a law from the germination of 
the idea to work it out until its application is ceased. 
Official sources of legal monitoring (documents) are: Federal 
constitutional laws of Russian Federation, Federal laws, Decrees of the 
President of Russian Federation, Resolutions of the Government of Russian 
Federation, laws of constituent entities of Russian Federation, others legal 
acts and documents. 
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Legal monitoring could be understood as a system of actions aimed to 
achieve not only a formally juristic but also social result. Information 
obtained by legal monitoring is required not only for a juristic but also for 
economic and social analysis.  
The development of legal monitoring system could help create a new 
model of state administration, open to institutes of civil society, 
business, social groups, clear to every citizen, and based on fruitful 
cooperation between the individual, society and the state. 
 
 
8 Conclusions: achieved results and  
 perspective  
Over the past decade, a passage has been made from a theoretical 
justification of the idea of legal monitoring, to attempts of practical 
implementation of its system in Russian Federation. The institution of legal 
monitoring as an inevitable stage in the process of improvement of 
legislative system has gained some recognition. Up until presently the 
experience of monitoring laws on the federal and regional levels of the 
Russian Federation has been accumulated, which allows of making certain 
generalizations and conclusions. The results of such monitoring are 
summarized and it’s analysis in comparative with the current practices 
shows that this institution should develop at a sufficiently firm 
methodological basis and find its place in the legal system. Only upon this 
condition it is possible to receive representative results that may be used 
both in law making and in law enforcement activities. 
The last six years Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation published annual reports “Legislative groundwork for 
the principal directions of domestic and foreign policy”. These reports 
were prepared on the base and crucial results of legal monitoring in 
corresponding years. 
Not long ago special department of legal monitoring was created in the 
Ministry of Justice of Russian Federation. 
Legal monitoring of federal law stimulated the creation of regional 
analysis systems. Regional bodies of state power also joined this process. 
A growing number of regional parliaments created their own monitoring 
services and presenting the results of their work in the form of public 
reports (approximately 30). These reports analyzed federal legislation and 
the legislation of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation from the 
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standpoint of quality of the legal groundwork in different spheres of law-
drafting.4 
All these results of monitoring of legislation (federal and regional) 
made some contribution in improving law-drafting and legal enforcement. 
Legal monitoring experts identified a series of substantive problems that 
law-drafters must still resolve. They analyzed federal legislation and the 
legislation of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation from the 
standpoint of quality of the legal groundwork. 
But named results don’t indicate that all methodological and 
organizational problems were been solved. New, more effective methods 
of expertise (especially judicial, humanitarian, anticorruptional, 
economical, ecological and so on) are still in process. Some of named 
potential subjects of monitoring didn’t become real subjects. Public 
organisations (parties, different movements and others) don’t jet monitor 
situation in legislation. Many state institutions (especially in regions) don’t 
jet understand main advantages of legal monitoring and ignore this practice 
in their work as a hole and in law-drafting in particular. 
Serious problem with financing of sociological support of legal 
monitoring has remained before now. The question is about financing 
public opinion polls , expert survey and research of focus groups. It’s 
necessary also to help development of scientific and public examination of 
laws and its implementation by methods legal monitoring.  
Legal monitoring aims to become an essential mean of regulatory 
impact on the law-making process and legal enforcement practice. The 
monitoring results allowed to create a single database of legislative practice 
and to make important conclusions. It is insufficient to simply develop law-
drafting or adopt relevant legislation; it is also essential to foresee the 
actual mechanism for its implementation, and envision the consequences of 
its enforcement. 
Legal monitoring creates a single database for comparative studies of 
results of previously adopted conclusions and recommendations in 
different spheres of socio-economic development inside the country and 
international relations. The development of legal monitoring system could 
help to create a new model of state administration, open to institutes of 
civil society, business, social groups, clear to every citizen, and based on 
fruitful cooperation between the individual, society and the state. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Report “On 
the State of Legislation in the Russian Federation (2008, 2009). Moscow: Council of 
Federation. 2009, 2010. 
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DEVELOPING CONSUMER PROTECTION OF 
AIR PASSENGERS WITH REDUCED MOBILITY 
IN THE EU 
Stakeholder Preferences for Regulatory Choices 
Minna Ollikainen  
 
The paper provides an overview of the consumer protection of air 
passengers with reduced mobility in the EU as well as an update of current 
developments regarding their rights. The paper discusses stakeholders’ 
regulatory preferences regarding the consumer protection of air passengers 
with reduced mobility in the EU, how European Commission proposals 
and resulting legislation take these preferences into account, and also how 
key stakeholders’ positions have developed over the past decade. This 
small case study analyses the views of key stakeholders in three 
consultations. These indicative results show that the Commission and its 
right of initiative have had a decisive role in forming the passenger rights 
and that the European Disability Forum has been very efficient in lobbying 
for the rights of passengers with reduced mobility. Airline and airport 
organisations have learned to better accept legislative measures to protect 
passengers with reduced mobility. Once made public in the latter part of 
2010, the contributions for the Commission’s latest public consultation on 
air passenger rights will provide an update on whether this trend continues. 
  
Disclaimer: The author is an official of the European Parliament. The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the European Parliament. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The number of people in the European Union (EU) directly affected by 
some form of disability is estimated at around 10% of the total population 
(COM (2000) 284 p. 4). The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999 introduced new EU competencies in consumer protection (Article 169 
of the Lisbon Treaty) and discrimination (Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty). 
Article 10 states that in defining and implementing its policies and 
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activities, the EU shall, among other criteria, aim to combat discrimination 
based on disability.  
As the air transport sector was the first to undergo liberalisation, the 
Commission put forward the first legislative proposals to ensure passenger 
rights. Since 2000, the Commission has been active in drafting initiatives 
and proposals to promote passenger rights, beginning with air transport and 
the rights of travellers with reduced mobility. In addition, some passenger 
rights in the EU stem from international law, such as the Montreal 
Convention of 1999 on air transport. 
Over past decade, the European Commission has actively used public 
consultations both in preparing new policies and legislation on air 
passenger rights as well as in assessing existing laws. In recent years, the 
European Commission has also introduced impact assessments in its 
legislative proposals. In this small case study, the results of three 
consultations will serve to analyse key stakeholders’ preferences for 
regulatory choices in the protection of passengers with reduced mobility. 
 
 
2 Objective 
The paper aims analyse key stakeholders’ preferences for regulatory 
choices in the protection of air passenger with reduced mobility in the EU 
during the past decade and to discuss the results achieved with the 
combination of regulatory choices and techniques adopted thus far. The 
key stakeholders studied include the European Commission, airlines and 
airports as well as disability organisations. On the basis of Commission 
documents and position papers presented by other stakeholders, the case 
study aims to determine the preferences of key stakeholders in 
guaranteeing the rights of passengers with reduced mobility: Who should 
regulate and how? 
 
 
3 Stakeholder preferences regarding who  
 should regulate and how 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997, pp. 853–854) define a stakeholder as any 
person or organization who can be positively or negatively impacted by or 
cause an impact on the actions of a company, government, or organization. 
Types of stakeholders are: 
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- Primary stakeholders, who are those ultimately affected – either 
positively or negatively – by an organization’s actions; 
- Secondary stakeholders, or ‘intermediaries’ (i.e., persons or 
organizations indirectly affected by an organization's actions); 
- Key stakeholders, who have significant influence on or importance 
within an organization. They can be either primary or secondary 
stakeholders. 
 
In management studies, stakeholder analysis of corporations aims to 
develop cooperation between the stakeholder and, usually, a project team. 
Stakeholder analysis takes place when there is a need to clarify the 
consequences of envisaged changes or at the start of new projects and in 
connection with organizational changes generally. In this paper, key 
stakeholders represent the main groups affected by the legislation in 
question and the aim is to illustrate how well their views were taken into 
account in the legislative process. 
In the case study, the Association of European Airlines (AEA) 
represents the airlines, the Airports Council International (ACI Europe) 
represents the airports, and the European Disability Forum represents the 
disability organisations. The views of the EU legislators, the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, are left out of the scope 
of this paper. Even though both the European Parliament and the Council 
have in the recent years become more active in influencing the legislative 
agenda already prior to the Commission proposal, the Commission can be 
seen to represent the overall European interest in this small case study. 
What would be the “correct” level of regulation on consumer protection 
for air passenger, which would not diminish consumer choice, but 
nevertheless adjusts the imbalance in economic power between the 
consumer and the service provider? What would be the optimal balance in 
consumer protection between interests of airline industry and air passenger, 
especially one with reduced mobility? Who has the power to regulate and 
who should – according to key stakeholders – have the power to regulate? 
Does consumer protection in air transport suffer from ‘regulatory gaps’ 
described by Weatherill (2005, p. 20), where Member States are precluded 
from taking action by Community law but where the Community fails to 
act? How are the rights of persons with reduced mobility ensured? 
As the European Union has been extending the Community-level 
passenger rights from the air transport to other modes of transport (e.g., 
COM (2005) 46), the evaluation of the experiences in air passenger 
protection is timely. Karsten (2007, p. 135) finds that in passenger law, 
traditional EC consumer law has developed an independent branch. He 
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considers that passenger regulations are the most developed example of the 
full harmonisation of European private law. In addition, the analysis of air 
passenger protection in the EU is relevant for other branches of consumer 
law, which are being developed towards further harmonisation (i.a., 
Commission proposal for a directive on consumer rights COM(2008) 614). 
Micklitz (2008, pp. 10–12) finds that the EU has in its transport 
legislation used private law instruments for contract law and liability, 
traditional regulatory instruments for mandatory rules, and agrees with 
Karsten that the aim has been full harmonisation. As regards contracts for 
services, he catalogues the 2001 Voluntary Commitments by airlines and 
airports as co-regulation, and IATA's Recommended Practice 1724 on Air 
Passenger Rights as self-regulation by the air transport industry (Ibid. pp. 23–
24). Micklitz lists participation of stakeholders under 'voluntary basis' (Ibid. 
p. 24), even though the Commission had a very active role in setting up the 
2001 Commitments and threatened to include some of the specific minimum 
criteria in its planned legislation on contracts, unless the airlines agree on 
‘convincing’ commitments by April 2001 (COM(2000) 365, p. 16). 
As regards safety rules, airlines are used to being subject to 
Regulations as directly applicable legislative acts. In most other cases, the 
airlines seem to prefer soft-law instruments like voluntary agreements by 
the airline industry associations instead of legislative interventions by the 
national or EU authorities. For the average consumer, the regulatory 
choice can be assumed less important as long as the air passenger rights 
are honoured and enforceable (c.f., Weatherill 2005, Karsten 2007, 
Micklitz 2008, COM(2000) 365). The disability organisations have on 
several public consultations indicated a strong preference for binding and 
enforceable legislative measures. 
Micklitz (2008, p. 33) deems on the basis of his overview of the 
different sectors of EU service regulation that the Commission applies an 
instrumental, sector-related approach and ”understands each new sector as 
a testing ground for new tools, strategies and instruments”. On the 
contrary, Karsten (2007, p. 135) finds that at least as regards different 
transport sectors, the trend is to abandon separate industry-specific 
legislative regimes and apply standard concepts of EU consumer law. 
However, Passenger Regulations remain sector-specific and risk 
eventually suffering from the lack of cohesion (Ibid. p. 133). 
The consumer protection of air passengers with reduced mobility 
cannot be considered to suffer from ‘regulatory gaps’ described by 
Weatherill (2005, p. 20), where Member States are precluded from taking 
action by Community law but where the Community fails to act.  
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In any case, choice of regulatory technique as well as the level of 
regulation (e.g., European versus national and administrative versus 
judicial enforcement) plays an important role in developing air passenger 
protection in the EU. A key question is how to achieve the best possible 
regulation for all parties involved: 1) who should regulate (global level, 
EU, Member States, airlines/airports); 2) in which way (international 
treaties/conventions, EU regulations/directives/recommendations, national 
law, voluntary agreements, codes of conduct)?  
 
 
4 Development of rights for air passengers  
 with reduced mobility 
How did disability, consumer and transport policies and legislation get 
together at the Community/Union level? The European Community's 
involvement in the area of disability policy was originally limited and 
restricted in the absence of Treaty competencies (Waddington 2006, p. 51). 
The Commission established between 1974 and 1996 four multi-annual 
disability action programmes, which aimed at promoting exchange of 
information and best practice, and contributing to the creation of a wider 
disability policy at Community level. Waddington (2006, p.6) finds it 
positive that European networks were set up, even if no broader disability 
policy was achieved at the time.  The early disability action programmes 
were criticised for failing to involve the disabled (Ibid. p. 21). Therefore 
the two latter action programmes in the later 1980s and early 1990s, Helios 
I and II, actively encouraged development of disability non-governmental-
organisations (NGOs) and, even more importantly, established a formal 
consultation mechanism with these organisations. Under Helios II 
programme, the Commission had a key role in launching the European 
Disability Forum, which has later become an independent body. By 1996 
political climate had changed: the principle of mainstreaming made 
disability action programmes unfashionable and they were discontinued. 
Waddington (2006, p. 6) also points out that in 2003 a new disability 
specific action programme was adopted and, perhaps paradoxically, one of 
the key objectives is the mainstreaming of disability issues. 
In the field of legislation, the Council adopted in 1986 a non-binding 
Recommendation 86/379/EEC on the Employment of Disabled People, which 
was the first attempt to come with a broad policy instrument. The anti-
discrimination measures at Community level have been mainly concentrated 
at employment, and only in 2008 the Commission made a proposal for a 
Regulation to implement the principle of equal treatment between persons 
 272
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation outside 
the labour market (COM(2008) 426). Outside anti-discrimination, most of 
specific EU rules on services concern quality and safety, which is mainly 
relevant for transport and energy supply (Micklitz 2000, p. 24).  
The Commission presented in 2000 a Communication on the Protection 
of Air Passengers in the European Union (COM(2000) 365), which 
launched a new era of initiatives on air passenger rights. The 
Communication could even be considered as a White Paper preceding 
major new legislative proposals. Based on the European Commission 
presentation in the communication, the protection of air passengers can be 
divided into four different areas:  
1) Safety-related provisions (air carrier liability for death and injury); 
2) Contractual conditions of carriage (internet booking, delays, denied 
boarding, lost and damaged baggage, bankruptcy of the airline, 
package travel, ticket pricing, electronic tickets); 
3) Airline business practices (computer reservation systems, code-
sharing, interlining, frequent flyer programmes, air fares, no frills 
airlines); 
4) Information and transparency (data protection, simple procedures 
for lodging complaints and settling disputes, making service quality 
reports available, strengthening the representation of passengers). 
 
In 2001, 29 European airlines adopted a voluntary agreement to improve air 
passenger rights: Airline Passenger Service Commitment, which covers 14 
areas. On that basis, each airline would develop their individual Service 
Plans. One of the areas covered is the commitment to provide assistance to 
passengers with reduced mobility and passengers with special needs. At the 
same time, Airports Council International (ACI) Europe adopted Voluntary 
Commitment on Air Passenger Service covering 11 areas, starting with 
persons with reduced mobility. Both commitments are accompanied with a 
two-page attachment on meeting the needs of people with reduced mobility. 
The signatory airlines and airports developed their own individual service 
plans, which incorporated also international provisions, notably ICAO 
Annex 91 and its follow-up ECAC Document 30 (Section 5).  
The Regulation 1107/2006 concerns the rights of disabled persons and 
persons with reduced mobility (PRMs) when travelling by air is a specific 
part of a general plan to reinforce passenger rights on all forms of transport. 
Persons placed at a disadvantage by reduced mobility, whether caused by 
disability, age or another factor, should have opportunities for air travel 
                                                     
1 One of the 18 technical annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, also 
known as the Chicago Convention. 
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comparable to those of other citizens. Under the regulation, people with 
disabilities and/or reduced mobility are protected from being discriminated 
against during reservation and boarding. They are also entitled to receive 
assistance at airports (on departure, on arrival and in transit) and on board 
airplanes2.  
During the negotiation process of Regulation 1107/2006, the 
Commission committed itself to launch a study and make a report on the 
scope of the liability of air carriers if a wheelchair or other mobility 
equipment is destroyed, damaged or lost during a flight. The main results 
were presented in a Commission Communication (COM(2008) 510). The 
Commission is currently assessing the state of play of the implementation 
and will on that basis decide whether further legislative action is needed. 
 
 
5 Public consultations as a policy-making tool 
Public consultations have become over the past ten years a key tool for the 
Commission to find out about the stakeholders’ views and thereby to 
improve the quality of legislation. Development of EU air passenger rights 
has been one of the first areas, where the European Commission has used 
public consultation widely. At least in the field of air passenger protection, 
the Commission has in its public consultations moved from asking general 
comments towards specific questions in a structured manner.  
The Commission continues to actively use public consultations. 
Nowadays, the public consultations are conducted only in electronic 
format via the Commission’ interactive policy-making tool. The 
contributions for the latest consultation on air passengers’ rights should 
have reached the Commission by 10 March 2010. In this public 
consultation, the Commission summarises “the main points identified 
where there seems to be room for regarding the application of three 
regulations” (Commission Public Consultation 2009, p. 2): 
1) Regulation (EC) 889/2002 on air carrier liability in the event of 
accidents, notably regarding limited liability for lost, delayed or 
damaged baggage, with special attention to mobility equipment 
checked in by passengers with reduced mobility; 
2) Regulation (EC) 261/2004 on compensation and assistance to 
passengers when boarding has been denied, the flight has been 
cancelled or when there is long delay; (Excluded from the scope of 
this paper.) 
                                                     
2 For more information, check the Commission website on PRM:  
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/passengers/air/prm_en.htm. 
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3) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 on the rights of passengers with 
reduced mobility.  
 
The contributions3 of the public consultation have not by end of June 2010 
been published on the Commission’s website. The Commission will use 
later in 2010 the results of the public consultation to assess the legislation 
on air passengers’ rights4. 
 
 
6 Case study 
The paper includes a limited case study, which will analyse the replies 
given on the rights of air passengers with reduced mobility by key 
stakeholders in one public consultation by the Commission on its 
Communication COM(2000) 365 on Protection of Air Passengers in the 
European Union and one non-public consultation on the same 
Communication by the European Parliament and the results provided in 
the Civic Consulting's study. The compensations for delayed flights are 
left outside the scope of this paper.  
 
 
6.1 Commission 
The Commission is the main initiator of legislation in the EU. With its 
Communication on Protection of air passengers, the Commission aimed at 
opening a discussion on how to best strengthen the representation of 
passengers with Member States and passengers’ organisations (COM(2000) 
365, p. 4).  
The Commission, however, admits that overregulation could raise costs, 
reduce competition and co-operation between airlines (Ibid. p. 7). It 
acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing the Community legislation, for 
which “adequate mechanisms and sanctions may not be in place” (Ibid. p. 
6). Nevertheless, it finds that “legislation will doubtless be needed but will 
                                                     
3 Rather surprisingly, in the call for public consultation on air passengers’ rights, the 
Commission is also interested in getting the views of the European Parliament and the 
Council. Even though the cooperation between the institutions is close, it hard to imagine 
that the Parliament or the Council as EU legislators would respond to Commission’s 
public consultation call for Member States authorities and interest organisations through 
a website.  
4 The Commission organized a Stakeholder Hearing in Brussels on 28 June 2010 to 
analyze the results of the latest public consultation. 
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be not the whole solution: voluntary commitments taken by the airlines, 
may sometimes be an effective course of action” (SEC(2000) 535).  
As regards ensuring rights of disabled people in air transport, the 
Commission lists in the Communication the advantages of using 
Community legislation: various requirements could be set without high 
costs. Assistance to and from the aircraft free of charge, special assistance, 
guide dogs in the aircraft cabin and full liability for loss or damage to wheel 
chairs are among the examples mentioned (COM(2000) 365, p. 13). 
The Commission welcomes the preparatory work by the Association of 
European Airlines on a set of basic commitments on passenger service. 
Among other minimum criteria, the Commission requires that the 
commitment will include provisions to meet the needs of the disabled, e.g., 
training staff and disseminating information (Ibid. p. 15). As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the Commission also demanded the airlines to agree on 
“convincing” commitments by April 2001, otherwise some of the minimum 
criteria listed would be included in its planned legislation on contracts 
(Ibid. p. 16).  
The Commission also recognised the need for informing passengers of 
their rights (Ibid. p. 6). In the draft Charter on Air Passenger Rights in the 
European Union suggested in 2000, the Commission does not mention 
passengers with reduced mobility at all (SEC(2000) 535). The Commission 
has been worried among other things about the inconsistency in treatment 
of passengers with reduced mobility: concerned about discriminatory 
charges and some low-cost airlines charging extra fees from passengers, 
and has responded by proposing legislative measures, which resulted in 
Regulation 1107/2006. 
In the unpublished comments for the European Parliament, the 
Commission states that passengers’ essential interests should be protected 
by legislation, which allow legal enforcement. This category should include 
air carriers' liability for damages in the event of death and injury, delays 
and mishandling of baggage as well as denied boarding. In the 
Commission's view (Replies to Questions, 2000, p. 1), Community 
legislation could first be extended to ”reinforce rights is the event of denied 
boarding and to extend them, where appropriate, to cancellations and to 
long delays” and ”set minimum requirements for airlines' contracts, so that 
there is legal certainty for both sides and a better balance of rights and 
obligations between airlines and passengers. These should also cover the 
rights of the disabled people.” Second, the other interests can be advanced 
through voluntary commitments. These would mean services offered by 
airlines, such as offer of lower fares, rapid notification of delays and 
cancellations, faster check-in, and handling of complaints (Ibid. p. 2). 
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In 2008, the Commission analyses a study it commissioned regarding 
the possibility of improving the rights of air passengers whose wheelchairs 
or other mobility equipment was destroyed, damaged or lost (COM(2008) 
510, p. 2). The actual number of incidents with mobility equipment is very 
low: little over one complaint per million passengers (COM(2008) 510, p. 
3). Nevertheless, passengers with reduced mobility are travelling less by air 
than the average population and one of the reasons could be that they are 
worried that their mobility equipment is damaged or lost. Another reason is 
that the compensation levels under the Montreal Treaty and the EU 
legislation implementing it is far lower than the value of an electric 
wheelchair (Ibid. p. 9).  
The immediate assistance to PRMs whose wheelchair has been lost, 
damaged or destroyed is currently covered by voluntary commitments by 
airlines and airports. However, the Commission states that voluntary 
agreements are not always properly honoured: few airlines and airports 
developed their own plans to implement the voluntary agreements, the 
plans adopted and the results are different, and the plans or customer 
policies are not always published (Ibid. p. 4). 
In 2008, the Commission did not propose immediate legal action on the 
issue (COM(2008) 510, p. 10). The Commission proposed to the Council 
that EU could launch an initiative within ICAO to clarify the situation and 
encourage the airlines to unilaterally waive the current liability limits on 
mobility equipment.5 
 
 
6.2 Organisations representing airlines and airports 
6.2.1 Association of European Airlines  
In its comments to the Commission Communication on Air Passenger 
Rights (COM(2000) 365), Association of European Airlines (AEA 
Comments 2000, pp. 1–5) states its clear preference for self-regulation by 
the industry and voluntary agreements. AEA point out that there is a 
problem in ensuring the application of the EC Regulations and that 
appropriate measures should be taken before strengthening legislation. 
AEA wonders why the Commission has not included an impact assessment 
in the form of cost/benefit analysis. The Comment paper does not mention 
persons with reduced mobility. 
                                                     
5 As of 18 March 2010, the Commission has not published on its website the report 
foreseen in Article 17 of Regulation 1107/2006, which would include a chapter on the 
rights of PRM whose mobility equipment has been lost damaged or destroyed. 
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In the unpublished comments for the European Parliament, the AEA 
underlines the importance of the Voluntary Commitment. AEA (2002, pp. 
1–2): ”Once the framework of the Voluntary Agreement is available and 
the names of the airlines who will be signatories are known, the regulators 
will then decide what remains outside and may require legislation. The 
implementation of the Voluntary Agreement would need to be monitored by 
the authorities with regular reports as it is done in the United States.” 
There is no reference to PRMs.  
When the Airline Passenger Service Commitment was signed in 2001, 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) Secretary General Karl-Heinz 
Neumeister stated: “The European Commission has made it clear, 
throughout the process, that they prefer a voluntary code to a legislative 
solution” (AEA press release 2001, p. 2). 
In 2009 Position Paper (p. 3), AEA says that no further regulation is 
needed, except to implement the current legislation. ”The biggest problem 
today is lack of coherent implementation, application and interpretation at 
Member States' level.” (Ibid. 2009, p. 4). 
In the replies on the study on the compensation thresholds of lost or 
damaged mobility equipment, airlines (AEA was one of the respondents), 
majority of airlines states that the procedures for lost, damaged or destroyed 
wheelchairs or mobility equipment as well as immediate replacement 
equipment meet the needs of PRM (Civic Consulting 2008 p. 77) and there 
is no need to improve administrative enforcement of the existing rules 
(Ibid. p. 104). Majority of airlines considered the compensation limit of the 
Montreal Convention appropriate (Ibid. p. 88). Majority of airlines do not 
consider that there is a need to improve the existing rules regarding 
compensation thresholds (Ibid. p. 102). 
 
 
6.2.2 Airports Council International ACI Europe  
Airports Council International (ACI) Europe, which represents over 450 
airports in 45 European countries, is selected as the representative of the 
airlines. In its Position Paper of 2000 on the Commission communication 
on the Protection of Air Passengers in the EU, ACI Europe welcomes the 
Commission’s objective to promote air transport industry’s voluntary 
commitments to improve service, but rather than aiming at pan-European 
voluntary commitment for airports, European guidelines to be implemented 
at national level should be adopted instead. In addition, ACI believes that 
“voluntary commitments would benefit the consumer more than a new and 
necessarily complex legal framework. Over-regulation would be 
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detrimental to all parties involved in the process of legislation on air 
passenger rights […].” (ACI Europe Position Paper of 2000, p. 1). 
ACI Europe disagrees with the Commission’s assumption that the 
ground services for Persons with Reduced Mobility could be provided 
without major costs (ACI Europe Position Paper of 2000, p. 3). However, 
ACI Europe agrees that airports should make sure that their infrastructure 
suits the needs of PMRs. 
In the unpublished comments for the European Parliament, ACI Europe 
underlines the importance of the pan-European voluntary Charter for the 
protection of air passengers (ACI Europe Comments 2000 cover page, pp. 
1–2). As regards rights of persons with reduced mobility (Ibid. p. 3), ACI 
Europe recalls that the process of assistance in boarding the aircraft is a 
ground handling activity as defined in Directive 96/67 and should be treated 
as general airport facilities. In order to avoid any disadvantages for PRMs, 
ACI Europe considers that the costs could be shared between all passengers 
making use of air transport. 
ACI Europe adopted a Voluntary Commitment on Air Passenger 
Service in 2001, which has Persons with Reduced Mobility as first 
commitment out of 11: “Each airport will prominently publicise the 
services it offers for assisting passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs). 
Most crucially each airport commits itself to the new special protocol on 
‘Meeting the needs of the people with reduced mobility’.” The attached 
protocol is the interlinked with the protocol of airlines’ voluntary 
agreement. 
In the ACI Europe Position Paper of 2005 on the proposal for PRM 
Regulation, the level of regulation or the regulator is not anymore 
discussed. ACI Europe simply notes the adoption of the Commission 
proposal and insists that airlines must not be able to opt-out of the 
centralised assistance service for the PRMs, and that airlines must pay a 
charge for airports to cover the assistance costs. 
In the replies on the study on the compensation thresholds of lost or 
damaged mobility equipment, airports (ACI Europe was one of the 
respondents), approximately half of airports states that the procedures for 
lost, damaged or destroyed wheelchairs or mobility equipment and 
immediate replacement equipment meet the needs of PRM, but some 
concerns were raised about the appropriateness of the replacement 
equipment and that airlines or passengers may not always have information 
about the availability of replacement equipment (Civic Consulting 2008 p. 
80). A considerable percentage of airports (3 out of 9) did not express a 
view in this matter.  
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6.3 European Disability Forum as representative of the  
 disabled people 
When the Commission organised a public consultation “Air passenger 
rights in the European Union” in view of its Communication of year 2000 
(COM(2000) 365), it received 61 replies from different stakeholders: the 
Member States, airlines, airports, travel agents and consumer organisations 
as well as 11 organisations representing the disabled (COM(2000) 365, pp. 
24–26). The European Disability Forum, which is the European umbrella 
organisation for the disabled, has been chosen to represent the disability 
organisations in this case study.  
In its replies to the Commission’s public consultation on air passenger 
rights in 2000 (DOC EDF 00/02 p. 4), the European Disability Forum 
welcomes the Commission’s idea for a [non-binding] Passengers’ Charter, 
which would aim at ensuring that a minimum standard of service is offered 
to all passengers. However, the EDF requests that the Commission includes 
all points raised in the reply in the development of the European legislation 
in this field (Ibid. p. 7). The overall preference is thus on the binding 
legislation at Community level.  
EDF in its response paper of 2002 to the Commission consultation paper 
on Airlines’ Contracts with Passengers “strongly supports the European 
Commission’s plans to propose legal obligations to carry PRMs and to 
provide a package of assistance free of charge” (DOC EDF 02/15 p. 3). 
The EDF supports also voluntary agreements, but is “greatly concerned” 
that not all airlines sign up and points out that there have been problems 
with air carriers which are “very unlikely” to sign up (Ibid. p. 3). It 
reiterates its strong support to Community legislation several times in the 
response paper (DOC EDF 02/15 pp. 3, 5–6). 
In 2004, when commenting the Commission Staff Working Paper on 
Rights of Persons with Reduced Mobility, the EDF presents its preference 
for binding legislation in a very clear manner: “EDF strongly believes that 
certain matters relating to disabled air travellers or travellers with reduced 
mobility cannot be addressed through voluntary commitments and must be 
addressed through European legislation.” 
In the replies on the study on the compensation thresholds of lost or 
damaged mobility equipment, disability organisations (European Disability 
Forum was one of the respondents), majority of PRM do not believe that the 
procedures for lost, damaged or destroyed wheelchairs or mobility equipment 
and immediate replacement equipment meet the needs of PRM (Civic 
Consulting 2008 p. 84). Overwhelming majority of PRM organisations 
considered the compensation limit of the Montreal Convention insufficient 
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(Ibid. p. 97). PMR organisations believe there is need to improve the existing 
national or EU legislation in these respects (Ibid. p. 114). 
 
 
6.4 Summary of the case study  
The results of case study sample data can be roughly summarised as 
follows: 
 
Figure 1 Development of stakeholder preferences on regulatory choices concerning 
rights of air passengers with reduced mobility 
 2000–2004 2005–2009 
Commission Community legislation/ Voluntary commitment 
Considers new EU 
legislation 
Airlines Self-regulation/ Voluntary agreement 
No further legislation is 
needed 
Airports 
European guidelines 
implemented at national 
level 
Takes note of Commission 
proposals 
Disability Forum 
European legislation, but 
welcomes also Voluntary 
agreements 
European legislation 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
The Commission estimates that around 10 % of the European population 
suffers from reduced mobility6 (COM(2005) 46 p. 9) and that the amount 
will increase significantly with the aging of population. During the past 
decade, the EU institutions, airline industry and organisations representing 
airlines, airports, consumers and people with disabilities have invested 
significantly in improving air passenger rights in Europe. Different means 
have been used to achieve better protection of air passengers in general and 
persons with reduced mobility in particular. Consequently, consumer 
protection in air transport in the EU is currently subject to several types of 
regulation at various levels by different actors.  
The Commission has increasingly used public consultations both when 
preparing legislation and when evaluating its effect. The disability 
organisations are one of the most ardent and efficient lobbyists of EU 
legislation. The Commission has had an important role in encouraging and 
supporting disability organisations. The case study sample on the rights of 
air passengers with reduced mobility clearly confirms that the disability 
                                                     
6 The figure on persons with reduced mobility includes not only disabled persons but 
also persons needing assistance when travelling due to age or illness. 
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NGOs are excellent in getting their points included in the EU legislation. 
Perhaps the successes in early cases like the lift directive have encouraged 
the disability organisations to fight for their rights. 
The Commission has been very active in coming up new rules to protect 
disabled air passengers in the recent years and moving towards more 
detailed legislation. Over the period studied and in the specific cases 
analysed, the European Disability Forum has been consistent in its demand 
for binding legislative measures. The airlines and airports have moved their 
preference from voluntary agreements towards better acceptance of 
legislative measures, but they prefer to avoid new rules and insist on better 
implementation of the current measures. 
Overall the implementation of and compliance with the legislation in 
force would be worth further analysis. In April 2010, the disruptions to the 
air traffic due to the Icelandic volcanic ashes put the compliance with the 
EU air passenger legislation under a very severe test. The Commission’s 
impact assessments on the legislative proposals, which were introduced in 
2002, have not yet been fully implemented in the proposals concerning air 
passenger protection. This will be an interesting issue for future follow-up. 
Another interesting issue for follow-up is the EU accession to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It will also be 
interesting to study the results of the latest public consultation on air 
passengers’ rights, when the contributions will be made available in the 
second half of 2010, and to see if the trends on stakeholder preferences for 
PRM rights remain similar to the ones identified in this paper.  
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 COMPENSATORY FINES IMPOSED BY THE 
FINNISH LABOUR COURT TO LOCAL TRADE 
UNIONS IN THE CASE OF ILLEGAL  
INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
Anssi Keinänen and Teemu Tukiainen 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the study is to analyse the breaches of collective bargaining 
agreements by local trade unions and the determination of compensatory fine by 
Labour Court. We try to identify factors that affect the determination of the 
compensation payment. 
The research data covers the Labour Court’s cases in Finland from 2000 until 
end 2009 where local trade unions have been charged with illegal industrial action. 
The data covers 101 cases of the Labour Court where the law of collective labour 
agreement was broken by local trade unions. The data contains information on 258 
local trade unions’ compensatory fines and other relevant factors.  
Empirical results show that when economic loss increases with € 100 000 the 
compensatory fine will be € 18 more than otherwise. The result is statistically 
significant. We can conclude that although the result is statistically significant, the 
impact of economic loss on the compensatory fine is rather insignificant in practice 
to create the deterrence effect on local trade unions to avoid illegal industrial 
actions. In the future in Finland, we must engage in the optimal level of 
compensatory fine so that it will create for both parties (employees and employers) 
incentives to not to violate the Collective Agreement Act or spirit of it.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
Significant monetary losses occur yearly because of illegal industrial 
actions. This topic pops up to the news every time when some big 
employees’ organisation threats to start a strike. Especially the 
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) is asking how reliable the present 
system is, if it cannot guarantee one of the most important things of 
collective labour agreement, that is, permanent industrial peace. 
In Finland, the Labour Court hears and tries the legal disputes arising 
out of collective agreements. The Labour Court also imposes sanctions for 
a breach of these agreements. The possible sanction imposed by Labour 
Court is a compensatory fine. In 2009, the maximum fine in the Collective 
Agreement Act is EUR 28 300. The compensatory fine is payable to the 
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employers’ or employees’ organisation, not for example for a single firm, 
winning the specific case. 
EK criticises that the compensatory fine does not correlate in the same 
ratio with the damages caused by industrial action. Employees’ side sees 
the illegal industrial actions as a way to express their feelings against 
employer’s plans of reducing labour. According to the President of Labour 
court, Pekka Orasmaa, employer’s monetary losses are not the prime 
criterion when determining the amount of compensatory fine (HS article 
24.8.2008). 
Above there were introduced three different subjective aspects about 
the current state of the labour system. Comprehensive clarification does not 
exist. This research aims to give objective facts about the criteria which 
affect the amount of compensatory fine. Research also compares how the 
criteria fit with the economic theory of contract remedies. The ground for 
this research is the data which consists of all cases of Labour court where 
employees’ side has been charged with illegal industrial action. The data 
will be analysed statistically by the multiple independent variables 
regression method. 
It seems that Labour Court does not have tools which are effective 
enough to prevent illegal industrial actions. The research also reveals the 
imperfections of Labour Court’s methods. On the Law and Economics 
point of view, considering the criteria which affect the sum of 
compensatory fine, the Court should prefer more monetary arguments 
instead of others. The Court should also give more detailed justifications of 
judicial decisions. That would ease all parties to understand better which 
criteria affect the amount of compensatory fine and by which intensity. 
Table 1 shows the reasons for the strike in Finland in 2009.1 The table 
shows that the most often strikes are related to the disagreements with the 
pay, the amount of labour or work arrangements. In fact, 84 % of the 
reasons for strikes are concerned one way or another employer Direction 
right2. 
 
                                                 
1 EK’s industrial statistics 2009. 
2 Kairinen (2002) p.107 and Kairinen (1983), p. 53–65. The employer has the right to 
manage and monitor his employees. Direction law is a base for a distinction between the 
employer and the employee, the employee is subordinate to the employer. 
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Table 1  Number of strikes in EK's member companies indicated by the cause in 2009 
Reason of Industrial Action Number of Industrial Actions % 
The requirement to pay or other wage dispute 6 6 
Workforce reduction or threat of it 58 57 
Procedures of supervision, work organisation 21 21 
Working conditions, occupational safety and health 2 2 
Other internal reason 6 6 
Sector’s collective bargaining 0 0 
Support Measure 3 3 
Other external reason 5 5 
Reason not reported / not known 0 0 
Total 101 100 
Source: Industries EK. Preliminary (21.12.2009) 
 
In response to illegal industrial action, the employer may bring a suit 
against the employee side. The action goes to the Labour Court, whose task 
is to concern the problem of collective bargaining and collective 
agreements resulting from the application and interpretation of disputes 
and breaches of industrial peace. As far as the defendant is found a guilty, 
the defendant can be doomed according to the collective bargaining law 
(436/1946) 9 § to pay compensation fine. Currently, a compensatory fine is 
limited to a maximum fine of EUR 28 300 per industrial action. 
In 2000–2007 Finland had lost in industrial actions the third highest 
amount of working days in the EU countries relative to the number of 
employees.3 Priority must therefore be considered the loss of labour 
disputes arising from the loss of labour input. It should also be noted that 
industrial actions in many cases are detrimental to third parties; customers, 
suppliers and subcontractors are often unable to prepare for sudden 
changes quickly enough, or they do not have any alternative or substitute 
available. It is noteworthy that in such situations, these interest groups may 
have a right to damages, for example due to late deliveries4. The actual 
payer of the damages is not only the company itself, but also the 
consumers who have to pay part of the loss in increased commodity prices. 
The question of how much that share will be depends on the field of the 
company and on how competitive the sector is.  
The study examines the breaches of collective bargaining agreements 
by local trade unions and the determination of compensatory fine by 
Labour Court. The determination of trade unions’ fines is not made clear in 
                                                 
3 Statistics Finland's publication 2007. Only Spain and Italy were above Finland. 
4Koskinen (2000), p.7–9 and 23–37. 
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this study. This is to ensure that research data should be as homogenous as 
possible5. The aim of this study is to determine empirically by which 
criteria the compensation amount of the fine is assessed, for example, the 
weight of the duration of the strike, financial loss incurred by the strike or 
the number of participants for the strike6. The legislature has left wide 
discretion for the authority applying the law, in this case, for the Labour 
Court, writing the law that ”where the duty to convict must take into 
account all the points of the circumstances ... ”7. These circumstances are 
not written on, but the legislature has found sufficient to mention a few of 
the main circumstances which at least must be taken into account. 
Therefore, the question arises how far the Labour Court, by imposing a 
compensatory fine, has emphasised the different circumstances and, in 
particular, where does it estimate to set up the yardstick. 
This study aims to identify factors that affect the determination of the 
compensation payment. Chapter 2 introduces the compensation payment 
for essential determinants; identifies the Finnish legal status and presents 
the various forms of industrial action and their underlying causes. Chapter 
3 presents the statistical data, or the Labour Court case law dealing with 
industrial action. In chapter 4 the statistical analysis is carried out and the 
results are presented. The fifth chapter goes through the investigation and 
the issues raised in the conclusions presented. 
 
 
2 Finland’s collective labour market system 
2.1  The preliminary aspects of the Finnish labour  
 market system 
The labour market’s rules consist a package, which includes the 
Employment Contracts Act (436/1946), labour disputes, conciliation Act 
(420/1962) and the umbrella between the Conventions, which govern the 
procedures for negotiations8. At the individual level are matters governed 
by labour contract law (55/2001). The investigation was limited to examine 
these whole labour standards in perspective: this case will weigh the matter 
                                                 
5 In the future, it would be good if the breaches of collective bargaining agreements by 
officials would be also analysed. 
6 Shavell (2004), p.1–3. This is the approach to be appointed for a positive aspect of Law 
and Economics. It will examine what the case really is. 
7 Employment Contracts Act 10 §. 
8 Kairinen (2001), p. 422–423. 
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first and foremost law on collective agreements in the industrial peace 
obligation on the basis of the provisions. 
The main achievement of the collective bargaining system, is to allow 
the interests of both parties into the agreement. Employers' side, this means 
first and foremost as comprehensive as possible the working climate and 
the fact that direction right is as unrestricted as possible. Employees in turn 
require effective consultation system, basic safety and the possibility of 
operation also when a collective agreement is in force.9 
 
 
2.2  The collective Agreements Act and its special  
features 
The collective Agreements Act (436/1946) sets the reference frame within 
which the collective agreements and contracts can be mirrored. Collective 
Agreement is a special contract, which is agreed on behalf of third parties: 
the signatories to the agreement, therefore, are regulated in relation to 
external relationships. A collective agreement shall be binding on: 
 
1) the employers and associations who or which concluded the 
collective agreement or subsequently accede to the agreement in 
writing and with the consent of the parties; 
2) registered associations which are subordinated directly or through 
one or more intermediaries to the associations mentioned in the 
preceding point; and 
3) employers and employees who are, or during the period of the 
agreement were members of an association bound by the 
agreement; and the said employers and employees shall be required 
to observe the provisions of the collective agreement in all contracts 
of employment concluded between them. 
 
Collective Agreements Act 6 §: Where any part of a contract is at variance 
with a collective agreement applicable thereto, such part of the contract of 
employment shall be invalid and superseded by the corresponding 
provisions of the collective agreement. 
Collective Agreements Act 7 § sets a ceiling for compensatory fine. If 
any employer or employee bound by collective agreement knowingly 
violates, or should reasonably become aware of infringing the provisions of 
the collective agreement, may be sentenced to pay a compensatory fine not 
                                                 
9 Leivo (1983), p. 106. 
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exceeding € 28 300 in the case of an employer and not exceeding € 280 in 
the case of an employee.10 
According to the 8 § of Collective Agreements Act a collective 
agreement shall bind all employers and associations who and which are 
parties thereto or otherwise bound thereby, and likewise any associations 
whose members or subordinate associations mentioned in point 2 of the 
first paragraph of section 4 have concluded the agreement with the consent 
of the association, to refrain from any hostile action directed against the 
collective agreement as a whole or against any particular provisions 
thereof. Furthermore, the associations which are bound by the agreement 
shall be required to ensure that the associations, employers and employees 
subordinated to them and covered by the agreement refrain from any such 
hostile action and that they do not contravene the provisions of the 
collective agreement in any other manner.11 Control cannot be merely 
formal, but it requires a situation of a particular activity. It is essential that 
the association will take industrial action after being notified of 
circumstances, taking into account sufficiently rapid and effective steps to 
restore social peace12. According to 9§ an association and employer, party 
to the collective agreement or otherwise bound by it, which does not fulfil 
its responsibilities under the agreement, as referred to in section 8, shall, 
unless otherwise stipulated in the collective agreement, pay a 
compensatory fine in lieu of damages.  
If the contravention of the provisions of the collective agreement 
consists in the fact that a money payment provided for in the agreement 
was not made, the offender may also be required to pay the amount due. 
According to Collective Agreements Act 10 § for a special reason, it 
shall be possible to refrain from imposing a compensatory fine. Although 
the law speaks only to a fine to condemn the failure, give a government 
proposal for understanding that also making fine equitable would be 
possible for a special reason. The reduction of the Compensatory fine and 
impunity will be dealt more specific in the later chapter with the impact 
criteria.13. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Government regulation of collective bargaining law for compensatory adjustment of 
the maximum fines 12.18.2008 1007/2008. Serving fine, the maximum credit under 
review takes place every three years. 
11 Sarkko (1969), p. 3–4. 
12 Kairinen (2001), p. 423–424. See also TT:2000-50 (TT means Labour Court), where 
the union avoided cited negligence breach of the duty of surveillance by taking prompt 
and effective action to restore labour peace. 
13 Government Bill 248/1985 diet. 
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2.3 The industrial actions in the practise 
Compassion Fighting (sympathetic collective action) 
Collective action is illegal if it is taken during the current collective 
bargaining agreement. The exception to the above-mentioned forms of 
collective action, which is to address non-issue for collective agreement. 
For example, compassion fight can support another area of ongoing 
industrial action or a political collective, which we want to inform the 
decision makers of potential deficiencies in the labour market, in this case, 
the collective power of the state and not subject to collective agreement14. 
Compassion Fight is an action taken by other reasons than the 
employers or workers own benefits. It is an established rule that true 
compassion fighting does not violate unions own industrial peace 
obligation.15 For labour dispute it is an absolute fact that industrial action 
could not, even indirectly, be subject to a collective agreement16. 
Compassion battle may be legally taken, notwithstanding that the measures 
taken are bound by the existing collective agreement. The requirement, 
however, that sympathy is a measure supported by the labour disputes 
Conditions of Employment permitted, in other words, illegal industrial 
action may not be supported. 
 
 
The work refusal 
The most common way to implement the employee side of the industrial 
action is to refuse to work or go on strike.17 A strike is a joint decision of 
the agreed work out of retirement or, in some cases, merely the work of a 
failure, either in part or in full18. So it does not matter, if any workers are in 
the workplace or not, fulfilling essential criterion is simply compliance 
with the provisions of the employer's supervisors. The strike is taken by 
employees the most serious and usually the most effective collective 
action. It creates the hardest economically pressure to the employer in 
order to grant the workers' demands. The strike may include all parties in 
the workplace or it can be implemented spot strike when only one point in 
the chain of production or part of the company's employees is on strike. 
                                                 
14 Sarkko (1969), p. 299–301, 310–318 and 320–324. 
15 Suviranta (1982), p. 7. 
16 Sarkko (1969), p. 299. 
17 Collective Statistics 2007. 
18 It is, however, situations where workers' refusal to work is not considered industrial 
action. For example, an employer not to pay wages, or fails to comply with safety 
regulations. 
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Usually the selected point is the most critical one, which prevents the other 
parts of the chain functioning.19It is also possible that the workers refuse to 
work on something down. Thus, for example, overtime may be prohibited 
by the refusal of the collective measure if it is due to other than personal 
reasons. 
 
 
The measure of the threat of industrial action as an  
industrial action 
The situation can be interpreted as collective action although no concrete 
steps had yet been made. As an example, the mere threat of a strike is 
sufficient to take industrial action. A requirement for threat of industrial 
action to be an industrial action is that, the threatened action if it is 
implemented would be an industrial action according to the Collective 
Agreements Act.  
Usually, the threat is considered less stringent measure than the threat 
to the implementation, but it is still always reprehensible act, if the court 
has been able to prove that the employer has reason to believe that threat 
would be fulfilled.20  
 
 
Covered industrial action 
Covered industrial action means, according to its name, an industrial action 
fulfilling characteristics of the law on collective industrial action, but 
which seeks to 'hide' so that it appears to be other than industrial action. In 
practice, this occurs so that the breached party denies that he has taken 
industrial action. Contested the motivation of the industrial action set out, 
for example, that collective agreement on standards has not been presented, 
or that the local trade union did not make a collective decision of taking 
disciplinary action. 
In the covered industrial action with the Labour Court's assessment of 
the industrial action, the decision criterion is the actual consequences of 
what is really intended and what has been done. If the essential elements of 
industrial action are fulfilled, there is industrial action even if it is 
disguised as something else. 
 
  
                                                 
19 TT: 2001-42. 
20 TT:2000-49 and TT:2003-40. 
  
293
2.4  Reviews about legislature’s set of criteria to  
 convict compensation fine 
Labour Court decision is always based on a case by case consideration. 
Although the court is ex officio obliged to investigate all factors affecting 
the case, so Collective Agreements Act § 10, however, includes the 
illustrative list of circumstances which at least should be taken into account 
when determining the fine credit. The determinants are the extent of the 
loss, guilt, the other party breaches any of the subjects and size of the 
association or the company.21 
Has the legislature failed to assess those factors responsible for court, it 
is not collective bargaining law or any government proposals in this 
respect, to guide how these criteria should be evaluated. The following 
analyses these criteria, first in terms of what these criteria mean, and, 
second, how these should be evaluated in Law and Economics from the 
scientific perspective. 
 
 
The extent of damage 
Extent of the loss is understandable about the amount of economic loss, 
which is a result of industrial action have been lost. Such losses may be, 
for example sales or production loss. In particular it should be noted that in 
assessing the amount of damages involved in the illegal industrial action 
mainly losses incurred to the other party are taken into account. Losses for 
third parties are usually excluded from the analysis because these losses are 
difficult to assess, and their inclusion in the scope of the contract would be 
nearly impossible22. However, the saved costs during the industrial action 
(such as wage and raw material costs) should be taken account when 
assessing the total amount of the losses caused by industrial action. The 
difference between losses and savings is the net amount of harm, which in 
principle should be replaced by a positive interest in accordance with a 
contract, the breach of the restricted party for the loss should be ”fully 
covered”23.  
An additional challenge is the assessment of extent of the injury labour 
dispute threatening, especially if it leaves before the realisation, which 
does not give rise to significant financial losses. In this case, should assess 
                                                 
21 Government Bill 248/1985 diet. 
22 Mattiacci & Parisi (2006), p.16 and 20. 
23 Check more closely Mahoney (2000) and the efficiency of under-compensation Eric 
A. Posner (2000). 
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the likelihood of threat realisation of a threat at the time of the presentation 
is and how great a threat in the implementation of economic harm would 
follow. From law and economic point of view, the amount of the fine 
should be the same as the probability of occurrence multiplied with 
resulting injury, in other words the expected loss of income.24 
 
 
Extent of guilt 
The amount of guilt in assessing similarities may be sought for Finnish 
Compensation Law (1974/412) and the Criminal Law (1889/39). 
Compensation Law § 4:1's view: ”... is obliged to pay an amount which is 
deemed reasonable by taking into account ... act of nature, causing the 
accident position, the victim need and other circumstances.” Criminal 
Law § 6:4 in to states that ”punishment must be measured so that it is fair 
in relation to crime and the dangerousness of the injurious, making 
motives, and the rest of the offence arises the guilt factor.” 
Assessing guilt is first measured with the quality of labour dispute: 
whether it is a threat, for example, braking, total strike, or perhaps a 
combination of the above. It is economically justified to impose a fine 
according to the expected harm. Could one have assumed that the threat is 
less severe economic consequences of the measure than the strike? Under 
the principle of marginal deterrence strikes should be sanctioned with 
higher compensation than the treat of labour disputes, because then the 
factor (for example, an employee union) would have an incentive to refrain 
from more severe forms of labour disputes.25 In other words, if the strike 
and the treat of strike would be sanctioned equally severely, it should be 
the same for the trade union to go on strike rather than make a threat. This 
would not be socially desirable, because the economic consequences of the 
strike to society are many times higher compared with the fact that the 
threatening with the strike is nothing more than a threat. 
Secondly, in assessing the sanction from an industrial action one should 
take into account the amount of repetitions. Criminal Law 6:5 § mentions 
as an aggravating circumstance ”the author earlier crime, if the new 
offence, and the ratio of crime due to the similarity or otherwise 
demonstrate a manifest disregard for the law factor prohibitions and 
commandments.” Collective Agreement Act § 7 states unequivocally that 
”where a duty condemnation can be repeated until a collective agreement 
contrary state of affairs has been removed.” Posner justifies tougher 
                                                 
24 Määttä (1999) p. 13. 
25 Shavell (2004). 
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punishment for repeaters because of the facts that 1) the earlier illegality 
establishes a presumption that the author has deliberately acted unlawfully, 
when the probability of an innocent sentencing is lower, and 2) the 
criminal has learned and developed their skills in the previous offence, 
when he is able to operate more efficiently, and as a result of this, 
paragraph should also be stricter.26  
 
 
The other party's contribution 
Explicit criterion means that the victim should influence the emergence of 
the injury. It can be interpreted that the injured party should have an 
obligation to try to limit the consequences of the injury. If the victim does 
not restrict harm of the illegal industrial action when it is reasonable, the 
amount of the compensatory fine can be moderated. The above-mentioned 
obligation creates an incentive to the victim to take the optimal amount of 
due care (or at least more care), in which case the overall costs are 
reduced27.  
The contribution of the other party is not the weight of the so-called 
”counter industrial act”28. This measure only refers to collective industrial 
action, which has been put in consequence of the other party initiated the 
collective agreement or collective agreement for unlawful activities.  
 
 
The size of the association or company 
From the law and economics point of view to determine the amount of the 
fine should not draw attention to the association or member of the 
company in terms of size, but the fine should be determined according to 
the harm inflicted. Evaluation of the party could be subjected to property 
and the ability to cope with the fine. The analogue may be derived from 
tort law. According to the tort Law, Chapter 2 § 1: ”Compensation for 
damages may be adjusted if the liability is considered excessively 
cumbersome, taking into account the tortfeasor and the injured party's 
property conditions and other circumstances.” In the same chapter, 
however, is an important addition to remark: ”if the damage was caused 
deliberately, however, full compensation for the condemnation, unless for 
special reasons, be considered reasonable to reduce the compensation.” 
                                                 
26 Richard A. Posner (1998), p. 252. See also Shavell (2004). 
27 Eric A Posner (2000).  
28 Sarkko (1969), p. 204–218. 
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It can be concluded that although illegal industrial action participating 
organisations would be a weak ability to pay the fine (e.g., due to the low 
level of membership), it should not affect the amount of the fine if the 
organisation has understood the illegality of the action.  
 
 
Criteria affecting to a compensation fine from the law and  
economic point of view  
A baseline for determining of compensation must be regarded as net harm 
of the industrial action i.e. the amount remain after all the savings accruing 
to the employer (saved wages, unused materials, etc.) has been reduced 
from harm. Generally accepted an idea in the law and economics is that, in 
principle, the promisor should cover the damage in full to the promisee.  
Law and Economically, the optimal compensation amount of the fine 
should be only determined in direct proportion to the harm inflicted. 
Exclusion of other factors in assessing the amount of the fine can be 
justified for two reasons. First, the evaluation is based authority’s own 
subjective assessment, which is not always without problems relating to 
monetary value. Second, the victim can be assumed to undergo only the 
economic losses; very rarely the victim has experienced another kind of 
harm from the illegal industrial action than financial loss. The optimal 
compensation should be equal to the harm caused by the illegal industrial 
action, because the victim’s experienced harm equals financial loss from 
the industrial action29. 
 
 
3 Research Data 
The research data covers the Labour Court’s cases in Finland from 2000 
until end 2009 where local trade unions have been charged with illegal 
industrial action. The data covers 101 cases of the Labour Court where the 
law of collective labour agreement has broken by local trade unions. The 
data contains information on 258 local trade unions’ compensatory fines 
and other relevant factors. 
Table 2 is a brief description of variables in the data. A single case was 
selected among the data if all relevant information was found from the 
Labour Court’s decision. In other words, if any relevant information of the 
local trade union level were not available from the Labour Court’s cases 
                                                 
29 See also Eric A. Posner (2000) about the efficient under-compensation.  
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(e.g., amount of compensatory fine), the case was not selected in the data. 
The research data consists of 32 per cent of all possible Labour Court cases 
during 2000–2009. In the following we shortly describe the research data. 
On average 2.6 local trade unions participated in the illegal industrial 
action. In this study the branches of the local trade unions were divided 
into four categories. Forest covers everything in the forest, wood, paper, 
paperboard and paper industry and the woodworking industry (35 % of all 
cases), transportation covers the automotive and transport, including port 
working stevedores (9 %), metal covers metal and technology industries 
(38 %), and other group includes all other industries (19 %).  
 
 Table 2  Summary Statistics 
Variable    
Number of cases 101 
Number of local trade unions 258 
Number of local trade unions/cases: average 2,6 
Forest (N/%) 35 (35) 
Transport (N/%) 9 (9) 
Metal (N/%) 38 (38) 
Other (N/%) 19 (19) 
Size of local trade unions (persons): average 656 
Number of participants per local trade union: average 264 
Organisation of work (N/%) 37(37) 
 Reducing of labour (N/%) 32 (32) 
Wage (N/%) 24 (24) 
Sympathy strike (N/%) 2 (2) 
Interpretation of contract (N/%) 1 (1) 
External labour force (N/%) 5(5) 
Duration of strike (days): average (min-max) 2,0 (0,25–65 days) 
Economic loss in 2009 value: average (€) 1 152 838 
Mean of compensatory fine in 2009 value (€) 2 906 
Mean of compensatory fine/economic loss in 2009 value: average 1,75 % 
Mean of compensatory fine/number of participants in 2009 value 33 € 
 
 
In the data, an average size of local trade unions (number of persons) was 
656 and the amount of participants in the illegal industrial action was on 
average 264 employees. The most common reasons for illegal industrial 
actions were the organisation of work (37 % of all cases), the reducing of 
labour (32 %) and the disagreement over wages (24 %). On average the 
duration of the strike was two days and the longest strike lasted 65 days. 
Economic loss is measured in monetary loss, which is indicated in the 
application caused by industrial action. Economic loss has been modified 
in the 2009 equivalent value of money. An average economic loss from 
  
298
illegal industrial action was € 1 153 000 in 2009 value. Figure 2 describes 
the amount of damages from illegal industrial action (€ 100 000) in the 
2009 value for money.  
 
 
Figure 2 Economic losses in the year 2009 money value. The case of TT:2006-4 was 
excluded (the loss was 60 million) 
 
The amounts of the compensatory fines have also been changed in the year 
2009 monetary value. The average amount of the fine was € 2 906. The 
maximum penalty was € 16 500, which is not the same as the possible 
maximum fine. Minimum amount of the fine was € 194. 
When comparing the amounts of compensatory fines with the economic 
losses caused by the illegal industrial actions, the average ratio was 0.023. 
In other words, an average fine covers somewhat more than two percent 
(2.3%) of the economic loss. This amount is very far from the economists’ 
thought, that the compensatory fine should fit the economic loss in the 
industrial action. 
The correlation between the compensatory fine and the economic loss 
was 0.26, which is lower than the correlation between the number of 
participants and the economic loss (0.64). Correlations are positive in line 
with expectations, because the law requires taking into account these 
variables in determining the amount of the compensatory fine. 
Figure 3 describes the relationship between the amount of 
compensatory fine and the economic loss (€ 100 000). In addition, a line in 
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the graph describes the best the linear dependence between the variables 
(ols estimations). According to a simple linear regression analysis, we can 
conclude that for every additional €100 000 of economic loss the amount 
of the compensatory fine will increase only by € 40. The result is 
statistically significant, but in practice the determination of the 
compensation fine in relation to the harm is insignificant. 
 
 
Figure 3  Relationship between compensatory fine and economic loss (€ 100 000) 
 
 
4 Statistical analysis 
Statistical dependencies in the previous chapter demonstrate the link 
between two variables. When explaining the amount of the compensatory 
fine in the empirical analysis, we must control simultaneously several 
different factors that also affect the compensatory fine. Regression analysis 
can be used to control the influence of a number of factors in the 
determination of the compensatory fine at the same time, resulting the 
”pure” effect of a single variable.  
It should be noted that, in some case, it is inherently assumed that the 
certain variable has an impact on the determination of the compensation 
payment. The Collective Agreement Act includes an illustrative list of 
circumstances which at least should be taken into account when 
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determining the compensatory fine. These are the amount of the loss, guilt, 
the other party breaches any of the subjects of labour contracts and the size 
of the company. On the other hand, the amount of damages should, in 
principle, affect the imposed compensatory fine. Nevertheless the law does 
not ”tell” how much the influence should be.  
An important part of statistical research is to analyse practical 
significances of the empirical results. A statistically significant result is not 
necessarily financially, legally or practically significant. For example, even 
small differences in the compensatory fine between industries will be 
statistically significant if the number of observation is large enough. 
However that does not mean that the difference would be significant in the 
legal sense. 
An amount of the fine was explained with eight models. That is because 
we can analyse whether empirical results depend on the explanatory 
variables included in the models. Reliability of the results will not be 
satisfactory if different models give different impact of economic loss on 
the amount of the compensatory fine. 
By adding new explanatory variables, we can examine how the impact 
of economic loss caused by illegal industrial action on the compensatory 
fine changes between the models. The greater the changes are, the more 
important it is to include correct variables in the empirical model. 
Regression results are reported at Table 3 when the dependent variable is 
the amount of the fine in 2009 value terms. At the table, we report the size 
of coefficients and p-values. 
The size of the research data was 258 observations. The TT 2006:4 case 
was excluded from the study, because the loss suffered by the amount of 
EUR 60 million differed so much in other cases. The next largest loss was 
in the case TT 2008:81, slightly less than EUR 10 million. One abnormal 
case distorted the statistical results and in order to give an overview of 
typical cases one case was excluded from the analysis. 
In the models the amount of compensatory fine was explained with the 
amount of economic loss (€ 100 000), the size of local trade union (number 
of members), the number of participants in industrial action, the duration of 
days to industrial action, the number of local trade unions included in the 
case (also quadratic) and the year. In addition, the models included dummy 
variables, which take into account both the industry and the cause for 
illegal industrial action. Empirical models were built so that in the next 
model, one new variable was included in addition to old variables. This 
allows us to review how the coefficients in the models are changing when 
the number of explanatory variables increases. 
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Table 3 reports the results of the empirical analysis. Coefficients and p-
values (heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used30) of each 
variable are reported at the table. In addition, the last row of the table 
reports 95 per cent confidence interval for the coefficient of economic loss. 
By analysing the goodness-of-fit of the models we report R2, adjusted R2, 
p-value of the omitted variable bias test and p-value of the multicollinearity 
test31. 
According to adjusted R2 the last (e.g. eighth) model fits best to the data 
and therefore we concentrate on analysing the results of that model. 
Furthermore, the eighth model does not suffer omitted variable bias or 
multicollinearity. The variables explain 55 percent of the variation in the 
amount of compensatory fine. Empirical results show that when economic 
loss increase an € 100 000 the compensatory fine will be € 18 more than 
otherwise. The result is statistically significant and 95 per cent confidence 
interval for the coefficient is € 8–28. We can conclude that although the 
results is statistically significant, in the practice the impact of economic 
loss on the compensatory fine is rather insignificant to create, for example, 
a deterrence effect on local trade unions to avoid illegal industrial actions. 
The size of the local trade unions is not related to the amount of the 
compensatory fine. On the other hand, the number of participants is a 
statistically significant factor to explain compensatory fine. 10 more 
participants in the illegal industrial action increase the amount of the fine 
by € 33. The impact is equal than economic loss increasing by € 184 000. 
The duration of industrial action had no significant effect on the 
compensatory fine. 
Examining the causes of industrial action shows that only in a situation 
where the cause is the interpretation of the contract agreement, the amount 
of the compensatory fine differs from the reference group, namely the 
work of management. In this case, the compensatory fine is around € 2360 
higher than otherwise (p-value 0.000). On the other hand, it must be noted 
that there was only one case in which the reason was the interpretation of 
the contract and therefore the result is not reliable to make generalisation.  
In the metal and transportation industries the compensatory fines are 
greater than in forest industry when all other factors are taken into account. 
Results are statistically significant at 10 per cent risk level. Of course there 
is not any legal reason why the amount of compensatory fine differs 
between industries.  
 
                                                 
30 See more e.g Wooldridge 2006. 
31 Reset -test for analysing omitted variable bias and VIF test for analysing 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 3  Results of regression analysis 
The number of the model
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Economic loss 40,3 36,7 16,2 16,1 20,7 20,6 18,1 17,9
(100 000 €) 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Size of local trade union 0,5 0,0 0,0 ‐0,1 ‐0,1 ‐0,1 ‐0,1
0,001 0,829 0,984 0,345 0,320 0,395 0,510
Number of participants 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,4 3,3
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Duration (days) 32,9 34,5 34,8 28,3 20,9
0,224 0,128 0,120 0,177 0,312
Transport 1933,4 1923,7 1722,0 2197,3
0,101 0,108 0,159 0,084
Metal 700,9 687,8 579,1 638,2
0,003 0,007 0,059 0,061
Other ‐133,3 ‐140,1 ‐301,0 ‐181,2
0,576 0,555 0,320 0,597
Year 9,8 ‐77,4 ‐86,8
0,806 0,176 0,248
Number of local trade unions 35,8 33,6
0,061 0,081
(Number of local trade unions)^2 ‐0,7 ‐0,7
0,014 0,019
Reducing labour 450,6
0,198
Wage 438,2
0,198
Sympathy srike ‐1207,4
0,167
Intepretation of contract 2359,5
0,000
Use of external labour force 756,1
0,127
Constant 2441,8 2174,4 1847,9 1784,2 1642,0 1586,9 2255,1 1965,7
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Diagnostiikka
R 2 0,182 0,229 0,424 0,434 0,500 0,500 0,532 0,551
adj. R 2 0,179 0,223 0,417 0,425 0,486 0,484 0,513 0,523
Omitted variable ‐test 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,006 0,076 0,078 0,112 0,183
VIF 1,00 1,03 1,35 1,28 1,30 1,33 9,03 6,99
95 %:n confidence interval 28,1‐52,4 25,4‐47,9 6,3‐26,0 6,3‐25,9 12,1‐29,4 12,0‐29,2 8,3‐27,8 8,0‐27,7  
 
 
When we comparing all the empirical models with each other, we will 
notice that the economic loss was statistically significant variable to 
explain the amount of the compensatory fine. The following graph 
describes the coefficients of economic loss and 95 per cent confidence 
interval on those coefficients in each of eight models. In the graph, we can 
see that the coefficients of the economic loss are relatively stable between 
third and eight models. This is important for the reliability of the results 
because it is no good that the sizes of coefficients vary a lot depending on 
the other parameters that have been included in the models. In this study 
the results of the impact on economic loss on the compensatory fine can be 
considered reliable because of a small variation of the sizes of the 
coefficient. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this study we examined the determination of the compensatory fine for 
local trade unions in the case of illegal industrial action. Illegal industrial 
actions cause harm to the employers but actions may cause harm or 
damage also to third parties. Industrial actions which are against the 
existing collective agreement are prohibited by law. In this study, we found 
that the economic losses to employers caused by the illegal industrial 
action are a significant factor for the economic point of view.  
The empirical results show that the amount of economic loss affects the 
size of the compensatory fine. However, the results are not very flattering 
from the economic point of view, because the change in the compensatory 
fine is relatively low in comparison with the change in economic losses: 
economic losses increased by € 100 000 will increase the compensatory 
fine only by € 20. This is far from a situation in which the fine is equal 
with harm occurred by the illegal industrial actions. In addition, factors 
which are not entitled to the economic analysis of the optimal 
compensation such as the amount of participants or the size of the local 
trade unions, explained the determination of the compensatory fine. On the 
other hand, those variables are mentioned in the Collective Agreement Act 
as the possible determinants of the compensatory fine. 
In Finland the Collective Agreement Act ban illegal industrial actions, 
but an effective ”tools” to implement the law are missing, because of the 
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amount of the compensatory fines are so low and fines hardly create 
deterrence effect to avoid illegal actions for employees. The research 
revealed that the compensatory fines are equal to an average of about two 
per cent the amount of damages suffered by employers, and the monetary 
amount of the fines are so low that it is not likely to have an impact to the 
decisions of the local trade unions.  
According to the law and economic analysis, the fines should be the 
same size as what the employees incurred economic losses actually are. 
That is meant if the economic losses (including third party) increase by one 
1 million euro the compensatory fine should also increase by 1 million 
euro. This is not the situation what we can find in Finland nowadays. 
In the labour market system, more financial thinking should be 
extended. The question is not only sharing their mutual benefits between 
the contracting parties, but the costs and benefits should be examined at the 
whole level of society. It is important for the Finnish international 
competitiveness point of view that the amount of illegal industrial actions 
could be reduced to more close the average level of Europe. It would be 
therefore advisable to consider a compensatory fine reform in Finland. At 
this moment, the level of compensatory fine is insignificant to prevent 
illegal industrial actions. In the future in Finland, we must engage in the 
optimal level of compensatory fine so that it will create for both parties 
(employees and employers) incentives to not to violate the Collective 
Agreement Act or spirit of it.  
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QUASI-MARKET:  
Instrument for Better Regulation? 
Erkki Siivonen  
 
1 Introduction  
Market, hierarchies and networks have traditionally been seen as 
alternative or competing paradigms of organisational types. In different 
countries objectives to improve public sector productivity have been 
resulted to reforms to reorganise the production for public services. The 
providing public services by bureaucratic organisation or complete 
privatization of these services are not only solutions to improve the quality 
and efficiency for providing public services. Le Grand and Barlett (1993)1 
use the term quasi-market because “markets” in the public sector differ 
from “real” ideal type market in many ways. Le Grand and Barlett outline 
number of ways in which quasi-market differed in the terms of economic 
theory from open markets in private sector. Especially in financing and 
regulating services the differences are great between public and private 
sector. These differences reflect also the differences in the interpretation 
the concepts of market, hierarchies and networks.  
Hierarchies, markets and networks are well established “model of co-
ordination” or governing structures (Thompson et al, 1991; Rhodes, 1997a, 
b). The market is usually defined within neoclassical model. It is based 
upon notions of exchange which produce market signals upon which actors 
are assumed to operate. Equilibrium is the supposed outcome as supply and 
demand is brought into line (“indivisible hand”). However, other 
conceptions beyond this neoclassical model are possible. These include the 
transaction cost economy (Williamson, 1983) and new economic sociology 
(Granovetter, 1985 and Wagner, 2007). Hierarchies conjure up the idea of 
bureaucracy, which is characterised a high degree of centralisation of 
policy making and resource allocation, essentially suggesting a 
transmission belt to implement central directions, with limited autonomy 
for the periphery. Public sector organisations tend to have a vertical 
division of labour based on a hierarchical distribution of authority and 
responsibility (Walsh, 1995, p. 12). For most post war countries in OECD, 
                                                          
1 quasi-market is a public sector institutional structure that is designed to reap the 
supposed effciency gains of free markets without losing the equity benefits of traditional 
systems of public administration and financing 
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public sector has been seen as the archetypical hierarchical organisation, 
often described in terms of “command and control” command in terms of 
policy goals and objectives, control in terms of the mechanism to achieve 
such goals. 
As “extended chains of connections and linkages”, networks are often 
characterized by informal organizational forms and a common ethic or 
outlook, which often involve the formation and sustenance of trust 
relationships linked to reciprocity and mutuality. Multiple and overlapping 
networks create dense patterns of action, interaction and reaction between 
network members within and between organisations Networks have often 
been associated with the critiques of markets and hierarchies. Networks 
offer an alternative type in a sense that, as Granovetter (1985) argues, 
economic action is achieved through actors operating in networks, not as 
atomized individuals. Similarly Powell (1991) rejects the market –
hierarchy dichotomy in favour to networks. To summarize the conclusion 
of literature, the trilogy of hierarchies, markets and networks are different 
organisational types, with different co-ordination mechanism: “If it is price 
competition that is the central co-ordinating mechanism of the market and 
administrative orders that of hierarchies, then it is trust and co-operation 
that centrally articulates networks” (Thompson et al, 1991, p. 15).  
In those countries, which have adopted in there reform policy on public 
sector so called NPM paradigm (New Public Management), it could be 
seen some transmission policy to more market based action. Some part of 
policy measures are privatisation of public owned enterprises and other 
part of policy measures are called the adaption of market type mechanism 
in public sector regulation.  
 
 
2 Some general orientation to quasi-markets  
 analysis  
The traditional orientation to toward public finance construes its object, 
state, as intervening in the economy to change the resource allocations that 
would otherwise have resulted. The seminal articulation of this orientation 
is Richards Musgrave’s (1959) treatise The Theory of Public Finance. 
Musgrave presented a three-fold analytical schema for state intervention 
that has provided the foundation for fiscal theorizing since. Musgrave 
conceptualized the state as pursuing its tasks within a three part budgetary 
framework whose elements were allocation, distribution and stabilization. 
The dichotomy between allocation and distribution is still full play in 
contemporary fiscal theorizing. The interest in stabilization through fiscal 
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policy is also still alive, except that it is now treated as a topic for macro 
theorizing more than in fiscal context.  
For policy conclusion it is important to know that distribution of 
income and allocation for resources affects each other. Change in income 
distribution causes also a change in supply of public goods. It is proved 
(Richard Musgrave) that decisions of these two phenomenons can be 
separated, but then it must assume that taxes are so called lump sum taxes. 
But in general the supply of public goods is financed in other ways than 
lump sum taxes. Richard Musgrave also separated above two phenomenons 
for different tasks of public authority. In legal context these tasks are very 
complex institutional structure. 
Most legal rules can be implemented also in quasi-market context. But 
there is differences especially some area of property rights implementation. 
As Charles A. Reich (1964) has studied in his New Property article the 
institution called property guards the trouble boundary between individual 
man and the state. One of most important developments in OECD countries 
during the past decades has been the emergence of government as the 
important source of wealth. Public sector is large actor. It draws revenue 
and power, and pours the wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, 
franchises and licences. In the development of basic rights individualism 
has been weighted more than before. But in same time also the view of 
citizen as the member of society and member of different networks has 
become interpretation of basic rights (KM 1992:3, 110 and HE 309/1993 
vp, 25). Also a general duty to the public authority secure these rights (PL 
22 §) has increased more pluralist interpretation of the tasks of state and 
local community. 
The primary aim of basic rights is to give equal constitutional 
protection for all individuals. In order to reach this aim, it is not necessary 
to leave legal persons outside of scope of application of basic rights as 
mainstream constitutional doctrine do. Argumentation to favour this is 
stronger in quasi-market context where basic services are financed by tax 
revenue. According traditional doctrine, legal persons enjoy constitutional 
protection only indirectly. This does not mean that protection of those 
rights should necessarily be as strong as the protection of basic rights of the 
individuals (Pekka Länsineva, 2002). 
The basic conceptual orientation toward public finance bears a mirror 
image relationship to the theory of welfare economics. This latter is 
summarized by two theorems. The first asserts that competitive resource 
allocations are Pareto efficient. The second theorem asserts that one 
Pareto-efficient allocation can be transformed into an alternative Pareto-
efficient allocation through a set lump-sum taxes and transfers. This two – 
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theorem framework of welfare economics, maps directly into 
conceptualization of public finance in terms of allocative and distributive 
branches. The territory to be filled by the allocative branch is the territory 
where the first theorem of welfare economics fails to hold. In the presence 
of such alleged failures, various arguments are advanced that states should 
use their budgetary and regulatory powers to offset market failure by 
providing public goods and by contracting externalities (Atkinson & 
Stieglitz, 1987).  
From the social theoretic orientation pursued here, the state is not agent 
of intervention but an arena or process of interaction among people who 
are pursuing ends and whose relationships with one another are governed 
by the various institutions that constitute those relationships. Fiscal 
phenomena are thus emergent and not so much “social planner,” and the 
relation between phenomena that are ascribed to state and those ascribed to 
market is coeval and not sequential. The conclusion is that orthodox 
welfare economics have some restrictions as analytical framework for 
quasi-market problems. Just because emergence replaces social planner as 
the organizing analytical orientation does not remove the interest we have 
in the quality of social order.  
The above mentioned welfare theorems bring a stark simplicity to the 
organization of choice theoretic orientation to public finance, for any state 
activity can be expressed in terms of its allocative and its distributive 
impacts. Welfare economics thus provide a two-dimensional embeddedness 
structure for the theory of public finance. The first dimension treats 
distributive justice, and concerns the preconditions that are thought to be 
necessary before market outcomes are thought to be warranted even if they 
are competitively organized. The second dimension treats the allocative 
activities of government, and these activities are conceptualized as arising 
from a lack of genuine competitiveness in market allocation. That lack of 
competitiveness is thought have several aspects. The one of most immediate 
relevance to a theory of public finance is the presumed inability of market 
processes to generate a provision of public goods.  
Responsibility of public sector is to supply goods and services, which 
are not supplied in private sector (market failure). Such services like 
security and ownership rights sustain the essential civil rights. Public 
interest is that consumptions of these types of goods and services are not 
delivered by the ability to pay them a market price. Pure public goods are 
traditional example for a kind of goods in which public sector are think to 
be the most efficient producer. Reason for this is some technical (non-
rivalous, non-excludable) aspects, which make private production 
inefficient in certain situation. A clear-cut dichotomy between private and 
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public goods does not exist, and this is essentially why there can be so 
many disagreements on how to classify a given good a service. All goods 
are or less private or public and can – and constantly do – change with 
respect to their degree of privateness/publicness as people’s values and 
evaluations change, and as changes occur in the composition of population. 
A benefit of public funds in providing on collective goods2 is in positive 
external effects, which accrue in consuming these goods and services. 
Public services are often regarded as core of welfare state and are 
organized by local communal authority. Common natural resources are a 
different question and it is not analysed in this paper. 
The production for public goods, collective goods and market goods 
has special aspects in relation to property rights, which make their parallel 
production problematic in the circumstance in open market context. One 
aspect is that public and community goods have strategic importance from 
the point of public authority (moral hazard problem). This has created a 
need to find solutions to some old public sector problems of economic 
inefficiency. Also the accelerated development of globalisation has 
increased demand for new regulative solutions. Competition and 
globalisation have emphasized the importance of public and community 
goods in the consumer’s choices (Tuomala 2009).  
Market failure, as mention above, is one reason for production of public 
goods. If everybody think to benefit the consumption of public good 
independently to funding its cost, people has not incentive to pay 
consumption by voluntary base. That is the reason why public goods are 
normally finance by taxes. Basically there are two models to provide public 
goods for people. One is public production by bureaucracy or private 
supplying by tax financing. The problem is how it to be supplied efficiency 
the public goods. The Pareto efficient condition to supply private good is 
MRS=MC=MRT=p or price is equivalent to marginal cost. Basically it be 
possible to define same kind of condition to the public good; Σ MRSh 
=MRT (=MC) (h referee to individual person). This condition is called 
Samulson condition according to his famous articles on public goods. 
Samulson rule can be interpreted so that the benefit of additional public 
good create marginal utility for person A + marginal utility to person B. 
For private good the situation is opposite and the utility goes to person A or 
person B. For public goods MRSh can be interpreted as “individual price” 
or individual tax. Because distribution of income and allocation of 
resources effect demand for public goods no unique Pareto equilibrium 
could be finding (Tuomala, 2009)  
                                                          
2 Collective goods are included public goods, goods which have large positive external 
like natural monopolies and merit goods like school books (Tuomala 2009, p. 82) 
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According to paretian agenda, the state engages in two types of 
corrective activity. One is to correct resource misallocation; the other is to 
correct mal-distribution of initial endowments. The first type of activity 
follows the analytical path framed by the first theorem; the second type 
follows the path framed by the second theorem. The paretian grammar is 
necessarily ambiguous to apply because the formal statements it offers in 
terms of equalities or inequalities among various marginal rates of 
substitution and transformation are not subject directly to observation. 
Whether one sees a market failure that government corrects or a market 
success that government disturbs will almost invariably be matter of what 
the beholder’s eye chooses to see or there is possibility to both market 
failure and government failure. For observation problem there is one strong 
motive for market mechanism and it is residual claimacy. In a market 
setting to promote ex ante exploitation of all gains from trade; an agent that 
failed to exploit such gains is one that is not maximizing its net worth. 
From the perspective of this agent, the market provision of public goods 
necessarily fulfils the paretian condition once the all relevant costs are 
taken into account, because the contrary is to assume that people 
knowingly refusing to try to be effective in their actions (Wagner, 2007).  
The intellectual root of quasi-market problem can be traced to the 
discussion for Austrian economist Rudolf Goldstein in the course of his 
debate with Joseph Schumpeter over the treatment of Austrian public debt 
after the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (Hickel, 1976). While the immediate point of the debate was how 
to service Austria’s large public debt, the intellectual core of the debate 
was the place of the property in the conduct of state activity. Schumpeter 
supported imposition of an extraordinary tax that would allow the debt to 
be extinguished. Once this was accomplished, the state would finance with 
normal level of taxation. In contrast, Goldscheid supported the 
recapitalisation of the state, by which he meant a return to cameralist-type 
arrangements wherein the state derived significant revenue from property 
and commercial activity through its taxes (public funds). Goldscheid 
operated with notion of an entrepreneurial state, Schumpeter thought in 
terms of a tax state. Goldscheid thought that tax state would operate to 
depress vigorous commercial activity through its taxes, so he advanced the 
notion of state as an entrepreneurial actor. There is surely the merit in both 
lines of argument, as well as a great deal of imponderable points of 
ambiguity involved in trying to sort out the issues.  
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3 Competition in quasi-markets  
One consequence of the reforms in public sector is that the purchase and 
sale of secondary public services resemble market transactions. Because, 
however, many of the providers are part of the same public governance 
structure as purchasers and because of extensive powers of ministerial 
administrations, where it thinks appropriate, it is usual to refer to these 
arrangements as quasi-markets. Two particular areas of policy concern in 
these quasi-markets are the form of interaction between purchasers and 
providers, which is often specified in a contract, and the extent and 
consequences of competition between the providers. In this context, 
increase competition is usually as being synonymous with an increase 
number of suppliers (at least potentially) without restriction of competition 
(KRL 4 §). This is appropriate definition also in this paper because 
increased complexities of policy goals increase the demand of specific 
labour and assets. Traditionally, concentration is viewed as an important 
influence on the performance of a market. What is not, however, clear is 
how greater competition in the public sector services will affect the 
performance of the quasi-markets.  
Economic models of public services have long recognized two 
important features of these services. First, as emphasized by Arrow (1963), 
with health services there are particular problems in ensuring that patients 
are as well informed as providers about the quality, appropriateness, and 
cost of treatments. Second, public services are in many cases paid for by a 
third party, such as insurance company or public authority. In the presence 
of these features attention has centred on how to ensure that providers 
deliver appropriate standards of services and how to keep costs down. It is 
these two concerns of quality and cost that have to be focus on in 
considering the role and importance of competition in quasi – market.  
In assessing the role of competition and market type mechanisms in 
public sector services it is useful to evaluate the experiences for some other 
countries (like UK, USA and Australia) especially in the institutional 
structures associated with the production, delivery and funding for public 
sector services. The emergence and growth of new forms of funding public 
services (like ppp-contracts) and public service delivery organisations, has 
served focus research on the way public services markets work (Dibben, 
Wood and Roper, 2004).The existence of purchasers with possible 
different objectives is also a feature the public sector services. Different 
policy area authorities, which are majority purchasers of these services, are 
public bodies bounded by primary constitutional goals, which mean that 
the objectives have to be taken beyond typical well-being of a particular 
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interest group (PL 124 §). At the same time, an important and growing 
number of services are purchased by fundholders, who might be expected 
to be more narrowly focused on the interests of their own practices and 
clients.  
There are, however, important differences between quasi-market and 
open real market, both in the organisation of public service provision and, 
possibly, with regard to objectives of providers, and these need to be born in 
mind before drawing policy conclusions. In real market the objective of the 
owners is to increase money value of their wealth, meanwhile in quasi-
market the utmost objective is to increase the well-being of citizens or 
taxpayers. The borderline between quasi-market and open real market is not 
clear because some number of actors is near non-profit organisation 
(subsided) or they provide services by public money. How these various 
features of the quasi-market affect policy conclusions depends, at least 
partly, upon the kind of quasi-market under consideration. In the beginning 
it is useful to consider separately two conceptually distinct markets within 
public sector. The first, which I call public authority market, is one in which 
public authorities purchase public services on the behalf of their population. 
The second, which can be called actors fundholder market, is one in which 
actors as fundholders (off-balance sheet budget funds) in their role as agents 
for customers purchase public services on their behalf. By definition in terms 
of volume and value of services transacted, public authority market is larger 
than fundholders market (because parliamentary power to tax).  
Competition has potentially two roles in quasi-market context. The first 
is efficiency role of helping ensure that the contract goes to the most 
efficient provider, so that unnecessary resources are not used in the 
provision of services. The second is rent allocation role of helping to 
ensure that the public authority does not pay more for services than 
necessary. In the conventional textbook monopoly, these two things 
together- the monopolist raises prices to extract rent and, in process of 
doing that, distorts the choices of purchasers so resulting in the efficiency 
loss. When purchasers negotiate over services and prices, the two effects 
can become de-coupled. The purchaser and provider both have interest in 
negotiating for the efficient provision of services and agreeing a total 
payment that allocates the rent without distorting that provision.  
When both purchaser and provider are equally well informed about the 
costs of providing services, the efficiency role of competition is trivial 
because the purchaser knows which provider has the lowest expected costs 
and will negotiate directly with that provider. Moreover, the rent allocation 
role may also be limited or nonexistent. This is most apparent if public 
authority can make “take it or leave it” offers. In that case, public authority 
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could simply specify the services it wants at prices that exactly reflect costs 
and extract all the rent even if the provider has no competitors. If public 
authority cannot make such offer, which is typical case, increased 
competition may help them by enabling them to play providers off against 
each other during contract negotiations and thereby get services delivered 
for lower prices. But weather or not that is the case, even in theory, on 
some complex issues of bargaining into which Osborne and Rubinstein 
(1990, ch. 9), who analyse the effect of competition in markets where there 
is bargaining over prices, provide insight.  
When a purchaser is less well-informed about costs than providers, 
competition has a clear role in rent allocation. Without competition, 
provider may be able to extract revenues over and above those that are 
strictly necessary to ensure the delivery of services. Excess revenues of this 
kind are referred to as informational rents. They can arise even if a public 
authority can make “take it or leave it” offers because the public authority 
needs to ensure that services are available even if the provider has high 
cost. The high prices necessary to ensure provision then lead to a low-cost 
provider getting an informational rent. This issue has been widely 
discussed in the context of government procurement (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). Informational rents can still arise when providers share the same 
concerns as purchasers. For broader context, even parliament that share a 
public authority’s concern for the welfare of citizens, may wish to retain 
rent that they can then spend on residual risk type of expenditure, which 
legislator has define on constitutional base. One role for competition in, for 
example, the form of competitive tendering, is to induce providers to offer 
lower prices for supplying services and thus reduce the informational rents 
they may otherwise appropriate.  
Auction and bidding theory provides an insight into a efficiency role 
and the effect of tendering on informational rents. McAfee and McMillan 
(1987) have an accessible review this. A standard result in auction theory is 
that, if providers differ in prices at which they are prepared to provide a 
particular service because of their different costs, competitive tendering 
will result in the contract going to lowest –cost provider at the price that on 
average reflects the cost of the second-lowest-cost provider (auction where 
one is finally left). The last but one bidder will drop out at its reservation 
price, leaving the winner to accept a price marginally below that. 
Competition among providers and subsequent bidding for contracts can 
thus both ensure efficiency in allocating the contract to the lowest-cost 
provider and limit the informational rent to the difference between the 
costs of the lowest-cost and of the second-lowest-cost providers.  
  
316
But it may not be efficient to allocate the contract to the lowest-cost 
provider if that provider supplies a low-quality service. In the absence of 
objective measures of quality that can made enforceable in contracts, 
bidders who are competing on price have an incentive to cut costs by 
reducing standards of service as long as these reductions are unlikely to be 
perceived by public authorities. To counter this, public authorities has to 
create incentives for providers to deliver the quality of services that it 
wants. If the users of public services perceive, albeit imperfectly, quality 
differences in the public services offered by different providers, then 
providers may use quality to attract users of public services and hence 
demand can be used to create such incentives. One way for public authority 
to exploit this demand mechanism is to set an appropriately price for 
services so that providers have an incentive to expand the number and 
quality of services. If the provider is the only supplier of services in the 
particular area, the best it can hope to achieve by increasing quality is an 
expansion of the market. If, however, a provider competes with others it 
has the possibility, through offering enchased quality, of increasing it 
market share. In such circumstances, therefore, competition between 
providers may substantially change their incentives to supply high-quality 
services. Thus, with greater competition between providers, the same 
quality can be achieved at lower price which may enable the public 
authority to purchase services at a lower overall cost.  
From the research perspective for informational rent, theories 
underlying government regulative information standards are mostly 
normative, in contrast to positive theory of business financial accounting. 
Coase 1937 and Williamson 1985 have studied property rights and 
transaction costs (TCE) in the contexts of organisational behaviour and it is 
possible to draw inspiration on their work to solve public sector 
informational problems. TCE recognizes the incompleteness of all 
contracts, since organisations can neither have perfect information nor 
possibly foresee all future contingencies. It also assumes that economic 
actors behave not only in bounded rational form, but also opportunistically. 
Because renegotiations are costly, bounded rationality, opportunism, and 
relationship-specific investments expose one of the transacting parties to 
the hazards of ex post hold-ups (Williamson 1985). In addition, ex ante 
uncertainty creates strategic misrepresentation risks such as moral hazard 
to the parties. Either situation may lead to the non – realization of 
investment or underinvestment in otherwise lucrative governmental 
relationships. The major sources of transaction costs identified in the 
literature are uncertainty, the frequency of contract updates, and asset 
specifity: physical, human, site, and dedicated assets (Williamson 1983). 
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The higher the uncertainty, frequency, or specifity governing contracts in a 
relationship, the higher transaction costs will be. Therefore, government 
would organize their boundaries to minimize these costs.  
Although empirical results have systemically supported the 
propositions that frequency of transactions, demand uncertainty, and 
especially asset specificity are positively associated with vertical 
integration, results are mixed to say the least when testing the influence of 
technological uncertainty on organisations’ boundaries. One possibility for 
this lack of empirical regarding technological uncertainty is that the 
competence perspective may play an important part in an innovative 
setting, diluting the influence of TCE as drive of integration. 
In analysing quasi-market one utmost goal is the welfare of citizens. 
How can approach these welfare arguments, when profit and wealth of 
owner’s is not only goal of providers? The first step is to analyse 
transaction cost as a drive of the institutional change. The initial structural 
for regulative regimes is the hypothesis to evaluate overall efficiency of 
quasi-market structure. In figure 1 I analyse the welfare effects of new 
regulative structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1 it is assumed that total markets are formed by two different types 
of submarkets. The informational relationship of these two submarkets is 
described by equilibrium price P0 and by different transaction cost levels (tc1 
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– tc4) measured by unit cost. Industrial and tax policy give some subsidies to 
real market actors, which increase supply from QD to QF. If these subside is 
competition neutral the society as whole can get welfare benefits. But if 
there is distortion competition effect, the net impact can be zero or even 
negative. In quasi-market side the initial bureaucratic model supply an 
amount QB for public services and after the adaption process an amount QC 
by transaction cost tc4. But the change in institutional structure can create 
new supply of public services so that final supply is in equilibrium at QA. 
The difference QA – QB is the welfare benefit created by quasi-market and 
partly financed by lower transaction cost.  
Both submarkets are regulated, but quasi-market more than real market. 
Most regulated is bureaucratic model. The goals for public square can be 
related several targets like productivity (resource allocation), cost 
efficiency and sustainability of public funds. There is also endogeneity of 
legal and fiscal capacity as the variables, which have to take account of 
evaluation for adaption processes. The effect on productivity is most 
closely linked to transaction costs, which create different obstacles or 
possibilities for overall economic efficiency. In which level transaction 
costs are, is an empirical question?  
 
 
4 Informational relationships for quasi-market  
actors  
The development of government accounting is related to the constitutional 
form of government that provides separation of powers, and checks and 
balances among legislative, executive, and juridical branches of 
government. In an administrative hierarchy, the superior holds subordinates 
accountable and requires feedback information on their performance. A 
legislature monitors the conduct of the executive branch, for example, in 
executing the approved budget. Furthermore, a government has the 
incentive to disclose information in order to induce others to provide 
resources to it. These include potential buyers of government securities; 
vendors of good and services, and other actors contracting with 
government. In these voluntary exchanges, information is used to predict a 
government’s ability to carry out the terms of contracts. After transactions 
are made accounting information is used to monitor contractual 
performance (Chan 2003).  
Government accounting has three purposes. The first and utmost is to 
prevent illegitimate the constitutional rights as social performance by 
detecting processes, which weaken these rights. For instance corruption in 
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government exists in various forms and is nurtured by incentives. This is 
an acute problem in poor, developing countries, but corruption is not 
limited to them (Rose Ackerman 1999).  
The intermediate purpose of government accounting is to facilitate 
sound financial management. Financial management includes activities 
such as collecting taxes and other revenues and collecting information on 
expenses on the principle for fair and sufficient knowledge on the public 
sector activities. In a well-run government, these activities are budgeted or 
otherwise planned. Their execution through duly authorized transaction is 
recorded in the financial accounting system. 
The advanced purpose of government accounting is to help government 
discharge its public accountability. Public accountability exists in three 
levels of principal – agent relationship, accountability of bureaucracy to 
chief executive, of the executive to the legislature, and the legislature to the 
people (Chan 2003). This purpose can be better achieved by increasing the 
agent’s incentive to disclose and by lowering the principal’s information 
costs. The main attraction of government – wide financial reporting is that 
it might reduce the information analysis and evaluation costs of users. Over 
40 – years ago, Downs (1957) warned that high information costs would 
discourage voters from obtaining more and complex information about 
government. Voters are rationally ignorant after weighing the marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of information search, in a manner similar than 
consumer’s behaviour (Stigler 1961).  
In order to serve the three identified purposes, financial accounting and 
management accounting cannot be so neatly compartmentalized in public 
sector, where management accounting refers to parliamentary budgeting 
and control, rather than accounting solely in the service of managers. The 
budget is an expression of public interest and political preferences. It is an 
instrument of fiscal policy on revenue and spending to achieve 
macroeconomic and welfare objectives. It provides benchmarks for 
productivity measured partly by the accounting system. The value of public 
activities is closely linked to parliamentary decision making especially on 
taxation in overall sense.  
The ownership concept is problematic in the public sector, but basically 
it could be solve by interlinked it in parliamentary and local voting process. 
In property right theory voting is special type of property right. In principal 
it is possible to estimate statistically an accounting equation (assets = 
liabilities + owner’s equity) and its corollary profit (return on taxes as 
value of public services) = revenues – expenses). Unfortunately, the assets 
and liabilities of the national government of a sovereign state are difficult 
to identify and harder still to measure in financial terms. Qvasi-market 
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approach makes the measurement problem easier to solve at least in micro 
level.  
Accounting principles allow a business, weather private or state owned, 
to recognize revenues only to the extent of goods or services provided. 
Governments uniquely provide public goods and finance them through 
taxation. Public goods are consumed collectively, and non payers cannot be 
excluded – hence requiring tax finance. These characteristic sever the link 
between service delivery and revenue recognition, making it impossible to 
match revenues to expenses. This accounting problem is also exacerbated 
by the involuntary nature of many transactions between government and 
people. The government’s operating statement tracks the resource flows, 
and only incidentally measures the government’s service efforts and 
accomplishments. In contrast to limited liability rule, governments in 
democracy are prone to expand to their responsibilities, resulting to larger 
budgets and frequent deficits. This further makes severer the matching 
problem (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). 
The government balance sheet provides important information on the 
financial and legislative performance (in economic sense) of the 
government from period to period. Because of theoretical weaknesses of 
balance sheet definitions an increasing net worth means that a government 
is reducing rather than increasing net liabilities on future generations. In 
theory it should be possible to determine the present value characteristics 
associated with major expense obligations created by law and invest assets 
(partly reallocation of resources) to offset these risks. However, there are 
many rights (like collective property rights3) and obligations of 
government that are excluded from the balance sheet, mainly because of 
valuation problems. The most significant item missing from the balance 
sheet is the “primary asset” or taxpayers’ equity. The source of value of 
this primary asset is for the government power to tax (Wilson Au-Yeung & 
al. 2006). While this power is limited by such factors as the constitution, 
international tax competition, the size and growth of the economy, the 
effects of tax rate and base changes on economic efficiency and welfare 
equity – the taxing power provides strong assurance of the government’s 
ability to meet its liabilities.  
The performance of public sector activities can be reflected by 
constitutional rights and the economic interpretation of residual risk. 
Taxpayer’s equity and net worth are both important concept in linking long 
term public economy sustainability and balance sheet management into 
quasi-market regulation. 
                                                          
3 Collective property rights are residual claim in the bundle of property rights in public 
sector balance sheet, when special assets are defined.  
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 +Taxpayer’s equity (forward looking item) 
adding liabilities, which are not debt  
+ constitutional value added  
+ reservations  
+ adjustment of values  
+ constitutional membership fees (like EU membership fee)  
subtracting  
- adjustment of values  
- revaluations of fixed asset  
- expense item covering several financial periods, but not being asset  
adding correction for adjustment values 
subtracting  
- tax rebate  
_______________________________________________________________________
= Net worth (backward looking item) 
 
 
Unless presented carefully, this can lead to misunderstanding of the 
underlying economic value of specific assets and liabilities on a 
government’s balance sheet. Probably the largest contingent liabilities not 
recorded on the balance sheet relate to future pensions and public health 
costs and human capital costs as assets. However, these obligations to fund 
future expenses have an impact on the economy today, as well as on fiscal 
sustainability. These conceptual and measurement problems mean that 
government balance sheet is not directly comparable with similar private 
sector financial statements not even on quasi-market context. Government 
balance sheet management therefore requires a different framework for 
determining whether investment strategies are optimal. In particular, 
contingent assets and liabilities are likely to have a significant influence on 
how best to structure the government balance sheet to reduce risk and 
improve fiscal sustainability.  
There are some important criticisms of the taxing power approach that 
can affect our policy conclusions. First, there is the potential problem of 
policy endogeneity. If the government’s improved financial asset 
performance encourages greater government spending then the 
independence between government spending and taxing is violated. The 
bulk of the super liability relates to previously accrued entitlements that are 
reasonably well defined. Finally, the government reports its underlying 
cash surplus exclusive of net worth earnings so that they cannot be used for 
recurrent expenditure. Moral hazard is a particularly severe for of policy 
endogeneity that appears to have limited the use of some financial 
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instruments to manage government balance sheets. Traditionally, the 
economics literature on optimal debt management has focused on “state-
contingent” debt. More recently, the literature has focused on hedging the 
balance sheet by optimal design of the maturity and denomination of 
conventional debt securities. But from the point of balance sheet 
management this is too narrow performance measure for over all net worth 
evaluation.  
 
 
5 Concluding remarks  
Quasi-market is one of the diverse histories to study the effects of 
regulatory reforms in sectors which were traditionally most heavily 
sheltered from competition and have witnessed, at different times and to 
different degrees, some form of deregulation and privatization in various 
countries. Specifically, I have looked at the effects of regulation on 
investment in institutional structure (legal capacity defined by property 
rights and transaction cost. Preliminary analysis for two types market and 
their information structure can tell us that competition neutrality and its 
relation to weak and strong incentives has important role in forming quasi-
market framework. The empirical study is needed to find indicators to 
measure regulation with different time varying behaviour that capture entry 
barriers and the extent of public ownership, among other things. Studies4 in 
OECD countries since have proved that regulatory reforms have had a 
significant positive impact on capital accumulation in the utilities 
industries. In particular, liberalization of entry in potentially competitive 
markets seems to have had the largest and most significant impact on 
private investment. The effect of privatization is less clear-cut5. On the one 
hand privatization may lead to more profit opportunities for private firms; 
on the other hand public enterprises may overinvest if they pursue political 
objectives and/or if managers are not constrained by the discipline imposed 
by capital markets. There is also evidence that the marginal effect of 
deregulation on investment is greater when the policy reform is large and 
when changes occur starting from already lower levels of regulation. In 
other words, small changes in a heavy regulated environment are not likely 
to produce much of an effect.  
                                                          
4 See Winston (1993)  
5 Alesina A. Ardagna S, Nicoletti G, Schiantarelli F, (2003) 
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TO UNDERSTAND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES  
DOCTRINE 
Beata Mäihäniemi 
 
Abstract  
The essential facilities doctrine (henceforth EFD), which dates back to 1912 and 
the American case of The United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, is 
constantly applied on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The doctrine is applied 
when access to a facility is essential and, in order for a person to operate on a 
certain market, the owner of the facility may, in particular circumstances, be 
obliged to grant access to that person. The concept of the EFD cannot be 
introduced without proving that the owner of that facility is in possession of 
monopoly power. Monopoly power is then the indispensable basis for antitrust 
principles and remedies. Nevertheless, the presence of “essentiality” and ease of 
duplication according to some scholars should also be considered as legal 
conditions. In addition to that, the importance of the condition of impracticability 
of duplication needs to be stressed, because it guarantees that the doctrine will 
only be applied to the cases where no feasible alternative exists or where a 
facility cannot be reproduced. The first aim of this paper is to understand the 
essence of the EFD. Which facilities are more likely to be deemed essential? 
Which economic conditions influence the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine? What are the boundaries of the doctrine (the difference between cases 
involving the essential facilities doctrine and refusal to deal)? 
As an introduction, the paper will identify industries where the doctrine is 
commonly applied. The nature of the EFD initially derives from the “classic 
cases”, which arose in areas of transport, communication services, as well as 
press and medicine. However, nowadays, in the presence of network industries, 
the doctrine may not only take a form of a physical asset, but also of information 
or an intangible asset. In Bronner for example, Advocate General Jacobs stressed 
that facility could be a product, such as raw material or service, a facility may 
also include condition of an access to a place such as harbour or airport or to a 
distribution system such as the telecommunications network. Additionally, 
Bronner mentioned three criteria, which appropriate the concept of the EFD. 
First, the access to the facility must be denied in order to prevent competition. 
Second, the access needs to be essential for the applicant to manage his business. 
Finally, the access should be refused without an objective justification.  
The EFD is present on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean; however there are 
significant differences in its application in the European Union and in the United 
States. This situation derives from the fact that in the EU a general duty to deal is 
imposed on enterprises, while in the US companies can choose freely whom to deal 
with. In the EU the idea of the essential facilities doctrine is still alive; however, in 
the US many scholars attack it and postulate abandoning the doctrine. 
Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have 
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never formally recognized the doctrine. Despite the criticism, the doctrine is still 
widely implemented, in particular in the area of network industries. Network 
industries are characterized by network effects, which are also known as demand 
economies of scale and can create or reinforce existing barriers to entry, insulate 
the monopolist from competition and lock consumers into the existing technology. 
From an economic perspective, this kind of situation may be very harmful for 
consumer welfare and create a need for a system of open standards and full 
interoperability that can be achieved by the application of the EFD. 
In the EC law, the development of the doctrine is based on Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 82 TEC) and the 
provision implicates that abuses of dominant position within the Common Market 
are forbidden. European version derives the liability from the relationship between 
the essential facility and the relevant market. In the US, where the regulation of the 
doctrine is rooted in Section 2 of the Sherman Act, liability needs to be based on 
the competitive relationship between the parties. Therefore many lower courts in 
the US require plaintiffs to prove that they are competitors who were denied access 
to an essential facility controlled by the defendant, monopolist. 
There is a controversy around the EFD, which is accompanied by significant 
changes in its popularity, definition, and application by the courts and 
enforcement agencies as a basis for imposing antitrust liability. We can observe 
evident attempts to hamper its use. Nowadays we can also witness the shift 
towards the new “convenient facilities doctrine” approach which is strongly 
advocated by the European Commission. The approach has been applied since 
the famous Microsoft case. “Convenient facility” is an “asset without access to 
which it would be inconvenient for rivals to operate on the market, because they 
would need to offer customers a better product in order to overcome the 
advantages of the incumbent”. “Convenient facilities” approach is often 
perceived as unjustified in economic terms. This situation has raised questions in 
the economic literature on the optimal environment for innovation. To evaluate 
the optimal environment for innovation it is crucial to balance between the 
situations when unrestrained monopoly power is likely to be too lazy to innovate, 
and when a firm with no chance of achieving a share of market power cannot 
expect to produce the funds to finance valuable investments in innovation. 
Finally, there is a need to identify doctrine’s limits and limitations. The first 
main problem arising in connection to the application of the EFD is the defence 
of the doctrine in natural monopoly cases. Natural monopoly is obtained when a 
single firm can supply the entire market at a declining average total cost of 
production. Encouraging entry into natural monopoly markets may therefore, 
result in wasteful expenditures on these fixed costs of production. Should then, as 
some scholars claim, natural monopolies be sheltered from antitrust liability? The 
second major issue is resentment towards the use of the essential facilities 
doctrine in the area of intellectual property rights (henceforth IPRs). A large 
number of scholars claim the doctrine should not be applied to IPRs at all. 
However, according to classic economic theories of intellectual property rights 
IPRs have characteristics similar to the ones of a natural monopoly, such as large 
fixed costs and low variable costs. Therefore, if the doctrine would be applied to 
the cases concerning a natural monopoly patent or copyright, it would have to be 
modified in order to distinguish between regular patents and copyrights and the 
ones with characteristics of a natural monopoly. Can this implication change the 
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way in which courts treat cases concerning IPRs? So far, the courts were 
reluctant to impose any antitrust liability either in a form neither of compulsory 
access nor in the form of the EFD when it comes to this kind of cases. 
The purpose of the paper is therefore to investigate the problem of the EFD, 
with its limitations and in circumstances involving its constant evolution. This 
will be primarily done by throughout analysis of the case law and scholars’ 
articles by means of the comparative law and economics.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
The nature of the essential facilities doctrine (henceforth EFD) derives 
from the classic cases that have been solved in the area of transport and 
communication services, press and medicine, where the issue was initially 
discussed. The doctrine is “not a piece of law but a systematic 
interpretation of how the courts have applied European competition law 
and American antitrust law in a particular class of situations” (Bergman 
2005, p. 7). Essential facility cases can be regarded as “specialized 
examples of general rules about discrimination and handicaps created by 
dominant companies” (OECD 1996, p. 94). 
In the European Union the application of the EFD is based on the 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex 
Article 82 TEC). The article prohibits, as incompatible with Common 
Market any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it, so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. The article includes the list of 
possible abuses which is not exhaustive. Article 102 is related to 
exploitative behaviour (excessive pricing) and exclusionary practices such 
as predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, refusal to supply and tying. In the 
United States the essential facilities doctrine has its roots in Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolise 
a market and conspiracies to monopolise “any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several stages, or with foreign nations” (however 
having a monopoly position is not by itself illegal). The act carries its own 
penalties which include imprisonment up to three years and recently jail 
sentences for antitrust enforcement have been given more often. On the 
contrary, in the EU competition law does not allow imposing criminal 
penalties in antitrust violations, although some of the Member States 
(Austria, France, Germany and Ireland) do. 
The EFD is being constantly criticized. The Supreme Court attacked the 
doctrine in the report of the Report of Antitrust Modernization Commission 
(2007) as well as in the recent report of the Bush administration Justice 
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Department. On the other hand, in Europe, the doctrine (also known as 
unilateral refusals to deal) has been in use for the last 30 years. The 
European Commission, the Court of First Instance, and the European Court 
of Justice have been implementing and applying the EFD, as well as have 
been the courts of the twenty seven Member States. 
The purpose of this paper is to understand the nature of the essential 
facilities (which forms can it take? when is the facility essential?) and 
explain the situations where the EFD is applied (what are the criteria? 
where is the application recommended or not recommended?). It also seeks 
to compare the American and European versions of the doctrine. The paper 
approaches the problems from Comparative Law and Economics point of 
view, which can be defined as a discipline which is located at the boarders 
of contemporary legal research and combines the analytical tools of 
complementary social sciences in order to develop a critical approach to 
legal rules and institutions (Mattei and Monti 2001, p. 1).  
 
 
2 Definition and Origins of Doctrine 
An essential facility can take a form of any input, which is deemed 
necessary for all industry participants to operate in a given industry and is 
not easily duplicated. The input can take a form of either physical or 
intangible asset. An essential facility also gives its owner a competitive 
advantage over rivals which have inferior inputs, therefore when input is 
easy, cheap and possible to reproduce it is difficult to say it is essential. 
The examples of the essential facility include slots in the airport, port 
installations, local loop, transmission, certain chemical components in 
pharmaceutical industry etc.  
The concept of essentiality is understood similarly in American and 
European Union legal jurisdictions. In the US the facility ought to be 
essential to potential competition between plaintiff and monopolist and 
must not be available from another source or easy to duplicate by the 
plaintiff or others (Areeda and Hovenkamp 1996, para. 773.b). 
Competition law in the EU has its own definition of essentiality, which can 
be found in Access Notice, where essential is “a facility or infrastructure 
which is essential for reaching customers and /or enabling competitors to 
carry on their business, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable 
means” (EC 1998, para. 68). One of the definitions of “essentiality” can be 
found in the case of Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, known as 
the case of Magill (1995). Magill concludes that the EFD does not entail 
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identical conditions for all competitors; it rather works as a mechanism 
where competition may exist on previously foreclosed markets. Therefore, 
mandatory access to the facility should be granted only when there is an 
overwhelming barrier to entry for competitors of the dominant company, or 
where without access, competitors would be threatened with “a serious, 
permanent and unavoidable competitive handicap which would make their 
activities uneconomical” (Lang 1994, p. 437). 
The essential facility situation can be explained using simple example 
(see below Figure 1.1). It occurs when an undertaking (A), which is active 
at both the upstream and downstream levels of an industry, possesses a 
monopoly at one or another level and denies access to the facility to other 
firm (B) who wishes to provide either upstream or downstream services 
only. In order for B to supply final consumers B requires access to a 
downstream asset which is controlled by A (Walker 2006, p. 56).  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of a Downstream Bottleneck (Walker 2006, p. 56) 
 
“Essential facility” has been defined by the EC1 in its Sea Containers 
(1994, recital 66) decision in the following way: 
 
An undertaking which occupies a dominant position in the 
provision of an essential facility and itself uses the facility (i.e., a 
facility or infrastructure, without access to which competitions 
cannot provide services to their customers), and which refuses 
other companies access to that facility without objective 
justification or grants access to competitors only on terms less 
favourable than those which it gives its own services, infringes 
Article [102], if the other conditions of Article [102] are met. 
 
The roots of the doctrine can be found in the US where the legislation 
prohibits monopolization and any attempt to monopolize a market 
                                                            
1 See also Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in 
the Telecommunications Sector, Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles (Access 
Notice) OJ 1998 C265/02, recital 68. 
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(Sherman Act 1890, §§ 1–7). However, the term “essential facilities 
doctrine” was used for the first time in 1970, when Neale illustrated and 
investigated the line of the Supreme Court and lower – court cases 
concerning the refusal to deal with a competitor by a vertically integrated 
dominant enterprise (Neale 1970, p. 67). The first known application of the 
doctrine is the case in The United States v Terminal Rail Road Association 
of St. Louis (1912). The case analysed the problem of allowing open and 
equal access to all competitors where the sanction has been imposed on the 
joint operators of the only railroad bridge across the Mississippi River. The 
doctrine has not been explicitly named; however, the Court held that 
refusing the access to the facilities of a dominant firm constituted a 
violation of the antitrust laws (Waller 2008, p. 361). Terminal Railroad 
(1912) stressed the social benefit of the natural monopoly and narrowed its 
antitrust liability to a compulsory license agreement.  
The EFD based on natural monopoly characteristics can be also 
concluded from Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States (1973), MCI 
Communications Corp. v. AT&T (1983), and Aspen Skiing v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing (1985), however in this last case the court has chosen to 
treat the natural monopoly with the normal regime of antitrust liability 
(Martin 2006, p. 31). In Aspen Skiing the doctrine was applied to a case 
concerning common selling of ski resort tickets by three competitors. After 
the decision on the common selling of multi-area ski tickets has been 
terminated, customers lost the possibility of using different areas’ ski 
resorts at a discounted price. The court stated that an essential facility has 
taken a form of multi-area and the defendant (one of three competitors, the 
only one excluded from the common selling of the tickets) was denied the 
access to it, which constituted an obvious intent to exclude the competitor. 
 
 
3 Criteria for Application of Essential Facilities  
Doctrine 
There are several criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to apply the 
EFD. Among them, is the crucial requirement of proving that the owner of 
that facility is in possession of monopoly power. The second condition 
includes the anticompetitive intent of the dominant undertaking. Some 
scholars, such as Lipsky and Sidak (1991, pp. 1211–1213) claim that the 
presence of “essentiality” and ease of duplication should be considered as 
legal conditions the same way as the issue of monopoly power. 
Additionally, there is the condition of impracticability of duplication, since 
it guarantees that the doctrine will only be applied to the cases, where no 
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feasible alternative exists, or when facility cannot be reproduced. The 
criteria for the application of the doctrine will be characterized below.  
Firstly, in order to apply the EFD the owner of the facility has to possess 
monopoly power, which is an indispensable basis for antitrust principles and 
remedies. “Monopoly power” is the power of a single firm, which is not 
acting in cooperation with competing seller, to maintain a price slightly 
above the competitive level. This concept differs from the one of “market 
power”, which is the real significance of concentration; it facilitates 
collusion, explicit or tacit, among the firms in the market by reducing the 
costs of collusion and of detecting cheating (Posner 1976, 2001 p. 124).  
Monopolistic bottlenecks are common occurrences in a number of 
industries such as energy, rail, or telecommunications. The term 
“bottleneck” represents the effective constraints on the minimum speed or 
level of an activity. Inefficiency of monopoly is based on the fact that a 
monopolist produces less than the competitive amount of output and is 
therefore Pareto inefficient. While a competitive industry operates at a 
point where price equals marginal cost, a monopolized industry operates 
where price is greater than marginal cost. Thus in general the price will be 
higher if a firm behaves monopolistically rather than competitively. For 
this reasons, consumers will typically be worse off in an industry organized 
as a monopoly than in the one organized competitively (Varian 1996, pp. 
411–412). The outcome of monopoly pricing is a wealth transfer from 
consumers of a product to the seller. When the price raises and the 
monopolist is trying to maximize the profits, some consumers will not be 
able to afford the product anymore and will have to be excluded. 
Monopoly then leads to the classic case of the occurrence of dead weight 
losses: the part of the consumer surplus that the monopolist cannot correct, 
however consumers lose (Depoorter 1999, pp. 501–502). 
The second condition for the application of the EFD is an assessment of 
anticompetitive intent of the dominant incumbent. This view is widely 
applied in the US, where many courts have established that a refusal to 
deal, combined with anticompetitive animus, may help to asses finding of 
antitrust liability. This finding may occur without proving that a particular 
facility is indeed essential. For example, in Intergraph Corporation v. Intel 
Corporation (1999) the court stated that “a refusal to deal may raise 
antitrust concerns when the refusal is directed against competition and the 
purpose is to create, maintain, or enlarge a monopoly”. Anticompetitive 
intent to maintain monopoly is prohibited in the US antitrust law, but in the 
EU, intent is not an element of the Article 102, since EC competition law 
has a goal of preventing only the abuse of a dominant position when 
acquired regardless of any intent. To sum up the problem of 
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anticompetitive intent Article 102 opts for a simple dominance, while 
Section 2 sets a much stricter standard of monopolization or an attempt to 
monopolize (Stratakis 2006, pp. 434–435). 
The third requirement in the claim concerning the EFD is lack of a real 
or potential substitute for a product or service. If it is easy and cheap to 
substitute a facility, then it cannot be considered “necessary” or “essential”. 
For example, if the retailer gains profits outside a shopping mall, then the 
shopping mall owner does not possess monopoly power over real estate as 
well as over other services associated with retail shopping expediency 
(Lipsky and Sidak 1999, p. 1216). Additionally, it needs to be stressed that 
while it is true that an undertaking in possession of an “essential facility” is 
in a dominant position on any market for that facility it does not always 
work the other way round. The fact that a given facility is not “essential” or 
“indispensable” for an economic activity on some distinct market, within 
the meaning of the existing case law, does not mean that the owner of this 
facility might not be in a dominant position. As an example, we can take a 
network operator who can be in a dominant position despite the existence 
of alternative competing networks, if the size or importance of its network 
allows him to behave independently from other network operators (EC 
2002, p. 17). The presence of other corresponding facilities can also 
prevent the classification of one such facility as “essential.” For example, 
even if an access to a shopping mall is absolutely essential for the 
commercial success of the retailer, there is no guarantee that if access to 
the shopping mall is denied, retailer will not use other facilities with 
similar characteristics available to the retailer (Lipsky and Sidak, p. 1216). 
Fourthly, while applying the EFD, an assessment whether building a 
second facility makes sense from an economic point of view is highly 
required. The economic point of view includes “all parameters, such as the 
increase in market size created by the new facility and the possibility of 
sharing the facility with other competitors or other undertakings in other 
markets” (Evrard 2004, pp. 521–522).  
If the new entrant cannot recoup the costs of a new facility, access to 
the existing facility should be granted (Ibid., p. 522). However a duty to 
provide access to a facility should be imposed only where there is an 
undefeatable barrier to entry for competitors of the dominant company, or 
if without access, competitors would be subject to a serious, permanent, an 
unavoidable competitive handicap that would make their activities 
uneconomical (Lang 1994, p. 437; Turney 2005, pp. 189–190). 
Finally, the EFD should not be relevant in cases where, in order to 
include a new user, it is necessary to expand the capacity of the facility. 
This argument has never been justified; however, it might be one of the 
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ways to avoid judicial omission of economic decisions, which obviously 
cannot be made in the process of litigation. Without expansion of the 
undersized capacity, the access given to the new competitor will not 
improve the downstream equilibrium. Unless the courts will avoid 
imposing requirements, which promote entrance to undersized capacity, the 
EFD will be useless as means to improve consumer welfare (Lipsky and 
Sidak 1999, p. 1222). The division between cases where there is spare 
capacity and where there is none derives from the principle of 
proportionality, which is present both in economics and in the Community. 
Additionally, there is a problem with justifying refusal to access which 
occurs in two particular situations: first, where the capacity of the essential 
facility is not fully used; and second, where the capacity is unlimited by 
nature. In any case, when the owner of the essential facility or its 
associated company holds a strong or a dominant position in the 
downstream market, it may be much harder to argue for refusing the 
access. He can be ordered to scale down or reorganize the activities only in 
the case where it is estimated to bring a significant increase in competition. 
It is also crucial to analyse if the capacity owned by the dominant company 
is indeed fully utilized (OECD 1996, p. 98). 
 
 
4 Essential Facilities Doctrine v Refusal to Deal 
There is a thin line between the EFD and refusal to supply concept. Two 
examples below could be helpful in explaining the difference. Refusal to 
supply occurs in the following example, where a shipping company X 
integrates backwards and builds new port installations in a certain town A, 
located in the ”home” country. Given the location, using this port’s 
infrastructure gives firm X a great advantage in serving the maritime route 
from the home country to a certain other foreign country. Company Y now 
requests use of the port and firm X denies it. The essential facilities 
doctrine can be found in the second example, where firm Y complains to 
the competition authorities that it should also have access to town A’s port 
installations. Competition authorities decide that the owner of the input had 
engaged in an illegal practice and is obliged to make the facility available 
to competitors. In most of the cases the essential facility has characteristics 
of natural monopoly (Motta 2004, p. 67). 
The EFD is considered as a particular case of refusal to deal strategies 
enacted by a dominant firm, which is a ”bottleneck monopolist”. These 
strategies aim to exclude competitors from the market not only by refusal to 
deal but also by imposing conditions, such as pricing, tying etc., which in fact 
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constitute a barrier to entry for competitors (Castaldo and Nicita 2005, pp. 3–
4). The linkage between the essential EFD and the refusal to deal implies that 
there has to be a horizontal and not vertical relationship between the owner of 
the essential facility and the firm demanding access to it (Robinson 2001, p. 
29). Horizontal agreements, which are agreements between competitors, 
restrict and/or reduce competition and in most of the cases should be strictly 
prohibited. They are allowed only in some specific circumstances, e.g. co-
operative agreements in Research and Development. By contrast, vertical 
agreements – agreements between firms operating at different stages of the 
production process, e.g. manufacturer and a retailer – are usually efficiency 
enhancing and do not create problems to competition, unless they are 
undertaken by firms with considerable market power (Motta 2004, p. 32). 
 
 
5 Comparison of Application of Doctrine in the  
US and the EU 
In the United States the application of the EFD is based on Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, while in the European Union on the Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. Both provisions are concerned 
with the regulation of the market concentration. Similarly, under both 
regulations the possession of monopoly power or dominant position is 
unlawful. However, Article 102 is concerned with abuse of a dominant 
position, whereas Section 2 – with the matter in which an undertaking 
acquires, expands or maintains monopoly power. The similarities between 
American and European systems include the common purpose of 
promoting consumer welfare. Consumer welfare (surplus) is the aggregate 
measure of the surplus of all consumers. The surplus of a particular 
consumer is given by the consumer’s valuation for the good considered and 
the price, which effectively he has to pay for it (Motta 2004, p. 19). 
Consumer welfare is then promoted by eliminating exclusionary or 
anticompetitive behaviour. Nevertheless, competition law in the EU has an 
additional goal of promoting the integration of Member States’ markets 
and has been often concerned about the protection of competitors, in 
particular in early Article 102 cases. Despite the application of the 
“Chicago school” economic analysis to the European antitrust 
enforcement, there are still some remaining instances where protecting 
competitors may be within the scope of European competition law, under 
the cover of preserving the competitive structure of the market (Stratakis 
2006, p. 434). The difference between legal framework where the EFD is 
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applied has been stressed by many commentators, including Venit and 
Kallaugher (1994, pp. 315, 325), or Fine (2002, p. 457).  
In the US the essential facilities cases are exceptions to the general 
“Colgate defence” principle, which states that undertakings are under no 
obligation to deal. In the EU, firms holding a dominant position have a 
general duty to deal and the essential facilities doctrine is a specification of 
the application of this general duty (Ong 2005, pp. 215, 217). However, the 
most significant difference, which limits the application of the EFD in the 
US, is the approach to leveraging. “Leverage” denotes using 
anticompetitive practices to protect and reinforce the market power a firm 
has in one market or to extend it to other markets (Motta 2004, p. 362). The 
“Berkeley Photo Formula”, stated in Berkeley Photo, Inc. v Eastman 
Kodak Co. (1979) had an aim of dispensing the need to show an attempt to 
monopolize or actual monopolization in the second market. It was then 
attacked by the US government and buried by the Supreme Court, therefore 
leveraging is still relevant in the American cases, while in the EU 
competition law market power in the downstream market is irrelevant for 
the analysis of the essential facilities. 
On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean the highest courts do not plan to 
officially announce that the doctrine is vivid and can be fully applicable. In 
the US, the Supreme Court has never openly called the EFD by name. 
Therefore, the Court following its treatment of the doctrine had an 
opportunity to remote itself from the doctrine in the case of Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis v. Trinko, Llp (2004). The 
customary declaration of the doctrine was not announced in any of the three 
main decisions of the Supreme Court, but only in the Seventh Circuit’s MCI 
Communications Corporation v. AT&T (1983) opinion. It is clear that the 
Supreme Court does not favour the EFD, since in the same decision, MCI, it 
has established that companies do not have general duty to deal with rivals 
with whom they do not have a prior course of dealing. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court rejected the possibility of any involvement in the 
development of the doctrine, claiming that the EFD is a creation of lower 
courts (Trinko 2004, p. 410). The Court declined its application even when 
the doctrine would be applicable only when there are no means of access. 
Therefore, it seems that in the US the status of the doctrine is rather unstable, 
regardless of the problem of the application of the doctrine in the intellectual 
property rights area (Ibid.). In Europe, the EFD, which is also known as 
unilateral refusals to deal, has been in use for the last 30 years. The 
European Commission, the Court of First Instance, and the European Court 
of Justice have been implementing and applying the EFD, as well as have 
been the courts of the twenty seven Member States. 
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6 Where Should the Essential Facilities  
Doctrine Be Applied?  
The courts were trying to apply the doctrine in cases where the denial of 
access would be socially wasteful, harshly restrain innovation and 
competition and likely have effects that expand beyond harm to 
competition in the in-between affected market. Such a conclusion derives 
from the fact that key essential facilities cases have included networks 
and/or natural monopolies, which were providing necessities or were a part 
of society’s infrastructure (Lao 2009, p. 567). Networks and natural 
monopolies share some common features. For example, one hypothesis 
assumes that network effect may be a reason for natural monopoly. This is 
explained by the assumption that a firm trying to enter the market for a 
network good, needs to acquire first not only fixed costs of building a 
competing network, but the costs of persuading customers of the existing 
network to switch. This assumption does not take into account whether the 
existing firm faced declining average costs of production in building the 
existing network and it also omits the relative extent of switching costs to 
the variable costs of producing the competing network (Martin 2006, pp. 
26–27). However, natural monopolies and network effects differ in the way 
that in the case of natural monopoly we can observe scale economies of 
supply, which means that the marginal and average costs of production 
decline throughout the demand curve for particular market. On the 
contrary, in the case of network effects demand-side economies of scale 
can be found, which means that the shape of the demand curve is affected 
by existing demand. 
 
 
6.1 Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to  
Natural Monopolies 
The application of the EFD can be justified by the natural monopoly 
characteristics. Before exploring the connection between the EFD and 
natural monopoly a word about the phenomenon of natural monopoly itself 
should be mentioned. A “regular” monopoly occurs where marginal revenue 
(that is an additional income from selling one more unit of good) equals 
marginal cost (the cost of producing one more unit of good) and thus too 
little output is produced. Therefore, regulating monopoly by setting the price 
equal to marginal cost and expecting that profit maximization will fix the 
inefficiency may look like a perfect solution. Nevertheless, this analogy 
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misses an important aspect of the problem: it may be that the monopolist 
would make negative profits at such a price. This situation can be found in 
the presence of large fixed costs (the part of total cost which does not depend 
on the level of current production) and small marginal costs and it is referred 
to as a natural monopoly (Varian 1996, p. 416).  
Natural monopoly appears when the production technology is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale. In a productive process, 
average productivity is increasing with output. Therefore, increasing all 
inputs in the same proportion results in a more than proportional increase 
in output (Black, Hashimzade and Myles 2009, p. 219). Additionally, in 
natural monopoly situation a single firm can supply the complete market at 
declining average total cost of production (Depoorter 1999, p. 499, see 
below Figure 1.2).  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Illustration of natural monopoly 
 
The examples of natural monopoly include the area of public utilities, such 
as telephone industry, electricity and water supplies, because these 
industries are characterized by very high fixed costs. Fixed costs do not 
affect the profit-maximizing level of output in the short run, though in the 
longer run (a period long enough for the firm to adjust all its inputs to a 
change in conditions) a firm which cannot cover its fixed cost will become 
insolvent and exit (Black, Hashimzade and Myles 2009, p. 172). 
At the heart of natural monopoly lie the concepts of economies of scale 
and scope. Economies of scale are the factors which make it possible for 
larger organizations or countries to produce goods or services more cheaply 
than smaller ones. Economies of scope are the benefits arising from carrying 
on related activities. These are similar to economies of scale, but with 
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economies of scale cost savings arise from carrying out more of the same 
activity, whereas with economies of scope cost savings arise from carrying 
out related activities. Given the prevalence of multi-product firms, much of 
what normally referred to as economies of scale is in fact economies of 
scope. However, as noticed by Robinson (2001, p. 35) the theory of natural 
monopoly, as a static concept does not include dynamic conditions of the 
market and therefore, when we take into account technology or economic 
factors, economies of scale and scope may occur to be only temporary. 
Conditions are constantly changing, just like policy recommendations; 
therefore we have to accept the fact, that many markets, originally 
considered as natural monopolies, are no longer thought as such (Ibid.). 
There is a requirement that, in order to apply the EFD the facility in 
question needs to show natural monopoly characteristic, however it may be 
difficult to support. This is due to the conflict between the essential facilities 
principle of sharing and the traditional lesson of natural monopoly market. 
Although the conflict has been overlooked by most of the courts and 
commentators, there is one exception to that rule. Judge Posner, who has 
insistently attacked the EFD on specifically this ground (Blue Cross 1995, 
pp. 1412–1413), has claimed that the monopolist should not be obliged to 
share its monopoly profits by allowing access to its facilities to the 
competitors, because “antitrust laws are not designed to regulate natural 
monopoly –that is the business of regulators” (Ibid.). However, Posner stated 
that forced sharing of monopoly facilities with other firms in order to affect 
monopoly rents is unjustified. It should not be done as matter of antitrust or 
regulatory policy. In every case regarding facility, which is, naturally 
monopolistic we need to assess whether there is a legitimate competitive 
purpose beyond mere sharing rents. Moreover, it may be the case, however, 
according to Posner, only sometimes (Robinson 2001, p. 34).  
Nevertheless, in the situation of natural monopoly, where a single firm 
is able to supply the entire market at declining costs of production, the EFD 
can be a functional rule for identifying that rare case where competition is 
crucial and new entry needs to be promoted. Therefore, Martin (2006, pp. 
24–25) claims that natural monopolies should be exempted from antirust 
liability to some extent. This exemption would be justified on the grounds 
that monopoly helps opening new markets and it is socially wasteful to 
encourage new entry to such a market. The EFD may then efficiently 
protect socially beneficial enterprises operating in natural monopoly 
markets (Ibid.). 
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6.2  Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to  
 Network Industries 
The need to provide access may take place in modern networks for 
example in the case when a monopolist, who is in control of essential 
technical information, refuses to license that information to competitors, 
usually in secondary (or complementary) markets. Such behaviour deprives 
consumers of demand-side economies of scale, which are a common 
outcome of network and also exclude competitors who offer complements 
to the monopolist’s product and give no other choice to the consumers but 
to use monopolist’s complement. Lao (2009, p. 558) suggests that the 
essential facilities doctrine could be used in such a case as a sound basis for 
antitrust intervention. 
To begin with, the concepts of networks, network effects/externalities 
will be clarified. Networks are “composed of links that connect nodes” 
(Economides 1996, p. 674). To provide a typical service a certain amount 
of components of networks is needed. Therefore network components are 
complementary to each other (Ibid.). The existence of network leads to 
occurrence of network effects, which can arise directly and indirectly. 
Direct network effects are characterized by increasing utility which derives 
from increasing number of interconnections as a result of increasing 
number of users. Direct externalities occur in a physical, two-way 
communications network. For example, a purchase of a fax machine, 
directly benefits existing fax machine owners, since they now have an 
additional person with whom they may communicate (Page, Lopatka 1999, 
p. 954). In the case of indirect network effects, the value is increasing 
because there are more complements for the product, resulting from the 
increasing number of users. Indirect externalities can arise only when, as it 
usually happens, components are purchased at different times. For 
example, applications software programs are often purchased at various 
times over the useful life of a computer (Ibid., p. 955).  
There are differences in the terminology concerning network industries. 
In particular, depending on the scholar, there may be a distinction between 
the definition of “network effect” and “network externality”, but they can 
also be treated as one and the same phenomenon. For example, according 
to Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, p. 135) a “network effect” can be defined 
as “the circumstance in which the net value of an action (consuming a 
good, subscribing to telephone service) is affected by the number of agents 
taking equivalent actions”. Broadly defined network effects are 
omnipresent. However a term “network externality” is limited to 
characterize “a specific kind of network effects in which the equilibrium 
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exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation” 
(Ibid.). The definition of a “network externality” derives from the common 
perception of externality as an example of market failure (Ibid.). Katz and 
Shapiro (1994) have been supporting the distinction between network 
effects and network externalities, however only in theory. They disagree 
with Liebowitz and Margolis arguing that true network externalities are in 
practice much more common. Other scholars (Economides 1996, Klausner 
1995) apply the term “network externalities” to cover all network effects. 
The phenomenon of network effects, which are also known as “demand-
side economies of scale”, is the main characteristic of network industries. 
The examples of network industries include telecommunications, computers, 
Internet and they are based on network or have network-like properties 
(Economides 2006, p. 471). Industries, which are based on networks, 
provide the infrastructure or other necessities for the society and may 
include transportation systems (railroads, airlines, subways); banking and 
finance (ATMs and credit/debit card systems); news and entertainment 
(broadcasting and cable TV), basic public services (electricity generation 
and distribution), and others (Ibid.).  
The efficiency of networks comes from the fact that they are reflecting 
economies of scale on the demand-side. Therefore, the more users join the 
network, the greater benefits every user will receive. Nevertheless, as 
network externalities are based on complementarities, in order to realize 
positive effects we will need interoperability. Interoperability is essential in 
order to achieve the implementation of one common standard, which 
would allow components and complements work together (Lao 2009, p. 
561). Additionally, in the context of networks, analyzing practices and 
competition appears to be a difficult and delicate task. Where network 
externalities are present perfect competition is inefficient. This is because 
“the marginal social benefit of network expansion is larger than the 
benefits that accrue to a particular firm under perfect competition” 
(Economides 1996, p. 682). Perfect competition will grant a smaller 
network than it is socially optimal and in the case of high marginal costs 
perfect competition will not make the good available while it is socially 
optimal to provide it (Ibid.). What is more, in the context of networks 
below cost pricing must be accepted as unavoidable, also such practices as 
tying agreements or exclusive dealing restrictions may cause the expansion 
or strengthen the positive externalities from network participation and 
consequently is welfare enhancing rather than reducing. A similar problem 
may be found when we assess horizontal relationships among evident 
competitors. Collaboration among competitors may be a way to capture 
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network benefits or even a progress towards a larger and more beneficial 
network (Priest 2007, pp. 8–9). 
 
 
7 Where Should the Doctrine Not Be Applied? 
In certain circumstances it may be inappropriate to apply the EFD. These 
cases involve three particular situations. One of the circumstances is the 
lack of monopoly power. In such case, there is no basis for antitrust 
intervention of any kind. The standard for identification of an “essential 
facility” should be at least as strict as the standard for proof of monopoly 
power. The second circumstance involves the situation where the facility is 
not a single, indivisible unit, but a collection of potentially independent and 
viable competitive units. Such a facility should not be considered a 
candidate for mandatory sharing. Instead, the facility should be the subject 
of structural remedies, like divestiture, that restore competitive market 
conditions. There is no need for regulatory substitute for competition when 
a different and more direct remedy can be applied. The third, and probably 
the most important case is that the essential facilities should not be applied 
to intellectual property. It is argued that doing so may be against the basic 
idea of the legal systems that create incentives for the production of 
information and this would constitute a threat for the technical progress 
(Lipsky and Sidak 1999, p. 1220). The last of the presented cases where the 
doctrine should not be applied to, is, nevertheless, widely discussed and 
debated on; therefore it needs a detailed analysis, which is provided below. 
 
 
7.1 Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in  
the Area of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights (henceforth IPRs) are private property rights in 
ideas. They may take the form of copyright, where material such as books 
or music can be copied only with permission from the copyright owner, 
who can charge for this, or patents where processes or product designs can 
only be used with permission from the patentee, who can charge a licence 
fee. Such property rights originally rest with owner or inventors, or their 
employers, but can be bought, sold or inherited (Black, Hashimzade and 
Myles 2009, p. 234). IPRs are difficult to classify and therefore courts tend 
to completely reject antitrust liability when an accused monopolist has 
raised barriers to entry using valid IPRs. In the classic regime, competition 
law is designed to encourage new entry into existing markets by means of 
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punishing enterprises that raise barriers to entry. Outside the classic regime 
however, the EFD is protecting natural monopolies by making them offer 
access to their natural monopolies market to downstream competitors on 
level-headed terms. Intellectual property rights as barriers to entry 
promoted by government can be classified neither inside nor outside the 
classic regime (Martin 2006, pp. 32–33). 
The essential facilities doctrine and intellectual property rights share 
some common features, such as the fact that they both give exclusionary 
power to their owners, because of the lack of economically feasible 
substitutes (Aoki and Small 2004, p. 17). They also both entail significant 
capital investments to obtain; therefore their duplication may be socially 
wasteful. Once investment has been made, it is not possible to regain sunk 
costs and the essential facility, which has been built or technology that has 
been created, allowing access to others can bring only benefits. These 
benefits derive from reducing the dead weight loss. However, when these 
benefits are too great they may also have undesirable dynamic 
consequences, for example when the access price is too low. When 
duplication is not prohibitively expensive, a more market-orientated 
approach may lead to less harmful dynamic consequences (Ibid., pp. 17–
18). Nevertheless, there are some significant discrepancies between the 
essential facilities and IPRs, such as different reasons for the existence of 
market power. For example, one of the IPRs – patents includes in their 
nature the right to exclude others from applying the technology, while 
essential facilities market power may derive from their physical properties 
or from past decisions. Therefore, market power of the essential facilities is 
justified by the lack of a specific legal action to remove it, while market 
power linked to the intellectual property rights comes from the presence of 
specific legal protection (Ibid.). 
On one hand, the application of the doctrine to the areas of the IPRs can 
be based on the claims against patent and copyright owners and it has its 
roots in the assumption that the essential facilities doctrine can be applied 
only in the case of natural monopoly. The classic economic theories of 
intellectual property markets classify IPRs as the ones having large fixed 
costs and low variable costs, which are also the characteristics of natural 
monopolies. However, the existence of an IPR is neither necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of a natural monopoly and that is 
why in order to identify a natural monopoly of patent or copyright, in the 
application of the doctrine we first need to distinguish between the regular 
patents and copyrights and the ones which give their owners a natural 
monopoly power (Martin 2006, p. 33).  
  343
On the other hand, there are also arguments against the application of 
the EFD to the IPRs area. It may for example reduce firms’ incentives to 
invest in the development of such intellectual property. Apprehension 
concerning incentives is based on the presumption that protecting exclusive 
use is crucial in order to preserve the owner’s incentive to invest in 
innovation. This kind of problem occurs always when other enterprises are 
given the opportunity to free ride on the investment made by the 
competitor, and it makes no difference if the investment includes regular 
tangible assets or proprietary assets. Therefore, while we can assume that 
sharing of intellectual property should be forbidden, it is equally suitable to 
say there should be assumption against sharing any asset to which the firm 
has an exclusive property right (Robinson 2001, p. 31). When the 
investment in research and development of IPRs has been made, the owner 
should not be deprived of its right to it only because it creates a 
competitive advantage and needs to be classified as an abuse. If we start 
interpreting the essential facilities doctrine other way, it would weaken the 
core of an intellectual property right. Therefore, the “monopolist should be 
able to exploit its advantage to the maximum level the market will tolerate 
as a reward for its creativity and innovation” (Turney 2005, p. 190). 
However, overprotection of IPRs may result in less innovation. This may 
happen when the system overcompensates the innovator. In this case, such 
a protection may instead hamper innovation, because without access to 
crucial information, competitors are not able to progress. Such a situation 
would additionally diminish the chances of future innovators or potential 
innovators in the same field to or in adjacent markets to create new 
innovations (Lao 1999, p. 214).  
Another argument against the application of the EFD to the IPRs is that 
they cannot be used without disclosure or significant possibility of disclosure. 
Therefore, when a crucial output of the facility includes information or some 
other form of intellectual property it will not be a good candidate for 
application of the doctrine. If the crucial output would be revealed it can be 
easy misappropriated, and its value may be simply destroyed. In order to 
protect the incentives for creation of new knowledge, the legal system awards 
the creator or inventor with the ability to maintain the exclusivity of that 
knowledge, or the exclusivity of its use (Lipsky and Sidak 1999, p. 1219).  
Despite the number of arguments against the application of the EFD, 
current trends show that antitrust and intellectual property will appear 
together in larger number of cases. This unstoppable trend has to be taken 
into account by scholars, practicing lawyers, and judges, so that they would 
be able to come up with theoretical justifications for the common 
application of both doctrines. Pro-competitive theories of patent and 
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copyright law might be of great help in this case. To work on the right 
balance, each body of law should have doctrines and remedies that are 
flexible enough to accommodate that balance (Martin 2006, pp. 51–52). In 
the case where a compulsory license is granted, there is still a need to 
specify the terms of the contract. A holder of the intellectual property 
should be able to receive reasonable royalties, despite the fact that he is 
duty – bound to license the intellectual property. There is, however a 
question if such compulsory license should be based upon the expected 
monopoly profit or the market value (Turney 2005, p. 185). Nevertheless, 
in the case where the regulator is interested in ensuring that new derivative 
products are not barred from emerging, a license based on monopoly 
profits would enable competitors to penetrate the market without disturbing 
the right holder’s expected compensation. However, if the creation of 
identical conditions for competition is the main objective, a license based 
on market value is more suitable (Ibid., pp. 185–186). 
 
 
8 Conclusions 
The opponents of the essential facilities doctrine attack it on various 
grounds. Hovenkamp claims that it is troublesome, illogical and impossible 
to control. He states that the best solution is analysing the general refusal to 
deal doctrine by case-by-case approach. Hovenkamp characterizes the 
latest version of the doctrine as pointless. He also claims that due to 
compulsory sharing the courts need to spare some time for the setting of 
forms of access and have to function as administrative agencies 
(Hovenkamp 1999, p. 305). Similarly, Areeda recommends caution while 
imposing liability based on the EFD theory. A defence of the doctrine 
should be based on genuine business justifications. Areeda defines the 
concept of “essential facility” as “anything one has that another wants”, 
while “the essential facilities doctrine” is “less the doctrine than an epithet, 
indicating some exception to the right to keep one’s creations to oneself, 
but not telling us what those exceptions are” (Areeda 1990, p. 844).  
Many propagators of the EFD recommend competition authorities to 
apply the doctrine “cautiously and reasonably”, with “special care”. 
Improper application may damage the incentives of undertakings to start 
risky investments. If companies are discouraged to innovate it can 
potentially significantly reduce the dynamic efficiency of an industry 
(Walker 2006, p. 56). According to Ridyard, proper resolution of essential 
facilities case cannot be done without a price regulation on the monopoly 
facility. This price regulation has to be of a similar kind to that which is used 
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to control natural monopoly utility networks. A requirement to grant access 
without specifying the terms of access is not sufficient for solving the 
problem. Because such regulation may do more harm than good, it is argued 
that it should only be limited to cases where there has been an extreme and 
chronic collapse of the competitive process (Ridyard 2004, p. 673). 
Additionally, some scholars claim that allowing a monopolist to control a 
critical asset, which makes it possible for the monopolist to leverage his 
monopoly power in one market into adjacent markets by denying rivals in 
adjacent markets access to that critical asset, is considered a bad policy 
(Economides, Hebert 2008, pp. 462–463). Many commentators claim this 
rationale is unsound, because increasing competition through access cannot 
improve consumer welfare. This argument has its roots in “single monopoly 
profit theory”, which has been promoted by the so called “Chicago School”. 
The theory states that only a single monopoly profit can be made in the sale 
of a product and its complement. Therefore, when a monopolist in one 
market is not able to gain extra monopoly profits by dominating the 
complement as well, any attempt by the monopolist in the first market must 
have been undertaken for efficiency reasons. The argumentation leads to the 
situation where there is no need for antitrust intervention, because 
consumers are no worse off (Lao 2009, pp. 587–588). 
There is a controversy around the EFD, which is accompanied by 
significant changes in the popularity of doctrine, definition, and use by the 
courts and enforcement agencies as a basis for imposing antitrust liability. 
We can observe attempts to hamper or eliminate its use have become more 
evident. The doctrine is in the process of constant evaluation, which takes 
the form of creating groups or forum where the idea is being discussed. The 
EFD has been criticized by the academic scholars for years. In particular, 
those who wish that dominant firms could be protected from having to share 
their property under the rules of antitrust liability use the same language of 
private rights that is fuelling the same positions in hotly contested debates in 
intellectual property, telecommunications, and other fields (Waller and 
Frischmann 2008, p. 3). Without a doubt, the application of the EFD is one 
of the most difficult tasks for antitrust authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean. This is partly because there are no clear guidelines or legal 
rules, which would clearly define the situation in which the doctrine could 
be of use. The criteria for the application of the doctrine change, depending 
on legal system where the bottleneck problem arises in. Additionally, it is 
difficult to assess the limits of the doctrine and its relationship to other 
anticompetitive practices, such as tying or discriminatory pricing. 
Reasonable way to understand the doctrine is therefore to apply it on case-
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by-case basis, taking into consideration the concept of “efficiency”, which is 
obtaining the maximum output for given inputs. 
There are many more questions which could be asked in connection to 
the EFD and might be valuable as policy recommendations. These include 
the most important question if law should determine (or provide 
guidelines) what kinds of facilities may be essential in the nature. Would 
narrow interpretation be better in this respect? Another interesting issue 
concerns the regulation of the doctrine. Is ex post regulation, that is 
regulation of general competition law better than ex ante regulation 
provided by special law, such as for example telecommunications law? Or 
maybe it depends on the circumstances? Since the EFD is constantly 
developing, the number of questions connected to its application as well as 
the number of areas where it can be applied will be growing. 
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NATIONAL IP STRATEGIES –  
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN  
DEVELOPING THE IP SECTOR 
Mikko Huuskonen 
 
First of all, I shall begin with a disclaimer regarding the scientific nature of 
this presentation. During my professional activity related to creation of a 
national IPR strategy in Finland, I haven’t come across a book or even an 
article trying to create a coherent, scientific approach on the subject. There 
seems to be no studies on this international phenomenon. The intention of 
this article is to be an introduction to the area of national IPR strategies in 
order to raise awareness of the issue, and hopefully also create some 
scientific interest in the future. 
However, the lack of scientific studies also means that the topic may 
well be of interest from scientific perspective, as this information is new – 
actually in the making – and not yet analysed in a scientific manner. I shall 
cover some general points and then refer to the Finnish IPR-strategy as one 
example of such exercises. 
Some basic identification of the subject is in order first. Intellectual 
property includes patents, trademarks, copyrights, industrial designs, utility 
models, business names, domain names, geographical indications, and plant 
breeder’s rights. The scope may even contain protection of confidential 
information. Intellectual property rights are also referred to as immaterial 
property rights or IPRs (short for intellectual property rights).1 
Intellectual property rights are generated by creative activity, such as 
artistic expression, or scientific research and development. These rights are 
extensively exploited in commercial operations. The broader concept of 
intangible capital is often used to provide a broader-scale description of 
assets that cannot be reduced to possession of physical objects. It has been 
estimated that 75 per cent of company assets may be composed expressly of 
intangible assets.2 Intellectual property rights constitute a more and more 
central part of such company assets. 
In this area, new international activity has spun approximately during the 
past five to ten years. The relatively new phenomenon is the creation of 
“national IP (or IPR) strategies” which I shall define in the following manner: 
                                                 
1 ”IPR to efficient use!” p. 17., http://www.tem.fi/files/26944/TEM_27_2010_netti.pdf 
2 ibid. p. 27. 
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A national program to enhance competitiveness of the business 
sector by measures targeted to the effective protection and use of 
intellectual property, IP. 
 
WIPO’s web-pages offer a more fine-tuned definition3: 
 
An IP strategy is a set of measures formulated and implemented by a 
government to encourage and facilitate effective creation, 
development and management of intellectual property. It outlines 
how to develop infrastructures and capabilities to support inventors 
of IP to protect, develop and exploit their inventions. An IP strategy 
may also be defined as a comprehensive national document which 
outlines how all the policy developments and implementation take 
place in a coordinated manner within a national framework. 
 
During the past decade, the nations’ interest to develop a coherent approach 
towards intellectual property administration and legislation has been 
steadily rising. These countries are as diverse as China, Japan, Kroatia, the 
Netherlands, UK and Finland. World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) has information on the projects of 23 countries4 but there are likely 
to be many more by the end of 2010 because several countries – sometimes 
referred to as economies in transition – have plans to carry out the strategy 
exercise with the expertise of WIPO. The European Union has developed 
an Industrial Property Strategy in 2008 and plans to set up a broader 
Intellectual Property Strategy in the year 2010.5 In a more scientific trait, 
the OECD has during the recent years intensified research activities in the 
field and produced important studies on IP.6 
The subject of the matter is basically the intellectual property rights and 
legislation regarding them. Usually this is also complemented with an 
analysis of the actual behaviour of business companies, i.e. how these rights 
are used in developing sustainable competitive advantages. These measures 
may also include other forms of protection, like applying innovative 
business models that are difficult to copy, relying on non-disclosure 
                                                 
3 “What is an Intellectual Property Strategy”; http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/ 
strategies/national_ip_strategies.html#what 
4 http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/strategies/national_ip_strategies.html 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee,”An Industrial Property Strategy for Europe”, 
COM(2008) 465. In the Communication from the Commission “Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy”, COM(2009) 532 final, the commission makes several references to 
an “ambitious and comprehensive intellectual property strategy to be presented byt the next 
Commission” (p. 3). So far, however, there are no concrete measures in this direction. 
6 A comprehensive listing of OECD’s IPR-activities is included in the OECD 
compendium on IPR, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/61/34305040.pdf 
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agreements, or creating and sustaining a competitive advantage based on 
lead-time. 
IP can be understood in a very broad sense. In e.g. the international 
accounting standard IAS 38, IP or intangible assets is a very broad concept.7 
National IP strategies rarely apply so broad definitions, but are usually 
broader than IPR defined as legal rights. Sometimes these definitions alone 
do not reveal the nature of the exercise, but the content of the strategy is 
crucial in defining, whether we should see it as an IP or IPR strategy. 
 
 
Why an IP strategy? 
According to WIPO, an IP strategy is useful because it strengthens a 
nation’s ability to generate economically valuable IP assets. All nations 
have rich human capital, universities, research institutions and 
entrepreneurial businesses. The goal of IP strategy is to provide a plan over 
time whereby all national stakeholders can work together to create, own, 
and exploit research results, innovations, new technologies, and works of 
creativity.8 
Many countries have “innovation strategies”, like Finland, with broader 
target to enhance economic activity. Often the documents may have similar 
contents with IP or IPR strategies. IPR strategy may be part of, or 
supporting, the innovation strategy.9 
 
 
Main Features of IP strategies 
The strategies may apply different methodologies. Many things are 
however common with these projects: analysis of the law, main problem 
                                                 
7 IAS 38, pp. 1865–1870: An asset meets the identifiability criterion in the definition of 
intangible asset when it: 
a) is separable, i.e. is capable of being separated or divided from the entity and sold, 
transferred, licensed, rented or exchanged, either individually or together with a related 
contract, asset or liability, regardless of whether the entity intends to do so; or 
b) arises from contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights are 
transferable or separable from the entity or from other rights and obligations. 
An intangible asset shall be recognised if, and only if: 
a) it is probable that the expected future economic benefits that are attributable to the 
asset will flow to the entity; and 
b) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably  
8 ”National IP Strategies”, www.wipo.org 
9 Government’s Communication on Finland’s National Innovation Strategy to the 
Parliament, ttp://www.tem.fi/files/21010/National_Innovation_Strategy_March_2009.pdf 
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areas, analysis of the operators of the field (starting usually with the 
functions of the Intellectual Property or Patent Office), experiences of the 
business companies, and a (detailed) plan for action. The authorities that 
manage IP strategies vary from country to country. The strategy is often 
supervised by a high authority, in e.g. Japan the steering group is the 
government of the country with PM as the chairman of the IP strategy.10 
Private companies may apply IP strategies in their operations, but, 
needless to say, the scope of this paper is only on the public sector 
activities. IP strategies however may well require public-private –
partnerships and of course, since the intention of the exercise is to increase 
the opportunities and abilities of the private sector to utilize IP. 
The interest to create national IP strategies has spread globally. Since IP 
legislation is however organised by international conventions, largely 
managed by the WIPO, it seems that broad national deviations from the 
internationally agreed principles are not possible in the IP strategies.11 
Therefore, it is obvious that the intention of the strategies is very much 
focused also in the functional aspects, i.e. increasing the knowledge and 
abilities of individuals, public sector and especially the business companies 
to increase abilities to operate with IP and to understand the nature and 
opportunities of IP. Education and research of IP is usually a fundamental 
element of an IP strategy. 
When a country decides to carry out an IPR-strategy project, it is 
customary that the task in practice will be given to either the national patent 
– or IP-office. Sometimes the ministry in charge of IP issues may be the 
project leader, putting the project higher on the political agenda. 
The project usually contains three different phases: survey of the current 
situation, setting the targets, and implementation. 
First of all is the survey of the current situation, legal and economic.12 
The country may have specific features which require a solid understanding 
of the country’s economic basics. Apparent failures of the legal system 
have to be identified. It is common that nearly all countries in the world 
participate in different international agreements regarding IP’s. The 
evaluation of the web of international agreements and to which extent the 
                                                 
10 There are several net-sources available on Japan’s IP-strategy, e.g.  
http://www.ipr.go.jp/e_material/ipsj.pdf, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/020703taikou_e.html 
11 The Government’s Resolution on the Strategy Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 
26 March 2009, chapter “Background” p.2., 
 http://www.tem.fi/files/22788/vn_periaatepaatos_ipr_strategia_en.pdf 
12 In the case of Finland, ”IPR to efficient use!” is the report containing background ideas 
and conclusion. The document is complete with the text of the report and a set of 
company surveys and interwievs and an evaluation of the Finnish IPR-field in general. 
The complete document is only available in Finnish.  
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country is participating to them is an essential part of the groundwork for 
an IP strategy. It is also instrumental to build a total picture of the level of 
know-how in companies, universities and public authorities. Major 
shortcomings must of course be identified in the project. 
Secondly, the setting of targets follows.13 Some of the targets may be 
selected because the surveys point clear shortcomings. Sometimes this may 
be relatively easy but going forward to more future-oriented policy choices 
may prove difficult due to different views in society. Companies and 
individuals operating as right holders may see it of great importance to 
safeguard the protection of rights and leave all other activities to free markets 
to be decided. This may however be slightly illusory, as strong and rigid IP 
protection versus a more relaxed and flexible approach is also a choice of the 
legislator. A cynic might ask what else IP legislation is but constructing the 
market rules by the society rather than by the market: anyone demanding 
pure market rule should also require the abolishment of, say, copyright or 
patent protection. But this would clearly make not much sense. 
At the same token, as timid regime may appeal to some, going too far 
may result in the society experiencing IP-related unrest and political 
movement. If this leads to the formation of political movement laying their 
philosophical base on IP agenda, the legislator should look into the mirror 
to see if the political elite has missed something. Maybe the voice of the 
consumers is being forgotten, which may make it difficult create a 
sustainable and balanced regime for IP protection. This type of balance-
setting work in smaller details may be quite painstaking. 
The third phase is implementation.14 This part is as tedious work as the 
previous phase, but if the establishment is able to agree on the targets and 
allocate sufficient resources to the project, this helps implementation a great 
deal. Implementation must however be part of the planning process, as the 
target-setting might have lead to adapting targets without adequate 
resources. Without necessary resources the implementation may land flat. It 
is better to lay targets and plans that are compatible with goals and 
resources rather than try to “make a mountain out of a molehill”. 
 
 
                                                 
13 In the case of Finland, the target was set in the Government Resolution of 26th March 
2009 in the chapter ”Future prospects and targets status for 2015”. See footnote 11 above. 
14 The implementation phase has meant carrying out several studies in various areas: the 
evaluation of patent and register authority of Finland (carried out by consultancy Ramboll 
Ltd), open source –survey (by doctors Mikko Välimäki and Ville Oksanen), survey on 
unfair competition (by Eliisa Reenpää), national evaluation of the effects of the 
community patent (Prof Kalle Määttä), and a survey regarding the group exemptions for 
R&D in European union (Finnish Competition Authority). 
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Case Finland 
The Government's Resolution for a strategy concerning intellectual 
property rights (26th March 2009) was prepared at the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy (MEE) in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Education (ME). The decision on drawing up a strategy concerning 
intellectual property rights was part of the Government Programme of 
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Second Cabinet.  
The IPR strategy is a part of the process to strengthen national 
innovation policy. Special attention has been paid to the opportunities of 
SMEs and private inventors to utilise various forms of protection and thus 
improve the opportunities to commercialise their products. The strategy 
consists of measures based on the goals presented in the report drawn up in 
connection with the preparatory work.15  
 
 
Background  
The preparation was supervised by a steering group that published its report 
in January 2009.16 The steering group identified four key development 
trends which will have an impact on the importance of intellectual property 
– namely, globalisation, digitalisation and convergence, politicisation of 
intellectual property rights, and expansion of the scope of intellectual 
property rights. The steering group characterised these trends in the 
following way. 
Globalisation is present in the everyday activities of Finnish companies 
in the form of international operations implemented in accordance with 
international rules. Even relatively small Finnish enterprises operate at least 
in areas neighbouring Finland or even globally. In other words, knowing 
the international practices in relation to issues of intellectual property rights 
is an essential success factor for Finnish companies. Finland’s decreasing 
legislative freedom of action is also associated with globalisation. Finland 
has joined agreements on international trade and intellectual property rights 
and, as a member of the EU, is under an obligation to comply with the 
Community legislation. On the other hand, engagement in international 
systems has also opened doors to international trade.17 
                                                 
15 ‘IPR to efficient use! p.9. 
16 “IPR to Efficient Use!”. 
17 Government’s Resolution on 26th March 2009 p. 2. Explanatory summary: “IPR to 
Efficient Use!” pp. 11–12. 
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Digitalisation and convergence are internet –related trends. The 
development of information technology has brought versatile audiovisual 
production and distribution systems that are available to everyone. A 
private citizen may carry around a calculator, mail ability, banking and 
shopping services, a library (the Internet), games, radio, television, a 
camera, plenty of audiovisual content, and a positioning device, all in his or 
her mobile phone alone. Technological development has made copying and 
distribution of digital material in the information network practically free of 
technical cost.18 
The politicisation of intellectual property rights is evident in the fact 
that things that used to be remote to this field, such as health care, supply of 
medicines, or traditional cultural expressions (folklore), have been given a 
strong intellectual property rights dimension. For instance, today 
international negotiations address matters such as intellectual property 
rights related to pandemic influenza viruses.19 
The expansion of the scope of intellectual property rights, on the other 
hand, manifests itself particularly as an explosive increase in patent 
applications worldwide. The emerging economic powers of the Far East are 
using all their strength to enter this sector. Globally, there are 
approximately 3 million pending patent applications. The expansion also 
shows in that, while the field of intellectual property used to be 
distinctively about negotiations and agreements between companies, 
consumers today must face issues related to intellectual property rights 
more and more often. For instance, counterfeit products can be found in the 
arenas of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and design. 
Furthermore, with the Internet, copyrights have involved legislation 
affecting the behaviour of private citizens more directly than before, since 
the meaning of, for instance, communications content created by consumers 
has increased. Consequently, the consumer perspective has become 
emphasised in the field of intellectual property rights in recent years.20 
 
 
Future prospects and targets status for 2015  
The structure of the Finnish IPR strategy is based on the Steering group’s 
description of the anticipated key elements of Finnish social development 
within the next few years. The list represents a “best guess” of the experts 
of the scenario for the near future. The strategy in its entirety is a strategy 
                                                 
18 Government’s Resolution p. 2. “IPR to Efficient Use!” pp. 12–13. 
19 Government’s Resolution p. 2. “IPR to Efficient Use!” p. 14. 
20 Government’s Resolution p. 2. “IPR to Efficient Use!” pp. 14–15. 
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“suitable for a country like Finland”, as one Steering Group member 
pointed out. Therefore the international aspect is dominant, as Finland is a 
small home-market where companies have to develop skills for foreign 
trade already at relatively small company size:21  
 
 
“Future Prospects and Target Status for 2015 
The importance as well as the amount of innovation and creative 
work has increased. 
Open innovation and, for instance, the great importance of content 
produced by consumers challenge the system of intellectual property 
rights based on exclusive rights. 
Skills, knowledge, and their controlled distribution are significant 
competitive factors. 
Patents, trademarks, and model rights are mostly granted through 
international systems. 
Direct licensing of copyrights will increase. 
Competition and IPR viewpoints associated with standardisation 
have become more central. 
Legal collisions have increased. 
Regulation of intellectual property rights is developed primarily by 
the EU and the WIPO. More often than before, legal disputes 
concerning intellectual property rights are settled at supranational 
level. 
The exploitation of digital technology has become more versatile, 
progressing to new areas. 
Convergence has changed and integrated conventional branches of 
business. 
Cross-licensing and co-operation projects crossing national 
boundaries have increased. 
The use of intellectual property rights as a medium of exchange has 
become more common. 
The expansion of the number of patent and trademark applications is 
a challenge to the intellectual property rights system.”  
 
 
Target areas and action 
In the Government Resolution of 26th March 2009, the “Outlook for 2015” 
is then broken down to four areas of action, “skills”, “the efficiency and 
clarity of rights”, “competition policy and functionality of markets”, and 
“functional and economic efficiency of the system”. Here are some 
examples of the targets and actions in the Government Resolution. 
                                                 
21 Government’s Resolution pp. 2–3. ”IPR to Efficient Use!” largely similar, “Operating 
environment and Vision 2015”, pp.35–36  
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Skills 
According to the Government’s Resolution, success in both domestic and 
international markets requires versatile command of protection of 
intellectual assets. Intellectual property rights training should be given a 
higher priority in both legal and business-related education. Strategies 
based on open innovation require full understanding of intellectual property 
rights as well. The conditions for co-ordination and integration in the field 
of education need to be improved. As far as possible, the technical, 
economic, and legal knowledge should be made available within the 
framework of one single line of study.  
The exploitation of patent information is not sufficiently active. 
Addressing this would help avoid overlaps in research and development 
and speed up the generation of commercial applications.  
Measures include e.g. promoting teaching and research concerning 
intellectual property rights in collaboration with universities and polytechnics 
and promoting intellectual property rights training in researcher education in 
particular. Teachers are to be provided with an expanded foundation of 
knowledge and competence concerning intellectual property rights by 
producing and offering content services for teacher education. Education in 
exploitation of patent information will be increased.22 
 
 
The efficiency and clarity of the rights  
In order to be efficient – i.e., implemented in an efficient manner – property 
rights should be clear and correctly dimensioned. The development of an 
electronic marketplace and information society must be promoted by means 
of counselling and information.  
To achieve balanced final results, in legislation concerning intellectual 
property rights and in practical action, the status of the final user must be 
taken into account alongside that of the holder of the rights. This applies to 
both companies as commercial users and consumers as end users of products. 
The high standard and speed of court proceedings hold a central position. 
With a view to effective exploitation of intellectual property rights, high-
quality dispute settlement and court action are of great importance. High-
standard court action is also a prerequisite for the development and 
maintenance of competence related to intellectual property rights in Finland. 
The standard of court action must be competitive at the EU level. Alongside 
                                                 
22 Government’s Resolution chapter 1. Skills, pp. 4–6. Explanatory summary in “IPR to 
Efficient Use!”, “Expertise”, pp. 37–39 
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solid court handling, there must be functional and reflexive dispute 
settlement mechanisms that can provide agreement-type solutions.  
Measures include the establishment of an IP court and several studies 
targeting to legal reforms on copyright. Increasing information and 
counselling on what is allowed and what is not allowed in data networks 
will be offered, and clarifying the legislation, as necessary. The legal risks 
associated with licensing and exploitation of open-source software will be 
evaluated. The Ministry of Education shall prepare assessment methods and 
criteria related to the functioning of the copyright system.23 
 
 
Competition policy and functionality of markets based on  
intellectual property rights 
In the view of the Government, both the competition rules and legislation 
concerning intellectual property rights aim at ensuring efficient operation of 
the markets and effective exploitation of innovations. For Finland, whose 
competitiveness and national well-being are critically dependent on the 
country’s ability to produce new innovations and exploit them to the 
maximum, the meaning of open and well-functioning national and 
international markets is especially important. Market bottlenecks and 
obstacles to technological development should be actively cleared. 
Use of intellectual property rights as company assets should be 
promoted by increasing information about the opportunities associated with 
intellectual property rights – in particular, issues related to valuation of 
intellectual property rights. The use of intellectual property as collateral is 
important in terms of financing opportunities for companies in the field. 
Measures include monitoring the European Community Block 
Exemption Regulations, linking the issues concerning intellectual property 
rights with the performance negotiations of the Finnish Competition 
Authority and e.g. assessing the licensing practices of copyright 
organisations from the standpoint of competition policy, and issues of IPR 
in public databases. Ministry of Employment and the Economy is in charge 
of surveying the economic information tools regarding IPR’s and also IPR 
questions related to standardisation.24 
 
                                                 
23 Government’s Resolution chapter 2, ”The Efficiency and Clarity of the Rights”, pp. 6–
7. Explanatory summary in “IPR to Efficient Use”, pp. 40–41.  
24 Government’s Resolution chapter 3, ”Competition Policy and Functionality of Markets 
Based on Intellectual Property”, pp. 7–8. Explanatory summary in “IPR to Efficient Use”, 
pp. 41–42. 
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Functional and economic efficiency of the system  
According to the Resolution, the intellectual property rights system should 
be co-ordinated in an efficient manner at a high political level, in order to 
ensure that state operations in the arena of intellectual property rights 
remain systematic and in compliance with the targets set. The status of the 
National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland as a high-standard 
authority responsible for intellectual property rights should be developed. 
The public actors in financing and counselling roles should operate 
openly in an efficient and uniform manner in order to promote the 
development of intellectual property rights competence in practical 
business operations. 
Measures include an assessment of the operation of the National Board of 
Patents and Registration of Finland is implemented in 2009, evaluating the 
development of the authority’s operations, the development needs of 
intellectual property administration, and the authority’s role as part of the 
Finnish innovation system. The problem areas related to intellectual property 
rights of universities and polytechnics and public research organisations will 
be mapped (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy) in terms of: IPR in co-operation between research and industry. 
The way in which the efficiency of counselling concerning intellectual 
property rights could be increased will be explored.25 
In addition to these areas of activity, there are some action points 
defined in the international fora and internal activities regarding the 
management of the strategy etc.  
The Finnish case is by far not the best or broadest exercise carried out in 
the world, to the contrary, but it reflects a practical approach which was 
well put by a steering group member: a strategy suitable for a country like 
Finland. Something like this will quite certainly emerge in the next years 
around the globe as countries of all sizes and importance start to pay 
attention to this problem area and seek action. What will be the legal, 
political and economic consequences remains for us to see, but judging 
from first experiences in several countries, organised improvement of the 
IP sector may well have a positive input in the development of the 
countries’ business environment. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Government’s Resolution chapter 4 ”Functional and Economic Efficiency of the 
System”, pp. 8–11. Explanatory summary in “IPR to Efficient Use”, pp. 43–45. 
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Final Remarks 
“Belief is nearly the whole of the Universe, whether based on truth 
or not.” (Kurt Vonnegut, Bluebeard, p. 144) 
 
I shall end this article with a more theoretical note. As a devoted follower 
of the institutional theory of law I share the view that institutional facts are 
based on the mutual beliefs in society. It is therefore basically these mutual 
beliefs that also guide legal development.26 
It looks like the international community is starting to get convinced 
that getting IP high on political agenda makes sense and is supporting 
businesses pursuing their goals. How is this going to affect international 
business on a broader sense will only be seen after maybe ten years. It is 
difficult to form an opinion yet on whether this development is entirely 
beneficial or are there negative side-effects such as the expansion of global 
patenting activity. 
Good or bad, the phenomenon is evidently there. This development may 
in the long run change the view we have on businesses. The traditional 
manufacturing of physical goods remains necessary but in parallel to this 
activity the fortress of intangible assets is being built. It stands on the ground 
of international treaties and solid contractual practices, but also in the will of 
governments not engage themselves in protectionist behaviour that could 
effectively harm the international system of IP. How strong this fortress is 
going to be in the fluctuations of the economy remains to be seen. 
If the “National IP Strategy” -approach helps developing countries and 
also countries in economic transition to get their economic infrastructures 
develop faster, we might expect gradual positive development and maybe 
even some changes in the international organisation of economy. Peaceful 
development of these countries may well bring about a promise of great 
economic potential and development also in the IP area.  
IP strategy is by far not the only factor in any nation’s way forward but 
surely efforts in having the IP sector under solid administration and policy 
with clear targets will improve their development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 On this trait of legal philosophy see Eerik Lagerspetz ”The Opposite Mirrors; An Essay 
on the Conventional Theory of Institutions”. Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995. 
Application of the theory to IPR, Mikko Huuskonen: “Copyright, Mass Use and 
Exclusivity”, University of Helsinki 2006, pp.28–30.  
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